The economic and trade effects of the UK–Korea free trade agreement on the United Kingdom,Korea, Japan,China, and the European Union

We explored a comparative static computable general equilibrium model with six regions and 12 sectors to estimate the impacts of the recent UK–Korea free trade agreement (FTA) along with the European Union (EU)–Korea FTA. The empirical results provide quantitative evidence of the impact on national GDP, national exports and imports by sector, and the changes in exports or imports among the United Kingdom, Korea, Japan, China, and the EU. The UK–Korea FTA, along with the EU–Korea FTA, increases GDP and welfare for the United Kingdom and Korea; moreover, there is a large increase in automobiles, transport equipment, and machinery exports between Korea and the United Kingdom. The GDP and welfare level of non-member countries such as Japan and China will slightly decline. Exports from the United Kingdom and Korea to non-member countries are also expected to decrease in most manufacturing sectors. The UK–Korea FTA will lead to increases in imports between the United Kingdom and Korea due to mutual trade creation effects and trade diversion effects. However, non-member countries such as Japan's exports are expected to experience a large decline in automobiles to the United Kingdom and in most manufacturing products to Korea due to the negative impact of the UK–Korea FTA.     

Hub‐and‐spoke free trade areas: theory and evidence from Israel

Abstract We study how the sequential formation of free trade areas affects trade flows between member countries. In a three‐country, three‐good model of comparative advantage if two countries have an FTA, and both sign a similar agreement with the third, trade between the two decreases. However, if only one of them signs an additional FTA, a hub‐ and‐spoke pattern arises, and trade between the initial members increases. Israel’s experience lends strong support to our model: trade between Israel and the EU, subject to an FTA since 1975, increased by an additional 29% after the introduction of the US‐Israel FTA in 1985.     

The determinants of trade performance: influence of R&D on export flows

A theoretical model is presented, in which supply side differences between countries determine international trade flows. This model is empirically tested at a sectoral level for a group of EU countries, within a framework that focuses on changes through time and differences between countries. The results show that the validity of the theoretical model is limited at sectoral level. However, as expected, we find that the variable representing technological differences is significant and correctly signed for high-technology sectors. The evidence points to the existence of different production functions across countries and to the importance of supply side factors in determining the direction and the terms of trade.     

FTA中TBT条款对中国全球价值链攀升的影响研究

基于2000—2014年中国签订的自由贸易协定（FTA）中技术性贸易壁垒（TBT）条款文本,使用自然语言文本处理法量化了中国各行业在FTA中TBT条款的合作水平,实证研究FTA中TBT条款对中国各行业全球价值链位置的影响。实证结果表明,FTA中TBT条款分别从降低贸易成本、促进技术创新、提高制度质量三个路径促进了中国各行业在全球价值链中的攀升。进一步分析发现,FTA中TBT条款对制造业和其他行业全球价值链攀升的促进作用明显,对中国服务业全球价值链攀升的影响不显著;相对于高技术制造业,低技术制造业的全球价值链攀升更容易受FTA中TBT条款的影响。中国政府应该更加积极地参与FTA中与贸易伙伴国的高水平TBT条款的谈判协商,充分发挥其对各行业全球价值链攀升的促进作用,同时重点关注对FTA中TBT条款敏感度较高的行业。     

Selected MENA countries' attractiveness to G7 investors

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relative attractiveness of seven MENA countries (Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Tunisia and Turkey) as a location for foreign portfolio investment (FPI) from the G7 investors' viewpoints over the period 2001-2005. We suggest a methodology based on the combination of the gravity model, the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) and the goal programming model (GP). The gravity model is used to determine the attractiveness factors of a country with respect to FPI for 30 investing and 43 receiving countries. Results show the importance of information costs and bilateral trade in the determination of the bilateral asset holdings. The AHP method is applied to prioritize the set of FPI location alternatives according to variables' significance in the gravity model outcome; information costs, bilateral trade, GDP, investment freedom, institutional quality, and geographic distance. Results show that in general Saudi Arabia is the best destination for Japanese and US investors, Turkey is the favorite location for French, German, Italian and British investors and Algeria is the preferred country for Canadian investors. A combined AHP-GP model has been used to determine the degree of portfolio investment in each MENA country from the viewpoint of G7 investors. The relative attractiveness of MENA countries varies over time and across investors. In general, over the period 2001-2005, the most attractive country is Iran for Canadian, French and Italian investors, Turkey for German and British investors and Saudi Arabia for Japanese and US investors. For a MENA country to attract more FPI it should especially improve bilateral trade and institutional quality and reduce foreign investment restrictions and information costs.     

Trade,conflict, and political integration: Explaining the heterogeneity of regional trade agreements

Many historians argue that the main goal of European trade integration was the preservation of peace. This paper investigates whether this reasoning is relevant for the EU and other regional trade agreements (RTAs). I provide empirical evidence that customs unions and common markets (deep RTAs) do reduce the probability of war between members. Partial scope and free trade agreements (shallow RTAs) however have no effect on war probabilities. Accordingly, international insecurity has a differential impact on incentives to create RTAs. Deep RTAs are signed between countries that are involved in many interstate disputes and that have low trade costs with the rest of the world, whereas the opposite is true for shallow RTAs.     

Institutional changes and breakpoints in Israeli trade

This paper examines the structural changes in Israeli trade trends since the 1970s. Structural change tests do not reject the null of no breaks in Israeli trade trends after Israel signed FTA agreements with the EEC and the USA, or after Israel's 1991 new trade policy. The tests, however, show significant evidence for breakpoints in 1993 in Israel's trade shares with three countries who had adhered strongly to the Arab boycott. This result suggests that the Middle East peace process, which began in 1991, considerably weakened the boycott and brought about positive changes in Israeli long-term trade patterns.     

Liberalization and the terms of trade in Turkey: a causal analysis

There has been extensive trade liberalization in developing countries in recent decades. Several liberalization episodes have been completed in Turkey. In this paper we evaluate the relationship between trade liberalization in Turkey and the terms of trade. Has liberalization preceded changes in the terms of trade or vice versa. Using causality analysis we investigate several hypotheses and conclude that in this case trade liberalization follows a terms of trade change, a finding which is consistent with the trade shocks hypothesis.     

EU participation and the external trade of Greece: an appraisal of the evidence

This paper investigates the trade effects caused by the accession of Greece to the EU. A large part of the analysis is in terms of trade flows disaggregated by the 21 categories of the Greek Tariff Schedule. These series are original data sets which have been constructed by the author to be used here for the first time. The main message is that after 1981 events took a turn closer to the pessimistic pre-accession predictions. Our findings indicate that during the post-integration period the external trade of Greece has been reoriented towards the EU countries and Greece lost part of its comparative advantage in those sectors in which such an advantage exists. We also suggest that as far as imports are concerned, EU participation has caused gross trade creation for imports from the EU countries and gross trade diversion for imports from the Rest of the World. As far as exports are concerned, the results indicate that EU participation has caused only a modest increase in Greek exports to the EU market.     

The silent success of customs unions

Globally, 81 countries are now part of a customs union (CU), following the rapid proliferation of this type of trade agreement in past decades. Much of this growth has been driven by countries “upgrading” their links from a free trade agreement (FTA) to CU. At the same time, the rapid formation of new FTAs among countries that had no prior agreement in place has largely overshadowed this growth, making CUs the silent success of regional integration. Using the canonical regionalism model, augmented to allow for political bias towards firm interests, we investigate the endogenous choice of trade agreement. We show it is generally politically viable to move from FTA to CU, because such a move is rent‐creating; but for countries without a trade agreement in place, it may be optimal to form an FTA as a stepping stone to reduce the risk of political derailment. Importantly, forming a CU is consistent with member social welfare maximization: as long as trade with the rest of the world does not cease entirely, a CU leads to higher social welfare than either FTA or no agreement. These gains come at the expense of third‐country welfare. If past trends continue, one can expect more FTAs to be upgraded to CU with associated adverse consequences for outsiders.     

FREE TRADE NETWORKS WITH TRANSFERS*

We investigate the network of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) in the context of a network formation game with transfers. In a previous paper we showed that without international transfers countries with different industrialization levels cannot sign an FTA, so that the global free trade network, in which every pair of countries signs an FTA, is not in general pairwise‐stable. In this paper we show that, even if the world consists of fairly asymmetric countries, the global free trade network is pairwise‐stable when transfers between FTA signatories are allowed. Moreover, it is a unique pairwise‐stable network unless industrial commodities are highly substitutable.     

外部关税约束、自由贸易区规模与世界自由贸易

该文在外部关税约束条件下分析了几种不同类型的自由贸易区与世界自由贸易的关系,该文结果显示,一个实行开放成员国地位的自由贸易区可以实现世界自由贸易,但是当自由贸易区以追求成员国福利最大化为目标时,在世界规模大于4时,该自由贸易区的扩张不可能最终实现世界自由贸易.该文还研究了对称的自由贸易区是否可以通过进一步的融合从而把世界变成一个一体化的自由贸易区,结果显示,具有对称市场能力的自由贸易区可以通过进一步的融合提高成员国福利,从而最终实现世界自由贸易.     

How close is Asia already to being a trade bloc?

FTA bilateral and regional negotiations in Asia have developed quickly in the past decade moving Asia ever closer to an economic union. This paper uses a fifteen-country global general equilibrium model with trade costs to numerically calculate Debreu distance measures between the present situation and potential full Asia integration in the form of a trade bloc. Our results reveal that these large Asia economies can be close to full integration if they act timely in agreements through negotiation. All Asia countries will gain from Asia trade bloc arrangements except when the Asia FTA can only eliminate tariffs. These countries’ gain will increase as bilateral non-tariff elimination deepens. Larger countries will gain more than small countries. Asia FTA, Asia Union and RCEP will benefit member countries more than ASEAN+3. Global free trade will benefit all countries the most.     

Endogenous Free Trade Agreements and Foreign Lobbying

This paper assesses the political viability of free trade agreements (FTAs) in the presence of lobbying by organized foreign interest groups. The assessment is based on a model in which external tariffs and the decision to form an FTA are endogenously determined. The findings demonstrate that, in the presence of an organized lobby group in a prospective partner country, an FTA may initiate an increase in the level of protection against imports from third countries and impede trade with non‐member countries. Further, this study finds that a foreign lobby may encourage the local government to enter a welfare‐reducing trade‐diverting FTA. Finally, this paper shows that an FTA increases the lobbying power of the organized lobby groups of the member countries, which can potentially obstruct the viability of welfare‐improving multilateral trade liberalization.     

Turkish trade unionists and Turkey’s membership of the European Union

In all the discussions regarding Turkey’s accession to the EU, little attention has been paid to the views of workers. This paper provides a statistical analysis of the views of over 6000 Turkish trade union members on Turkey’s EU membership. Parameters are estimated using multilevel probit models where the nested structures of workers into trade unions and federations were taken into account since they shared some joint characteristics because of belonging to these organisations. It confirms the extensive disillusion with the EU found elsewhere in Turkish society but more interestingly it disconfirms an idea that those inside the EU may too easily assume to be the case: that it is those with what might be considered modernist characteristics among the Turkish population who are most likely to be in favour of EU entry. The idea seems to chime well with assumptions that the EU is a progressive, modern force. But whatever the validity of such a view, EU entry is not in fact found to be the favoured goal of the young and the best educated: it is older workers who are the most likely to support entry and those who are educated to the highest level the most likely to oppose it. Amongst the main three trade union federations there is also a greater propensity of members of trade unions affiliated to Hak Is (the Islamic federation) to support entry than those in Turk Is (centre right) or DISK (historically the most militant).     

Free Trade Agreement with Endogenous Market Structure

We examine the incentives of free trade agreement (FTA) formation between two countries under endogenous market structure with leaders and followers. We demonstrate that establishing a FTA is neither an equilibrium outcome nor socially optimal when consumer demand and fixed cost are intermediate, products are close substitutes and countries are asymmetrical. This is because the FTA induces exit of followers, which makes the market less competitive and shrinks the leader’s production both in the domestic and foreign markets. We also show that large developing countries are less likely to establish a FTA than small developed countries.     

What has New Zealand gained from The FTA with China?: Two counterfactual analyses†

We investigate the effects of the 2008 New Zealand (NZ)–China free trade agreement (FTA) on exports from NZ to China, and real GDP per capita in NZ using the synthetic control method to estimate the counterfactuals. NZ exports to China were more than 200% higher in 2014 than what they would have had the FTA never been signed. NZ's food and live animals exports to China were more than 180% higher in 2014 than the counterfactual. Our counterfactuals indicate a small but negative effect of the FTA on NZ's real GDP per capita between 2009 and 2012.     

Small Countries and Preferential Trade Agreements: How Severe is the Innocent Bystander Problem?

In this paper the welfare implications of preferential trade agreements (PTA) are examined from the perspective of small countries in the context of a multi-country general equilibrium model. We calibrate our model to represent one relatively small country and two symmetric big countries. We consider two cases. In one case, the small country is an 'innocent bystander', that is, it is left out of a PTA between the two large countries. In the second case, the small country signs a PTA with one of the large countries. We simulate the model and calculate consumption allocations, prices, trade volume, and tariffs in these two cases considering three different equilibria: free trade (FT), free trade association (FTA) and customs union (CU). We find that free trade is the best outcome for the small country. If the large country PTA takes the form of a CU then the cost of being an 'innocent bystander' is very large. If it is an FTA then the cost of being an 'innocent bystander' is relatively modest. In fact, the small country prefers to be an 'innocent bystander' to being a member of an FTA with one of the large countries.     

International supply chains and trade agreements

There is a growing literature that examines the role of trade agreements on the formation of international supply chains. The evidence indicates that in general countries that share trade agreements are more likely to develope cross-border supply chains. In this analysis, we argue that in order to examine the effects of trade agreements on the formation of supply chains between two countries, it is not enough to analyse the impact of the trade agreements that the two countries share but it is also important to assess the impact of the trade agreements that they share with third countries. Using data on trade in value added for 129 countries, we show empirically that about 40% of the potential increase in trade in value added induced by a trade agreement between an importing country and a sourcing partner is wiped out by each additional trade agreement signed by the importing country with third nations in which the sourcing partner is not a member. The result has important implications for regions seeking to develop international supply chains but in which the process of integration is highly fragmented.     

An assessment of the Europe agreements’ effects on bilateral trade, GDP, and welfare

The so-called Europe Agreements had been enacted in the 1990s to initiate the integration of goods markets between the 15 EU incumbent economies as of 1995 and 10 potential entrants located in Central and Eastern Europe. This paper evaluates the trade, GDP, and welfare effects of these agreements by means of structural analysis of a bilateral trade flow model. The results support three conclusions. First, the agreements exerted significant positive effects on goods trade between the EU15 incumbents and the CEEC and, at the same time, they induced trade redirection from other countries. Second, EU15 GDP responded by an increase of much less than 1% while that in the 10 CEEC increased by several percent in response to the agreements. Third, the effects on welfare were moderate in the EU15 but amounted to more double-digit percentage changes in the involved CEEC.