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1.
Canada's trade policy at the end of the 19th century is commonly viewed as protectionist and extremely costly. In this paper, we employ the Anderson‐Neary Trade Restrictiveness Index to re‐examine this view. Based on product‐level customs data, we show that Canadian trade policy between 1870 and 1910 was more restrictive than previously understood, but created smaller welfare losses than previously believed. These results are primarily driven by high tariffs on inelastic, non‐competing import goods. Although Canada's tariff structure becomes more restrictive over the period, our findings indicate it was not as protectionist or as costly as once thought. 相似文献
2.
《Ecological Economics》2005,52(3):305-313
Trade has become the main mode of transport for many invasive species, including diseases and agricultural pests. Most species are brought to their new homes unintentionally, which constitutes a market failure rooted in international trade. Unless it is practical to drive invasion risk to zero, the external costs may justify a tariff. In this paper, we analyze the political process likely to govern the formation of tariffs so justified using a straightforward incorporation of an invasive species externality into Grossman and Helpman's (GH) well-known political economy model. We show that our measure of disguised protectionism—the gap between the optimal tariff and that set in the equilibrium of the political economy game—is equal to the tariff that would be set if there were no invasive species and no international disciplines on trade policy. The informational needs required to distinguish disguised protectionism from legitimate public-goods protection are formidable. 相似文献
3.
Alistair fnUlph 《Environmental and Resource Economics》1996,7(4):333-355
Policy makers, industrialists and environmentalists express concern that the imposition of tough environmental policies in some countries displaces production, and hence pollution, to countries which impose less tough environmental policies. Yet empirical studies of such impacts suggest they are small. However, these findings are derived from models in which international trade is modelled as being perfectly competitive. In this paper I model trade as imperfectly competitive with scope for strategic behavior by producers, in this case investment in capital. I show that the choice of environmental policy instrument can have a marked impact on the incentives for producers to act strategically, with environmental standards significantly reducing the incentives for strategic overinvestment relative to environmental taxes or no environmental policy at all. Whether welfare is higher using standards or taxes depends on whether producing countries are also significant consumers of the polluting product, and on whether all producing governments act to reduce emissions or only some subset of governments. To assess the quantitative significance of these theoretical results I conduct policy simulations on a calibrated model of the world fertilizer industry. These simulations show that the impact of environmental policy on strategic behaviour can be large. 相似文献
4.
Kenji Fujiwara 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2011,49(4):561-572
Recent empirics suggest the relevance of transport cost reductions for world trade growth along with eliminations in protectionist trade barriers. To address the welfare effects of trade cost reductions in a context of ??trade and the environment,?? we develop a two-stage game model where governments choose environmental and trade policies and firms play a Cournot-Nash game. We show that reductions in transport costs lead to lower emission taxes and higher tariffs. And, we find that the degree of pollution damage plays a central role in whether market integration is welfare-improving relative to autarky. 相似文献
5.
The new age of trade wars could simultaneously affect the worldwide distribution pattern of the economy and environmental emissions. However, previous studies have focused on economic impacts, and on trade liberalization, while little is known about the equilibrium effects of trade barriers on the environment. Using a global computable general equilibrium model and taking the recent anti-trade policies of the Trump administration as an example, this study investigates the possible socio-economic and environmental effects of trade friction. Specifically, this study explores how the implemented six rounds of China–US trade friction and its different long-term development trends affect regional economic output, GHG and air pollutant emissions. Results show that trade barriers harm both countries’ economies and such losses have a certain permanence, while non-participants can benefit indirectly. Trade friction decreases participants’ GHG emissions, modifies global GHG emission distribution patterns, and leads to improved air quality in most countries. If governments continue to impose tariffs, global GHG emissions could counterfactually decrease by up to 5%. However, the change in trade patterns is not conducive to clean energy development in the less-developed regions, including the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, and emission reductions from trade friction are insufficient to avoid catastrophic climate change. 相似文献
6.
Ian Keay 《The Canadian journal of economics》2019,52(4):1464-1496
As industries mature, experience is accumulated, productivity increases, trade performance improves on domestic and international markets and learning potential dissipates. Using theory‐consistent empirical specifications, I find a strong, robust negative relationship linking tariff rates to trade performance for manufactured products that matured during the first decade after Canada prioritized protectionist policy objectives in 1879. This relationship also holds at a more aggregate industry level, where I can use other measures of maturity, control for import penetration, use historically contemporaneous trade elasticity estimates, link trade performance to trade restrictiveness and effective rates of protection and where I can instrument for import penetration and trade performance using a two‐stage IV–GMM estimation approach. The results suggest that after 1890 the Canadian government carefully cut tariffs on products produced by maturing Canadian producers and this retreat from protectionism significantly lowered the static deadweight losses resulting from Canadian trade policy during the post‐1890 period. 相似文献
7.
This paper empirically estimates the trade effects of technical barriers to trade (TBT) based on all TBT notifications from 105 World Trade Organization (WTO) countries during 1995–2008. The paper adopts a modified two‐stage gravity model to control for both sample selection bias and firm heterogeneity bias. It was found that a country's TBT notifications decrease other countries' probability of exporting, but increase their export volumes. The result can be explained by the TBT's differential effects on the fixed and variable cost of export, and consumer confidence. It was further found that (i) a developing country's TBT have significant effects on other developing countries' exports, but no significant effects on the developed countries' exports, (ii) a developed country's TBT have significant effects on the exports from both types of countries, and (iii) exports from developed countries are affected by a developed country's TBT more seriously than a developing country's TBT. 相似文献
8.
In this paper we shall develop and investigate a three-country and two-commodity model of international trade with an imperfectly competitive good which is produced under increasing marginal costs by explicitly incorporating intra-industry trade between industrialized countries. The main results we obtain are: (1) the full optimal discriminatory tariffs levied by a third importing country are necessarily positive; (2) the imposition of tariff can cause an increase in intra-industry trade, and therefore (3) under certain conditions the importing country's intervention into the international market can be a Pareto superior policy for the world as a whole as well as for the country. 相似文献
9.
《Review of Economic Dynamics》2008,11(4):904-916
The share of merchandise output that is internationally traded has significantly increased while tariffs have fallen. However, standard trade models have surprising difficulty linking these two facts. Trade growth slowed in the 1970s as tariffs fell relatively sharply while after the late 1980s trade grew quickly as tariffs fell slowly. This pattern implies that the price-import elasticity has changed over time. Also, tariffs have not fallen enough to generate such a large increase in trade given estimates of this elasticity. Changes in transport costs can resolve both puzzles. I present a vertical specialization trade model with an energy-using transportation sector. In the simulated model, trade growth slows from 1974 to 1985. The oil shocks raised transport costs, offsetting falling tariffs, so the price-import elasticity no longer needs to change. It also generates the observed volume of trade growth since transport costs have fallen over the long run. 相似文献
10.
Sumeet Gulati 《The Canadian journal of economics》2008,41(3):817-837
Abstract. Consider a small economy facing accession to a exogenously defined trade agreement. Before accession, the government controls trade and pollution policy. After accession, it retains control over pollution policy, but must allow free trade in all goods. This is a choice many governments face while joining trade agreements today. They decide whether greater market access to other members is more valuable than control over trade policy. I ask two questions. All else being equal what happens to environmental policy after accession? Second, what affects the choice of accession and how does this choice impact aggregate welfare? I show that a loss in control over trade policy alters the political incentives determining environmental policy. Before accession, producers can transfer a portion of their burden of environmental regulation to consumers through price increases. After accession the same regulation is borne entirely by producers. Owing to the change in burden, there exist plausible conditions under which the adoption of free trade can lead to more stringent environmental regulation, a reduction in the preferential treatment of special interest groups, and an increase in aggregate welfare. 相似文献
11.
Carolyn Fischer 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2017,66(3):553-575
Industrial policy has long been criticized as subject to protectionist interests; accordingly, subsidies to domestic producers face disciplines under World Trade Organization agreements, without exceptions for environmental purposes. Now green industrial policy is gaining popularity as governments search for low-carbon solutions that also provide jobs at home. The strategic trade literature has largely ignored the issue of market failures related to green goods. I consider the market for a new environmental good (like low-carbon technology) whose downstream consumption provides external benefits (like reduced emissions). Governments may have some preference for supporting domestic production, such as by interest-group lobbying, introducing a political distortion in their objective function. I examine the national incentives and global rationales for offering production (upstream) and deployment (downstream) subsidies in producer countries, allowing that some of the downstream market may lie in nonregulating third-party countries. Restraints on upstream subsidies erode global welfare when environmental externalities are large enough relative to political distortions. Climate finance is an effective alternative if political distortions are large and governments do not undervalue carbon costs. Numerical simulations of the case of renewable energy indicate that a modest social cost of carbon can imply benefits from allowing upstream subsidies. 相似文献
12.
Abstract A partial two country equilibrium model is built in which two different exogenous random shocks may occur. the governments simultaneously choose tariff functions relating their specific tariff to the level of an observable variable (volume of trade or international price). In the case of a “volume of trade shock” the Nash equilibria of this game are more protectionist the larger the possible trade swings and autarky is always an equilibrium outcome. In the case of a “terms of trade shock”, constant tariffs, at their Nash equilibrium in specific tariff levels are the only sensible equilibrium outcome. 相似文献
13.
Endogenous trade policy in general equilibrium: An interaction of redistribution rule,trade openness,and labor market condition
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Ram C. Acharya 《Economics & Politics》2018,30(3):423-443
Using a general equilibrium framework, the paper derives trade policy endogenously for a small country. It shows that, contrary to the existing literature, a lobbying industry is not guaranteed trade protection; it may even face trade taxes. Besides lobbying, trade policy depends on other factors such as the trade revenue distribution rule, income distribution across groups, trade openness, factor substitutability in production, industry employment size, and labor market flexibility. The paper also shows that the observed phenomenon of government preference for import tariffs over export subsidies—a long overdue puzzle—is an inherent outcome of lobbying equilibrium. It also shows that trade policies such as import tariffs and export taxes that have the same impact on economic market—Lerner symmetry (1936)—are driven by the same forces in the political market. 相似文献
14.
The effect of the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement on Canadian multilateral trade liberalization
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In this paper show that the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) tariff preferences have triggered a decline in Canadian external tariffs, explaining a two percentage point reduction in the average tariff between 1989 and 1998. Next, we found that industries that generate the least export rent to the US firms experienced deeper tariff cuts in Canada; this result provides evidence of cooperation in trade policies between the US and Canada. Finally, we estimate the effect of the CUSFTA on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade policy in Canada and find no relationship between preferential trade liberalization and lobbying activity. 相似文献
15.
We analyze the heterogeneous effects of technical regulations and safety standards embodied in nontariff measures on foreign direct investment using global firm-level panel data of bilateral cross-border ownership relationships over the period 2008–2018. We develop a novel measure of time-varying bilateral ad valorem equivalents of sectoral nontariff measures, which reveals that technical barriers to trade (TBTs) played a much greater role as a trade-inhibiting factor in comparison with import tariffs and sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures over the period 1996–2018. Estimations using the Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood framework reveal the importance of nontariff measures as a driver of foreign direct investment. 相似文献
16.
When trade policy is determined endogenously by lobbying, it matters whether countries are arranged into a customs union or a free trade area. This paper compares the two regimes when the member governments are asymmetric in their susceptibilities to lobbying and in their bargaining power within a customs union. In the model, a customs union never leads to lower tariffs for both countries, whereas it can lead to higher tariffs for both. 相似文献
17.
We introduce an index of trade policy restrictiveness defined as the uniform tariff that maintains the same trade volume as a given tariff/quota structure. Our index overcomes the problems of the trade‐weighted average tariff: It avoids substitution bias, correctly accounts for general equilibrium transfers, and takes import volume instead of welfare as benchmark. Empirical applications to international cross section and time‐series comparisons of trade policy confirm our theoretical results: Trade‐weighted average tariffs generally underestimate the true height of tariffs as measured by the trade‐volume‐equivalent index; this in turn always underestimates the welfare‐equivalent index. 相似文献
18.
In this paper we study the optimal import policy in an oligopolistic market with a given number of quantity-setting firms.
In the absence of fixed costs, we show that if the policy instrument is an import quota, the optimal policy is either free
trade or autarky, while if the instrument is a tariff the optimal policy is neither free trade nor autarky. In the case of
fixed costs, we show that contrary to the traditional protectionist argument, a restrictive import policy might increase domestic
welfare by increasing domestic consumers' surplus, instead of increasing domestic profits. 相似文献
19.
Simulated economic impacts in applied trade modelling: A comparison of tariff aggregation approaches
This paper assesses the performance of two recently developed tariff aggregators in reducing tariff aggregation bias by analysing Swiss beef market liberalisation scenarios. Specific relevant sources of bias are addressed: substitution effects on import demand, Tariff Rate Quotas and overprotection in tariffs. The aggregators are linked to a global large-scale partial equilibrium model and benchmarked against a standard aggregator. The choice of the aggregation method shows considerable effects on simulated economic impacts, specifically if the dispersion in tariffs or tariff cuts is large. A large bias is revealed in simulated gains from trade liberalisation using the standard aggregator. The impacts on traded quantities are found to be overestimated, while price and welfare effects can be higher or lower by switching to alternative aggregation methods. By reducing aggregation bias and depicting negotiated tariff schedules more directly, the proposed aggregators enhance the contribution of trade modelling to evidence-based policy making. 相似文献
20.
CAROLYN L. EVANS 《Economics & Politics》2009,21(2):278-307
Do politics affect trade policy? Despite an extensive literature examining the relationship between trade policy and some political factors, relatively few studies have explored the role of a country's electoral system, arguably one of the most fundamental characteristics of a nation's political landscape. This paper examines the empirical relationship between tariffs and electoral systems across countries and over time. The broad theoretical framework is provided by Grossman and Helpman, which predicts a bias towards a non‐zero average tariff, i.e. a “protectionist bias”, in countries with majoritarian systems, since politicians in a majoritarian system aim to maximize the welfare of their home districts, as opposed to the welfare of the nation as a whole. I compare average tariffs of countries with majoritarian systems to those with proportional systems, using methods that address the omitted variables/sample selection problem inherent to this analysis. I find that countries with majoritarian systems do indeed appear to have higher average tariffs than do countries with proportional systems. This result holds after controlling for other country‐specific characteristics, such as a country's legal origins, colonial history, and geographic location. 相似文献