共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 546 毫秒
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Sumon C. Mazumdar 《The Journal of Financial Research》1996,19(2):209-228
The joint influence of the Federal Reserve's (Fed) discount window credit and reserve requirements and FDIC's deposit insurance on a bank's optimal capital structure and asset risk choices is analyzed. The specific seniority of such regulatory claims, and potentially strong negative correlation between bank asset classes, significantly alters our traditional view of such regulatory influences on bank behavior. I find that the discount window's presence does not always prompt bank risk taking and leverage, but it does partially offset such incentives under certain conditions. In addition to its cost, a reserve requirement provides the bank with an indirect subsidy that may encourage deposit funding. Thus, regulatory reforms, such as the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991, which curtail banks' access to the discount window, may not always be appropriate to resolve a bank's incentive for moral hazard behavior. The Fed's presence needs to be more comprehensively examined to design effective regulatory policy. 相似文献
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William Beranek Christopher Cornwell Sunho Choi 《The Journal of Financial Research》1995,18(2):207-222
Using a large panel of industrial Compustat firms from 1971 to 1988, we find long-term external financing to be positively related to the period's capital expenditures on growth opportunities, but negatively related to beginning-of-the-period financial slack, broadly defined. These findings support the view that firms tend to match long-term sources of financing with long-lived assets, and short-term debt with short-lived assets. Our results also reinforce the belief that firms prefer internal to external financing. We find no evidence that firms favor financing capital expenditures with short-term debt, either permanently or temporarily. 相似文献
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就产融结合来看,东部地区的金融业比较发达,应该重点发展金融主导型的合作模式,而在中西部地区则应该发展产业主导型的合作模式。 相似文献
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We show how capital structure is influenced by the strength of shareholder rights. Our empirical evidence shows an inverse relation between leverage and shareholder rights, suggesting that firms adopt higher debt ratios where shareholder rights are more restricted. This is consistent with agency theory, which predicts that leverage helps alleviate agency problems. This negative relation, however, is not found in regulated firms (i.e., utilities). We contend that this is because regulation already helps alleviate agency conflicts and, hence, mitigates the role of leverage in controlling agency costs. 相似文献
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F. M. McDougall 《Accounting & Finance》1980,20(2):21-34
In this paper, a multi-period version of the CAPM is used to establish conditions for an optimal capital structure in the presence of a tax on corporate earnings, and bankruptcy costs. It is shown that the optimal point is reached when the marginal tax advantage arising from an increase in debt, is equal to the marginal increase in expected bankruptcy penalties. 相似文献
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The coskewness and dividend yield effects on capital asset prices have been established in two separate literatures. Neither literature controls for the variable in the other, nor for other potentially confounding factors such as size of the firm and the January effect on returns. Using stock return data for 1969–1978, this study provides evidence of coskewness, size, yield and January effects on stock returns. Coskewness appears to be a surrogate variable for dividend yield. When yield is controlled for, the coskewness effect cannot be detected. Hence, the significance of coskewness seems to result from the presence of the uncontrolled factor, dividend yield. 相似文献
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