Analysis of loan guarantees among the Korean Chaebol affiliates

This paper analyses corporate loan guarantees among the Korean chaebol affiliates. Loan guarantees are found to be efficiency‐neutral under a set of ideal conditions characterized by perfect and symmetric information, no agency problem, and no governmental interference in private financial contracts. In reality though, corporate loan guarantees have negative as well as positive effects. The negative effects of loan guarantees arise from the agency problem between the controlling minority shareholders and outside investors. Government's implicit support to financial institutions worsens the problem. Without such distortions, a loan guarantee by the guarantor firm may signal the quality of the investment project of the borrowing firm, if the guarantor firm has more information than the lending bank with regards to the type of the borrowing firm's investment project.     

Loan guarantee schemes in the UK: the natural experiment of the enterprise finance guarantee and the 5 year rule

Loan guarantee schemes have existed since 1953 (in the US) and are widely used throughout the world to provide financial support to smaller firms by guaranteeing loans from commercial banks. The UK government has been an active supporter of loan guarantees since 1981, and has a long track record of modifying its scheme to reflect changing market conditions and the financing needs of its SME sector. Arguably the two most significant changes occurred in 2008 when the 5-Year Rule on eligibility was removed and in 2009 when the long-standing Small Firms Loan Guarantee Scheme was replaced by the Enterprise Finance Guarantee Scheme. We treat the removal of the 5-Year Rule as a natural policy experiment and empirically question whether, on economic grounds, this was a sensible policy. Our findings suggest that the 5-Year Rule was a better policy choice with regard to employment but had no impact on sales growth.     

短贷长投对企业创新可持续性支持的实证研究

基于我国特殊的制度环境,研究短贷长投对我国企业创新活动的影响。研究表明,短贷长投作为一种替代性融资方式,对企业创新能力产生了显著的抑制效应,并且对不同产权性质和规模的企业而言,这种抑制效应具有差异性。进一步的影响机制研究表明,短贷长投会阻碍人力资本投入和R&D投入,影响企业创新能力积累。另外,就短贷长投对创新与企业成长两者关系影响进行研究,发现短贷长投弱化了创新与企业成长之间的敏感性,进一步证明了短贷长投负面效应的存在。最后,考察了外部金融环境的影响,发现货币政策、地区金融发展水平等因素均能显著影响短贷长投对企业创新能力的抑制效应。     

产权性质、债券融资与过度投资——基于中国A股上市公司的经验证据

以我国沪深两市2008-2011年发行公司债券的A股上市公司为样本,考察不同产权性质下公司债的发行对公司过度投资的影响,实证检验结果表明:公司债可以有效地制约过度投资;相对于国有控股的上市公司,公司债券对民营上市公司的过度投资可以发挥更为有效的制约作用,银行贷款负债的治理作用弱化不及公司债券对投资的约束作用。     

地方政府性债务治理与上市企业投融资*——基于我国247座城市的初步证据

本文利用中国社科院披露的我国247座城市地方政府性债务对金融稳定影响的评价指数,分析了地方政府性债务治理对上市企业债务融资与资本性投资效率的影响及其传导机理。研究发现,与地方政府性债务治理较好地区相比,处于地方政府性债务治理较差地区的地方政府控股国企,其杠杆率均显著较高,但企业资本性投资效率却显著较低,企业产能过剩的财务特征十分明显。这表明,地方政府性债务治理会显著影响微观企业的投融资,并且地方政府性债务治理越差,透过政府对经济活动的控制或干预,通过预算外举债,政府“杠杆”有转化为企业“杠杆”的风险。本文明确了“去杠杆”究竟应去谁的“杠杆”问题,对理解地方政府性债务治理转变为“内涵型”经济增长的微观基础具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

完善信用担保体系:解决中小企业融资难的路径

中小企业是我国国民经济发展的重要力量,但是目前中小企业发展的最大障碍是资金短缺问题.本文通过对中小企业融资困境分析表明,向金融机构贷款是解决中小企业融资困难的主要渠道,信用担保体系又是制约中小企业贷款的主要因素,目前我国现有中小企业信用担保体系远不能满足中小企业融资条件的要求.文章根据我国中小企业融资的实际情况,探讨了从政府机构、信用担保机构、中小企业自身、法律法规、贷款机构的角度建立和完善我国中小企业信用担保体系问题.     

Incentive effects of benevolent intervention: The case of government loan guarantees

There has been a substantial recent growth in government loan guarantees to ailing firms in the United States. This paper investigates the potential incentive effects of this practice. Using the simplest available two-period model, it is shown that when firms know that loan guarantees may be forthcoming, they may be induced to adopt riskier investments and take on more leverage. These perverse incentive effects imply that the actual loan-guarantees-related contingent liability of the government could be much larger than suspected. Our policy recommendation is that the government either abandon the practice altogether or set up a federal agency that sells loan guarantees to all firms at prices that depend on the riskiness of the firm's assets and its leverage.     

构建河北农村多元化投融资体系的路径探讨

资金投入是新农村建设的物质基础和财力保障,健全完善多元化的农村投融资体系,对支持新农村建设具有深远的意义。本文从财政支农重点投向、深化农村金融体制改革、调动农民自主投资、引导社会资本、证券直接融资与吸引外资等几个方面阐述了健全农村投融资体系的路径选择,以期为河北新农村建设提供充足的资金支持。     

农户投资机电井的财务效益与障碍因素分析——以世行贷款内蒙古巴林右旗机电井子项目为例

以世行贷款内蒙古巴林右旗机电井子项目为案例,运用现金流量分析方法,测算了农户投资于机电井的财务效益。计算结果表明,机电井投资可以取得很好的财务回报,因而从理论上来说,农户私人投资或合作投资于机电井建设具有现实可能性。论文在此基础上对影响农户投资机电井的障碍因素进行了分析。     

Modeling Guarantees,Over-Indebtedness and Financial Crises in an Open Economy

This work develops a simple framework to analyse how financial intermediaries’ balance sheet problems combined with financial guarantees make an economy more vulnerable to financial crises. A ‘double default’ problem – that is, the default of financial intermediaries on their debt repayments and of the government on its guarantees to bailout intermediaries’ losses – is modelled in this study. The possibility of multiple equilibria, including a crisis equilibrium where the government is not able or willing to honor its guarantees towards the domestic financial sector, arises from the interplay of all the above elements: financial intermediaries’ level of indebtedness, government implicit guarantees and high-risk creditors’ lending. This work also produces predictions concerning the vulnerability to a financial crisis: multiple equilibria are possible only in certain ranges of the fundamentals.     

我国中小企业融资难的成因与对策研究

当前,中小企业融资难已成为制约其发展的“瓶颈”。本文认为,中小企业融资难并非中国独有的问题,信息不对称导致信贷市场的“逆向选择”和“道德风险”是其融资难的一般原因;所有制歧视、信用和担保服务体系建设落后、企业治理结构不完善、金融体制改革不深入、融资制度安排不合理、直接融资渠道不畅等是其融资难的特殊原因。并提出了相应的对策,即在完善中小企业制度,健全治理结构的基础上,需要直接融资和间接融资的双重支持、良性互动。此外,还建议政府制定中小企业的财政援助与税收优惠政策。     

Estimating the Value of Implicit Government Guarantees to Thai Banks

The paper estimates the contingent liability of the Thai government to their banking system prior to the 1997 financial crisis by maximizing a likelihood function that utilizes the established result that deposit insurance can be modeled as a put option on the value of bank assets. The results show that the estimated value of the government guarantee was large and statistically greater than the premium banks paid for this guarantee, suggesting that guarantees provided a subsidy to Thai banks. Additionally, the estimates are able to identify weak banks before the crisis emerged. These results suggest that the estimated value of implicit deposit guarantees can serve as an early warning indicator of banking crises. The paper contrasts the option pricing results with traditional balance sheet indicators, and demonstrates that these alternative indicators are unable to identify weaknesses in the Thai banking systems before the crisis.     

实物期权方法在BOT公路投资项目中的应用

投资项目具有多种期权特性,传统的DCF评价方法无法评估多个不确定性对投资项目的影响。实物期权方法为决策者提供了一个有效管理不确定性因素的工具。国内外学者就BOT公路投资项目中的增长期权、延迟期权、投资扩张、政府保证、特许权期限调整、通行费率调整、投资成本和车流量不确定性等多个问题进行了大量的讨论。本文首先对实物期权理论在BOT公路投资项目方面的应用研究进行文献回顾,然后详细的分析了国内BOT公路投资项目收益的不确定性、项目投资的可延迟性、项目的可扩建性、政府的保证以及项目特有的土地开发及广告收益等多个特点具有的期权价值。并对这些期权的定价模型进行了简要的介绍。文章最后对运用实物期权理论应用过程中的难点进行了分析,并在此基础上总结实物期权理论在BOT公路投资项目中应用的研究方向。     

改革开放以来中国财政教育投资问题研究

财政教育投资是指国家和各级政府对教育领域的投资,它是发展教育事业的重要物质保证.中国财政教育投资绝对数增长较快,但相对数水平较低,投资级别结构和地区结构均不合理.应加强财政教育投资的调控,完善财政教育经费收入制度,确保财政教育投资落实到位.     

金融危机背景下政府干预与银行信贷风险研究

金融危机冲击导致经营环境恶化,银行信贷萎缩,在政府施加的指令性贷款和自身经营利润最大化的双重任务约束下,银行道德风险增加,贷款资金投放背离政府救市意图。文章在一个双重任务约束模型框架下分析了危机中政府干预对国有商业银行贷款风险的影响,根据任务之间的关联度对银行的激励行为做出拓展性解释。动态面板GMM模型实证检验结果显示,政府干预没有造成不良贷款的上升,但对信贷规模的扩张存在明显影响,长期将造成银行资源的过度利用和潜在风险的上升。     

Investment Cycles and Sovereign Debt Overhang

We characterize optimal taxation of foreign capital and optimal sovereign debt policy in a small open economy where the government cannot commit to policy, seeks to insure a risk-averse domestic constituency, and is more impatient than the market. Optimal policy generates long-run cycles in both sovereign debt and foreign direct investment in an environment in which the first best capital stock is a constant. The expected tax on capital endogenously varies with the state of the economy, and investment is distorted by more in recessions than in booms, amplifying the effect of shocks. The government's lack of commitment induces a negative correlation between investment and the stock of government debt, a "debt overhang" effect. Debt relief is never Pareto improving and cannot affect the long-run level of investment. Furthermore, restricting the government to a balanced budget can eliminate the cyclical distortion of investment.     

Loan guarantees and the cost of debt: evidence from China

In this article, we examine the potential influence of loan guarantees and the nature of ownership on a company’s cost of debt. Using data on Chinese A-share listed companies from 2007 to 2014, we find that guaranteeing another entity’s debt significantly increases the guarantor’s cost of its own debt. Regarding the nature of ownership, our results indicate that the cost of debt for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is lower than that for non-SOEs. Among SOEs, firms controlled by the central government have lower cost of debt than firms controlled by local governments. We also find some evidence that local government ownership mitigates the effects of loan guarantees on the cost of a guarantor’s own debt.     

金融中介及关系银行——基于广东外资企业银行融资数据的研究

本文根据外资银行和国有商业银行向在中国境内的外资企业提供的外币贷款和人民币贷款的数据 ,对金融中介及关系银行进行了实证研究。我们的主要结论有两点 :第一 ,企业与银行建立起来的金融业务关系越长久 ,那么其所获得的外币贷款利率就越低。这是对金融中介理论的支持。另外 ,外资控股、第三方担保等因素 ,也具有降低外币贷款利率的效应。第二 ,人民币贷款的利率随着外资企业与更多的银行建立和保持合作关系而降低。人民币贷款主要是由我国商业银行提供。如果商业银行间的竞争仅仅是用来作为信贷定价的主要决定因素 ,而不是用来推进金融创新 ,提供高质量的金融产品和服务 ,那么这将会损害我国商业银行的获利能力并进而影响金融系统的健康发展。     

Do the GSEs expand the supply of mortgage credit? New evidence of crowd out in the secondary mortgage market

The dramatic government takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in September, 2008 was motivated in part by a desire to ensure a continued flow of credit to the mortgage market. This study examines a closely related issue: the extent to which GSE activity crowds out mortgage purchases by private secondary market intermediaries. Evidence of substantial crowd out suggests that government support for the GSEs may be less warranted, whereas the absence of crowd out implies that GSE loan purchases enhance liquidity.Using 1994–2008 HMDA data for conventional, conforming sized loans, three distinct periods with regard to GSE crowd out are apparent. From 1994 to 2003, the share of loans sold to the secondary market increased from 60 to over 90%, private sector and GSE market shares of loan purchases were roughly similar for most market segments, and IV estimates indicate relatively little GSE crowd out of private secondary market purchases. From 2004 to 2006, private loan purchases boomed and dominated those of the GSEs, while IV estimates indicate crowd out jumped to 50% at the peak of the boom. This is especially true in the market for home purchase as opposed to refinance loans. With the crash in housing and mortgage markets in 2007, private sector intermediaries pulled back, the GSEs regained market share, and evidence of GSE crowd out disappeared in both the home purchase loan and refinance markets. These patterns suggest that the degree of GSE crowd out varies with market conditions and that the federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac likely served to enhance liquidity to the mortgage market during the 2007–2009 financial crisis.     

Restrictions on Foreign Investments and the Relocation of Firms

We analyse why the Chinese government sets restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus our analysis on the percentage of shares in relocated firms that the government allows to be foreign‐owned. The government's decision on this percentage depends on the entry cost, the number of firms that relocate and the weight of the consumer surplus in the objective function of the government. We show that by its choice of this percentage, the Chinese government may restrict or encourage FDI to its country. We also find that if the government may subsidise the fixed entry cost, it provides a subsidy only when the producer surplus has a greater weight than the consumer surplus in weighted welfare. In that case, the subsidy encourages relocation by both firms and permits the government to allow a lower percentage of shares to be foreign‐owned in relocated firms.