排污权拍卖方式比较研究

排污权交易是基于市场的经济政策.排污权拍卖方式的选择是决定排污权交易市场效率的关键问题.文章首先阐述了排污权拍卖的意义和特点,然后提出了排污权拍卖三种不同方式,并从期望收益、有效性、公平性和简便性等方面进行了比较,最后得出我国排污权的拍卖应采用单一价格拍卖方式。     

不确定性市场中两人交易对策与资源有效配置

一、引言 由于信息不完全导致的不确定性市场中交易与资源配置效率性一直是人们研究的一个重要而又复杂的问题。在典型的拍卖问题中,W·Samuelson和K·Chatterjte研究了在信息不完全下效用可转移情况的双方叫价交易模型。J·Myerson等研究了在信息不完全的市场上拍卖交易与实现资源有效配置的机制问题。而交易费用理论研究了涉及到不确定性的市场     

市场实验与排污权交易制度设计

排污权交易已被不少国家的实践证明是一种较为高效的污染治理途径.排污权交易制度在很大程度上从理论研究和实践操作两个层面推动了环境规制理论与政策的不断发展与完善.今后国内排污权交易研究的重要方向之一是采用规范的实验经济学研究方法,借鉴国外同类实验的排污权交易市场机制设计思路,研究不同交易制度,包括双向拍卖、分散交易、标签价格制度等对排污权交易市场效率高低的影响,研究交易费用对市场运行效果的影响及如何降低排污权交易市场中垄断因素所造成的不良影响等问题.     

排污权拍卖的最优机制设计

采用拍卖的方式分配排污权既是环境污染外部性的内部化,又是市场价格扭曲的纠正。本文基于一级密封价格拍卖方式,分析了排污权拍卖中厂商的最优策略和政府对排污权拍卖的机制设计问题。     

我国海域使用权招标拍卖市场机制分析与完善

海域使用权招标拍卖作为国有海域资源配置的重要方式之一,是海域使用管理制度顺应市场经济发展需要的突出表现。本文从参与主体、适用范围以及市场规模方面对海域使用权招标拍卖市场机制进行了现状分析,从保留价格计算、创新招标拍卖方式、构建交易平台等方面,对现有的海域使用权招标拍卖市场交易机制进行了完善,以期丰富和发展海域使用权的招标拍卖机制,提高海域使用权的市场化配置效率。     

拍卖机制设计的相关思考

市场经济追求效率与公平的统一,拍卖作为一种具体的市场机制,其目的是实现资源的有效配置。本文围绕拍卖的功能与目标,以拍卖理论为依据,阐述拍卖机制设计的意义,并分析设计拍卖机制所要考虑的五个因素。     

拍卖机制设计的相关思考

市场经济追求效率与公平的统一,拍卖作为一种具体的市场机制,其目的是实现资源的有效配置.本文围绕拍卖的功能与目标,以拍卖理论为依据,阐述拍卖机制设计的意义,并分析设计拍卖机制所要考虑的五个因素.     

企业排污权交易行为及交易制度稳定性影响

排污权交易制度是以科斯产权理论为基础,以环境资源有偿使用和市场交易机制为前提,实现内部化外部成本的制度安排。现阶段关于排污权交易制度的研究多集中在排污权初始分配的研究上,对二级交易市场的研究较少。文章将排污权交易企业分为购买者、让渡者和自足者三类,分别对三者在排污权交易制度调整前后两阶段的行为选择进行分析,随后讨论了排污权交易制度稳定性对环境绩效的影响,结果表明稳定的排污权交易制度有利于环境绩效的提升。文章最后提出完善排污权交易制度进而提升环境绩效的政策建议。     

排污权交易会计处理不同方法比较

排污权交易是通过排污权的有偿交易,使环境友好型企业获得更多的经济补偿,同时增加超量排污企业的环境成本,以市场交易方式有效地配置环境资源。然而在排污权交易的会计处理方面,目前理论上尚存在诸多争议。本文基于排污权交易的本质,对比分析了排污权交易两种模式以及现行的三种主要会计处理方法,并结合我国现状提出了排污权交易会计处理的建议。     

排污权有偿转让会计处理例解

排污权有偿使用和排污权交易是许多国家通过市场手段配置、保护环境资源的重要经济政策之一,其主要思想是在“总量控制”前提下,政府将排污权有偿出让给排污者,并允许排污权在二级市场上进行交易。     

Buyer brokerage: Experimental evidence

This paper offers an experimental investigation of two commission structures for buyer brokerage. One commission structure is the currently used structure in the industry where both the seller’s broker and the buyer’s broker each receive a percentage of the sales price as their compensation from the seller. In an alternative commission structure, while the seller’s broker still receives a percentage of the sales price from the seller, the buyer’s broker is compensated by the buyer and the compensation is inversely related to the sales price. We find that how the buyer’s broker gets compensated has significant implications. While both commission structures yield a similar probability of reaching an agreement, the alternative commission structure yields a lower price and a longer time to reach an agreement. Furthermore, the alternative commission structure achieves a better alignment of the interests of the buyer and the buyer’s broker without affecting the earnings of the players in the transaction. We also find that the improvement in the alignment of interests is more significant for female buyers than for male buyers. Furthermore, a higher listing price by the seller and a higher initial bid price by the buyer each lead to a significant increase in the negotiated price.     

Neutrality of buyer and seller commissions to auction house profit

This paper presents an examination of optimal revenue management of a monopoly auction house through which a seller sells goods via a second‐price auction. The house charges commissions to both the buyer and seller. Results demonstrate that a continuum of combinations of optimal buyer and seller commission rates exists, all of which yield the same expected profit of the house. Additionally, we discuss several possible factors that lead to the prevailing custom of zero buyer commission, such as commission aversion of buyers, the house's incentive to maximize the hammer price, and seller and buyer preferences for apparently lowered commission rates.     

中国碳排放权在国际交易中形成价格落差的原因探析——基于MAC的视角

自2005年《京都议定书》协议下的碳交易走向实际操作阶段以来,国际碳交易价格在发达国家和发展中国家之间出现了巨额剪刀差。文章依照双边交易模型理论分析了国际碳交易结束在各国边际减排成本均衡点,分析了目前出现价格剪刀差的原因,提出中国应加快建设自愿碳排放市场并设立碳排放权储备池。     

基于拍卖的垄断型产品供应链的博弈分析

论文研究了基于拍卖交易的垄断型产品供应链中卖方和买方的博弈问题,成交价格同时取决于卖方向拍卖市场的供货数量和买方向拍卖市场的竞拍数量。博弈结果显示,在垄断供应的情况下,博弈的纳什均衡将会是买卖双方都不通过拍卖渠道来进行交易,只有在非常极端的条件下可以达成供货和竞拍等量的均衡。最后,论文引入一个新卖方作为买方参与拍卖后的补货来源,得到的新均衡解能使原买卖双方的收益提高,从而说明单纯的拍卖并不总是最好的交易方式,多渠道的销售方式有时更能保障买卖双方的利益。     

Search and Trading in Intermediated Markets

This paper examines the effect of a middleman on the search and trading behavior of the traders. It is shown that the buyer and seller types with middle valuations choose to search for each other, while the buyer and seller types with high or low valuations drop out of the search market and choose to trade directly with the middleman. The ask and bid prices of the middleman act as an outside option for the buyer and seller, and influence the outcome of the bargaining between the two. The model generalizes Gehrig (1993) by endogenizing the traders' search intensities, by allowing the traders to go to an intermediary even if thy have engaged in search, and by enabling the intermediary to provide the service of immediacy.     

Buyer–seller networks with demand shocks and intermediation

We present a model in which buyers and sellers use links to trade with each other. Each seller produces a good which can be one of two types. Buyers are ex ante identical but receive specification or valuation shocks after the links are formed. We show that efficient networks are stable and that severing a link in an efficient network results in a higher price for the buyer but a lower price for the seller. We also examine network intermediation when sellers (buyers) form links sequentially. When sellers form links sequentially, the first seller becomes an intermediary and shares links with other sellers; this makes all sellers better off. However, when buyers form links sequentially, buyers may or may not share links. If links are shared multiple intermediaries result.     

Price experimentation with strategic buyers

A two-period model in which a monopolist endeavors to learn about the permanent demand parameter of a specific repeat buyer is investigated. The buyer may strategically reject the seller’s first-period offer for one of two reasons. First, in order to conceal information (i.e., to pool), a high-valuation buyer may reject high prices that would never be accepted by a low-valuation buyer. Second, in order to reveal information (i.e., to signal), a low-valuation buyer may reject low prices that would always be accepted by a high-valuation buyer. Given this, the seller often finds it optimal to post prices that reveal no useful information. Indeed, in the equilibrium where there is no signaling, the seller never charges an informative first-period price. Learning may occur in the equilibrium where there is maximal signaling, but the scope for learning is quite limited even in this case. Indeed, in order to preempt information transmission through signaling, the seller may be induced to set a first-period price strictly below the buyer’s lowest possible valuation.      

Core and competitive equilibria: An approach from discrete convex analysis

We extend the assignment market (Shapley and Shubik, 1972; Kaneko, 1976, 1982) by utilizing discrete convex analysis. We consider the market in which buyers and sellers trade indivisible commodities for money. Each buyer demands at most one unit of commodity. Each seller produces multiple units of several types of commodities. We make the quasi-linearity assumption on the sellers, but not on the buyers. We assume that the cost function of each seller is M^♮-convex, which is a concept in discrete convex analysis. We prove that the core and the competitive equilibria exist and coincide in our market model.     

Asset sales and takeover threats

This research addresses the question of whether the existence of a recent takeover threat affects the market reaction to a subsequent sale of assets. The effect of a prior takeover threat on the stock price reaction to an asset sale is examined from the perspective of both the buying firm and the selling firm. The total gains to the transaction are estimated as a market weighted average of the abnormal returns to the two firms. The results show that when there has not been a recent takeover threat on the selling firm, abnormal returns are significantly positive for the seller, the buyer and in total. However, if the selling firm has faced a takeover threat within the previous year, the abnormal returns upon announcement of an asset sale are insignificant for the seller, negative for the buyer, and negative for a portfolio of the two. Hence, the market has a lower estimate of the overall gains in transactions that follow takeover threats on the selling firm; in fact, these transactions result in a net wealth reduction.     

Adverse selection and costly information acquisition in asset markets

We develop an asset exchange model with adverse selection and costly information acquisition incentives. A seller of an asset knows the true value of the asset, while a buyer can obtain information about the asset’s quality at a cost. An equilibrium offer is pooling, but a buyer can purchase only good assets after producing the costly information about the asset’s quality. When the probability that the seller holds good assets is above the threshold value, a trade can occur with and without information acquisition, depending on the information acquisition cost, and the trade volume and social welfare are higher in equilibrium without information production than in equilibrium with information production. When the probability of facing good assets is below the threshold value, a trade occurs only after screening the quality of assets, and, hence, the market collapses if the information acquisition cost is sufficiently high. As the information acquisition cost increases, social welfare can increase or decrease depending on the probability of facing good and bad assets.