Multistage R&D competition and patent policy

In this paper a model of multistage R&D patent policy is investigated. We study the impact of the duration of patent protection for intermediate products on R&D races when the discovery of the final product requires the accomplishment of an intermediate step. Using a multistage model where firms choose their levels of research investment at each stage, we find all subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. We also determine how competition affects a firm's level of research investment at different stages of the R&D competition.     

基于因子分析法的地区专利发展水平比较研究

专利是一个国家或地区科技资产的核心,专利综合实力是衡量一个国家或地区综合实力以及区域创新能力的重要标志。通过对2008年我国发明、实用新型和外观设计三种专利申请总量排名前20位地区的分析,运用因子分析法评价了其专利发展状况,然后通过分析评价结果指出了各地区的优势与劣势。这对于提升各地区的专利综合实力具有重要的参考价值和借鉴意义,也为各相关部门的政策制定提供了理论决策依据。     

Climate Policy under Technology Spillovers

We study climate policy when there are technology spillovers between countries, as there is no instrument that (directly) corrects for these externalities. Without an international climate agreement, the (non-cooperative) equilibrium depends on whether countries use tradable quotas or carbon taxes as their environmental policy instruments. All countries are better-off in the tax case than in the quota case. Two types of international climate agreements are then studied: One is a Kyoto type of agreement where each country is assigned a specific number of internationally tradable quotas. In the second type of agreement, a common carbon tax is used domestically in all countries. None of the cases satisfy the conditions for the social optimum. Even if the quota price is equal to the Pigovian level, R&D investments will be lower than what is socially optimal in the quota case. It is also argued that the quota agreement gives higher R&D expenditures and more abatement than the tax agreement.     

Innovation and imitation as an interactive process

This article deals with the problem of the coexistence of innovators and imitators in a competitive market. The study proposes a model of innovation and diffusion of productive knowledge as an interactive process between innovators and imitators under conditions of dynamic uncertainty. The process can be modelled as a Stackelberg game, where the innovator acts as a leader in choosing whether to share knowledge or set up private protection and the imitator as a follower in choosing when becoming active. Under these conditions, activation thresholds are derived for both innovators and imitators. If protection policies are effective, the imitator can be trapped into an inaction region by the innovator. Thus, there will be two regimes without and with diffusion, according to whether the inaction region is enacted or not. Under these conditions, discovery and diffusion appear to be dynamic complements, as a higher speed of activation of innovating firms is favoured by a higher level of imitation and a higher speed of activation of imitating firms is favoured by a higher level of discoveries. In order to explore some of the quantitative implications of these results, the paper also proposes an application of the model to four European countries.     

Price normalization under imperfect competition

In general equilibrium models of imperfect competition the equilibria depend on how prices are normalized. This note shows that a price normalization preserves convexity properties if and only if prices are measured in terms of a fixed commodity bundle. I am grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments, inspiring a simplification in the proof of the main result, and the argument in the Remark.     

Electoral competition under imperfect information

Summary. This paper considers electoral competition between two office-motivated parties and one voter, in the presence of two alternative policies and under imperfect information. The theory of refinements of Nash equilibrium predicts the outcome of this three-player game: both parties faithfully use their information and try to find the best policy for the voter. We discuss the meaning of this model for Politics and prove that the same result holds for any number of voters, provided that parties are expected plurality maximizers and that voters satisfy a version of the sincere voting assumption adapted to this strategic setting.Received: 12 December 2001, Revised: 16 June 2003JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D72, D82.Correspondence to: Jean-François LaslierThanks to Gabrielle Demange, Françoise Forges, Roger Guesnerie, Jean-Fran çois Mertens, Thomas Palfrey, Sylvain Sorin and other participants in workshops and conferences in Caen, Paris, Caltech and Yale. Thanks also to two anonymous referees and to Paul Heidues and Johan Lagerlöf for their comments. This work was originated when K. Van der Straeten was at THEMA (Université de Cergy-Pontoise) and DELTA.     

美国信息技术领域专利政策分析及对我启示

高技术产业是真正建立在知识产权基础上的新产业。没有知识产权就没有高新技术产业。作为当前高技术产业的核心领域，信息技术产业更是建立在知识产权基础上的新兴产业，专利权是其中的关键因素。我们有必要研究美国的专利政策经验，为完善我国专利政策提供借鉴。     

Optimal fiscal policy in a world liquidity trap

We construct a model of the international transmission of ‘liquidity trap’ shocks, and examine the case for international coordination of fiscal policy to respond to the liquidity trap. Integrated financial markets tend to propagate liquidity traps. In a global environment, fiscal policy may be effective in raising GDP when the economy is stuck in a liquidity trap, but it does so in a ‘beggar thy neighbor’ fashion; when one economy is in a liquidity trap, the cross country spillover effect of fiscal policy is negative. We examine the welfare optimizing policy response to a liquidity trap when countries coordinate on fiscal policy. Fiscal policy may be an effective tool in responding to a liquidity trap, although it is never optimal to use fiscal expansion sufficiently to fully eliminate a downturn. Moreover, there is little case for coordinated global fiscal expansion. For the most part, the country worst hit by a liquidity trap shock should use its own policies to respond, without much help from foreign policies.     

Environmental risk and welfare valuation under imperfect information

Consumers are often uninformed, or unsure, about the ambient level of environmental risk. An optimal policy must jointly determine efficient levels of self-protection, information provision, and public risk mitigation efforts. Unfortunately, conventional welfare measures are not amenable to welfare analysis in the presence of imperfect information. We develop a theoretical welfare measure, called quasi-compensating variation, that is a natural extension of compensating variation (CV). We show that this welfare measure offers not only a money metric of the “value of information,” but also a means to appropriately evaluate the welfare effects of various policies when consumers are imperfectly informed about ambient risk. This welfare measure allows us to obtain a number of results that the traditional CV measure fails to offer. In particular, we show that the consumer’s willingness to pay for a (small) environmental risk reduction is higher for those who underestimate ambient risk than for those who overestimate or are perfectly informed if the marginal return to self-protection increases with ambient risk.     

专利丛林引发的反公地悲剧及对专利政策的思考

由于专利具有排他性,因此,专利丛林的出现使得后续研发必须得到上游所有专利权人的许可,当专利权人行使排他权时,后续研发工作就难以进行,从而造成专利成果利用不足和上游基础研究被闲置的反公地悲剧。从避免反公地悲剧的角度出发,对专利政策进行了有益的反思。     

Unsuccessful patent application and cooperative R&;D

We show that uncertainty in patent approvals may induce the firms to do cooperative R&D. With an exogenous probability of success in patent application, we show that, if all firms apply for patents under non-cooperative R&D, the firms prefer cooperative R&D than non-cooperative R&D for moderate (high) probabilities of success in patent applications, if the cost of patenting is small (large). We also show the implications of entry of non-innovating firms and endogenous probability of success in patent applications.      

基于专利战略的企业技术创新模式研究

基于专利战略的视角,企业技术创新必须具备创新技术的新颖性、创新技术的创造性、创新技术的实用性三个基本特征。技术创新具有特定的模式,这些模式反映了技术创新发生过程的普遍规律。将专利战略与技术创新有机结合起来,通过专利分析、专利创造和专利实施为纽带联结起企业技术创新活动中的技术预测、技术开发和技术应用的主要环节,形成一种在时间上继起和在空间上并存的关系,构建一个专利战略视角下的企业技术创新模型（ PS－TI模型）,可以为企业技术创新提供一个新的指导框架。     

Patent Enforcement, Innovation and Welfare

This paper analyzes how the Southern patent enforcement affects the Northern firm's choice of licensing, subsidiary production or exports for serving the Southern market, and the innovation rate in the North and ultimately the welfare in the South. We show that for imperfect patent enforcement, licensing contract leads to more innovation in the North relative to subsidiary or exports. When both subsidiary and exports are very costly options, no patent enforcement in the South is best for the South. However, when either subsidiary operation or exports can be organized cheaply, the Southern government chooses some positive degree of patent enforcement. We also establish that strengthening of patent enforcement in the South may lead to more licensing and less subsidiary operations or exports.     

Exploring technology diffusion and classification of business methods: Using the patent citation network

Among the many technology forecasting indicators, patents and patent citations are useful and important indicators. The more frequently a certain patent is cited by subsequent patents, the more the related technology can be said to be diffused, implying that the technology is more widely applied and thus more valuable. This paper analyzes the business methods technology which retrieves patents from the USPTO database. There are two purposes of this paper: 1. establish the indicators for finding basic patents and measure the relationship of these basic patents; 2. classify the basic patents and explain the groups of technology diffusion. Finally, this study identifies the two mainstreams in business method technology: one is focused on marketing technology, and the other one stresses on data security. Both are important for Internet data processes or e-commerce activities.     

Vacant technology forecasting using new Bayesian patent clustering

Vacant technology forecasting (VTF) is a technology forecasting approach to find technological needs for given industrial field in the future. It is important to know the future trend of developing technology for the R&D planning of a company and a country. In this paper, we propose a new Bayesian model for patent clustering. This is a VTF methodology based on patent data analysis. Our method is composed of Bayesian learning and ensemble method to construct the VTF model. To illustrate the practical way of the proposed methodology, we perform a case study of given technology domain using retrieved patent documents from patent databases in the world.     

知识溢出支撑集群企业创新跨越研究

培育集群企业技术创新能力是产业集群竞争优势的主要表现形式,而企业是集群中最活跃的行为主体,单个企业的技术创新能力在很大程度上反映了一个集群的技术创新能力.知识溢出、集群企业吸收能力是产业集群创新的关键要素.首先对集群企业技术创新能力、知识溢出、集群企业吸收能力的相关文献进行了综述,在此基础上归纳本文的研究要素,明确要素之间的逻辑关系;针对当前集群企业的现实,从吸收能力视角提出了知识溢出支撑集群企业技术创新能力跨越的理论分析框架,并从隐性知识、显性知识、吸收能力与集群企业技术创新能力跨越进行了分析,知识溢出对集群企业提升技术创新能力具有促进作用,而这种促进作用的大小受到集群企业本身吸收能力影响,即吸收能力增强了知识溢出对集群企业技术创新能力的促进作用.