ADVANCING THE THEORY OF THE COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION: THE COOPERATIVE AS A TRUE HYBRID

ABSTRACT: What is a cooperative? Is it a form of vertical integration, an independent organization or an intermediate form of governance between the market and the hierarchy? This paper contributes to the economic theory of the cooperative organization by examining it from a comparative economic perspective. Departing from Williamson's one‐dimensional continuum of governance structures, the paper adopts the view that governance structures exhibit multiple dimensions and true hybrids are market‐like on some of these dimensions while hierarchy‐like on others. I show that the cooperative blends market‐like attributes with hierarchy‐like mechanisms and thus should be viewed as a true hybrid rather than as an intermediate form. The paper concludes with a discussion about the usefulness of this approach and potential avenues for future research.     

合作行为与合作经济学:一个理论分析框架

本文对合作经济学理论体系发展的一些基本问题进行了讨论。由于现实生活中表现出了以竞争作为主线的自利模型不能解释的大量事例,因此笔者试图将亲社会性他涉偏好纳入到经济学理论体系假设中来构建合作经济学,并为其提供了翔实的科学证据。本文还讨论了合作、亲社会情感、他涉偏好等一些基本范畴,并对合作经济学的基本理论内容以及基本方法论等问题进行了探讨。     

THE EMPLOYMENT STRUCTURE OF COOPERATIVE BANKS – A TEST OF INSTITUTIONAL HYPOTHESES

We study the claim that, because of their institutional design, current cooperative banks differ in their employment decisions compared to other conventional banks. The success of cooperative banks in the past was grounded on efficiency advantages generated through peer‐monitoring, social sanctions, and institutional trust. Institutional economic theory and anecdotal historical evidence suggest that these core institutional mechanisms also had an effect on the employment structure of early credit cooperatives. By examining the employment structure of current cooperative banks, we aim to provide insights to the question of how and to what extent original institutional mechanisms of credit cooperatives may still be functional. We use administrative establishment data from Germany and compare employment structures of banks by legal form. The results indicate that cooperative banks in comparison with otherwise similar private and savings banks are characterized by more stable employment, an older workforce, more extensive training activities, and a more homogeneous composition of employees.     

A DYNAMIC ANALYSIS OF COOPERATIVE RESEARCH IN THE SEMICONDUCTOR INDUSTRY*

In this article I construct a dynamic oligopoly model of research joint ventures (RJVs) where firms, investing to improve product quality, fully share the rewards of research success. RJVs benefit firms by eliminating duplicative research efforts, but firms also give up the possibility of becoming a solo innovator. Consumers benefit from lower prices, but may have to wait longer for new products to arrive. I show that RJVs are welfare enhancing by quantitatively evaluating these trade‐offs with data from the semiconductor industry. I also analyze how changes in product market competition affect research cooperation.     

ANTECEDENTS TO MARKET ORIENTATION IN THE WORKER COOPERATIVE ORGANIZATION: THE MONDRAGON GROUP

Given the socio‐economic importance of cooperative firms and in the light of evidence that they are an effective option for competing in complex environments, an intensive examination of their organizational model is required. It is significant that some of the most consolidated worker cooperative organizations have focused on Market Orientation. The central purpose of this research is therefore to examine the influence of a set of internal antecedents of market orientation found in cooperatives. We shall then verify the possible benefits of market orientation on their business performance. The subject of this analysis will be the worker‐owned businesses that make up the Mondragon cooperative group, a global pioneer in democratic business practice.     

THE EXTENDED GOVERNANCE OF COOPERATIVE FIRMS: INTER‐FIRM COORDINATION AND CONSISTENCY OF VALUES

This work aims at providing a framework for the analysis of governance in networks of cooperative firms. It builds on four bodies of literature: cooperation, transaction costs, monopoly capitalism, production networks. The framework associates the specific principles that define the identity of cooperative organizations (self‐help, member ownership, democratic control, financial participation, limited capital remuneration) alongside more general governance levels (embodied values, property rights, control, resource allocation). We then apply the same dimensions to production networks and propose a stylized networking model for cooperatives. We introduce market power, and identify two polarized types of networks: (1) heterarchical forms of coordination based on cooperation and mutual help, (2) hierarchical coordination based on exclusive direction. We compare both types with our normative framework providing examples and brief case studies for each network type. Recommendations to scholars and practitioners point at the opportunity to discriminate inter‐firm relations and production development strategy in terms of the values of cooperation, at all governance levels.     

EFFICIENCY AND HYBRIDIZATION IN COOPERATIVE BANKING: THE FRENCH CASE*

ABSTRACT: This paper analyzes how French cooperative banking groups adapted their organization, status and model to develop and grow, until the current financial crisis. It explores how they benefitted from evolutions in cooperative law that lowered financing constraints and increased the scope of their activities, becoming large banking groups, and identifies how these groups tried to develop a model of governance, characterized by internal control, which was partly dedicated to the members, but biased more and more towards the top of the organizational pyramid and to stockholders (the new stakeholders coming from the existence of listed vehicles). While the developing business model for cooperative banks appeared to confer a comparative advantage and was synonymous with efficiency before the financial crisis, it seems that the hybridization of the cooperative model has also been a source of conflict of interest, weakness in strategy and an incentive to increase risk. The third part of the article examines how French cooperative banking groups have been hurt by the recent crisis and whether different organizational and strategic features or choices may explain different levels of resilience to financial turmoil.     

FARMERS’ WILLINGNESS TO INVEST IN NEW COOPERATIVE INSTRUMENTS: A CHOICE EXPERIMENT

Globalization of agricultural markets put pressures on producer cooperatives to invest in expansion and growth to safeguard their competitiveness. Availability of capital is limited if farmers do not have incentives to increase their capital contribution. Cooperative literature recognizes the residual rights, transferability, and the appreciation potential of the investment as the potential solutions for the problems that may impede cooperative investments. The objective of this study is to understand farmer preferences regarding investment attributes and the potential for attracting investment capital from members and non‐members. We employ a choice experiment method to test new cooperative investment instruments. The data consist of a questionnaire conducted with 406 Finnish dairy farmers. Random parameter latent class logit model is used in the estimation of the data. The results indicate that most of the respondents regard the new investment instruments positively. However, farmers prefer restricting ownership rights to members. Incentives for members to participate in financing cooperative growth could be designed with capital‐based residual rights, mechanisms for transferability and for the appreciation of firm value. Estimation that considered choice difficulty improved model fit, which highlights the need to address respondent burden also in future studies of hypothetical investments in order to produce unbiased estimates.     

REGIONAL ACCOUNTS IN ACTION: CONCERNING METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS FROM A BELGIAN PERSPECTIVE

In this paper we address the methodological problems encountered in the building of regional accounts. These problems are discussed by describing the methodological and conceptual options applied in an original and recent experience with regional accounts in Belgium. A comparison is offered with alternative choices concerning the regionalisation of main aggregates made in some other countries. The reasons for the urgency of an appropriate regional accounting framework (a regional equivalent of the universal SNA) are outlined in the conclusion.     

BANK PERFORMANCE,FINANCIAL STABILITY AND MARKET CONCENTRATION: EVIDENCE FROM COOPERATIVE AND NON‐COOPERATIVE BANKS

Relying upon highly territorially disaggregated data taken at labour market areas, the paper explores the relationship between bank performances and financial stability of the banking system taking into account the role of market concentration. The z‐score is used as financial stability indicator, while the performance of financial intermediaries is measured using a parametric method recently developed (Kumbhakar et al. 2014). The empirical evidence shows a positive relationship between bank performance and financial stability and supports the ‘concentration–stability’ view for non‐cooperative banks only when concentration is measured on the whole sample of banks. Differences in the performance–stability nexus seem to depend more on the type of banks rather than different levels of market concentration. Higher market concentration of cooperative banks affects systemic stability by reducing the z‐scores of non‐cooperative banks, supporting the hypothesis that the presence of non‐profit‐maximizing entities can pull down stability of other financial institutions.     

COOPERATIVE FIRMS AND THE CRISIS: EVIDENCE FROM SOME ITALIAN MIXED OLIGOPOLIES

We investigate how cooperative firms reacted to the current crisis. This allows us to compare the behaviour of cooperative and conventional firms facing exogenous shifts in demand. After a short survey of a stream of theoretical literature, we analyze a large group of Italian production cooperatives in the periods 2003–2010 and 1994–2011 and we contrast co‐ops behaviour with the overall trend in the industries in which they operate. Our sample's evidence suggests that the cooperative's behaviour has a stabilizing effect on employment with respect to shocks in output demand. Unlike profit‐maximizers, cooperative firms seem to be adjusting pay more than employment when facing shocks. Production co‐ops look better equipped than their profit‐maximizing counterparts in tackling the long recession also because they have been very cautious in their profit policies over time. Unlike conventional firms, they have significantly increased their own equity during ‘good’ years instead of distributing large dividends to their members.