The evolutionary firm and Cournot's Dilemma

Recently, competence/capability has been introduced as a rivaland as a complement to the idea of transaction-costs as thefoundation for a modern theory of the firm. However, while thecompetence-based approach may be inspired by evolutionary economics,it does not, in its current form, provide an evolutionary theoryof the firm. To transform this competence-based approach intoan evolutionary theory, the connection between the firm andVeblen's concept of social knowledge is more fully developed.Once established, the evolutionary theory of the firm is utilisedto bypass Marshall's reconciliation problem and solve Cournot'sDilemma.     

Harald B. Malmgren's Analysis of the Firm: lessons for modern theorists?

This paper analyses Harald B. Malmgren's neglected 1961 paper ‘Information, expectations, and the theory of the firm’, which provided the first extensive elaboration of Coase's 1937 analysis in ‘The nature of the firm’. Malmgren's primary sources of inspiration were Coase, Hayek, Richardson and Penrose. Combining these sources in a creative way allowed Malmgren to anticipate themes that have only recently been addressed in the theory of economic organization. However, there is still much to be learned from Malmgren's discussion, particularly the way in which he combined contractual and knowledge-based approaches to the firm. Moreover, Malmgren suggested that it is possible to construct an opportunism-independent approach to economic organization.     

Conventions: An evolutionary approach

Conventions are social institutions that solve recurrent coordination problems. In normative game theory, coordination games are considered problematic because of the multiplicity of equilibria. From a neoinstitutionalist perspective, however, this multiplicity should be an important part of the explanation of real-world institutions. The paper discusses the evolutionary (or “positive”) game-theoretical approach to the emergence of conventions. I note a precise sense in which conventions may be said to minimize transaction costs, but that they need not be efficient. Example applications to language, money, and the theory of the firm are discussed.     

What drives innovativeness in industrial clusters? Transcending the debate

The paper throws new light on the debate about the role playedby local knowledge spillovers (LKS) as a driver of regionalinnovative activity. It transcends the regional level of analysisthat has been commonly adopted in the literature so far, usinginsights from the evolutionary theory of the firm. This makesit possible to derive a typology of mechanisms through whichregional agglomeration may stimulate learning and innovationat the firm level. When this typology is brought to bear onthe extant approaches in the debate, the contrasting viewpointscan be reconciled to some extent. The main conclusion is thatlittle theoretical ground for the LKS debate remains.     

双重成本约束下的最优企业所有权安排-企业共同治理的经济学分析

对企业治理及其最优所有权安排的探讨必须从企业本质的两重属性及其互动的角度动态地考察.从这个角度看,企业的最优所有权安排受到知识成本和代理成本的双重约束.在双重成本约束下,企业所有权的集中与分散对应的结合是企业发展中最优所有权安排的常态.共同治理是企业长期发展和成长的必然选择.     

我国中小企业企业家能力与企业绩效关系研究

企业家能力对企业的绩效有重要影响.建立了一个中小企业企业家能力与企业绩效之间的综合模型,系统研究了中小企业企业家能力和企业绩效之间的关系,对基于能力和基于资源的理论进行了完善和发展.研究结果显示,不同的企业家的能力会对企业绩效产生不同的作用.因此,对于中国中小企业来说,充分利用企业家能力,可以增强企业的竞争力,从而提高企业绩效.     

Contemporary Economic thought. The Contribution of Neo-Institutional Economics

This article examines the historical developments of the institutionalist theory of the business enterprise since the early 1900s in order to demonstrate its distinctive characteristics that are often overlooked or belittled by some institutional-evolutionary economists and most mainstream economists. I argue that the institutionalist theory is an evolving and emergent theory, which bears a reciprocal, evolutionary, and cumulative relationship between the business enterprise and society. The institutionalist theory is, therefore, suitable for the understanding of the real-world business enterprise as it can be modified and refined along with the evolution of capitalism. The article begins with a discussion of the present state of the institutionalist theory. The following section is devoted to the major contributions to the institutionalist theory situated in the evolution of U.S. capitalism. The penultimate section provides a critical discussion of new institutional and evolutionary approaches to the firm. The article concludes with a brief discussion as to what should be done for the further development of the institutionalist theory of the business enterprise.     

Towards a competence theory of the region

This paper argues the case for extending the competence theoryof the firm, or more generally the competence perspective, toanalysis of the region. The relevance of the perspective followsfrom the characterisation of productive systems such as firmsand regions as ensembles of competences that emerge from, butare not reducible to social interaction. Attention is drawnto an identifiable (although unacknowledged) convergence ofideas in the recent regional literature, arguing that theseideas are best re-conceptualised in terms of regional competences.The cluster of high-technology firms in the Cambridge regionof the UK is briefly referred to in order to illustrate themain ideas of the paper.     

The governance of innovative firms: An evolutionary perspective

Corporate governance has been in the recent years one of the most debated issues in conventional economic approaches. Agency theory combined with financial indicators has particularly contributed to the development of shareholder value as a key concept in companies’ governance both at a theoretical and empirical level. We argue that an evolutionary perspective can be developed on the governance of innovative firms since (1) conventional economic approaches only consider a restricted part of this complex issue, and (2) this restricted vision applied in practice has driven the economic system into major coordination problems and turbulences. On the basis of empirical investigations into the telecommunications industry, and guided by a simple model of evolutionary game, we propose new principles of corporate governance centered upon managerial entrepreneurship and its role on innovation and industry dynamics. The outcome is a set of rules of conduct for the manager and the shareholder.     

A simple theory and evidence on the determinants of firm R&D

This paper derives a simple, but informative, model of firm R&D to figure out key factors that determine firm R&D effort. The model suggests a demand-pull, technology-push theory of R&D by showing that a firm's profit-maximizing R&D expenditure is determined jointly by both demand-side factors and technology-side factors. The former includes demand size (firm sales) and consumer preference over quality and price and the latter includes R&D cost structure or the production-cost effect of product R&D and firm-specific technological competence. In addition, the model shows that other things being equal, the stock of exogenous technological knowledge, including the firm's previously accumulated technological knowledge, relevant to current R&D which is negatively related with current R&D effort. An empirical analysis of firm R&D intensities and technological capabilities of more than 1600 firms in nine industries across six countries provides supportive evidence for the theory. Further, the theory implies that R&D intensity or the R&D-to-sales ratio is independent of firm size unless firm size affects technological competence and that given consumer preference and R&D cost structure facing all firms in the same industry, the distribution of firm-specific technological competence among firms determines the distribution of firm R&D intensities within the industry.     

The semiconductor silicon industry roadmap: Epochs driven by the dynamics between disruptive technologies and core competencies

The resource-based perspective has done much to identify idiosyncratic firm attributes that may be a principal source of competitive advantages. Unfortunately, there has been little systematic industry evidence to support the strategic importance of core competence, nor has there been much work on the temporal or cumulative nature of core capabilities within an industrial setting. Further, little or no research has been performed demonstrating how the advent of technological discontinuities or disruptive technologies plays a part in creating epochs in technology competency development and the roadmap of an industry. In this study, we analyze the evolutionary and cumulative nature of core capabilities and their interactions with technological discontinuities from a market-driven perspective. We have studied the evolution of 167 firms through the 50-year history of the semiconductor silicon industry. Over time, there were several structural shifts in the necessary competencies through the advent of disruptive technologies. In the last 30 years, however, the change in the required competencies has been more cumulative in nature. We summarize this in a roadmap detailing the epochs in the semiconductor silicon industry.     

Charles Sanders Peirce and the Social Ontology of the Firm: A Semiotic Perspective on Human Agency

The ontological framework developed in the article aims to contribute to the social ontology of the firm by achieving three objectives: (i) to provide a well-developed conception of the human mind and conscience, (ii) to define the role of human agency in an evolutionary context and (iii) to highlight the importance of semiosis for the emergence of social structures with an emphasis on the concept of the firm as a social entity. Peirce’s semiotic conception of mind and consciousness provides insights for combining human signifying practices and social emergent properties. Thereupon, the semiotic attributions of the human mind may be understood as a basis for the ontological perspective of the firm.     

Firms,agency, and evolution

A recent (though controversial) trend in economics has been to appeal to evolutionary theory when addressing various open questions in the subject. I here further investigate one particular such appeal to evolutionary biology: the argument that, since markets select (in a standard biological sense) firms as coherent units, firms should be seen to be genuine economic agents. To assess this argument, I present a model of firm/office selection in a competitive market, and show that there are cases where markets can select for firms/offices as collective units – and thus, as agents of their own – but also that there are cases where they do not. In this way, I try to make the evolutionary argument for the agency-based view of the firm more precise.     

企业的性质:要素使用权交易合约之履行过程

本文对企业的性质进行了分析 ,发现企业的性质在于 ,企业是市场中由要素所有者签订的一组不完备的要素使用权交易合约的履行过程。要素使用权交易合约的履行过程包括要素投入、要素使用权 (核心是剩余控制权 )的行使以及要素增值的分配 (核心是剩余索取权的行使 )以及企业组织资本与组织资产的创造和使用等 ,这一过程融交易功能与生产功能于一体。该组合约的关键内容就在于企业剩余索取权与剩余控制权的安排。作为要素使用权交易合约的履行过程 ,企业与市场是不能截然对立分离的 ,即要素市场、资产及服务市场等与要素使用权交易合约的签订与履行是互为基础 ,互相促进的。     

能力—机会框架：理解企业创业和成长的统一视角*

“交易范式”影响下发展出来的主流经济学片面强调激励和契约,无法为理解真实世界的企业创业和成长现象提供有效理论支撑。本文重新构建了一个根植于“生产范式”,尤其是资源—能力理论和演化视角的,并能够适用于理解后发展语境下企业创业和成长现象的统一理论框架——“能力—机会”框架。这个框架包含四个基本命题：第一,当讨论企业创业和成长问题时,本质上都在讨论组织能力和市场机会的问题。第二,能力和机会的来源、类型以及二者系统性的变化过程,共同直接决定了企业的创业选择和成长动力。第三,能力和机会同时具有工业和产品特定性,只能在持续的工业生产和管理过程中内生出来。往往已经存在或有条件创造出什么类型的能力和机会时,才可能出现相应状态的创业和成长活动。第四,后发展语境中的特定组织能力和市场机会,从未因为市场经济制度的存在而自动产生。政府部门和公共研究机构等非市场组织,充当了塑造能力和机会的状态及其变化过程的关键力量。总之,“能力—机会”框架提供了一种显著区别于主流经济学的新研究视角,同时有助于弥合创业研究和企业成长研究长期存在的鸿沟。     

SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT RECONSIDERED

This paper demonstrates that Kornai's original concept of the soft budget constraint (SBC) as a theoretical innovation in micro‐theory disguises income redistributions that are essentially macroeconomic relationships. The SBC also postulates a competitive market economy as the benchmark of hard budget constraint (HBC) and efficiency. A recent formal theory explains the SBC as a component of profit‐maximizing strategic behaviour. From this perspective, the SBC can be integrated into the new microeconomics, but it loses its specific institutional connotation and its macroeconomic dimension. The SBC is thus included in ubiquitous market‐type relationships, particularly complete (optimal) contractual arrangements.     

The dynamics of firms in a micro-to-macro model: The role of training, learning and innovation

We analyze the co-evolution of the performances of firms and of the economy in an evolutionary micro-to-macro model of the Swedish economy. The model emphasizes the interactions between human capital (or competences) and technological change at the firm level and their effects on aggregate growth, taking into account the micro-macro feedbacks. The model features learning-by-doing, incremental and radical innovations, user-producer learning at the firm level, and a change in the techno-economic paradigm. We find that there is an optimal sequence for the firm to allocate their resources: (1) build a general human capital stock before the change in the techno-economic paradigm, (2) spend on R&D, and (3) invest in specific human capital. Innovators fare better than imitators on average, not only because they innovate, but also because they build a competence base, which supports the learning from other firms.     

企业会计契约:动态过程与效率

企业是利益相关者之间相互缔约形成的利益共同体 ,企业会计契约是企业契约的主要组成部分。利益相关者之间的利益冲突与协调是通过会计契约来实现的 ,而企业契约的执行所需要的计量与监督功能则具体落实在会计契约的动态运行与优化上。优化会计契约机制的经济途径是从决策行为的角度 ,将其剩余控制权配置给决策效率最大的参与者 ;而法律途径则是运用格式化方法将经过长期实践检验、对促使会计契约机制运行有效的惯例加以总结 ,以此节约会计契约结构的规范成本