所有权与自然垄断产业规制——组合模式及选择

对于自然垄断产业采用何种所有权结构的规制模式,在理论研究与实践操作中都存在着多样化的选择。本文主要比较分析了民营外生规制、国有内生规制和混合所有权规制三种不同组合模式,并认为混合所有权规制模式较好地兼容了其他模式的优点,可以成为自然垄断产业改革与治理进程中的一个可取路径。欧盟国家自然垄断产业的改革经验,从实践上证明了混合所有权规制模式的可行性,尽管其也存在一定的局限性。同时,本文认为对于转型改革时期的中国,针对自然垄断行业的国有企业,可以考虑采用混合所有权规制模式的改革路径,通过股权开放的形式放松民营资本进入自然垄断产业的行业管制,并有效、平稳地建立起自然垄断产业规制体系。     

中国垄断性生产业管制机构的改革--以中国电信产业管制机构为例

管制机构对垄断性产业的经济效率具有重要影响.本文将分析中国垄断性产业现行管制机构存在的主要问题,具有独立性的管制机构的优越性,讨论美国和英国等经济发达国家管制机构的特点,最后探讨中国垄断性产业管制机构的设立与规范问题.     

Eine Konzeption zum Regulierungsmanagement im Kontext der Anreizregulierung

Strategic decisions of network operators are directly and indirectly affected by the current regulatory environment. Representing an important political and legal influence factor, the regulatory environment must be taken into account in the strategic decision-making process. Dealing with this factor is essential for an unbundled network operator, who’s main source of income is its grid access fee. Therefore, a comprehensive evaluation of the regulatory environment is indispensable for the success of network operators. This task should be handled by a department for regulatory management. However, as regulatory management is not clearly defined in business research, the present article intends to close this gap and develop a design for implementing a department for regulatory management. Our findings contribute to a better understanding of managerial behaviour under regulatory constraints. As part of our design, environmental analysis serves as an example to point out the specific challenges in regulated markets.     

规制定价机制的激励强度权衡与模型设计--以我国电信产业的规制定价总体模型设计为例

自然垄断产业中，由于规制机构与被规制企业之间存在着信息不对称。价格规制政策的实施效果受到制约，而制度背景和经济发展程度是设计一个适合国情的规制定价机制必须考虑的前提因素。本文分析了我国目前的制度特征如何影响我国自然垄断产业规制定价机制激励强度的权衡。在此基础上，尝试提出适合我国目前制度特征的电信产业规制定价总体模型——基于收益率规制并加入动态激励因素的规制定价模型．最后对未来的规制定价机制做出展望．     

Politically induced regulatory risk and independent regulatory agencies

Uncertainty in election outcomes generates politically induced regulatory risk. For monopoly regulation, political parties’ risk attitudes towards such risk depend on a fluctuation effect that hurts both parties and an output–expansion effect that benefits at least one party. Irrespective of the parties’ risk attitudes, political parties have incentives to negotiate away regulatory risk by pre-electoral bargaining. Pareto-efficient bargaining outcomes fully eliminate regulatory risk and are attainable through institutionalizing independent regulatory agencies with a specific objective. Key aspects of the regulatory overhaul of the US Postal system in 1970 are argued to be consistent with these results.     

Endogenous Regulatory Constraints and the Emergence of Hybrid Regulation

Models of public utility regulation are often framed, alternatively, as rate-of-return or price-cap regulation. In practice, however, regulators have increasingly adopted a variety of hybrid regulatory constraints that embody elements of both these, and other, regulatory forms. In this paper, we draw upon elements of both the positive economic theory of regulation and standard efficiency-based economic analysis of regulation to develop a model that endogenously yields hybrid regulatory constraints as a regulatory optimum. In this context, the paper further demonstrates that a commonly observed side payment–profit sharing–enhances regulator welfare. The results provide a plausible basis for understanding the pattern of modern regulatory constraints.     

Limitations on the growth of computer-communication services

The author examines current and potential limitations to the growth of computer communications in the USA in relation to user learning costs; regulatory restrictions on rate of return and regulatory policy concerning depreciation allowances; the structure of computer-communication networks; and regulatory limitations on the provision of services.     

The proceduralization of telecommunications law

The trend towards ever more technical regulatory regimes associated with the reform of telecommunicaitons provision and regulation in the industrialised countries appears to be reversing itself, as changes across a number of jurisdictions occur which may be loosely characterized as a process of proceduralization. These changes have three facets: a shift towards more general regulatory norms; greater emphasis on procedural, as opposed to substantive, regulatory rules; and greater reliance on regulatory institutions of a general rather than sector-specific character. Explanations are offered not simply by reference to the external pressures, but also the adapation of the legal system itself.     

A CDS approach to induce facilities-based competition over NGA networks

The current regulatory framework in the European NGA market provides the basic principles for the gradual migration from service-based competition over the legacy copper access networks to facilities-based competition over fiber-based Next Generation Access (NGA) networks. This paper initially reviews the related literature and shows that: (i) an unbundling policy that boosts entry by alternative operators promotes service-based competition but provides operators with disincentives to invest in network upgrade; (ii) there is no consensus about the optimal regulatory policy that promotes competition and encourages investments in NGA networks; and (iii) the reviewed research articles are not consistent with the current regulatory framework in the European NGA market in terms of both the evolution of the regulatory goals over time and the recommended regulatory settings. This paper aims to propose a novel approach in order to effectively meet the current regulatory goals using the recommended settings. It is shown that the proposed approach, which is based on the basic principles governing a Credit Default Swap (CDS), provides an effective migration path towards facilities-based competition over NGA networks.     

The option to expand to a next generation access network infrastructure and the role of regulation in a discrete time setting: A real options approach

Serious concerns have been raised, especially across Europe, about the role of regulation in network infrastructure investments. More specifically, the installation of optical fiber closer to customer premises, the so-called next generation access networks, requires massive investments in the face of demand and regulatory uncertainty. The purpose of this paper is to assess whether specific regulatory scenarios (permanent regulation, regulatory forbearance, regulatory holidays and sunset clauses) alter the timing of the investment decision of an incumbent to expand to a new network infrastructure exploiting the binomial lattice approach from real options analysis.     

Institutional endowment as foundation for regulatory performance and regime transitions: the role of the US constitution in telecommunications regulation in the United States

Recent research demonstrates the importance of what Spiller and Levy (1994, 1996) call a nation's institutional endowment to the efficacy of regulatory policies. We examine various roles of the US Constitution as an enabler of regulatory governance institutions that shape policies towards telecommunications industries, and constrain efforts to change those policies. Constitutional clauses designed to serve important noneconomic societal goals do so by limiting the discretion and efficacy of government bodies. This limits the extent to which regulatory policies may be used to promote economic efficiency. However, these constitutional constraints may also promote long-term efficiency goals by making regulatory commitments more credible.     

Towards next generation regulation

The rapid convergence taking place between broadcasting, content and communication technologies, services and markets requires an urgent review of existing regulatory frameworks. The central question is not how to regulate convergence, but how regulation should (and must) change in the face of convergence. Although, convergence is a continuing process, the main trends are already discernible. Steps need to be taken now to clear the path of regulatory obstacles in order to facilitate convergence and delivery of its promised benefits. The risks in waiting too long are significant. This paper explores the regulatory reform required in the transition to the ‘next-generation’ regulatory frameworks needed as convergence progresses and competitive markets become increasingly necessary.     

Testing theories of regulatory behavior

Many decisions by regulators have been analyzed over the last two decades in an effort to test regulatory behavioral theories. As a result, the interest group theory of behavior has gained a considerable following and the public interest theory has been largely dismissed. However, many of these tests are inadequate; with the regulatory decisions analyzed, both the interest group and public interest theories lead to the same predictions. To properly distinguish between these theories, a set of necessary conditions that a regulatory decision must satisfy is developed. Based on these conditions and the extant empirical literature, public interest concerns of regulators cannot be dismissed, and a more general theory of regulatory behavior is suggested.     

A dynamic policy license for flexible spectrum management

Electromagnetic spectrum for wireless communications is fully allocated by regulatory authorities, but this does not mean that it is fully utilized. Demand for greater capacity and new services requires new regulatory and technical models for spectrum sharing. This paper develops a regulatory model denoted the dynamic policy license. The dynamic policy license combines the assurances to licensees that come from holding a fixed license while maintaining regulatory flexibility. A dynamic policy license is similar to a traditional spectrum license that specifies a bandwidth, power, center frequency, location, and other parameters. However, one or more of these parameters is subject to change by the regulator over time. The allowed changes are restricted by the license to provide assurances and predictability to the licensee. The opportunities and challenges that this presents to both regulators and licensees is described. For instance, the dynamic policy license can be a regulatory tool for more aggressive spectrum sharing.     

大部制背景下垄断性产业的管制机构改革——以中国电力管制机构改革为例

在新一轮的政府机构改革中推行大部门体制,这需要探讨与此相关的垄断性产业管制机构改革问题。本文以中国能源产业大部制改革为背景,并以电力产业为例,讨论政府行政部与垄断性产业管制机构的区别与联系;在能源产业大部制过渡时期,现行电力管制机构的定位问题;在能源产业最终实现大部制后,电力管制机构将采取的理论模式及其特征;最后,本文对电力管制机构的动态发展趋势作了预期分析。     

Moving beyond dichotomy: Comparing composite telecommunications regulatory governance indices

Despite an apparent consensus about the importance of the quality of telecommunications regulatory agencies, there is no agreement among researchers about how to measure it. While dichotomous coding of de jure independence has served as a proxy to measure whether an agency's regulatory governance is transparent, non-arbitrary, and free from political influence, we view measuring multiple components of regulatory governance including incorporating measures of regulatory independence into a composite index as providing a more nuanced understanding of facilitating or inhibiting factors. This paper compares composite telecommunications regulatory independence indices and regulatory governance indices available in the literature in order to construct more parsimonious indices. Using a methodology labeled “qualitative meta-synthesis” based on synthesizing previously published indices, we construct six different indices using combinations of 32 different variables, and different weights. Data from the OECD database are used to re-create the five original indices from the literature as well as our own six composites. Some of these indices (original and composites) were found to be negatively correlated with independent measures of regulatory governance such as the World Bank's Government Effectiveness Index and the Rule of Law Index; this may be attributable to the fact that countries, and especially those with poor overall governance standards, may need to put in place stronger telecommunications governance institutions in order to attract telecommunications investment to the country. The analysis suggests that a parsimonious index of as few as seven variables is capable of measuring the quality of telecommunications governance in a country, at the same time making the selection of variables and their weighting in the index more systematic than in previously available indices.     

Regulation and transaction costs in telecommunications: A research agenda

Antitrust and regulatory policies influence the vertical and horizontal integration of firms and the characteristics of their contractual arrangements. This paper examines the relevance of transaction cost economics for the analysis of regulatory policy in telecommunications. It explores the impact of changes in national telecommunications regulation on the level of transaction costs. After building a new theoretical framework based upon previous transaction cost contributions, the paper sets out a research agenda concerning the importance of transaction costs for antitrust and regulatory policies.     

Institutional variety in communications regulation. Classification scheme and empirical evidence from Austria

In recent decades, major regulatory reforms have changed the role of the state in the liberalised and convergent communications sectors of developed economies worldwide. The central characteristics of this transformed statehood in communications are, inter alia, a rising importance of independent national regulatory agencies (NRAs) and a growing reliance on alternative modes of regulation, i.e. self- and co-regulation. While the advent and activities of NRAs are often analysed in current literature, the institutional variety and regulatory contributions of private actors through self- and co-regulation are largely neglected. This article contributes to closing this research gap. A newly developed classification scheme of regulatory modes makes it possible to grasp the numerous and often intertwined contributions of both state and private actors. Furthermore, a case study of Austrian regulatory institutions active in the convergent communications sector demonstrates the potential of this new analytical tool and provides an in-depth analysis of various kinds of self- and co-regulation, which have substantially increased in communications regulation in Austria in the past decade.     

Regulierung, Effizienz und das Anreizdilemma bei Investitionen in intelligente Netze

In this paper, we survey from a theoretical point of view to what extend cost-based and incentive-based regulatory regimes stimulate investments. For the purpose of this analysis, we furthermore differentiate by different efficiency measures, i.e. allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency and analyse to what extend each efficiency measure is stimulated by the regulatory regime. Eventually, we analyse to what extend regulatory incentives for network innovation in a smart grid context exist and to what extend different forms of regulation stimulate dynamic efficiency.     

A comparative analysis of net neutrality: Insights gained by juxtaposing the U.S. and Korea

This study compares and contrasts the U.S. and Korea in the context of network neutrality, focusing on debates among stakeholders and regulatory approaches. Similarities and differences are highlighted by comparisons within the broadband ecosystem framework: government functions, histories, people׳s perceptions, regulatory approaches, legislative initiatives, and implementation. In Korea, a regulatory framework with suggested guidelines exists, and it can be used to address net neutrality in a case-by-case fashion. The U.S. follows a regulatory approach by creating enforceable non-discrimination rules. The findings in this study suggest that the issue is not only complicated because it is embedded contextually, but also because the respective parties׳ diverse interests are multifaceted and vague. It is concluded, therefore, that a coherent and consistent approach is an effective way to govern neutrality.