Not all international monetary shocks are alike for the Japanese economy

This paper examines the influence of monetary aggregates shocks in the U.S., China and the Euro area on Japan. China's monetary expansion has significant effects on Japan's economy that are quite different from those of the U.S. and Euro area. In line with the implications of the Mundell–Fleming model when there are capital controls in place, Chinese monetary expansion is found to primarily affect Japan through trade. The income absorption effect of China's monetary expansion is substantial for Japan. China's monetary expansion results in significant increases in Japan's industrial production, exports and inflation, and decreases in the trade-weighted yen. After 24 months, monetary shocks in China forecast 20% of the variation in Japan's real trade balance. In contrast, U.S. monetary expansion results in contraction in Japan's industrial production, exports and trade balance (expenditure-switching). Monetary expansion in the Euro area does not significantly affect Japan. Structural vector error correction models and a factor-augmented model are estimated to establish robustness of results.     

Convergence of interest rates around the Pacific Rim

This article applies the panel data unit root tests provided by Im, Pesaran and Shin (Discussion paper, 1997) to examine the interest rate convergence of small-open Asian countries with major financial centres. With monthly data from 1988:1 to 1997:6, it was found that the nominal interest rates of these countries converge to the US rates rather than to Japan's. This finding is consistent with the view that the monetary authorities of non-Japan Asian economies pegged their exchange rates overwhelmingly to the dollar rather than the yen before the financial crisis of 1997.     

Aiding regional instability? The geopolitical paradox of Japanese development assistance to China

During the past decade, Japan established itself as the largest bilateral donor of development aid in the world, with more of it directed toward projects in China than any other recipient. Japan sees its aid flows to China as maintaining economic stability in East Asia, particularly as China's raw material and energy resources are articulated into regional markets. In this article, I argue that Japan's aid to China may unintentionally diminish Japan's and the East Asian region's long‐term security for two reasons. First, similar to other nations receiving such assistance, this aid may allow China to reallocate scarce capital to military modernisation. Such military modernisation may enable China to both better suppress internal dissent and carry out a more aggressive foreign policy. Second, this aid does not address the fundamental structural aspects of China's present instability. Long‐term structural instability has many sources, but the two discussed here are socio‐economic inequality (both interregional and intraregional), and sustainable production and environmental problems. Taken together these have important regional and geopolitical implications and repercussions. This article fills a gap in the existing literature on East Asian geopolitics. Namely, that by attending only to relatively short‐term corporate and perceived state interests of China and Japan, Japanese aid to China does little to ameliorate and potentially exacerbates long‐term structural social and environmental problems for China's vast majority living in rural hinterlands. The potential for internal turmoil springing from this uneven and unsustainable development inside China is the real basis for China's ‘threat’ to East Asian security. Thus what appears to make good development and geopolitical sense at first look, Japan's current aid regime with China, paradoxically may actually be the worst path to follow.     

Structural VAR models for Malaysian monetary policy analysis during the pre- and post-1997 Asian crisis periods

This article conducts an in-depth investigation into building a Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model and analysing the Malaysian monetary policy. Considerable attention is paid to: (i) the selection of foreign, policy and target variables; (ii) establish identifying restrictions and improve the estimates of impulse response functions; (iii) assess the importance of intermediate channels in transmitting monetary policy mechanism; and (iv) the way in which the 1997 Asian financial crisis affected the working of monetary policy. Malaysia is an interesting small open economy to study because, following this crisis, the government imposed capital and exchange rate control measures. The overall results suggest that the crisis and the subsequent major shift in the exchange rate regime have significantly affected the Malaysian ‘Black Box’. In the pre-crisis period, domestic variables appear to be more vulnerable to foreign monetary shocks. Further, the exchange rate played a significant role in transmitting the interest rate shocks, whereas credit and asset prices helped to propagate the money shock. In the post-crisis period however, asset prices play a more domineering role in intensifying the effects of both interest rate and money shocks on output, and the economy was insulated from foreign shocks.     

Understanding Benign Liquidity Traps: The Case of Japan

Japan has been in a benign liquidity trap since the 1990s. In a benign liquidity trap, interest rates approach zero and monetary policy is ineffective but output and employment perform decently. Such a pattern contradicts traditional macro theories. This paper introduces a monetary general equilibrium model that is compatible with Japan's performance and resolves puzzles associated with liquidity traps. Possible conclusions for Anglo‐Saxon countries and eurozone members are also discussed.     

Domestic Political Institutions,Diplomatic Style and Trade Agreements: A Comparative Study of China and Japan

Through an analysis of the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs), this article seeks to examine the factors that caused the gap in Japan and China's relationship with Southeast Asia to emerge and expand in the new millennium. In order to address this question, the article focuses on China and Japan's diplomatic styles and domestic political institutions and examines how these two elements influenced negotiations on the formation of FTAs, as well as the evolving perceptions that the Southeast Asian nations have of these two states. The article argues that Japan and China possess different kinds of weaknesses in implementing feasible external policies – a lack of policy decisiveness for Japan and weak policy credibility for China – which have resulted from the operation of domestic political institutions. Given these differences, while China implemented pragmatic diplomacy that helped improve its policy credibility, Japan's bargaining diplomatic style did not serve to rectify its weak policy decisiveness. Such differences in their diplomatic approach have led to the differing influence of these two states on Southeast Asia.     

Unlikely Pivotal States in Competitive Free Trade Agreement Diffusion: The Effect of Japan's Trans-Pacific Partnership Participation on Asia-Pacific Regional Integration

How can a state with dysfunctional trade politics spur the negotiation of major free trade agreements (FTAs)? Using the case of Japan's participation in the trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), we develop an analytical framework on FTA diffusion that takes into account multidimensional (economic, legal and political) competitive pressures, and the ability of states to act as pivots in triggering FTA cascades. We disaggregate the makeup of a pivotal state into two main components – capability and credibility – and underscore Japan's significant latent capabilities, but also its serious credibility shortcomings. The TPP's boost to Japan's credibility raised the possibility of significant economic, legal and political externalities for specific countries which responded by accelerating FTA initiatives that had long stalled: the trilateral China–Japan–Korea FTA, a 16-state East Asian FTA and the Japan–European Union trade negotiations. This study extends the theoretical frontier in policy diffusion studies by clarifying the combination of factors that allows some states, but not others, to activate the externalities behind the dissemination of defensive FTAs.     

The East Asian Dollar Standard, Fear of Floating, and Original Sin

Before the crisis of 1997/98, the East Asian economies—except for Japan but including China—pegged their currencies to the US dollar. To avoid further turmoil, the IMF argues that these currencies should float more freely. However, the authors’ econometric estimations show that the dollar's predominant weight in East Asian currency baskets has returned to its pre‐crisis levels. By 2002, the day‐to‐day volatility of each country's exchange rate against the dollar had again become negligible. Most governments were rapidly accumulating a “war chest” of official dollar reserves, which portends that this exchange rate stabilization will come to extend over months or quarters. From the doctrine of “original sin” applied to emerging‐market economies, the authors argue that this fear of floating is entirely rational from the perspective of each individual country. And their joint pegging to the dollar benefits the East Asian dollar bloc as a whole, although Japan remains an important outlier.     

The endogeneity of the Optimum Currency Area criteria in East Asia

The Asian financial crisis in mid-1997 has increased interest in policies to achieve greater regional exchange rate stability in East Asia. It has renewed calls for greater monetary and exchange rate cooperation. A country's suitability to join a monetary union depends, inter alia, on the trade intensity and the business cycle synchronization with other potential members of the monetary union. However, these two Optimum Currency Area criteria are endogenous. Theoretically, the effect of increased trade integration (after the elimination of exchange fluctuations among the countries in the region) on the business cycle synchronization is ambiguous. Reduction in trade barriers can potentially increase industrial specialization by country and therefore resulting in more asymmetry business cycles from industry-specific shocks. On the other hand, increased trade integration may result in more highly correlated business cycles due to common demand shocks or intra-industry trade. If the second hypothesis is empirically verified, policy makers have little to worry about the region being unsynchronized in their business cycles as the business cycles will become more synchronized after the monetary union is formed. This paper assesses the dynamic relationships between trade, finance, specialization and business cycle synchronization for East Asian economies using a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) approach. The dynamic panel approach improves on previous efforts to examine the business cycle correlations — trade link using panel procedures, which control for the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables. Based on the findings on how trade, finance and sectoral specialization have effects on the size of common shocks among countries, potential policies that can help East Asian countries move closer toward a regional currency arrangement can be suggested. The empirical results of this study suggest that there exists scope for East Asia to form a monetary union.     

Structural change and international stock market interdependence: Evidence from Asian emerging markets

This study investigates the evolving pattern of the interdependence among selected Asian emerging markets and three major stock markets (Japan, UK and US). Using rolling cointegration methods and the recently developed algorithms of inductive causation, we found that time-varying cointegration relationships exist among these stock markets. The results indicate that the wave of financial liberalization policies in the early 1990s led to a significant increase in market linkages which was later weakened during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Furthermore, the data indicate that Japan and the US have the greatest influence on the emerging markets while the influence of Singapore and Thailand has increased since the Asian financial crisis.     

Applying the Lessons of Asia: The IMF's Crisis Management Strategy following the Global Financial Crisis

ABSTRACT

The paper reviews the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) non-concessional lending programs following the global financial crisis, with a view to understanding how the IMF applied the lessons of the Asian crisis in designing its approach to crisis management. For this purpose, the paper focuses on the 2008 programs in Hungary, Iceland, Latvia and Ukraine – the first of its kind since the early 2000s – and compares them with the 1997 programs in Indonesia, Korea and Thailand. Our analysis finds the European programs better funded and their structural conditionality more focused. Other than these, the overall thrust of the programs was similar: fiscal and monetary tightening, coupled with banking reforms. The real difference was not so much about content but about philosophy. Relative to the Asian programs, the European programs were characterized by more emphasis on ownership, greater collaboration among stakeholders, more realistic assumptions and greater transparency about the risks and the logic of policy actions, and more built-in flexibility of targets and policy options. This approach to crisis management incorporated the changes that had been made since the Asian crisis in the IMF's policies and procedures to manage capital account crises more effectively.     

ADAPTIVE LEARNING AND MONETARY POLICY IN AN OPEN ECONOMY: LESSONS FROM JAPAN

Abstract. Motivated by Japan's economic experiences in recent decades, we incorporate adaptive learning into an open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to examine the volatility and welfare impact of alternative monetary policies. Comparing four Taylor‐styled policy rules that reflect Japan's monetary policy debates, we first show that imperfect knowledge and the associated learning process induce higher volatility in the economy and that explicit exchange rate stabilization is unwarranted. Moreover, contrary to results under the rational expectation paradigm, we find that while tight inflation controls raise output volatility, they can improve overall welfare under learning by smoothing inflation fluctuations.     

Asian real interest rates, nonlinear dynamics, and international parity

This study tests for nonlinearities in the real interest differentials of four South East Asian economies with respect to Japan and the United States. The logistic and exponential smooth transition regression models are applied to monthly data over the sample period 1977M1–2000M3. There is evidence of nonlinearities in Asian real interest differentials where nonlinearities are often captured by the logistic smooth transition autoregressive (STAR) model. The extent of nonlinearities varies across the sample with the Singapore–Japan and Thailand–Japan differentials exhibiting the sharpest transition from one regime to another. Large shocks to real interest parity (RIP) are more likely to lead to the reestablishment of parity at a faster rate than small shocks. Modeling the nonlinear stochastic dynamics of RIP can thus be useful for policymaking purposes in recovering information on monetary and financial crises.     

What Happened to the Japanese Model?

Japan's steep postwar growth was nested in a political economy built around producer‐oriented policies: by fostering the growth of large firms using the tools of industrial policy, the government could jumpstart development. Many large firms, and their employees, benefited indirectly from this growth program, and very small firms and industries not included in the growth model were compensated through preferential policies or subsidies. Japan's social contract evolved around this system, having as its centerpiece lifetime employment. The government spent more resources on supporting exporting industries and compensating domestic ones than on building a forward‐looking welfare system. Japan's decade‐long economic downturn marks a structural transition towards a postindustrial society. While excelling in producing tangibles, Japan has fallen behind in fostering modern industries, including services; the country also lacks a welfare system to handle increasing structural unemployment that this transition brings about. Without a commitment towards a welfare system and a welfare society, and a reorientation of the social contract towards citizens, Japan is unlikely to transition successfully.     

The 1997 Asian Currency Crisis,Financial Linkages,and the Monetary Policy of Japan

The evidence is examined that excessively liberal monetary policy by the Bank of Japan, before and after the financial collapse of Japan in 1992, may have led other East Asian economies into “over‐borrowing” and speculative investments, prior to the currency crisis in 1997–98. The authors test for cointegration and Granger causality between Japanese money supply M1 and the domestic investment of eight East Asian economies and Australia. US and German money supplies are also used as a benchmark. There is strong evidence that there are long‐ and short‐run causal relationships between the Japanese money supply and the domestic investment of the Asian crisis‐inflicted economies prior to 1997.     

Revisiting the Roots of Japan's Economic Stagnation: The role of the Japanese corporation

For a long period in the 20th century, the development of the Japanese corporation appeared congruent with the development of the Japanese economy. The growth-maximising behaviour of the Japanese corporation and the preference for internal growth over acquisitions (see Odagiri, 1992) appeared to suit the long-term ambitions of Japan. Now, that formerly clear connection between the ambitions of corporate Japan and the Japanese public interest is no longer so clear. Increasingly, the global ambitions of the corporation appear as an impediment to Japan's economic development. By favouring the development of large-scale transnational corporations, Japanese industrial policy-making appears to have contained a fundamental flaw. Japan is now dominated by large-scale organisations with global ambitions, controlled by corporate elites. It is unlikely that their strategic decisions will correspond with the wider public interest, which raises the possibility that Japan is now afflicted with 'strategic failure'. Other examples from around the world suggest that Japan is not unique in this respect. Alternative ways forward are suggested.     

The Effectiveness of Unconventional Monetary Policy in Japan

Since the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, central bankers around the world have been forced to abandon conventional monetary policy tools in favor of unconventional policies such as quantitative easing, forward guidance, and even lowering the interest rate paid on bank reserves into negative territory. Japan, which faced a crisis in its banking sector and came up against the theoretical zero lower bound on interest rates nearly a decade earlier, was a pioneer in the use of many of these unconventional policy tools. This article analyzes the effectiveness of Japan’s bold experiment with unconventional monetary policy. Using a panel of bi-annual bank data covering the full universe of Japanese commercial banks over a fifteen-year period, this study analyzes the effectiveness of quantitative easing policy on the bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission. Our findings suggest that Japan’s unconventional monetary policy worked: there is a bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in Japan. These results are robust to the inclusion of time fixed effects and generalized method of moments analysis.     

THE EFFECTS OF THE BANK OF JAPAN'S ZERO INTEREST RATE COMMITMENT AND QUANTITATIVE MONETARY EASING ON THE YIELD CURVE: A MACRO‐FINANCE APPROACH*

This paper empirically investigates the effects of the Bank of Japan's (BOJ) zero interest rate commitment and quantitative monetary easing on the yield curve. Applying a macro‐finance approach, we decompose interest rates into expectations and risk premium components and extract the market's perception of the BOJ's policy stance. We make clear the counterfactual policy without the BOJ's commitment. We find some evidence that the commitment lowered interest rates and mat raising the reserve target may have been perceived as a signal indicating the BOJ's accommodative policy stance. The portfolio rebalancing effect has not been found to be significant.     

Exchange rate volatility and exports from East Asian countries to Japan and the USA

The purpose of this article is to investigate the impact of exchange rate volatility on exports in four East Asian countries (Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Thailand). Specifically, this article aims at determining whether the bilateral real exchange rate volatility between an East Asian country and its trading partner negatively affects the exports of the East Asian country. Considering the dominant roles of the USA and Japan as trading partners of those East Asian countries, this article focuses on the quarterly export volumes of East Asian countries to the US and Japan for the period from 1981 to 2004. Except for the case of Hong Kong's exports to Japan, cointegration tests and estimations of error correction models indicate exchange rate volatility has negative impacts on exports either in the short-run or in the long-run, or both. On the other hand, the real GDP of importing countries and depreciation of real bilateral exchange rates turn out, in general, to have positive effects. Of special interest is the finding that the impact of the exchange rate volatility does not show any stylized differences depending on whether the importing country is Japan or the USA, even though dollar invoicing dominates in East Asia.     

Monetary Policy in the Aftermath of Currency Crises: The Case of Asia

The paper evaluates monetary policy and its relationship with the exchange rate in the five Asian crisis countries. The findings are compared with previous currency crises in recent history. It is found that there is no evidence of overly tight monetary policy in the Asian crisis countries in 1997 and early 1998. There is also no evidence that high interest rates led to weaker exchange rates. The usual tradeoff between inflation and output when raising interest rates suggested the need for a softer monetary policy in the crisis countries to combat recession. However, in some countries, corporate balance sheet considerations suggested the need to reverse overly depreciated currencies through firmer monetary policy.