The Impact of a Multiple Listing Service

This article offers a theoretical investigation of the impact of a multiple listing service (MLS) and its optimal size. We study a principal‐agent model of real estate brokerage with multiple agents, where the entry of new agents imposes externalities on the other agents. We solve simultaneously for the equilibrium and socially efficient levels of agents’ effort choices, the size of the MLS and the commission rate. Introducing an MLS reduces the number of agents, increases agents’ effort levels and improves total surplus. Current commission rates of 5–7% appear much higher than the competitive commission rate, leading to too many agents, too much effort by agents and a lower overall surplus. We also find that giving a greater portion of the commission to the selling agent increases effort levels, reduces the number of agents and improves total surplus.     

Housing Market Conditions, Listing Choice and MLS Market Share

In some housing markets, a seller may hire a broker to multiple list or exclusively list a property for sale or may bypass the brokerage industry and list the property privately as a "sale by owner." This article introduces a new model that illustrates the factors which will impact on the broker's and seller's preferred type of listing. An implication of the model is that if the choice is available, sellers and real estate brokers will employ a multiple listing service more often during slower market periods where the volume of sales is low and properties are more difficult to sell. An empirical analysis of Vancouver data yields results consistent with these arguments.     

Information Costs and the Organization of the Real Estate Brokerage Industry in the U.S. and Great Britain

This paper examines the differing organizations of the residential real estate brokerage industry in the U.S. and Great Britain, and argues that they may be interpreted as alternative solutions to a common set of informational problems. Of particular interest is why the multiple listing service — an arrangement whereby brokers share market information in an effort to exploit the public-good nature of information — is so pervasive in the United States, but is largely absent in Great Britain. Some possible reasons are found in the differing histories of the parent housing markets, as well as other institutional differences.     

Costs and Pricing of Home Brokerage Services

This paper explores a simple economic search model, and various brokerage cost assumptions, to derive brokerage pricing implications for three dimensions of the home transaction: (1) level of home price, (2) new relative to existing home sales, and (3) co-op relative to non-co-op sales. The model incorporates time-on-market (the price-time tradeoff) as an important element in home brokerage (search)
It is argued that relative search cost differences imply that commission rates will be lower (1) on sales of higher-priced homes, (2) on sales of new relative to existing homes and (3) on non-co-op relative to co-op sales. A main contribution of the paper is the presentation of considerable supporting evidence showing variation in actual home brokerage commission rates according to these three variables.     

The Housing Market and Real Estate Brokers

The major development in this paper concerns the failure, in earlier studies, to consider interaction between alternative methods of arranging sales in the housing market. A seller may market a house by direct negotiations with buyers, without the intermediation of real estate brokers, or by listing the house with a broker. A rational seller would choose the option which offers the higher expected return on the house. In a sequence of models we argue that the seller's option of a method of sale induces competitive pressure in the choice of the commission rate by the broker. We also consider the split rate in a multiple listing system, ease of entry of brokers and the cartel hypothesis as applied to brokers. We conclude that the competitive pressure of direct negotiations between sellers and buyers, relative free entry of brokers and the inappropri-ateness of the cartel hypothesis cast serious doubt about a general consensus of opinion that the brokerage system is characterized by price fixing, excessive commissions and excessive marketing costs.     

A Simple Search and Bargaining Model of Real Estate Markets

This paper examines the impact of brokers on buyers' and sellers' search behavior and on the transaction prices in real estate markets. It is shown that the seller and the buyer search less intensively if the house is listed with a broker. The seller gets a higher price when he employs a broker, but the increase in price is smaller than the commission fee. More specifically, the portion of the commission covered by the increase in price is directly related to the bargaining powers of the buyer and the seller. In the special case where the price is determined according to the Nash bargaining solution, the increase in price is shown to be half of the commission fee. It is also shown that an increase in the commission rate increases the equilibrium price but decreases the equilibrium search intensities.     

The Multiple Listing Service, Commission Splits, and Broker Effort

This paper examines the impact of split commissions on broker effort in MLS sales. The joint effort of brokers to find a buyer for a given listing is maximized when the broker who locates a buyer first receives the entire commission. In contrast, splitting the commission between the listing and finding broker (when they differ) maximizes the joint profits of brokers. When competition among brokers to acquire listings is considered, however, the split brokers most prefer entails a smaller (though still positive) share for the listing broker in order to reduce wasteful competition for listings. While sellers still prefer to pay only the broker who finds a buyer, brokers may not be willing to acquire and share listings under such an arrangement.     

Real Estate Brokers, Nonprice Competition and the Housing Market

Given a fixed commission rate and easy entry, economic profits must be competed away on some nonprice margin in the real estate brokerage market. This paper focuses on nonprice competition in the level or quality of services offered buyers and sellers in the market, examining the equilibrium adjustment process, comparative static predictions and efficiency implications. In contrast with earlier studies focusing on wasteful advertising, this paper demonstrates that higher commission rates can either increase or decrease deadweight loss, depending upon how broker services affect buyer and seller transaction costs.     

Advertising and Natural Vacancies in Rental Housing Markets

We formulate a model that explains vacancy durations arising from lags in matches between the suppliers and demanders of housing units. We emphasize rental housing markets in this exposition although the model could be extended to competitive or noncompetitive rental or home-ownership markets. In the case of rental markets, if tenants do not immediately inform landlords upon initiating search for a new unit, landlords are delayed in their search for a new tenant. These matching delays induce a positive natural vacancy rate that cannot be reduced to zero, even in competitive markets. Price-taking landlords are, however, able to affect the resulting vacancy duration through advertising in a Cournot-Nash equilibrium and will, in general, invest in inefficient levels of advertising. As a consequence, there may be a role for public policy to provide incentives that would induce noncooperative landlords to choose the vacancy cost-minimizing advertising solution.     

Are Brokers' Commission Rates on Home Sales Too High? A Conceptual Analysis

Many people in North America believe that prevailing commission rates for residential real estate brokers are too high, even though such beliefs are not based on a formal model. This paper presents a general equilibrium model of the housing market in which real estate brokers serve as matching intermediaries. We use this model to construct an illustrative example which is calibrated using data consistent with a typical housing market. The example suggests that the commission rate which maximizes aggregate efficiency is considerably below the prevailing rate. Moreover, this finding appears to be robust to changes in the matching process.     

Referrals in search markets

This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes in search markets with and without referrals. Although it seems clear that consumers would benefit from referrals, it is not at all clear whether firms would unilaterally provide information about competing offers since such information could encourage consumers to purchase the product elsewhere. In a model of a horizontally differentiated product market with sequential consumer search, we show that valuable referrals can arise in the equilibrium: a firm will give referrals to consumers whose ideal product is sufficiently far away from the firm's offering. We allow firms to price-discriminate among consumers, and consumers to misrepresent their tastes. We found that the equilibrium profits tend to be higher in markets with referrals than in markets without. Consumers tend to be better off in the presence of referrals when search costs are not too low, and under a certain parameter range, referrals lead to a Pareto improvement.     

The Effects of Charm Listing Prices on House Transaction Prices

As is the case for many different goods and services, it is common practice in many real estate markets for sellers to offer properties for sale at listing prices just below some round number price ( e.g. , $99,900 instead of $100,000). The academic marketing literature refers to this practice as "charm" pricing and suggests that this strategy is an attempt by sellers to take advantage of buyers' cognitive processes in which charm prices affect buyers' perceptions about the seller or the item being offered for sale. Although numerous papers in the housing economics literature have addressed the impact of the magnitude of listing price on observed house transaction prices, no prior published study has considered the impact of the design of listing prices in housing markets. This paper presents an empirical investigation of the effects of charm pricing on house transaction prices using sample data. The results provide some evidence that houses listed at certain charm prices sell for significantly greater transaction prices than those listed at round number prices.     

The Principal-Agent Relationship in Real Estate Brokerage Services

This article investigates the principal-agent relationship between the owner of a house and her real estate broker. The principal's (owner's) problem is to design a contract that induces the agent (broker) to adopt a selling strategy that maximizes the owner's expected return. A sequential search model is utilized to analyze this principal-agent relationship. Three different systems for paying the broker are considered: fixed-percentage commission, flat-fee, and consignment. Both the discount factors of the owner and the broker and the net costs of ownership incurred while attempting to sell the house play a central role in determining the nature of the optimal contract. The analysis demonstrates that the fixed-percentage commission system is the only one of the three systems considered that can induce a first-best, incentive-compatible contract. A numerical analysis provides insights regarding the effect of the fixed-percentage commission system on competition in the real estate brokerage industry.     

Creative Financing and House Prices: A Theoretical Inquiry into the Capitalization Issue

Since buyers offer a premium for access to creative financing (CF), creatively-financed houses will sell for more than otherwise identical houses purchased with standard financing. A commonly suggested method for adjusting house values to eliminate the effects of CF is the "cash equivalence" method, where the CF premium is assumed to equal the present value of savings from CF. This paper shows that in a world with active housing speculators, the cash equivalence approach gives the right answer: In an "arbitrage" equilibrium, house values must differ by exactly the present value of CF savings. Further analysis shows that when capital markets are perfect, each consumer is indifferent between CF and standard financing when arbitrage equilibrium obtains. Without perfect capital markets, however, consumers will strictly prefer one financing mode or the other.     

Market Share in the Real Estate Brokerage Industry

This paper is concerned with the factors that determine the market share of listings and the market share of sales for brokerage firms. Models are developed and tested in a SMSA that conveniently corresponds exactly to a particular Multiple Listing Service area. Indices of firm specialization and market concentration were computed in addition to more conventional characterizations of the market and the data used in the study.
The regression results reveal a small degree of consistency in the impacts of the explanatory variables over the two years of the study and over the listing and sales markets. The number of salespeople is the most consistently significant variable. Indeed, market share per salesperson appears to be a non-monotonic function of the number of salespeople. The presence of a franchise and the quantity of display advertising are occasionally significant. Classified advertising, Yellow Pages advertising, and open houses all do not significantly affect market share per salesperson.     

Are There Investor Clienteles in Rental Housing?

The possible existence of investor clientele groups has received little attention in the real estate finance literature. In this paper we develop a clientele model, which in equilibrium produces a clustering of investors by tax characteristics. Low-tax-bracket investors are concentrated in low-value rental housing that attracts rents which are high in relation to property values. On the other hand, only high-tax-bracket investors will be observed in high-value rental housing, and they charge rents that are low in relation to property values. An empirical model is specified and estimated using a cross section of investors in Australian private rental housing markets. Investor clienteles are detected among property investors, though there is a weak diversification effect indicating that clientele effects may be stronger among single property investors.     

Brokerage commissions and margin requirements: With special reference to Japan

In Japan, brokerage commissions and margin requirements are currently regulated by the Ministry of Finance. However, commissions may soon be deregulated. This paper examines several economic factors which determine commissions and margins in a deregulated environment. The analysis is motivated by the observations that for Japan's securities companies, 1) brokerage commissions constitute a large component of their revenues; 2) margin transactions account for a significant proportion of their trading volume; 3) their gross income exhibits a great deal of volatility; 4) income tax is one of their two largest expenses; and 5) they face a significant tax asymmetry.While executing an unmargined long transaction for a customer is a riskless activity, executing either a margined long or a short transaction exposes the firm to some risk and possibly negative profits. While the commission charged by a brokerage firm for executing a riskless (unmargined) long transaction is simply equal to the marginal cost of producing the firm's total number of transactions, it is demonstrated that the gross commission charged for executing either a margined long or a short transaction includes two other components. The first additional component is a risk/tax premium that is determined by the brokerage firm's tax rate and degree of tax asymmetry, the security's volatility, and the customer's margin deposit. The second additional component is the premium required for the implicit put option associated with a margined long transaction, or for the implicit call option associated with a short transaction. The option falls in-the-money if the security's price changes significantly, so that it is optimal for the customer to default on his contract with the brokerage firm.The determinants of the customer's optimal margin, for both long and short transactions, are also examined. The benefit to the customer of depositing a higher margin is that his commission cost declines. For example, with short transactions a higher margin increases the exercise price of the implicit call option, causing both the risk/tax premium and the implicit option premium to decline. However, a higher margin may increase the customer's opportunity cost of capital. Consequently, the optimal margin increases with the firm's tax rate and degree of tax asymmetry, and decreases with the customer's opportunity cost of capital. An increase in the security's volatility has an ambiguous impact on the optimal margin.The authors are from York University, Canada and International University of Japan, respectively. Part of this paper was written while the first author was on leave at Kyoto University, Japan. We acknowledge helpful comments by Richard Arnott, Lawrence Harris, Hiromitsu Ishi, Eliakim Katz, Johannes Raaballe and Lim Kian Guan (the editor).     

Renegotiation of Listing Contracts, Seller Opportunism and Efficiency: An Economic Analysis

When a property owner engages a real estate broker to sell his or her property, the parties enter into a listing contract which entitles the broker to a commission if a ready, willing and able buyer is found before the contract expires. While a limit on the duration of the contract provides the broker with an incentive to work hard to find a buyer, it also creates the potential for seller opportunism. In particular, sellers have an incentive to renegotiate a lower commission as the end of the contract approaches. The paper concludes that, from an efficiency perspective, courts should generally enforce such renegotiations, given that transaction costs between brokers and sellers are ordinarily low.     

The Welfare Effects of Non-Price Competition Among Real Estate Brokers

This paper examines the role of brokers in economizing on transaction costs in the housing market. By lowering the cost of transactions, brokers create welfare gains compared to a market in which buyers and sellers transact on their own. However, if brokers engage in unproductive, non-price competition to acquire a larger share of available listings, then some of the welfare gains are dissipated. Using a partial equilibrium model, this paper shows how an excessive commission rate can lead to this result.     

Market Mechanism Choice and Real Estate Disposition: Search Versus Auction

We propose a model of mechanism choice in the disposition of real estate assets where we consider two alternatives: a search market and an auction. Within the search framework, we derive an equilibrium whereby buyers incur search costs and sellers incur holding costs for the period during which the property is not sold. In the auction alternative, the seller joins an existing pool of sellers in undertaking a multiple–object auction and pays a commission upon sale. Buyers and sellers freely choose their mechanisms, which in equilibrium are optimal given each group's conjectures about the mechanism choice of their counterpart. In equilibrium, an agent cannot benefit from deviating from his choice and each agent's beliefs are consistent with the equilibrium outcome. It is shown that (a) buyers with high search costs will choose auctions because the auction payoff imposes an upper bound on buyers' gains from search, and (b) prices at auctions will be higher. Using vacant lot sales data and a method–of–moment estimator which accounts for the presence of an endogenous discrete mechanism choice variable, we estimated a hedonic regression to detect the price effect. It was determined that, on average, lots sold for $1.44 per square foot more in auctions than in the search market, as predicted by our model.