广西发展创业投资基金的初步思考

近年来,我国创业投资事业发展迅速,在培育战略性新兴产业和高新技术产业、提升区域创新能力方面起到了举足轻重的作用。文章通过分析广西创业投资基金的发展现状、有利条件以及存在的问题,提出广西发展创业投资事业的建议和对策。     

浅述创业投资发展的政府行为及资金来源——以厦门为例

本文在走访各大主要的创投企业以及政府相关部门的基础上,参考国内外创业投资发展成功案例,经过深入调研和分析,对厦门创业投资的现状和未来可能的发展模式进行讨论。首先剖析厦门目前创业投资现状和存在的主要问题,而后结合厦门实际情况,从资金来源、组织结构、管理模式、激励方式以及风险补偿等几个方面对厦门创业投资的发展模式进行探讨。我们认为,厦门创业投资的发展最好从资金的供给方入手,建立政府引导型基金,通过资金吸引好的项目落户厦门来繁荣厦门的创投产业。资金的供给可以从几个方面入手,加大财政拨款力度,引导厦门一定比例的厦门社保基金进入创投,和周边的兄弟市联合共同出资以及进步一扩大园区自有资金发展创业园区引导基金的方式多管齐下解决资金供给难题。     

杠杆理论在政府引导创业投资基金中的应用研究

本文分析了我国创业投资事业的发展历史与现状,提出创业投资发展中面临的主要问题在很大程度上都是由于宏观环境不优和创业投资运作体制——政府主办主营等因素造成的,这些因素己经严重制约了中国创业投资的顺利发展。在分析和总结国外发达国家政府创业引导基金的成功经验的基础上,分析我国政府引导创业投资基金现阶段的发展状况,结合杠杆理论探讨了我国的创业投资基金如何在政府引导下更加健康有效的发展,并对未来的进一步研究提出了建议。     

常州市创业投资企业发展现状、问题及对策研究

近年来,随着资本市场的迅猛发展,创业投资进入了快速发展阶段,已成为产业升级和金融创新的重要力量。而作为创业投资的实施主体,创业投资企业的发展已日益成为经济金融研究的热点。本文通过对常州市创业投资企业发展现状、问题的研究分析,从政策、资本、人才、机制等方面提出促进创业投资企业全面健康发展的对策建议。     

创业投资与区域经济增长的灰色关联性分析

我国经济目前发展的重中之重是建设创新的经济体制,而创新的经济体制就包含了创业与投资,本文在对创业投资与区域经济增长的灰色关联性的分析主要是从船业投资与区域经济增长的关系着手,进而分析什么是灰色系统模型,进而探析灰色关联性分析涉及的两方面指标,最后就创业投资与区域经济增长给予一些具体的建议,以期为后续这方面的研究提供理论上的参考依据。     

创业投资与孵化器的融合发展

高新技术产业的发展不仅能拉动区域经济的增长还能促进产业结构的调整,同时也能提高国家的综合能力以及国际竞争力。创业投资和孵化器的融合对高新技术产业的发展具有重要的意义,而两者优势的互补使其融合成为必要的趋势,在此趋势下,通过研究孵化器与创业投资的相同点和不同点来探索二者融合的意义与优势。     

创业投资区域发展水平影响因素的实证研究

本文通过对创业投资地区差异的分析,探索创业投资与其支撑环境的相互关系,运用多元线性回归方法,发现影响了我国创业投资发展水平的因素,并提出相应对策以促进我国创业投资的快速发展。     

发展江苏民营创业投资的思考

江苏省创业投资发展迅猛,但民营创业投资发展相对滞后。分析了江苏民营创业投资发展滞后的原因,提出要从战略高度充分认识发展民营创业投资的重大价值,转变发展模式,以发展民营创业投资为主要路径,推动江苏民营创业投资发展的对策建议。     

创业投资产业税收激励政策:国际经验及启示

创业投资是一种由专门的投资公司向具有巨大发展潜力的成长型、扩张型或重组型的未上市企业提供资金支持并辅之以管理参与的投资行为.因此,创业投资产业的发展对于一个国家或地区急需资金的初创型小企业与高技术企业的发展具有举足轻重的作用,世界许多国家或地区给予创业投资活动以税收金融政策上的支持,本文通过对创业投资税收政策的国际比较分析,希冀对于正在发展中的我国创业投资产业提供可供借鉴的经验.     

创业投资引导基金参股运作方式的国际比较

创业投资引导基金是许多国家和地区普遍采用的一种支持创业投资产业发展的政策。为了促进各自创业投资产业的发展,澳大利亚和芬兰均设立了创业投资引导基金。通过对澳大利亚和芬兰两国引导基金进行分析和比较,并在此基础上对我国创业投资引导基金的运作提出政策建议。     

Assessing the impact of public venture capital programmes in the United Kingdom: Do regional characteristics matter?

This article analyses whether and how the impact of publicly backed venture capital (VC) funds varies across regions, depending on their level of innovation intensity and in comparison with private VC funds. Building on agency and human capital theories, the authors distinguish public VC funds into regional and governmental types, to assess potential differences in the performance of their portfolio companies. The analyses rely on a sample of 628 VC-backed companies in the United Kingdom during 1998–2007, and they confirm that regional characteristics matter for rigorous assessments of the effectiveness of public VC programmes.     

New venture internationalization: The role of venture capital types and reputation

This study examines how different types of venture capital relate to new venture internationalization. Using a sample of 646 U.S. new ventures that executed IPOs between 1995 and 2010, we find that ventures with foreign or corporate venture capital have higher levels of international intensity. We also investigate the moderating role of VC reputation on the relationship between foreign venture capital and international intensity and corporate venture capital and international intensity. Our results suggest that VC reputation weakens the positive relationship between corporate VC and international intensity.     

风险投资对创业企业作用的实证研究

文章从风险投资对创业企业作用的机理分析出发,实证研究风险投资对创业企业创生和企业成长的作用。对企业创生作用的研究表明风险投资活动的发展和增长有助于地区新企业的创生,一方面风险投资为那些无法从传统渠道融资的创业企业提供资金支持,另一方面也刺激地区创新,促使新经济部门、新技术、新产品的出现,为创业者创业活动提供更多机遇。有关风险投资对创业企业成长作用的研究采用倾向得分匹配法,该方法有效剔除了风险投资家“选择作用”对研究结果造成的偏差。研究结果表明风险投资不但有助于企业规模的不断扩大,同时也有助于企业研发创新等各项成长能力的提升,有效促进了企业竞争优势,帮助企业做大做强。     

How to Design Public Venture Capital Funds: Empirical Evidence from South Korea

This study examines the effects of several features of government‐managed, sponsored venture capital (VC), and private VC funds on overall VC investments in new technology‐based firms (NTBFs) during two developmental stages (i.e., growth and restructuring) in South Korean VC market and suggests hints for designing effective government VC programs. Our results from data on 463 funds in the period 1995–2005 indicate the factors bearing a positive effect on VC investments targeted to NTBFs. Such factors are the fund specialization focusing on certain industrial sectors, performance‐sensitive compensation for venture capitalists in private and government VC funds.     

清洁技术产业风险投资的现状与对策

清洁技术产业已成为我国风险投资基金的热门投资领域,当前我国清洁技术产业风险投资呈现出投资增长迅速、覆盖行业全面、地域分布广泛和投资成效初显等特点,同时存在着风险投资认知度低、投资热点领域有待突破、政策风险大以及企业同质化发展等问题,如何解决这些问题成为制约清洁技术产业风险投资发展的关键。     

风险投资对风险企业IPO功效研究——以我国深市中小板为例

风险投资是专业化投资过程,IPO是参与各方首选退出方式。我国风险投资起步晚、发展缓慢,基于发达国家资本市场得出的有关风险投资的结论未必适用于我国。本文使用深交所中小板相关数据检验风险投资在我国风险企业IPO过程中的具体作用,并对检验结果进行分析。通过对风险投资与风险企业IPO关系研究,为我国风险投资的发展提出合理化建议。     

风险投资的资本来源影响企业技术创新的机理分析和实证研究——基于非资本增值视角

文章基于非资本增值的视角,研究了风险投资的资本来源对企业技术创新的影响。通过机理分析,认为风险投资提供的非资本增值服务可能对企业的技术创新资源的获取、技术创新成果的取得以及提高技术创新效益等方面产生影响;基于实证分析,文章发现政府背景风险投资会促进企业技术创新资源的增加,但并没有促进风险企业技术创新成果和技术创新效益的显著增加;而民营风险投资由于具有技术优势、管理优势、研发优势,因此对风险企业创新资源的扩大、创新成果的增加以及创新效益的提升都有着正向显著影响。文章认为基于非资本增值的视角,风险投资的资本来源会影响企业的技术创新。     

Participating convertible preferred stock in venture capital exits

This paper develops a theory of the participating convertible preferred (PCP) stock commonly used in venture capital settings. I show that the participation and convertibility features of PCP stock can be used to reduce information asymmetry between the venture and potential investors at the time of exit. Further, the convertibility feature of PCP helps in alleviating the problem of insufficient entrepreneurial effort. I then derive implications for the two most common types of exits in venture capital—initial public offerings and trade sales—and explain how US venture capital markets differ from other VC markets.     

Formal institutions, culture, and venture capital activity: A cross-country analysis

Why does the level of venture capital activity vary across countries? This study suggests that the variation can be attributed to the different levels of formal institutional development. Further, this study proposes that venture capitalists respond differently to the incentives provided by formal institutions depending on different cultural settings. Analysis of VC activity for 68 countries during the 1996-2006 period shows that formal institutions have a positive effect on the level of venture capital activity, but this effect is weaker in more uncertainty-avoiding societies and in more collectivist societies. This study has useful theory and policy implications for venture capital and entrepreneurship development.     

Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist

This research analyzes the venture capitalist's incentives to maximize the profits of the entrepreneurs of ventures and the limited partners of a venture fund. Venture capital is a professionally managed pool of capital invested in equity-linked private ventures. Entrepreneurs turn to venture capitalists for financing because high-technology startup firms have low or negative cash flows, which prevent them from borrowing or issuing equity. In addition, venture capitalists are actively involved in management of the venture to assure its success. This solves the problem of startup firms that do not have the cash flows to hire management consultants.Venture capital contracts have three main characteristics: (1) staging the commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon, (2) using compensation systems directly linked to value creation, and (3) preserving ways to force management to distribute investment proceeds. These characteristics address three fundamental problems: (1) sorting the venture capital among the entrepreneurial ventures, (2) providing incentives to motivate venture capitalists to maximize the value of the funded ventures, and (3) providing incentives to motivate entrepreneurs to maximize the value of the ventures. Venture capitalists fund only about a dozen projects a year out of a thousand evaluated. Each project may receive several rounds of financing. Payoffs to VCs can be very high or be a complete loss.The typical venture capital (VC) firm is organized as a limited partnership, with the venture capitalists serving as general partners and the investors as limited partners. General partner VCs act as agents for the limited partners in investing their funds. VCs invest their human capital by placing their reputation on the line. The goal is to begin to convert the investment into cash or marketable securities, which are distributed to the partners. VC management companies receive a management fee equal to a percentage (usually 2.5%) of the capital of each fund. They also receive a percentage (15–30%) of the profits of each fund, called carried interest. Periodic reports are made by the VC firm to the limited partners. Usually these are only costs of managing the fund, and so revenues are negative. Most contracts specify the percentage of time that the VC will devote to managing the fund.The analysis of this research deals with the incentives of the VC who has limited attention to be allocated between improving current ventures and evaluating new ventures for possible funding. The analysis shows that the VC, as agent for both the entrepreneur and the general partners, does not have the incentives required to maximize their profits. The VC allocates attention among ventures and venture funds less frequently than required to maximize the entrepreneurs' and limited partners' profits. However, the VC does maximize the total profits of all ventures. Because the VC considers the opportunity cost of attention, the VC's allocation of attention is efficient. The implication of this result is that, although the entrepreneurs and limited partners could be made better off with a different allocation of the VC's time, this would be an inefficient use of the VC's time.