Managerial ownership and firm performance: A re-examination using productivity measurement

The role of productivity in firm performance is of fundamental importance to the US economy. Consistent with the corporate finance approach, this paper uses the ownership stake of a firm's managers as an argument in estimating the firm's production function. Accordingly, this paper brings together the corporate finance and productivity literature. Using a large sample of randomly selected manufacturing firms that does not suffer from any survivorship or large firm size biases, we find that managerial ownership changes are positively related to changes in productivity. We also find a higher sensitivity of changes in managerial ownership to changes in productivity for firms who experience greater than the median change in managerial ownership. These results are robust to including lagged estimates of production inputs, year dummies and separate dummies for each firm to control for unobservable firm characteristics. In addition, we find that the stock market rewards firms with increases in firm value when these firms increase their level of productivity.     

Greenmail premia, board composition and management shareholdings

This paper investigates the association between premia paid in targeted share repurchases (greenmail) and the characteristics of the boards of directors. A nonlinear relationship is found between the premium paid and the proportion of shares held by the inside directors. The premium decreases as the proportion of unaffiliated outside directors increases.     

Measuring managerial equity ownership: a comparison of sources of ownership data

This paper demonstrates that differences in managerial ownership data cannot explain contradictory empirical evidence on the relation between equity ownership and the entrenchment of managers. Three commonly used sources of managerial equity ownership data are described and contrasted. The Value Line Investment Survey is shown to be a relatively low-cost substitute for the data on beneficial ownership by officers and directors found in corporate proxy statements.     

Changes in CEO compensation structure and the impact on firm performance following CEO turnover

We document changes in compensation structure following CEO turnover and relate them to future performance. Compared to outgoing CEOs, incoming CEOs derive a significantly greater percentage of their compensation from option grants and new stock grants. The voluntary turnover sample shows similar changes in compensation structure while the forced turnover sample results suggest that new stock grants drive the significant increase in incentive compensation following turnover. Post-turnover performance is positively associated with new stock grants as a percentage of total compensation in the full sample and when analyzing forced and voluntary turnovers separately. We find limited evidence that future operating income is positively associated with option grants following forced turnover. Post-turnover improvement in operating income is positively associated with an increase in new stock grants for the incoming relative to the outgoing CEO.

Reexamining the managerial ownership effect on firm value

Whether equity-based compensation and equity ownership align the interests of managers with stockholders is an important question in finance. Early studies found an inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and firm value, but later studies using firm fixed effects found no relation. Managerial ownership levels change very slowly over time which may mask an ownership effect on firm value when using a fixed effect model. This is due to a much smaller within firm variation than between firm variation. We demonstrate that using pay-performance semi-elasticity, rather than pay-performance sensitivity as a measure of managerial ownership incentives, results in meaningful variation within firm over time. The greater within firm variation increases the power to detect a relation between managerial ownership and firm value with fixed effect regressions. As in the early research on this issue, we find a significant inverted U-shaped relation between managerial ownership and Tobin's Q in fixed effects regressions and after controlling for endogeneity with both two-stage and three-stage least squares regressions. Our results are consistent with incentive alignment at low levels and risk aversion at high levels of managerial ownership.     

Financing constraints and unemployment: Evidence from the Great Recession

This paper shows that financing constraints of small firms were one of the drivers of unemployment dynamics during the 2007–2009 recession in the United States. Specifically, workers in small firms were more likely to become unemployed during the 2007–2009 recession than comparable workers in large firms, but only if they were employed in industries with high financing needs. We find very similar results for the 1990–1991 recession, but not for the 2001 recession, where only the former was associated with a reduction in loan supply. The findings support the credit constraints hypothesis and underscore the role of bank lending in explaining labor market activity.     

Corporate risk-taking,firm value and high levels of managerial earnings forecasts

We examine the impact of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts, an important form of voluntary disclosure, on corporate risk-taking and firm value. Theory and anecdotal evidence suggest that a policy of high disclosure may reduce managers' willingness to invest in higher-risk, higher-return projects. We first verify, as in prior research, that corporate risk-taking is associated with higher future firm value. We then document a negative relation between firms with high levels of forecasting and corporate risk-taking. Finally, we provide evidence suggesting that high levels of managerial earnings forecasts reduce the positive association between corporate risk-taking and future firm value. Our results are robust to alternative measures of corporate risk-taking and future firm value, and alternative definitions of high levels of managerial earnings forecasts. Our results may be of importance to varying interests as they highlight the potential for high levels of earnings forecasts to inhibit corporate risk-taking and lower firm value.     

Internal and external discipline following securities class actions

Companies are sometimes accused of misleading the market. The SEC can punish this with enforcement actions. Alternatively, shareholders can seek redress through a shareholder class action (SCA). Thus, using a sample of 416 securities class actions, this paper shows that SCAs are a catalyst to promote disciplinary takeovers, CEO turnover and pay-cuts, and harm CEOs’ future job-prospects.     

Disproportionate insider control and firm performance

The effect of disproportionate insider control on firm performance is ambiguous. Disproportionate control may enhance insiders’ ability to expropriate perquisites; on the other hand, it may provide stability of management and reduce short‐term market pressures. Using a hand‐collected sample of U.S. dual‐class firms, we find that disproportionate control is positively associated with accounting‐based performance, but negatively associated with Tobin's Q. These results are consistent with the incentives of entrenched insiders who are interested in profitability but less beholden to capital markets.     

经营者股权激励与企业价值——基于内生性视角的理论分析与经验证据

本文首次从内生性视角研究中国上市企业经营者股权激励的影响因素及与企业价值相关性的问题。遵循内生性的研究思路,选取高科技上市企业2001—2004年均衡的平行数据为研究样本,通过研究发现:各种企业可观测特征和不可观测因素对经营者股权激励水平有显著影响。在此基础上,以托宾Q值表示企业价值时,我们发现,对高科技企业来说,即使考虑到内生性影响,经营者股权激励与企业价值之间仍然存在强烈的区间效应,即经营者股权激励水平与企业价值之间存在倒U型关系。大力加强经营者股权激励的程度,将有助于高科技企业价值的提升。     

Effect of ownership structure on underinvestment and overinvestment: empirical evidence from Spain

This paper investigates how ownership affects the investment‐cash flow sensitivity by taking into account the non‐linearities of ownership with respect to firm value, and using a free cash flow index and a criterion for financial constraints to disentangle underinvestment and overinvestment. Interesting results are provided by estimating using the Generalized Method of Moments to eliminate the endogeneity problem. The alignment of interests between owners and managers and the monitoring by concentrated ownership both alleviate the sensitivity of investment to cash flow both in underinvestor and overinvestor firms. However, in the presence of controlling owners, underinvestment and overinvestment are exacerbated.     

CEO optimism and forced turnover

We show theoretically that optimism can lead a risk-averse Chief Executive Officer (CEO) to choose the first-best investment level that maximizes shareholder value. Optimism below (above) the interior optimum leads the CEO to underinvest (overinvest). Hence, if boards of directors act in the interests of shareholders, CEOs with relatively low or high optimism face a higher probability of forced turnover than moderately optimistic CEOs face. Using a large sample of turnovers, we find strong empirical support for this prediction. The results are consistent with the view that there is an interior optimum level of managerial optimism that maximizes firm value.