建设项目投标不平衡报价模型及简捷算法

建设项目招投标竞争日益激烈,有经验的承包商可以利用工程量清单中的数量与实际的差异进行不平衡报价。本文从承包商的角度出发,构建了建设项目投标不平衡报价线性规划模型,并且找到了该模型的简捷算法。     

建设项目投标不平衡报价模型及简捷算法

建设项目招投标竞争日益激烈,有经验的承包商可以利用工程量清单中的数量与实际的差异进行不平衡报价.本文从承包商的角度出发,构建了建设项目投标不平衡报价线性规划模型,并且找到了该模型的简捷算法.     

工程量清单招标模式下投标报价策略研究

基于资金的时间价值并考虑投标竞争环境的影响,利用不平衡方法和Game理论提出了工程量清单报价的优化策略。它通过调整单价组合,能够解决承包商在实际投标时最为关心的在预期利润不减少时如何降低报价,提高中标率,以及在报价基本不变时,如何无形提高预期利润增值两种情况。     

招投标中不平衡报价法的应用探析

在工程项目投标报价过程中,投标人为了维持报价的竞争力和活力,往往采用不平衡报价法的报价技巧。文章基于不平衡报价法的内涵、原则以及应用范围,分析了该方法的两种形式:"提高早期项目单价,降低后期项目单价"和"按照工程量变化趋势调整单价",并且在技术细节方面提出了该报价方法的注意事项和风险。     

工程量清单计价模式下投标报价优化策略分析

我国目前所推行的清单计价模式是规范建设市场秩序、促进建设市场有序竞争和企业健康发展的需要。以武汉某别墅工程为例,在投标报价时对报价进行优化策略分析,运用不平衡报价策略、高价策略、低价策略等多种方法对清单单价进行合理调整,竣工后对比原始报价和优化后报价,证实了合理优化调整投标报价能有效提高企业利润。     

工程投标中的不平衡报价策略探讨

站在工程监理的角度,以工程投标报价为出发点,提出了一些实用的不平衡报价策略,实践性、针对性较强,对工程投标报价有借鉴意义。     

浅谈水利工程投标中的不平衡报价

投标是水利施工企业最重要的经济内容,投标竞争的胜负不仅取决于投标人的实力,也取决于投标人的投标策略和投标技巧运用得是否得当。不平衡报价法是投标者经常使用的一种有效的报价策略,在使用过程中屡收实效。     

不平衡报价现象分析及防范策略

不平衡报价是业主在工程招投标过程中需要防范的主要风险之一。严重的不平衡报价将扰乱招投标工作的正常进行。分析不平衡报价常用手段及成因,可以有效防范不平衡报价带来的市场风险。     

关于高速公路机电工程不平衡报价的思考

随着全球经济一体化的不断深入，高速发展的社会经济为我国的施工企业带来严峻的挑战，面对全球经济发展的蓬勃态势，为了在激烈的市场竞争中获取利润，投标工作者们在工程投标中经常会使用到不平衡报价法，以期获得工程收益的最大值，本文尝试从高速公路机电工程不平衡报价的产生原因以及注意问题等方面入手进行简要论述。     

施工企业投标报价策略——不平衡报价

在投标报价中合理的应用不平衡报价可以较快提高企业收益,但在收益的同时也存在着一定的风险.施工企业要想在投标时中标又能在以后的施工过程中收益,就应该在应用不平衡报价的同时合理的规避其风险.对施工企业来说,采用不平衡报价一定要建立在对工程量仔细核对、分析的基础上,特别是对报低单价的项目,如果工程量在执行时增多,将会造成施工企业的重大损失;另外,不平衡报价过多或过于明显,也会引起业主注意,甚至导致废标.因此,采用适当的投标报价策略是施工企业取得较多利润的有效途径.施工企业要加强企业管理,不断提高自身管理、经济、技术、装备和信誉等综合能力,从而在当前市场经济条件下的建筑市场竞争中保持优势,取得长久的利益.     

(Un)expected Bidder Behavior in Spectrum Auctions: About Inconsistent Bidding and Its Impact on Efficiency in the Combinatorial Clock Auction

The combinatorial clock auction is a two-stage auction format, which has been used to sell spectrum licenses worldwide in the recent years. It draws on a number of elegant ideas inspired by economic theory. A revealed preference activity rule should provide incentives to bid straightforward, i.e., consistent with the bidders’ valuations on a payoff-maximizing package, in each round of the clock phase. A second-price rule should set incentives to bid truthfully in both phases. If bidders respond to these incentives and bid straightforward in the clock phase and truthful in the second sealed-bid stage, then the auction is fully efficient. Unfortunately, bidders might neither bid straightforward in the clock phase nor truthful on all packages in the second sealed-bid stage due to strategic reasons or practical limitations. We introduce metrics based on Afriat’s Efficiency Index to analyze straightforward bidding and report on empirical data from the lab and from the field in the British 4G auction in 2013 and the Canadian 700 MHz auction in 2014, where the bids were made public. The data provides evidence that bidders deviate significantly from straightforward bidding in the clock phase, which can restrict the bids they can submit in the supplementary phase. We show that such restrictions can have a significant negative impact on efficiency and revenue.     

Bid-Elicitation Interfaces and Bidding Behavior in Retail Interactive Pricing

Advances in information technology have led to a substantial increase in the use of interactive pricing mechanisms, where buyers (i.e., consumers) and sellers (i.e., retailers) enter a formal computer-mediated price-negotiation process during which consumers submit bids for a specific product. This article examines how the interface used for bid elicitation affects bidding behavior and, ultimately, retailer profit. Our focus is on one key aspect of the bid-elicitation interface – how retailers require bidders to articulate their bids. Evidence from four experiments involving economically consequential bids demonstrates that the candidate bid amounts specified by the retailer have a strong influence on bidding behavior, and consequently also on retailer profit. In particular, the level of candidate bid amounts has a positive effect on actual bid amounts, whereas it has a negative impact on the likelihood that a consumer will actually submit a bid. Critically, we show that the former effect can more than offset the latter to cause an increase in retailer profit. We propose and find support for two distinct pathways driving this phenomenon – the candidate bid amounts (1) influence bidders’ valuations of the offered product and (2) shape bidders’ beliefs about what bid amounts will be successful. Our results highlight the importance of the design of user interfaces for interactive pricing, demonstrating that even seemingly innocuous aspects of interfaces can have a dramatic impact on bidding behavior and retailer profit.     

不同质条件下招投标双方的博弈研究

在无标底招标项目中,招投标各方之间存在诸多博弈现象。基于投标各方不同质的假设条件下,对招投标双方的博弈进行了深入地研究。利用价值效益评价决策的方法建立了招标方的评标计分模型和中标评价模型。根据招标方的评标偏好性,提出了招标方的评标策略集和中标策略集。同时制定在不同条件下的招投标双方最优中标策略和最优投标策略。     

Strategic Bidding for Multiple Units in Simultaneous and Sequential Auctions

A buyer in an electronic marketplace may be interested in buying a bundle of items, where any one item in the bundle may not be of particular interest. The emergence of online auctions allow such users to obtain bundles by bidding on different simultaneous or sequentially run auctions. Because the number of auctions and the number of combinations to form the bundles may be large, the bundle bidding problem becomes intractable and the user is likely to make sub-optimal decision given time constraints and information overload. We believe that an automated agent that takes user preferences and budgetary constraints and can strategically bid on behalf of a user can significantly enhance user profit and satisfaction. Our first step to developing such an agent is to consider bundles containing many units of a single item to be bought from auctions that sell only multiple units of one item type. We assume that users obtain goods over several days. Expectations of auctions and their outcome in the future allow the agent to bid strategically on currently open auctions. We present an expected utility based strategy to decide how many items to bid for in the current auctions, and the maximum price to bid for each item. We evaluate our proposed strategy in different configurations by varying the number of items sold per auction, number of concurrently running auctions, expected closing prices, etc. We simulate several multiple unit English auctions per day, over multiple days, where most of the bidders bid their true utilities drawn from a distribution. The strategic bidding agent has knowledge of this distribution and uses it to determine its bids. A strategic agent who looks farther ahead into the future produces larger returns when there are few strategic bidders. We also evaluate the effect of risk attitudes on the relative performance of the bidders.     

The Effect of Social Cues on Sniping Behavior in Internet Auctions: Field Evidence and a Lab Experiment

This research explores how social cues presented in an online auction affect sniping behavior. Sniping is a strategy of placing a bid on an item in the very ending stages of an auction with a pre-determined ending time in an attempt to win the auction. Such a strategy conceals the intentions of the bidder until the last moments of the auction and minimizes the possibility of other opposing bidders submitting higher bids due to the short period of time left to respond. The research includes two field studies and a lab experiment indicating that sniping appears to be influenced by social factors, that is, when there are a greater number of bidders in the auction or the auction site provides social information about the bidders, the relative use of sniping increases. This research supports the perspective that bidders rely on others' bidding behavior and characteristics as an indication of the true value of the item on sale, and is one of the first studies in the literature which takes this perspective.     

Effect of Buyer and Seller Experience on Buy It Now Pricing

ABSTRACT

Although auctions have been around for centuries, online auctions are still a relatively new phenomenon. This paper examines the phenomenon of online auctions, specifically on a pricing option known as “Buy It Now.” With this option, a buyer can purchase merchandise immediately at a stated price and truncate the auction process. Auction items sold with a Buy It Now price tend to be at a higher price than the high bid price for an identical item sold through an ascending-bid auction. In addition, Buy It Now prices tend to attract risk averse bidders while high bidders of ascending-bid auctions tend to be less risk averse or risk neutral bidders. On the other hand, we found more experienced sellers sell their items with a Buy It Now price while less experienced sellers sell their items through an ascending-bid process. Thus, experience and risk are factors in choosing a Buy It Now price for the seller and buyer.     

A Network Bidder Behavior Model in Online Auctions: A Case of Fine Art Auctions

The marketing literature provides a solid understanding of auctions regarding final sales prices and many aspects of the processes that unfold to result in those outcomes. This research complements those perspectives by first presenting a new bidder behavior model that shows the role of emergent network ties among bidders on the auction outcome. Dyadic ties are identified as the bid and counter-bid patterns of interactions between bidders that unfold throughout the duration of an auction. These structures are modeled using network analyses, which enables: (1) a richer understanding of detailed auction processes, both within auctions and across auctions of multiple lots, (2) a mapping of the processes to the forecast of prices and the trajectory toward final sales prices, (3) the clear and early identification of key bidders who are influential to the bidding action and who impact final auction sales prices, and (4) the results clearly show that the network exchange patterns are significant and contribute to an understanding of auction processes and outcomes above and beyond simple economic predictors such as the number of bids or bidders or the bidders’ economic status. We conclude by providing some managerial implications for online auction houses and bidders.     

Consequences of Riding Takeover Waves: Australian Evidence

This paper uses Australian data to analyze takeover bid premiums and long‐term abnormal returns for mergers that occur during wave and non‐wave periods. Findings reveal that bid premiums are slightly lower in wave periods, and bidding firms earn normal post‐takeover returns (relative to a portfolio of firms matched on size and survival) if their bids were made in non‐wave periods. However, bidders who announced their takeover bids during wave periods exhibit significant underperformance. For mergers that took place within waves, there is no difference in bid premiums nor is there a difference in the long‐run returns of bidders involved during the first half and second half of the waves. We find that none of prominent theories of merger waves (managerial, misvaluation, and neoclassical) can fully account for Australian takeover waves and their effects. Instead, our results suggest that Banal‐Estanol et al.'s screening theory of merger activity, by combining the misvaluation and neoclassical theories, may provide a better explanation.     

Vettes and lemons on eBay

This paper empirically tests whether there are asymmetric information problems in the market for used Chevrolet Corvettes sold on eBay. The first test is based on a result from Akerlof (Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970). If there is asymmetric information in the used market, bidders should place a premium on a new Corvette, all else equal. The paper finds little systematic evidence of a new car premium. The second test is based on a result from Bajari and Hortacsu (Rand Journal of Economics 34(2):329–355, 2003). If there is asymmetric information, then bidders will prefer to bid late in the auction in order to conceal their private information from other bidders. The paper fails to find evidence of more late bidding on used Corvettes relative to new Corvettes. The third test is based on the idea that if there is asymmetric information then there may be a winner’s curse problem in these auctions. The paper fails to find evidence consistent with bidders avoiding the winner’s curse. The results are not consistent with asymmetric information problems in the market for used Corvettes sold on eBay. It is not clear however, whether this result generalizes to other cars sold on eBay or cars sold in the off-line market.     

Bidder motives in cause-related auctions

We study cause-related auctions where a percentage of the dynamically determined purchase price of an item is donated to charity. Little is known about the effectiveness of such auctions. Bidders who value donations to charity have an incentive to bid more aggressively in such auctions. Regardless of whether they win or not, these bidders can significantly affect prices. The purpose of this paper is to study bidders' willingness to pay a premium in charity auctions and the drivers that affect the charity premium. We use a carefully designed field experiment involving simultaneous pairs of auctions that are identical in all respects but percentage of the proceeds donated to charity. This design gives us the ability to look at bidder choice among auctions based on charitable considerations. We use a mixture model approach to allow for different types of individual preferences. We find that individuals fall into three segments: two altruistic segments and a selfish segment. The altruistic segments, which drive up the charity premium, can be classified as warm glow bidders who derive pleasure from the act of giving and other-regarding bidders who give for selfless reasons. Results show that the difference in donation percentages is the major factor influencing the charitable premium. However, bidders differ considerably in their responses to donation percentages. While other-regarding bidders tend to seek auctions where a greater percentage of revenue is donated to charity, warm glow bidders only contribute when the charity premium is sufficiently low. Thus, managers should focus their marketing efforts on appealing to these different segments, depending on the percentage donated to charity.