Macroeconomic effects of corporate default crisis: A long-term perspective

Using an extensive data set on corporate bond defaults in the US from 1866 to 2010, we study the macroeconomic effects of bond market crises and contrast them with those resulting from banking crises. During the past 150 years, the US has experienced many severe corporate default crises in which 20–50% of all corporate bonds defaulted. Although the total par amount of corporate bonds has at times rivaled the amount of bank loans outstanding, we find that corporate default crises have far fewer real effects than do banking crises. These results provide empirical support for current theories that emphasize the unique role that banks and the credit and collateral channels play in amplifying macroeconomic shocks.     

Corporate distress and lobbying: Evidence from the Stimulus Act

The literature on distressed firms has focused on these firms’ investment, capital structure, and labor decisions. This paper investigates a novel aspect of firm behavior in distress: how financial health affects a firm?s lobbying and, consequently, its relationship with the government. We exploit the shock to nonfinancial firms during the 2008 financial crisis and the availability of the stimulus package in the first quarter of 2009. We find that firms with weaker financial health, as measured by credit default swap spreads, lobbied more. We also show that the amount spent on lobbying was associated with a greater likelihood of receiving stimulus funds.     

Feedback effects of credit ratings

Rating agencies are often criticized for being biased in favor of borrowers, for being too slow to downgrade following credit quality deterioration, and for being oligopolists. Based on a model that takes into account the feedback effects of credit ratings, I show that: (i) rating agencies should focus not only on the accuracy of their ratings but also on the effects of their ratings on the probability of survival of the borrower; (ii) even when rating agencies pursue an accurate rating policy, multi-notch downgrades or immediate default may occur in response to small shocks to fundamentals; (iii) increased competition between rating agencies can lead to rating downgrades, increasing default frequency and reducing welfare.     

Has the CDS market influenced the borrowing cost of European countries during the sovereign crisis?

This paper assesses the potential influence of the growing CDS market on the borrowing cost of sovereign states during the European sovereign crisis. We analyze the sovereign debt market to ascertain the pattern of information transmission between the CDS and corresponding bond markets. Our methodological innovation is the use of a non-linear specification rather than the linear VECM specification customarily employed. Using a panel smooth transition model during the 2008–2010 period, we find that: 1) linearity tests clearly reject the null hypothesis of a linear transmission mechanisms between the bond and the CDS markets; 2) market distress alters the mutual influence and 3) the higher the distress the more the CDS market dominates the information transmission between CDS and bond markets.     

Collateral pricing

We examine how collateral affects the cost of debt capital. Using a novel data set of secured debt issued by U.S. airlines, we construct industry-specific measures of collateral redeployability. We show that debt tranches that are secured by more redeployable collateral exhibit lower credit spreads, higher credit ratings, and higher loan-to-value ratios—an effect which our estimates show to be economically sizeable. Our results suggest that the ability to pledge collateral, and in particular redeployable collateral, lowers the cost of external financing and increases debt capacity.     

The bright and dark side of staging: Investment performance and the varying motivations of private equity firms

Previous papers that examined investment decisions by private equity funds are divided on whether staging has a positive or negative effect on returns. We believe these opposing views can be reconciled by studying when staging is used during the life of the investment relationship: We find that staging has a positive effect on investment returns in the beginning of the investment relationship, consistent with the notion that staging helps mitigate information asymmetry. However, staging appears to be negatively associated with returns when used prior to the exit decision. Our unique dataset allows us to measure these intertemporal effects precisely.     

Beyond bankruptcy: Does the US bankruptcy code provide a fresh start to entrepreneurs?

This paper assesses the extent to which the US bankruptcy system is effective in providing small businesses a “fresh start” after a bankruptcy filing. I use data from the 1993, 1998 and 2003 National Survey of Small Business Finances to explore how firms fare after a bankruptcy filing. On the positive side, previously bankrupt firms are not any more burdened than the average small firm by problems relating to profitability, cash flow, health insurance costs, or taxes. Further, the fact that these firms are surviving several years after the filing is itself a testament to the efficient functioning of the US bankruptcy system. It suggests that the bankruptcy system goes a long way toward helping businesses recover after a bankruptcy filing.     

Are fairness opinions fair? The case of mergers and acquisitions

Over the period 1994–2003, 80% of targets and 37% of acquirers obtain a third-party assessment of the fairness of a merger or acquisition. These fairness opinions do not affect deal outcomes when used by targets, but they affect deal outcomes when used by acquirers. The deal premium is lower in transactions if the acquirer obtains a fairness opinion, and is further reduced if multiple advisors provide an opinion. However, the acquirer's announcement-period return is 2.3% lower if the acquirer has a fairness opinion, especially if the acquirer pays a high premium, indicating that investors are skeptical of these transactions.     

Executive stock options and IPO underpricing

In about one-third of US IPOs between 1996 and 2000, executives received stock options with an exercise price equal to the IPO offer price rather than a market-determined price. Among firms with such “IPO options”, 58% of top executives realize a net benefit from underpricing: the gain from the options exceeds the loss from the dilution of their pre-IPO shareholdings. If executives can influence either the IPO offer price or the timing and terms of their stock option grants, there should be a positive relation between IPO option grants and underpricing. We find no evidence of such a relation. Our results contrast sharply with the emerging literature on managerial self-dealing at shareholder expense.     

The two sides of CEO option grants at the IPO

This paper examines the impact of CEO IPO option grants on IPO underpricing. Contrary to Lowry and Murphy (2007) who do not find a relationship between the two, this paper finds such a relationship when board independence, the power of the CEO and venture capitalists (VCs) are taken into account. The results are threefold. First, powerful CEOs are able to reap substantial gains from IPO options, to the detriment of the shareholders. Second, young, powerful VCs use IPO option grants to bribe the CEO to agree to an early IPO which will leave more of the existing shareholders' money on the table. Finally, IPO options only work as a value-enhancing incentive in the presence of strong boards.     

Employee well-being,firm leverage,and bankruptcy risk

Employees of liquidating firms are likely to lose income and non-pecuniary benefits of working for the firm, which makes bankruptcy costly for employees. This paper examines whether firms take these costs into account when deciding on the optimal amount of leverage. We find that firms with leading track records in employee well-being significantly reduce the probability of bankruptcy by operating with lower debt ratios. Moreover, we observe that firms with better employee track records have better credit ratings, even when we control for differences in firm leverage.     

The alchemy of CDO credit ratings

Collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) were one of the largest and fastest growing segments of the structured finance market, fueling the 2003-2007 boom in syndicated loans and leveraged buyouts. The credit crisis brought CLO issuance to a halt, and as a result the leveraged loan market dried up. Similar to other structured finance products, investors in CLOs rely heavily on credit rating provided by the rating agencies, yet little is known about CLO rating practices. This paper attempts to fill the gap. Using novel hand-collected data on 3912 tranches of collateralized loan obligations we document the rating practices of CLOs and analyze their structures.     

A public good approach to credit ratings – From concept to reality

From the onset of the 2008–2009 financial crisis to the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, credit rating agencies have been assigned considerable blame. Reforming the credit rating industry has hence become an important policy issue. In addition to the regulatory efforts in the context of accepting the for-profit business model of ratings, there is a growing realization that credit ratings bear the characteristics of a public good. Financial market participants need reliable, transparent and independent assessment of credit risks. Credit ratings are therefore better viewed as an infrastructure matter. However, the proposed regulations seem to have missed this point. This paper introduces a new approach to credit ratings undertaken by the Risk Management Institute at the National University of Singapore that is predicated on the provision of credit ratings as a public good. With a public good alternative in place, the currently predominant for-profit business model may be counterbalanced.     

A market-based approach to sector risk determinants and transmission in the euro area

In a panel data framework applied to Portfolio Distance-to-Default series of corporate sectors in the euro area, this paper evaluates systemic and idiosyncratic determinants of default risk and examines how distress is transferred in and between the financial and corporate sectors since the early days of the euro. This approach takes into account observed and unobserved common factors and the presence of different degrees of cross-section dependence in the form of economic proximity. This paper contributes to the financial stability literature with a contingent claims approach to a sector-based analysis with a less dominant macro focus while being compatible with existing stress-testing methodologies in the literature. A disaggregated analysis of the different corporate and financial sectors allows for a more detailed assessment of specificities in terms of risk profile, i.e. heterogeneity of business models, risk exposures and interaction with the rest of the macro environment.     

Employee treatment and firm leverage: A test of the stakeholder theory of capital structure

We investigate the stakeholder theory of capital structure from the perspective of a firm’s relations with its employees. We find that firms that treat their employees fairly (as measured by high employee‐friendly ratings) maintain low debt ratios. This result is robust to a variety of model specifications and endogeneity issues. The negative relation between leverage and a firm’s ability to treat employees fairly is also evident when we measure its ability by whether it is included in the Fortune magazine list, “100 Best Companies to Work For.” These results suggest that a firm’s incentive or ability to offer fair employee treatment is an important determinant of its financing policy.     

Who are the active investors? : Evidence from venture capital

This paper examines the determinants and consequences of investor activism in venture capital. Using a hand-collected sample of European venture capital deals, it shows the importance of human capital. Venture capital firms with partners that have prior business experience are more active recruiting managers and directors, helping with fundraising, and interacting more frequently with their portfolio companies. Independent venture capital firms are also more active than ‘captive’ (bank-, corporate-, or government-owned) firms. After controlling for endogeneity, investor activism is shown to be positively related to the success of portfolio companies.