When is a Nation? Comparing Lithuania and Georgia

The article uses a constructivist reformulation of the question 'when is a nation?' as a parameter of comparison for the analysis of nationalist discourses on history in post-socialist Lithuania and Georgia. It shows that Lithuanian nationalists, by means of a critical reassessment of national history, described the nation as something that still had to be created, whereas Georgian nationalists referred to the unchallenged image of a glorious past and so treated the nation as something to be simply picked up from history. It is also argued that these diverging historiographical narratives correspond to different conceptualisations of the notion of the nation. While Lithuanians nationalists conceptualised the nation in the tradition of the French Revolution as a category that aims at the reconfiguration of state-society relations, Georgian nationalists identified it with traditional modes of organising social relations.     

When is the Greek Nation? The Role of Enemies and Minorities

This paper questions the importance and usefulness of identifying, through theoretical analysis and empirical study, an historical moment when a nation comes into being. In the first part of our study, we discuss briefly the theoretical background of the question 'when is the nation?'. The second part addresses this question with reference to the Greek case. We first look at the process of consolidation of Greek national identity during the first two decades of the twentieth century. The role of Turks, Bulgarians and other neighbouring countries in the development and crystallisation of Greek nationhood is highlighted. We show that although the Greek nation-state was established in 1829, the Greek nation has been in the process of becoming through the nineteenth century until the 1920s, when its ethnic and territorial components were brought together and irredentism was abandoned. However, as we show in the section that follows, the Greek nation has been further reshaped through its interaction with the Muslim minority of western Thrace, its fundamental 'Other within' during the twentieth century. In the concluding section, we look at more recent developments, such as the Greece-FYROM controversy, that have further influenced the definition of the Greek nation. By analysing the dynamic and constantly evolving nature of nation formation as a socio-political process, we show that fixing an historical moment when a nation comes into being is an analytic exercise for which there is little empirical grounding. Rather, we argue, scholarly research should concentrate on 'how' is the nation.     

When is a Nation not a Nation? The Case of Anglo-British Nationhood

This article examines the articulation of Anglo-British national identity in the tabloid Press, paying particular attention to how the emotions of shame, sorrow, defiance and nostalgia underlie much tabloid discourse of nationhood. These are depicted either as emotions aroused in the writer (and, by extension, the reader) by aspects of the Anglo-British nation; or as emotions which the nation itself (and, again, the reader) is experiencing. The exaggeration and intensity of this discourse suggests that the tabloids are adopting a special role in defending not only the virtues of the Anglo-British nation but also the very notion of nationhood, at a time when this is being undermined by various social, political and economic forces. The study thus provides insight into the dynamic and contested character of contemporary Anglo-Britishness, and illustrates that the nation is a process rather than an entity that either exists or does not exist.     

When is reputation bad?

In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds. The key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is “bad.” We allow a broad set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the “Stackelberg type” used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely.     

When is there state independence?

Whether a preference relation can be represented using state-independent utilities as opposed to state-dependent utilities may depend on which acts count as constant acts. This observation underlies an extension of Savage's expected utility theory to the state-dependent case that was proposed in this journal by Edi Karni. His result contains a condition requiring the existence of a set of acts which can play the role of constant acts and support a representation involving a state-independent utility function. This paper contains necessary and sufficient conditions on the preference relation for such a set of acts to exist. Results are obtained both for the Savage and the Anscombe and Aumann frameworks. Among the corollaries are representation theorems for state-dependent utilities. Relationships to Karni's work and extensions of the results are discussed.     

When is the optimal lending contract in microfinance state non-contingent?

Whether a microfinance institution should use a state-contingent repayment or not is very important since a state-contingent loan can provide insurance for borrowers. However, the classic Grameen bank used state non-contingent repayment, which is puzzling since it forces poor borrowers to make their payments even under hard circumstances. This paper provides an explanation to this puzzle. We consider two modes of lending, group and individual lending, and for each mode we characterize the optimal lending and supervisory contracts when a staff member (a supervisor) can embezzle borrowers’ repayments by misrepresenting realized returns. We identify the main trade-off between the insurance gain and the cost of controlling the supervisor's misbehavior. We also find that group lending dominates individual lending either by providing more insurance or by saving audit costs.     

When is your experience valuable? Occupation-industry transitions and self-employment success

The literature on employee spinoffs has, for a long time, stressed the importance of industry-specific skills and experiences in explaining the success of new firms. We argue that employees also develop skills that are associated with their occupation within an industry, and that success as an entrepreneur, therefore, is also contingent on the relation between the entrepreneurs’ previous occupation and the industry in which they operate as self-employed. Using matched employer-employee data, we develop a measure, occupational spin-offs, that accounts for this relation. An occupational spin-off is defined as a start-up in the most common industry, given the previous occupation of the founder. We then show that entrepreneurs starting occupational spinoffs enjoy above average income from self-employment and have longer spells as business owners.     

When is fiscal adjustment an illusion?

Fiscal adjustment is an illusion when it lowers the budget deficit or public debt but leaves government net worth unchanged. Conventional measures of the budget deficit largely show the change in public sector debt. Ideally, the measured deficit would reflect the change in public sector net worth. Many people consider it impractical to try to measure public sector assets. My paper does not discuss what the deficit should measure, but instead proposes a positive and testable theory of how governments actually behave.
When an outside agent forces a reduction in a government's conventional deficit and debt accumulation, the government responds by lowering asset accumulation or increasing hidden liabilities. Since government net worth is unchanged, such fiscal adjustment is an illusion. Using data from countries with World Bank and IMF fiscal adjustment programmes, and case studies of EMU countries' compliance with the Maastricht criteria, I confirm my theoretical predictions: fiscal adjustment in these countries was at least partly an illusion.     

When is FDI a capital flow?

In this paper we analyze the conditions under which a foreign direct investment (FDI) involves a net capital flow across countries. For this purpose, we investigate how multinational firms finance their foreign affiliates, globally or locally. We develop a contract theoretical model in which the financing structure is used to govern the incentives of managers. We find that the investment tends to be financed locally if managerial incentive problems are large. Thus, microeconomic governance problems may have macroeconomic implications for the net capital flow to host countries. Our results are consistent with survey data on German and Austrian investment flows of firms to Eastern Europe.     

When is multidimensional screening a convex program?

A principal wishes to transact business with a multidimensional distribution of agents whose preferences are known only in the aggregate. Assuming a twist (= generalized Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing) hypothesis, quasi-linear utilities, and that agents can choose only pure strategies, we identify a structural condition on the value b(x,y) of product type y to agent type x — and on the principal?s costs c(y) — which is necessary and sufficient for reducing the profit maximization problem faced by the principal to a convex program. This is a key step toward making the principal?s problem theoretically and computationally tractable; in particular, it allows us to derive uniqueness and stability of the principal?s optimal strategy — and similarly of the strategy maximizing the expected welfare of the agents when the principal?s profitability is constrained. We call this condition non-negative cross-curvature: it is also (i) necessary and sufficient to guarantee convexity of the set of b-convex functions, (ii) invariant under reparametrization of agent and/or product types by diffeomorphisms, and (iii) a strengthening of Ma, Trudinger and Wang?s necessary and sufficient condition (A3w) for continuity of the correspondence between an exogenously prescribed distribution of agents and of products. We derive the persistence of economic effects such as the desirability for a monopoly to establish prices so high they effectively exclude a positive fraction of its potential customers, in nearly the full range of non-negatively cross-curved models.     

When is market incompleteness irrelevant for the price of aggregate risk (and when is it not)?

In a standard incomplete markets model with a continuum of households that have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) preferences, the absence of insurance markets for idiosyncratic labor income risk has no effect on the premium for aggregate risk if the distribution of idiosyncratic risk is independent of aggregate shocks and aggregate consumption growth is independent over time. In equilibrium, households only use the stock market to smooth consumption; the bond market is inoperative. Furthermore, the cross-sectional distributions of wealth and consumption are not affected by aggregate shocks. These results hold regardless of the persistence of idiosyncratic shocks, even when households face tight solvency constraints. A weaker irrelevance result survives when we allow for predictability in aggregate consumption growth.     

When is a “wait and see” approach to invasive species justified?

Predictions of damages and damages that might be avoided from invasive species control policies are marred by uncertainty that has both economic and ecological roots. Public policies directed at invasive species typically lag their detection. One possible explanation is the coupling of uncertainty with political and economic commitments creates an incentive to delay a policy response in order to gain more information on how damaging the invasion will be – a “wait and see” approach. We investigate whether this rationale is justified by identifying invasion characteristics that require the wait and see approach often adopted by lawmakers and government agencies. The model shows that the source of uncertainty and degree of policy irreversibility matter and allows the classification of invasive species with a low rate of spread and low levels of uncertainty as those where policies can be optimally timed in the future.     

When is money neutral under flexible exchange rates?

The paper studies the conditions for the neutrality of money under flexible exchange rates in an extended real-wage Mundell–Fleming model, with special emphasis on the specification of the behavior functions to correspond to their foundations in closed-economy macrotheory.It is shown that monetary expansion causes output first to decline, to eventually rise above its original level. However, if interest earnings on foreign securities dominate the trade balance in the expression for the exchange rate, monetary expansion leads to an appreciation of the exchange rate, while having an expansionary output effect. Money is neutral in the long run if either the wealth effect or foreign interest payments are abstracted from; if both are abstracted from, it is neutral also in the short run. Short and long-run neutrality results also if wealth consists only of foreign securities. The above responses hold both for net creditors and – with a minor qualification – debtors.     

When old meets young? Germany's population ageing and the current account

In a three-region New Keynesian life-cycle model calibrated to Germany, the Euro area (without Germany) and the rest of the world, we analyze the impact of population ageing on net foreign asset and current account developments. Using unsynchronized demographic trends by taking those of Germany as given and assuming constant population everywhere else, we are able to generate German current account surpluses of up to 15% of GDP during the first half of this century. However, projected demographic trends from 2000 to 2080 in OECD countries (and China in an additional analysis) are much more synchronized. Feeding these into our model suggests that the average annual German current account surplus from 2000 to 2018 that should be attributed to ageing reduces to around 2.83% (1.23%) of GDP, with a maximum at 4.3% (2.7%) in 2006 (when taking into account China), turning negative around 2035.     

When is fish quota enforcement worth while? A study of the Northeast Arctic cod

Many fish stocks are controlled by fish quotas divided among individual firms. Such quota regimes need an enforcement mechanism in order to be effective. Whether or not quota management regimes are worth while depends on whether the rents generated by such regimes cover their costs. Cost-efficient quota regimes would attain an optimal deterrence through minimal control and high fines, but in practice there are likely to be socially determined limits on how high fines could be set. We analyze these questions for the Northeast Arctic cod stock, using data on enforcement of Norwegian fish quotas.     

Fixed Exchange Rates and Banking Crises: When Does the Former Prevent the Latter?

Because monetary policy is constrained in fixed exchange rate regimes, banks should expect fewer money‐financed bailouts and therefore manage their risks more carefully when exchange rates are fixed than when they are flexible. It follows that we should observe fewer banking crises in countries with formal currency pegs. The 1990s however are littered with occurrences of banking crises in countries with fixed exchange rates. This paper asks whether banks in those countries could have adopted excess risk expecting money‐financed bailouts or whether their pegs discouraged such moral hazard‐type risks.     

When do the USDA forecasters make mistakes?

This study analysed forecasts for all US corn, soya bean and wheat categories published within the World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates (WASDE ) reports over the 1987/88 through 2009/10 marketing years in an attempt to identify patterns and better understand when the USDA forecasters make mistakes. Two general sources of errors were investigated: behavioural and macroeconomic factors. The first objective was to examine how these factors affect the size of the forecast error and the second concentrated on the direction of the error due to these effects. Our findings suggest that the largest increase in the size of USDA forecast errors was associated with structural changes in commodity markets that took place in the mid-2000s. Corn, soya bean and wheat forecast errors also grew during the periods of economic growth and with changes in exchange rates, while inflation and changes in oil price had a much smaller impact. With respect to behavioural sources, we identified patterns consistent with leniency and pessimism across different categories. Predictability of forecast errors based on the information available at the time the forecasts are made provides evidence of inefficiency and suggests that these forecasts may be improved using the findings of this study.