Financial frictions and optimal stabilization policy in a monetary union

Financial frictions differ across countries and thus cause international differences in the transmission of shocks. This paper shows how the optimal mix of monetary and fiscal policy depends on these country-specific financial frictions. To this end, we build a two-country DSGE-model of a monetary union. Financial frictions are captured by the cost channel approach. We show that the traditional solution to the assignment problem – the common central bank stabilizes the inflation rate at the union level and the national fiscal authorities stabilize the national economies – does not hold in a world with financial frictions. The cost channel decreases the efficiency of monetary policy and increases the need for fiscal stabilization even at the union level. Moreover, the more heterogeneous the union, the more important is fiscal policy in stabilizing shocks. Finally, we evaluate the scenarios in terms of welfare of the representative household.     

Overturning Mundell: Fiscal Policy in a Monetary Union

Central to ongoing debates over the desirability of monetary unions is a supposed trade-off, outlined by Mundell (1961) : a monetary union reduces transactions costs but renders stabilization policy less effective. If shocks across countries are sufficiently correlated, then, according to this argument, delegating monetary policy to a single central bank is not very costly and a monetary union is desirable.
This paper explores this argument in a setting with both monetary and fiscal policies. In an economy with monetary policy alone, we confirm the presence of the trade-off and find that indeed a monetary union will not be welfare improving if the correlation of national shocks is too low. However, fiscal interventions by national governments, combined with a central bank that has the ability to commit to monetary policy, overturn these results. In equilibrium, such a monetary union will be welfare improving for any correlation of shocks.     

The optimality of a gulf currency union: Commonalities and idiosyncrasies

A high degree of shared national elements that drive the bulk of observed output volatility between countries is generally seen as a necessary prerequisite for the formation of a successful monetary union. This is because countries in a monetary union accept a one-size-fits all, resigning regions to policies that are based on some aggregate macroeconomic target rather than a country-specific one. For this reason, the cost of monetary union membership depends on the incidence of asymmetric (nation-specific) shocks rather than symmetric, or common shocks. This criteria is examined for the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, who reaffirmed plans for the implementation of a single currency. This paper quantifies, using structural factor models with common factor restrictions, changes in output synchronisation, the importance of common factor or idiosyncratic shocks between the regions, and the synchronisation of these shocks across the GCC as well as the implications for GCC-wide macroeconomic policy at short-to-medium term horizons. Despite current difficulties in fulfilling the convergence criteria goals to monetary union, the results show the synchronisation of output growth fluctuations between economies of the GCC to have increased over the past 25 years. This paper also finds that a fairly sizeable proportion of output fluctuations in business cycle frequencies are driven by a common component that, to some degree, reflects U.S. monetary policy and U.S. demand shocks as well as changes in crude oil prices.     

MONETARY POLICY IN EMU WITH ASYMMETRIC TRANSMISSION AND NON-TRADABLE GOODS

Which policy objective should a central bank pursue in a monetary union with asymmetric monetary transmission and different rates of inflation? Should it base its decisions on the EU‐wide average of inflation and growth or should it instead focus on (appropriately weighted) national utility losses based on national rates of inflation and growth? We find that a policy which minimises the sum of national utility losses leads to higher average utility if the variability of common shocks is large relative to idiosyncratic demand shocks in the non‐tradables sectors. We draw conclusions for the appropriate weight of common and national objectives in the union.     

“Core” and “Periphery” in a Monetary Union: A Macroeconomic Policy Game

We develop a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study strategic interactions between macroeconomic policy makers, namely the central bank and governments. In this union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies, whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a core, with lower initial public debt, and a periphery, with higher initial public debt. For a symmetric demand shock, we derive numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that mildly active cooperative countercyclical policies dominate noncooperative solutions and a scenario of no policy intervention. Optimal policies call for a brief expansionary action to bolster the effects on output and a return to a small fiscal primary surplus as soon as the crisis is over until the targeted level of public debt is reached.     

Wage restraint and monetary union

Existing work on wage bargaining predicts more aggressive wage setting under monetary union. This is exemplified by Cukierman and Lippi (2001) who postulate that wages are set having area-wide prices in mind. The insight of aggressive wage behaviour has not been confirmed by the EMU experience, which has been characterised by wage moderation. The present paper investigates the possibility of wage restraint using a monetary union model which, realistically, assumes that trade unions set wages with national prices in mind. Drawing on plausible ranges for all parameter values (and macroeconomic shocks), our simulations show that a monetary union elicits real wages that are broadly comparable to those obtained under monetary autonomy. The confidence bounds around these results are rather wide, in particular including scenarios of wage restraint.     

“Haircuts” for the EMU periphery: virtue or vice?

We use a dynamic game model of a two-country monetary union to study the impacts of an exogenous fall in aggregate demand, the resulting increase in public debt, and the consequences of a sovereign debt haircut for a member country or bloc of the union. Two different scenarios for such a haircut are assumed: an expected and an unexpected haircut. In the union, the governments of participating countries pursue national goals when deciding on fiscal policies whereas the common central bank’s monetary policy aims at union-wide objective variables. The union considered is asymmetric, consisting of a “core” with lower initial public debt, and a “periphery” with higher initial public debt. The “periphery’’ may experience the haircut due to the high level of its sovereign debt. We calculate numerical solutions of the dynamic game between the governments and the central bank using the OPTGAME algorithm. We show that a haircut as modeled in our study is disadvantageous for both the “core” and the “periphery” of the monetary union, both when expected and when unexpected.     

Fiscal Transfers in a Monetary Union with Exit Option

It is widely debated whether a monetary union has to be accompanied by a fiscal transfer scheme to accommodate asymmetric shocks. We build a model of a monetary union with a central bank and two heterogeneous countries that are linked by a fiscal transfer scheme with repercussions on monetary policy. A central bank aiming at securing the existence of a monetary union in the presence of asymmetric shocks has to compensate single countries for the tax distortions arising from fiscal transfers. Monetary policy may become more expansionary or restrictive depending on asymmetries between member countries' inflation aversion and exit costs.     

A model of relative national price levels under pricing to market

This paper proposes an alternative to the Balassa-Samuelson theory of how relative price levels between countries are determined. The theory is a general equilibrium formulation of a model where pricing to market arises endogenously from firm decisions. It differs from Balassa-Samuelson in that it centers on the distinction between segmented national goods markets rather than the distinction between traded and nontraded goods. The paper also explores how Balassa-Samuelson might be updated by combining it together with pricing to market elements. Applied to the case of a monetary union, the theory offers an alternative explanation for the inflation differentials observed in EMU. It implies that such differentials may be a natural and enduring feature of a monetary union in which markets for goods and labor are less than fully integrated.     

One Size Must Fit All: National Divergences in a Monetary Union

Should a common central bank in a heterogeneous monetary union base its decisions on EU‐wide averages of economic variables or on national welfare losses? A central bank that minimizes the sum of national welfare losses reacts less to common shocks. Under certain parameter constellations this leads to higher average union‐wide expected welfare and it might thus be preferable that decision‐making is dominated by national representatives. Countries with a transmission mechanism far from the average benefit from an orientation on national welfare losses. For countries with a transmission mechanism close to the average, welfare can be lower in this case.     

Discretionary policy in a monetary union with sovereign debt

This paper examines the interactions between multiple national fiscal policymakers and a single monetary policy maker in response to shocks to government debt in some or all of the countries of a monetary union. We assume that national governments respond to excess debt in an optimal manner, but that they do not have access to a commitment technology. This implies that national fiscal policy gradually reduces debt: the lack of a commitment technology precludes a random walk in steady-state debt, but the need to maintain national competitiveness avoids excessively rapid debt reduction. If the central bank can commit, it adjusts its policies only slightly in response to higher debt, allowing national fiscal policy to undertake most of the adjustment. However, if it cannot commit, then optimal monetary policy involves using interest rates to rapidly reduce debt, with significant welfare costs. We show that in these circumstances the central bank would do better to ignore national fiscal policies in formulating its policy.     

HETEROGENEITY IN A CURRENCY UNION WITH SOCIAL MARKET OBJECTIVES

In this paper, we explore whether heterogeneity among union members could threaten the stability of the European Monetary Union. The types of heterogeneity we consider are (1) asymmetries in the transmission of monetary and fiscal policies, and (2) differences in national preferences for price stability, output growth, and income redistribution. Our results show that the costs of membership can be significant for countries whose transmissions, structure, or preferences deviate from those underlying the common monetary policy. In part, these costs arise because monetary policy imposed by an independent central bank automatically constrains the use of fiscal policy by national governments.     

Monetary union or currency competition? Currency arrangements for monetary stability in East and West

Recent events in the European Monetary System on the one hand and monetary disintegration in the former Soviet Union on the other hand have revived interest in the question of how to design and choose a monetary regime for both parts of Europe that ensures monetary stability. The objective of monetary stability can be achieved either by complete monetary union or by currency competition. Building on Hayek's ideas, I argue that both regimes are viable solutions depending on the circumstances. The paper first focuses on the misperceived benefits of flexible exchange rates, making the case for monetary union in Western Europe. However, monetary union is no alternative for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Instead currency competition could be used to retain the benefits of flexible exchange rates and to foster monetary stability at the same time.     

Policy-making in EMU: strategies, rules and discretion

Six years into the successful operation of European economic and monetary union (EMU), the conduct of the single monetary policy and of national economic policies and the interaction between them continue to be debated by both academics and policy-makers. This paper approaches the debate by assessing the role that strategies, rules and discretion play in the conduct of economic policies in the euro area. From this perspective, it discusses in particular the monetary policy strategy of the European Central Bank (ECB), the rules-based framework for national fiscal policies as laid down in the Stability and Growth Pact and the structural reform efforts under the umbrella of the Lisbon Strategy. It concludes that the current policy framework - with its combination of strategies, rules and constrained discretion - is well suited to deliver stability and growth in Europe, provided it is implemented effectively.     

Is Canada an optimal currency area? An inflation targeting perspective

We propose a method, based on the currency union model of Galí and Monacelli ( 2008 ), to determine whether a region within an existing currency area belongs in the currency union. The method involves assessing the predictability of regional inflation rates at medium term horizons. We apply the method to the Canadian provinces and find that for all but Alberta there is little evidence of costs in terms of inflation arising from national monetary policy. For Alberta, the evidence suggests that they are not as well served by the inflation targeting framework and that a more flexible policy environment might improve inflation outcomes.     

第一套人民币的诞生与新中国货币的统一

第一套人民币是在统一各革命根据地货币的基础上,于1948年12月1日由新成立的中国人民银行印制发行的,随后,经过长期艰苦的货币统一斗争,人民币最终成为统一的全国货币,这是中国历史上最伟大的一次货币制度变革,彻底结束了旧中国的货币混乱状态,实现了中国向现代货币制度的转变,为中国的经济发展、现代化的建设奠定了坚实的基础。     

The Economic Case for Monetary Union in the European Union

Differential requirements for seigniorage provide a weak case for retaining monetary independence. As regards adjustment to asymmetric shocks, nominal exchange rate flexibility is at best a limited blessing and at worst a limited curse. Absence of significant fiscal redistribution mechanisms among EU members is not an obstacle to monetary union. Neither is limited international labour mobility. Convergence of real economic performance is irrelevant for monetary union. A common currency is the logical implication of unrestricted capital mobility. The Maastricht criteria need not hinder monetary union provided the political will exists to adopt a flexible interpretation of the fiscal criteria.     

Monetary and Financial Integration in the EMU: Push or Pull?

This paper examines the channels through which monetary union increased financial integration, using panel data on bilateral international commercial bank claims from 1998–2006. I decompose the increase in claims into three channels: a "borrower effect," as a country's EMU membership may leave its borrowers more creditworthy in the eyes of foreign lenders; a "creditor effect," as membership in a monetary union may increase the attractiveness of a nation's commercial banks as intermediaries, perhaps through increased scale economies or through an improved regulatory environment after the advent of monetary union; and a "pairwise effect," as joint membership in a monetary union increases the quality of intermediation between borrowers and creditors when both are in the union. Isolating these three channels through a series of difference-in-differences specifications, I find that the pairwise effect is the primary source of increased financial integration. This result is robust to a number of sensitivity exercises.     

Macroeconomic Stabilization in the EMU: Rules Versus Institutions

This paper investigates the macroeconomic implications of different regimes of international fiscal coordination and monetary‐fiscal cooperation in a monetary union with independent fiscal authorities, that act strategically vis‐à‐vis a common central bank. In the presence of other policy goals than cyclical stabilization, such as interest rate smoothing and fiscal stability, we show that coordination among national fiscal authorities can reduce output and inflation volatility relative to the non‐cooperative setting in specific circumstances, as in case of demand disturbances, while turning potentially counterproductive otherwise. The adverse effects of union‐wide coordinated fiscal measures can be attenuated in a regime of global coordination, namely, when a centralized fiscal stabilization is coordinated with the common monetary policy as well.     

ON THE FEASIBILITY OF A ONE-SPEED OR MULTISPEED EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION

This paper addresses two questions: (1) Is a twelve-country monetary union in Europe feasible? (2) Can monetary union be achieved at multispeed, i.e., with a small group of countries going first, and later admitting the others? After examining several politico-economic arguments concerning problems of feasibility of the union, we conclude with a fair amount of skepticism concerning the multispeed idea. We show that the final result of the process of monetary integration is dependent upon the number of countries that initiate it. Our discussion of feasibility sheds some light on the political economy of the recent (Fall 1992) turmoil in the monetary system of Europe.