Dynamic theory of preferences: Habit formation and taste for variety

We analyze individual preferences over infinite horizon consumption choices. Our axioms provide the foundation for a recursive representation of the utility function that contains as particular cases the classical Koopmans representation (Koopmans (1960)) as well as the habit formation specification.We examine some of the consequences of our axiomatization by considering a standard consumer choice problem, and show that typically in the space of concave utility functions satisfying our axioms the consumer displays a taste for variety. The latter means that such a consumer selects optimally time variant consumption programs for any given time invariant sequence of commodities’ relative prices and for all possible sequences of market discount factors. In contrast, if a concave utility function satisfies Koopmans’ axioms the consumer does not display a taste for variety.     

Stochastic models for risky choices: A comparison of different axiomatizations

For a long time researchers have recognized the need for applying stochastic models for analyzing data generated from agents’ choice under risk. This paper compares and discusses recent axiomatizations of stochastic models for risky choice given by Blavatskyy (2008) and Dagsvik (2008). We show that some of Blavatskyy’s axioms are equivalent to some of Dagsvik’s axioms. We also propose new axioms and derive their implications. Specifically, we show that some of the results of Dagsvik (2008) can be derived under weaker axioms than those he proposed originally.     

Aggregate Poverty Measures

The way poverty is measured is important for an understanding of what has happened to poverty as well as for anti-poverty policy evaluation. Sen's (1976) pathfinding work has motivated many researchers to focus on the way poverty should be measured. A poverty measure, argued by Sen, should satisfy certain properties or axioms and the desirability of a poverty measure should be evaluated by these axioms. During the last two decades, many researchers have adopted the axiomatic approach pioneered by Sen to propose additional axioms and develop alternative poverty measures. The objective of this survey is to provide a clarification on the extensive literature of aggregate poverty measures. In this survey, we first examine the desirability of each axiom, the properties of each poverty measure, and the interrelationships among axioms. The desirability of an axiom cannot be evaluated in isolation, and some combination of axioms may make it impossible to devise a satisfactory poverty measure; some axioms can be implied by other axioms combined and so are not independent; some others are ad hoc and are disqualified as axioms for poverty measurement. Based on the interactions among axioms, we identify the ‘core’ axioms which together have a strong implication on the functional form of a poverty measure. We then review poverty measures that have appeared in the literature, evaluating the interrelationships among different measures, and examining the properties of each measure. The axioms each measure satisfies/violates are also summarized in a tabular form. Several ‘good’ poverty measures, which have not been documented by previous surveys, are also included.     

Randomly evolving tastes and delayed commitment

We consider a decision maker with randomly evolving tastes who faces dynamic decision situations that involve intertemporal tradeoffs, such as those in consumption savings problems. We axiomatize a recursive representation of choice that features uncertain consumption utilities, which evolve according to a subjective Markov process. The parameters of the representation, which are the subjective Markov process governing the evolution of utilities, and the discount factor, are uniquely identified from behavior. We relate the correlation of tastes over time and the desire to delay commitment to future consumption.     

Axiomatic foundations of efficiency measurement on data-generated technologies

We assess the ability of three well-known technical efficiency indexes, the Debreu-Farrell index, the Färe–Lovell index, and the Zieschang index, to satisfy the Färe–Lovell axioms and continuity axioms (for technologies as well as input quantities) on the class of technologies generated by standard mathematical-programming methods of measuring efficiency: data envelopment analysis (DEA) and free-disposal-hull (FDH) analysis. Our principal conclusions are that (a) restriction to these data-based technologies adds continuity in input quantities to the properties satisfied by the Färe–Lovell and the Zieschang indexes (thus eliminating a salient advantage of the Debreu–Farrell index), but (b) none of the indexes satisfies all Färe–Lovell axioms (nor all continuity axioms) on either DEA or FDH technologies, and hence (c) trade-offs among the indexes remain. These findings provide motivation for the search for an index that does satisfy these axioms on DEA and FDH technologies.     

Decision analysis using targets instead of utility functions

A common precept of decision analysis under uncertainty is the choice of an action which maximizes the expected value of a utility function. Savage's (1954) axioms for subjective expected utility provide a normative foundation for this principle of choice. This paper shows that the same set of axioms implies that one should select an action which maximizes the probability of meeting an uncertain target. This suggests a new perspective and an alternate target-based language for decision analysis. We explore the implications and the advantages of this target-based approach for both individual and group decision-making.     

CONTINUOUS PREFERENCE ORDERINGS REPRESENTABLE BY UTILITY FUNCTIONS

This paper surveys the conditions under which it is possible to represent a continuous preference ordering using utility functions. We start with a historical perspective on the notions of utility and preferences, continue by defining the mathematical concepts employed in this literature, and then list several key contributions to the topic of representability. These contributions concern both the preference orderings and the spaces where they are defined. For any continuous preference ordering, we show the need for separability and the sufficiency of connectedness and separability, or second countability, of the space where it is defined. We emphasize the need for separability by showing that in any nonseparable metric space, there are continuous preference orderings without utility representation. However, by reinforcing connectedness, we show that countably boundedness of the preference ordering is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a (continuous) utility representation. Finally, we discuss the special case of strictly monotonic preferences.     

Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions,axioms, and axiomatizations

In this paper, for each solution for TU games, we define its “dual” and “anti-dual”. Then, we apply these notions to axioms: two axioms are (anti-)dual to each other if whenever a solution satisfies one of them, its (anti-)dual satisfies the other. It turns out that these definitions allow us not only to organize existing axiomatizations of various solutions but also to find new axiomatizations of some solutions. As an illustration, we show that two well-known axiomatizations of the core are essentially equivalent in the sense that one can be derived from the other, and derive new axiomatizations of the Shapley value and the Dutta–Ray solution.     

Nash bargaining in ordinal environments

We analyze the implications of Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the scale invariance axiom needs to be strenghtened to take into account all order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. This axiom, called ordinal invariance, is a very demanding one. For two-agents, it is violated by every strongly individually rational bargaining rule. In general, no ordinally invariant bargaining rule satisfies the other three axioms of Nash. Parallel to Roth (J Econ Theory 16:247–251, 1977), we introduce a weaker independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom that we argue is better suited for ordinally invariant bargaining rules. We show that the three-agent Shapley–Shubik bargaining rule uniquely satisfies ordinal invariance, Pareto optimality, symmetry, and this weaker IIA axiom. We also analyze the implications of other independence axioms.     

Preference aggregation and atoms in measures

This paper examines the aggregation of preferences with a finitely additive measure space of agents. We consider three types of non-dictatorship axioms: non-dictatorship, coalitional non-dictatorship, and atomic non-dictatorship. First, we show that the existence of an atom is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a social welfare function that satisfies weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and coalitional non-dictatorship. Second, we simultaneously impose non-dictatorship and coalitional non-dictatorship, and specify a necessary and sufficient condition for the finitely additive measure that guarantees the compatibility among the axioms. Third, we impose all non-dictatorship axioms and show that the corresponding measure is extremely restricted.     

Recoverability revisited

This study considers the uniqueness problem of the preference relation corresponding to a demand function, which is called the “recoverability problem”. We show that if a demand function has sufficiently wide range and is income-Lipschitzian, then there exists a unique corresponding upper semi-continuous preference relation. Moreover, we explicitly construct a utility function that represents this preference relation. Compared with related research, a feature of our result is that it ensures not only the uniqueness, but also the existence of the corresponding upper semi-continuous preference relation. Further, we introduce two axioms related to demand functions, and show that these axioms are equivalent to the continuity of our preference relation in the interior of the consumption set. In addition to these results, we present three examples that explain why our requirements (including the upper semi-continuity of preference relations and the wide range requirement and income-Lipschitzian property of demand functions) are necessary, and a further two examples in which there is no continuous preference relation corresponding to the given demand function.     

Choice functions and weak Nash axioms

The Nash axiom is a basic property of consistency in choice. This paper proposes weaker versions of the axiom and examines their logical implications. In particular, we demonstrate that weak Nash axioms are useful to understand the relationship between the Nash axiom and the path independence axiom. We provide an application of weak Nash axioms to the no-envy approach. We present a possibility result and an impossibility result.     

跨期决策中的消费者自我控制行为研究

跨期决策系指做出购买决策与获得产品之间存在时间距离的一种决策类型,随着电子商务的发展,产生这种决策类型的消费情景日渐增多,使得对这一问题的消费行为学研究成为必要.本研究采用行为学实验的方法对于跨期决策中的消费者自我控制行为进行了研究,并发现当消费者作出决策的时间点与能够真实获取商品的时间点之间若存在一定时间间隔的场合,消费者会较之可以现场获取产品的场合展示出较强的自我控制行为,具体地表现为对能提供更多长期有用性但在短期内效用较低的产品的较强偏好与支付意愿.这一发现为现有的消费行为学有关理论提供了有益的支持,同时在电子商务日益发达的今天具有一定的应用价值.     

The Dynamic Production Axioms and System Dynamics Behaviors: The Foundation for Future Integration

Realistically, organizational and/or system performance is dynamic and non-linear. However, in the efficiency literature, system performance is frequently evaluated considering linear combinations of the input/output variables and without explicitly taking into account the causes of efficiency behavior nor the dynamic behavior of systems. Policy decisions based on these results may be sub-optimized because the non-linear relationships among variables, causal relationships, and feedback mechanisms are ignored.This research takes the initial step of evaluating system performance in a dynamic environment, by relating the factors that effect system performance to the policies that govern it. To accomplish this, this paper extends the concepts of the static production axioms into a dynamic realm, where inputs are not instantaneously converted into outputs. The relationships of these new dynamic production axioms to the basic behaviors associated with system dynamics structures are explored.     

On the Functional Form of an Efficiency Index

An input efficiency index gives a numeric assessment of the degree to which a given input combination falls short of being efficient in producing a fixed amount of output. This paper presents a system of axioms which characterise a certain family of efficiency indices containing the well-known Farrell and Färe-Lovell indices. The family of indices satisfying the axioms can be obtained by minimizing a suitable function, called a performance evaluation, and different choices of performance evaluation will result in different indices.     

How to share when context matters: The Möbius value as a generalized solution for cooperative games

All quasivalues rest on a set of three basic axioms (efficiency, null player, and additivity), which are augmented with positivity for random order values, and with positivity and partnership for weighted values. We introduce the concept of Möbius value associated with a sharing system and show that this value is characterized by the above three axioms. We then establish that (i) a Möbius value is a random order value if and only if the sharing system is stochastically rationalizable and (ii) a Möbius value is a weighted value if and only if the sharing system satisfies the Luce choice axiom.     

Entitlements to continued life and the evaluation of population health

Review of Economic Design - We analyze the implications of axioms formalizing entitlements to continued life for the evaluation of population health, when combined with basic structural axioms. A...     

A study of proportionality and robustness in economies with a commonly owned technology

Abstract. Studying one-input one-output economies, we say that an allocation is proportional if the input-output ratio is identical among agents and if each agent maximizes her welfare given this ratio. We propose three equity axioms based on this definition, and we use them to compare the main solutions to this simple equity problem. We also combine efficiency, robustness axioms and our proportionality axioms to characterize two solutions. Received: 11 June 1997 / Accepted: 26 May 2000     

Characterization of stationary preferences in a continuous time framework

We characterize preference relations on continuous time consumption paths which admit an exponential discounting representation. We provide two theorems as such, one in the cardinal framework and another in the ordinal framework. Our characterizations parallel the known characterizations in discrete time framework. In the cardinal framework, we adopt the axioms of Epstein (1983), which characterize a stationary preference relation in discrete time, and obtain the exponential discounting model as a special case of the discounting model proposed by Uzawa (1968). In the ordinal framework, we adopt the axioms of Bleichrodt et al. (2008) which were proposed to generalize Koopmans’ classical characterization of stationary preferences.     

Bargaining with independence of higher or irrelevant claims

This paper studies independence of higher claims and independence of irrelevant claims on the domain of bargaining problems with claims. Independence of higher claims requires that the payoff of an agent does not depend on the higher claim of another agent. Independence of irrelevant claims states that the payoffs should not change when the claims decrease but remain higher than the payoffs. Interestingly, in conjunction with standard axioms from bargaining theory, these properties characterize a new constrained Nash solution, a constrained Kalai–Smorodinsky solution, and a constrained Kalai solution.