The role of investment banks in acquisitions

We compare acquisitions completed with and without investmentbank advice over the 1981 to 1982 period. We find that the choiceto use an investment bank depends on the complexity of the transaction,the type of transaction (takeovers versus acquisitions of assets),the acquiror's prior acquisition experience, and the degreeof diversification of the target firm. Although acquisitionannouncement returns are lower for firms using investment banks,this difference can be explained by differences in transactioncharacteristics. These results suggest that transaction costsare the main determinant of investment banking choice, followedby contracting costs and asymmetric information costs.     

The no-arbitrage condition and financial markets with transaction costs and heterogeneous information: The bid-ask spread

This paper investigates the implications of the no-arbitrage (NA) condition in markets with transaction costs and heterogeneous information. Dermody and Prisman (1993) showed that, in financial markets with increasing marginal transaction costs, the NA condition is equivalent to the existence of a valuation operator. They explore the exact dependence of this operator on the structure of transaction costs. They show that equilibrium prices in the “corresponding” perfect markets plus a certain factor determine the valuation operator in markets with increasing marginal transaction costs. This paper emphasizes that their result is applicable to financial markets with decreasing marginal transaction costs. Furthermore, this paper shows that, in financial markets with transaction costs and heterogeneous information, the NA condition imposes a constraint on the bid-ask spread.     

Firm survival and financial development: Evidence from a panel of emerging Asian economies

Using a panel of five Asian economies - Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand - over the period 1995-2007 we analyze the links between firm survival and financial development. We find that traditionally used measures of financial development play an important role in influencing firm survival. When stock markets become larger or more liquid firms’ survival chances improve. On the contrary, we show that higher levels of financial intermediation can increase firm failures. We also find that the beneficial effects of stock market development are more pronounced during the later years of our sample, while the adverse effects of bank intermediation have declined over time. Finally, large firms are more likely to benefit from developments in financial markets compared to small firms.     

Optimal security design

How should new securities be designed? Traditional theorieshave little to say on this: the literature on capital structureand general equilibrium theories with incomplete markets takesthe securities firms issue as exogenous. This article explicitlyincorporates the transaction costs of issuing securities anddevelops a model in which the instruments that are traded arechosen optimally and the economy's market structure is endogenous.Among other things, it is shown that the firm's income streamshould be split so that in every state all payoffs are allocatedto the security held by the group that values it most.     

Implications of Transaction Costs for the Post–Earnings Announcement Drift

This paper examines the effect of transaction costs on the post–earnings announcement drift (PEAD). Using standard market microstructure features we show that transaction costs constrain the informed trades that are necessary to incorporate earnings information into price. This implies weaker return responses at the time of the earnings announcement and higher subsequent returns drift for firms with higher transaction costs. Consistent with this prediction, we find that earnings response coefficients are lower for firms with higher transaction costs. Using portfolio analyses, we find that the profits of implementing the PEAD trading strategy are significantly reduced by transaction costs. In addition, we show, using a combination of portfolio and regression analyses, that firms with higher transaction costs are the ones that provide the higher abnormal returns for the PEAD strategy. Our results indicate that transaction costs can provide an explanation not only for the persistence but also for the existence of PEAD.     

Human Capital,Bankruptcy, and Capital Structure

We derive the optimal labor contract for a levered firm in an economy with perfectly competitive capital and labor markets. Employees become entrenched under this contract and so face large human costs of bankruptcy. The firm's optimal capital structure therefore depends on the trade‐off between these human costs and the tax benefits of debt. Optimal debt levels consistent with those observed in practice emerge without relying on frictions such as moral hazard or asymmetric information. Consistent with empirical evidence, persistent idiosyncratic differences in leverage across firms also result. In addition, wages should have explanatory power for firm leverage.     

The Diversification Discount Puzzle: Evidence for a Transaction-Cost Resolution

The literature on the corporate diversification discount and the relative efficiency of internal versus external capital markets provides mixed results. We argue that transaction-cost economics is useful in understanding this puzzle. According to transaction-cost economics, diversified firms should outperform single segment firms in industries with higher external transaction costs (e.g., emergent industries) and under-perform in industries with low external transaction costs and high agency and other internal costs (e.g., some mature industries). This paper provides evidence supporting these contentions.     

Asymmetric Information and the Market Structure of the Venture Capital Industry

In this paper we study a horizontally differentiated market for financial intermediation and develop a simple explanation for concentration in the financial intermediation industry. We show that under asymmetric information, if the demand for funds is not perfectly elastic, the heterogeneity of entrepreneurs in need of financing translates into a barrier to entry. That is, we do not need to resort to learning, weak property rights or exogenous costs of entry to generate this result.     

Financial development,financial structure,and domestic investment: International evidence

Does it matter for domestic investment whether a country's financial system is bank-based or stock-market based? This paper posits that financial intermediation affects domestic investment notably by alleviating financing constraints, allowing firms to increase investment in response to increased demand for output. The key result is that the structure of the financial system has no independent effect on investment, in the sense that it does not enhance the response of investment to changes in output, while financial development makes investment more responsive to output growth. Consequently, rather than promoting a particular type of financial structure, countries should implement policies that reduce transactions costs in financial intermediation and enforce creditor and investor rights. This will facilitate the development of banks and stock markets, which will stimulate domestic investment.     

The effect of asymmetric information on product market outcomes

We explore how asymmetric information in financial markets affects outcomes in product markets. Difference-in-difference tests around brokerage house merger/closure events (which increase asymmetric information through reductions in analyst coverage) indicate worse industry-adjusted sales growth for shocked firms than for their peers. Our results are consistent with Bolton and Scharfstein's (1990) tradeoff between investor agency concerns and predation risk. Further support is found in stronger treatment effects among firms with ex ante greater agency concerns, financing constraints, asymmetric information, and those operating in ex ante more competitive (fluid) product market spaces. Our results are concentrated in industries where we can clearly identify either net firm entry or exit.     

Freedom of services and competition in insurance markets: A note

We study entry in markets which are characterized by adverse selection. The analysis is motivated by the introduction of freedom of services in insurance markets at the European Community (EC) level. We assume that entrants in each domestic market (large multinational firms) are more efficient due to scale/scope economies but suffer an informational disadvantage. Incumbent firms, on the other hand, have perfect information about risks but incur higher production costs. We show there may exist competitive equilibria in which both types of firms coexist. The idea is that each technology trades-off production costs with information costs.     

The Determinants of Execution Costs in Short‐Term Money Markets

Prior research attributes the observed negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets to two factors—information asymmetry and broker‐client relationships. We provide evidence that a trader's ex ante transaction price information and the relationship traders have with their brokers are both significant determinants of a trader's execution costs in an opaque market; however, traders who establish strong relationships with their brokers will achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than traders with ex ante transaction price information. We also find evidence that trade size has little explanatory power after controlling for a trader's ex ante transaction price information and broker‐client relationships.     

赶超战略与大银行垄断——基于新结构经济学的视角

改革开放初期,中国有很多资本高度密集的大型国有企业,需要大量资金维持生产运营,若无法获得足够的银行贷款以致资金链断裂而破产倒闭,极易引发动荡。本文研究发现,在当时中国资本稀缺的要素禀赋结构下,为确保“重要而不能倒”的国有企业获得足够的银行贷款而不破产倒闭,不适合采用放开银行准入以促使银行竞争的方式,反而应限制银行准入,控制银行数量。原因在于,放开银行准入增加的仅是中小银行,其资金动员能力有限,与国有企业的规模特性不相匹配,更重要的是,大量中小银行进入会分流大银行的存款,降低大银行的资金动员及服务国有企业的能力,导致国有企业的贷款成本和破产风险因此而上升。本文指出,一个国家的银行业结构内生于该国的经济发展战略。限制银行准入的政策安排通过在金融方面支持国有企业,在改革初期起到了维护国防安全、保障国计民生和维持社会经济稳定的作用,为平稳推动改革创造了条件。     

International equity portfolio allocations and transaction costs

In spite of the critical role of transaction cost, there are not many papers that explicitly examine its influence on international equity portfolio allocation decisions. Using bilateral cross-country equity portfolio investment data and three direct measures of transaction costs for 36 countries, we provide evidence that markets where transaction costs are lower attract greater equity portfolio investments. The results imply that future research on international equity portfolio diversification cannot afford to ignore the role of transaction costs, and policy makers, especially in emerging markets, will have to reduce transaction costs to attract higher levels of foreign equity portfolio investments.     

Experimental Tests of Self-Selection and Screening in Insurance Decisions

A major characteristic of insurance markets is information asymmetry that may lead to phenomena such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Another aspect of markets with asymmetric information is self-selection, which refers to the pattern of choices that individuals with different personal characteristics make when facing a menu of contracts or options. To combat problems of asymmetric information, insurance firms can use screening. That is, they can offer the clients a menu of choices and infer their characteristics from their choices.This article reports the results of several studies that examined the degree to which people behave according to the notions of self-selection and screening. Subjects played the role of either insurance buyers or sellers. The results of these studies provide partial support for the hypothesis that subjects use self-selection and screening in insurance markets. Our study also points at the importance of learning in experimental studies. In one-stage experiments where subjects did not get feedback, screening was not detected. When multistage experiments were conducted, and the subjects learned from experience and were also taught the relevant theories, their decisions were more aligned with screening.     

Competitive differential pricing

We analyze welfare under differential versus uniform pricing across oligopoly markets that differ in costs of service, and establish general demand conditions for differential pricing by symmetric firms to increase consumer surplus, profit, and total welfare. The analysis reveals why competitive differential pricing is generally beneficial—more than price discrimination—but not always, including why profit may fall, unlike for monopoly. The presence of more competitors tends to enlarge consumers' share of the gain from differential pricing, though profits often still rise. When firms have asymmetric costs, however, profit or consumer surplus can fall even with ‘simple’ linear demands.     

Adverse selection in cryptocurrency markets

In this article we investigate the influence that information asymmetry may have on future volatility, liquidity, market toxicity, and returns within cryptocurrency markets. We use the adverse-selection component of the effective spread as a proxy for overall information asymmetry. Using order and trade data from the Bitfinex exchange, we first document statistically significant adverse-selection costs for major cryptocurrencies. Also, our results suggest that adverse-selection costs, on average, correspond to 10% of the estimated effective spread, indicating an economically significant impact of adverse-selection risk on transaction costs in cryptocurrency markets. Finally, we document that adverse-selection costs are important predictors of intraday volatility, liquidity, market toxicity, and returns.     

Entrepreneurship and asymmetric information in input markets

Entrepreneurs starting new firms face two sorts of asymmetric information problems. Information about the quality of new investments may be private, leading to adverse selection in credit markets, and entrepreneurs may not observe the quality of workers applying for jobs, resulting in adverse selection in labor markets. We construct a simple model to illustrate some consequences of new firms facing both sorts of asymmetric information. The market equilibrium can involve an excess supply of workers entering the entrepreneurial sector, as well as credit rationing. Equilibrium outcomes mismatch workers to firms, and will generally result in an inefficient number of both entrepreneurs and workers opting for the entrepreneurial sector. Taxes or subsidies on new firms and on wages can improve efficiency, but a second-best optimum can only be achieved if it is optimal to induce an excess supply of workers to enter the entrepreneurial sector.     

Capital Structure Dynamics in the UK and Continental Europe

Abstract

This paper investigates empirically the effects of institutions and market characteristics on corporate capital structure dynamics. Based on the fact that firms may temporarily deviate from their optimal capital structure due to the existence of adjustment costs, a partial adjustment model is used that links these transaction costs to country-specific characteristics such as the development of the financial markets, legal system, and macroeconomic environment. The sample comprises data from 873 firms in France, Germany, Italy and the UK over the period from 1982 to 2002. The results support the hypotheses that more developed financial markets, greater efficiency of the legal system and better protection of shareholders all have a positive effect on the speed at which firms adjust their capital structure towards the target. Similarly, higher economic growth and a higher inflation rate positively affect the speed of adjustment to the optimal capital structure as well.     

Environmental performance and analyst information processing costs

This study tests whether the information processing costs of analysts vary positively with the environmental performance information available on the firms they follow. Consistent with this conjecture, we find that these costs increase when analysts process a wider array of environmental performance ratings. Specifically we find that as the number of environmental performance ratings increases, analysts cover fewer firms in their portfolio, provide fewer earnings-per-share (EPS) forecast revisions, and make less timely forecast revisions. Two additional tests confirm that our results relate to environmental performance information and not to confounding factors. First, the “shock” of the Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 implemented for California firms in 2012 increases analyst information processing costs incremental to the main effect of environmental performance ratings. Second, analyst information processing costs increase further in the year a firm covered by an analyst provides a CSR report for the first time. Our results have implications for firm managers considering voluntary environmental disclosure and investors deciding on what stocks to include in their socially responsible portfolios because when processing costs are high, analysts will provide less information or less timely information, resulting in more gradual price discovery in capital markets.