Foreclosure Delay and Consumer Credit Performance

The deep housing market recession from 2008 through 2010 was characterized by a steep rise in number of foreclosures. The average length of time from onset of delinquency through the end of the foreclosure process also expanded dramatically. Although most individuals undergoing foreclosure were experiencing serious financial stress, the extended foreclosure timelines enabled them to live in their homes without making mortgage payments until the end of the foreclosure process, thus providing temporary income and liquidity benefits from lower housing costs. This paper investigates the impact of extended foreclosure timelines on borrower performance with credit card debt. Our results indicate that a longer period of nonpayment of mortgage expenses results in higher cure rates on delinquent credit cards and reduced credit card balances. Thus, foreclosure process delays may have mitigated the impact of the economic downturn on credit card default—suggesting that improvement in credit card performance during the post-crisis period would likely be slowed by the removal of the temporary liquidity benefits as foreclosures reach completion.     

Determinants of Mortgage Default and Consumer Credit Use: The Effects of Foreclosure Laws and Foreclosure Delays

The mortgage default decision is part of a complex household credit management problem. We examine how factors affecting mortgage default spill over to other credit markets. As home equity turns negative, homeowners default on mortgages and home equity lines of credit at higher rates, whereas they prioritize repaying credit cards and auto loans. Larger unused credit card limits intensify the preservation of credit cards over housing debt. Although mortgage nonrecourse statutes increase default on all types of housing debt, they reduce credit card defaults. Foreclosure delays increase default rates for housing and nonhousing debts. Our analysis highlights the interconnectedness of debt repayment decisions.     

Debt overhang and non-distressed debt restructuring

In this paper, we analyse the restructuring of debt in the presence of debt overhang. The firm starts out with a debt liability and an investment opportunity. Then with unrestructured debt, the firm maintains the current borrowing payments until default or investment. If the creditors allow the parties to restructure the debt with exchange offers, then the borrowing payments change as well as the default and investment points. We find that there is a unique optimal restructuring path which maintains debt at positive levels but defers default indefinitely. This path is optimal regardless of whether the debt holders or the firm control the process through superior bargaining power. Moreover, a debt-for-equity exchange to remove all existing debt takes place just before investment that is followed by the issue of an optimal amount of new debt as part of the funding for the investment cost. The optimal investment trigger is higher along the optimal restructuring path than it is for an unlevered firm. We discuss the findings in the light of existing empirical evidence.     

Resaleable debt and systemic risk

Many debt claims, such as bonds, are resaleable; others, such as repos, are not. There was a fivefold increase in repo borrowing before the 2008–2009 financial crisis. Why? Did banks’ dependence on non-resaleable debt precipitate the crisis? In this paper, we develop a model of bank lending with credit frictions. The key feature of the model is that debt claims are heterogenous in their resaleability. We find that decreasing credit market frictions leads to an increase in borrowing via non-resaleable debt. Such borrowing has a dark side: It causes credit chains to form, because, if a bank makes a loan via non-resaleable debt and needs liquidity, it cannot sell the loan but must borrow via a new contract. These credit chains are a source of systemic risk, as one bank’s default harms not only its creditors but also its creditors’ creditors. Overall, our model suggests that reducing credit market frictions may have an adverse effect on the financial system and even lead to the failures of financial institutions.     

Credit derivatives with multiple debt issues

We evaluate the most actively traded types of credit derivatives within a unified pricing framework that allows for multiple debt issues. Since firms default on all of their obligations, total debt is instrumental in the likelihood of default and therefore in credit derivatives valuation. We use a single factor interest rate model where the exponential default frontier is based on total debt and is made coherent with observed bond prices. Analytical formulae are derived for credit default swaps, total return swaps (both fixed-for-fixed and fixed-for-floating), and credit risk options (CROs). Price behaviors and hedging properties of all these credit derivatives are investigated. Simulations document that credit derivatives prices may be significantly affected by terms of debt other than those of the reference obligation. The analysis of CROs indicates their superior ability to fine-tune the hedging of magnitude and arrival risks of default.     

House prices, consumption, and monetary policy: a financial accelerator approach

We consider a general equilibrium model with frictions in credit markets used by households. In our economy, houses provide housing services to consumers and serve as collateral to lower borrowing cost. We show that this amplifies and propagates the effect of monetary policy shocks on housing investment, house prices and consumption. We also consider the effect of a structural change in credit markets that lowers the transaction costs of additional borrowing against housing equity. We show that such a change would increase the effect of monetary policy shocks on consumption, but would decrease the effect on house prices and housing investment.     

Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model

We derive the optimal dynamic contract in a continuous‐time principal‐agent setting, and implement it with a capital structure (credit line, long‐term debt, and equity) over which the agent controls the payout policy. While the project's volatility and liquidation cost have little impact on the firm's total debt capacity, they increase the use of credit versus debt. Leverage is nonstationary, and declines with past profitability. The firm may hold a compensating cash balance while borrowing (at a higher rate) through the credit line. Surprisingly, the usual conflicts between debt and equity (asset substitution, strategic default) need not arise.     

Taxpayer resistance,guarantee uncertainty,and housing finance subsidies

In the absence of external guarantees, a private firm's debt trades in the market at rates reflective of its private default risk. Not all firms go it alone, however. There are entities, government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), whose debt obligations enjoy federal guarantees. Federal guarantees affect housing finance indirectly in that they tend to enhance the creditworthiness of the debt obligations of the housing intermediary which lessens the debtholder's exposure to default. The market investor then becomes a willing buyer of GSE debt at a lower (subsidized) rate as a result of the government guarantee.Due to the fact that the subsidy rests on the presumption that the GSE debt will be bailed out by the government it can be seen that the subsidy in turn rests upon the presumption by the GSE debtholder that the taxpayers will honor the guarantee in the event of a GSE default. Hence, government subsidies to the housing intermediaries rest not on ongoing government outlays but rather on the confidence that the taxpayers will be willing, if called upon, to cover GSE losses, i.e., the confidence of a bailout.This article analyzes the effects on the GSE subsidy and on the taxpayer, if the debt markets charge for bailout risk. Bailout risk pricing is an economic event. When debtholders seek to protect themselves by pricing for bailout risk, this increases GSE borrowing costs and cuts into both GSE borrowers' subsidies and stockholder earnings. Higher borrowing costs leave the GSE in a weakened condition and increase the ex ante bailout cost to the taxpayer. When bailout risk premiums become priced by the market, it substantially lessens the government's ability to subsidize housing finance or other GSE activities.     

Leverage change,debt overhang,and stock prices

We document a significant and negative effect of the change in a firm's leverage ratio on its stock prices. We find that the negative effect is stronger for firms that have higher leverage ratios, higher likelihood of default, and face more severe financial constraints. Moreover, firms with an increase in leverage ratio tend to have less future investment. These findings are consistent with Myers' (1977) debt overhang theory that an increase in leverage may lead to future underinvestment, thus reducing a firm's value.     

Mortgage Debt Overhang: Reduced Investment by Homeowners at Risk of Default

Homeowners at risk of default face a debt overhang that reduces their incentive to invest in their property: in expectation, some value created by investments in the property will go to the lender. This agency conflict affects housing investments. Homeowners at risk of default cut back substantially on home improvements and mortgage principal payments, even when they appear financially unconstrained. Meanwhile, they do not reduce spending on assets that they may retain in default, including home appliances, furniture, and vehicles. These findings highlight an important financial friction that has stifled housing investment since the Great Recession.     

Joint Dynamics of House Prices and Foreclosures

This paper studies the joint transitional dynamics of the foreclosures and house prices in a standard life‐cycle incomplete markets model with housing and a realistic long‐term mortgage structure. We calibrate our model to match several long‐term features of the U.S. housing market, and analyze the effects of several unexpected and permanent shocks on the house price and the foreclosure rate both across the steady states and along the transition between the steady states. We examine permanent, unexpected shocks to the risk‐free interest rate, the minimum down‐payment ratio, and unemployment. During the transition, these shocks create large movements in house prices. More importantly, the foreclosure dynamics are quite significant along the transition compared to the steady‐state changes, and there are strong feedbacks between foreclosures and house prices. We assess the effects of a temporary reduction in the risk‐free interest rate, which has moderate effects on house prices but little effect on foreclosure dynamics. We also study the effects of an ex ante macroprudential policy, which establishes a minimum down‐payment requirement at a higher threshold. Such a macroprudential policy helps substantially stabilize both house prices and foreclosures.     

Distressed Debt Restructuring in the Presence of Credit Default Swaps

The availability of credit insurance via credit default swaps has been closely associated with the emergence of empty creditors. We empirically investigate this issue by looking at the debt restructurings (distressed exchanges and bankruptcy filings) of rated, nonfinancial U.S. companies over the period January 2007–June 2011. Using different proxies for the existence of insured creditors, we do not find evidence that the access to credit insurance favors bankruptcy over a debt workout. However, we document higher recovery prices following a distressed exchange in firms where empty creditors are more likely to emerge.     

Credit Card Debt and Default over the Life Cycle

This paper solves an empirically parameterized model of life cycle consumption, which allows for uncollaterized borrowing and the possibility of default. The simulation results show that: (i) "social stigma " and credit limit have a very large impact on default rates; (ii) education level also has a significant effect on the probability of default, namely, through differences in the shape of lifetime labor income profiles; and (iii) the response of simulated default rates to labor income shocks is determined by the nature of labor income uncertainty (temporary versus permanent). Additionally, the model generates simultaneous consumer holdings of credit card debt and liquid assets.     

Investment timing and optimal capital structure under liquidity risk

Deterioration in debt market liquidity reduces debt values and affects firms' decisions. Considering such risk, we develop an investment timing model and obtain analytic solutions. We carry out a comprehensive analysis in optimal financing, default, and investment strategies, and stockholder–bondholder conflicts. Our model explains stylized facts and replicates empirical findings in credit spreads. We obtain six new insights for decision makers. We propose a ‘new trade-off theory’ for optimal capital structure, a new tax effect, and new explanations of ‘debt conservatism puzzle’ and ‘zero-leverage puzzle’. Failure in recognizing liquidity risk results in substantially over-leveraging, early bankruptcy or investment, overpriced options, and undervalued coupons and credit spreads. In addition, agency costs are surprisingly small for a high liquidity risk or a low project risk. Interestingly, the risk shifting incentive and debt overhang problem decrease with liquidity risk under moderate tax rates while they increase under high tax rates.     

基于房地产市场的我国系统性金融风险测度与预警研究

本文阐释了基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险形成机制,据此建立了分阶段、跨部门的房地产市场的系统性金融风险网络模型,并运用2006-2017年16家上市银行数据,分析和测度了我国房价大幅下跌所引发的系统性金融风险水平和结构,构建了基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险预警指标并进行测算。研究发现:在房价下跌30%的压力情景下,我国金融体系的潜在总损失总体呈级数式上升,年均增长22.70%;基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险值(SR)呈现先上升后波动下降的总体趋势;系统性金融风险(SR)的脆弱性指标(FLI)整体呈现波浪式振荡变化,且与房地产贷款/权益整体呈反向变动,系统性金融风险(SR)的传染性指标(CTI)在2012-2017年呈持续下降趋势,且与金融市场压力指数、金融机构间资产占总资产比重呈现出高度的一致性变化趋势。最后,基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险预警指标(SRWI)值呈收敛式振荡走势,表明基于房地产市场的系统性金融风险总体可控且呈收敛式下降。     

Macroeconomic Conditions and the Puzzles of Credit Spreads and Capital Structure

I build a dynamic capital structure model that demonstrates how business cycle variation in expected growth rates, economic uncertainty, and risk premia influences firms' financing policies. Countercyclical fluctuations in risk prices, default probabilities, and default losses arise endogenously through firms' responses to macroeconomic conditions. These comovements generate large credit risk premia for investment grade firms, which helps address the credit spread puzzle and the under‐leverage puzzle in a unified framework. The model generates interesting dynamics for financing and defaults, including market timing in debt issuance and credit contagion. It also provides a novel procedure to estimate state‐dependent default losses.     

住房价格、房屋购买与中国家庭杠杆率

本文基于中国家庭追踪调查的微观数据以及相匹配的城市层面的住房价格数据,从住房购买需求的角度,给出了一个近年来家庭杠杆率急剧上升的解释。利用中国家庭追踪调查的微观数据探讨了房价上涨对家庭杠杆率的作用机制以及潜在影响。结果表明,住房价格的快速上涨推动了家庭杠杆率的急剧攀升,从数量上看,房价每上涨1倍,样本期间的家庭贷款数额将会增长288.1%,家庭杠杆率将上升39.2%,而此部分贷款的增加主要来源于银行贷款而非私人借贷,由房价导致的家庭借贷数额和杠杆率的上升大概占到购房家庭总体借贷数额和杠杆率上升的90%左右。机制分析表明,住房价格的快速上涨刺激了家庭必需型和投资型住房需求,并提高了家庭的借贷意愿和风险偏好。分样本的探讨发现,这一效应对于非农户口家户以及有配偶和子女家户的影响更为明显。     

Sovereign credit spreads

The paper develops a structural credit risk model to study sovereign credit risk and the dynamics of sovereign credit spreads. The model features endogenous default and recovery rates that both depend on the interaction between domestic output fluctuations and global macroeconomic conditions. We show that sovereigns choose to default at higher levels of economic output once global macroeconomic conditions are bad. This yields to default rates and credit spreads that are substantially higher compared to normal times. We derive closed-form expressions for sovereign debt values and default times and focus on the dynamics of sovereign credit spreads. As opposed to standard theories of sovereign debt, this paper’s structural model generates much richer default patterns and non-linearities through regime-shifts in the global macroeconomic environment. Moreover, changes in the global environment reveal the interconnectedness of the financial system.     

Tobin's Q, Debt Overhang, and Investment

Incorporating debt in a dynamic real options framework, we show that underinvestment stems from truncation of equity's horizon at default. Debt overhang distorts both the level and composition of investment, with underinvestment being more severe for long‐lived assets. An empirical proxy for the shadow price of capital to equity is derived. Use of this proxy yields a structural test for debt overhang and its mitigation through issuance of additional secured debt. Using measurement error‐consistent GMM estimators, we find a statistically significant debt overhang effect regardless of firms' ability to issue additional secured debt.     

Rollover Risk and Credit Risk

Our model shows that deterioration in debt market liquidity leads to an increase in not only the liquidity premium of corporate bonds but also credit risk. The latter effect originates from firms' debt rollover. When liquidity deterioration causes a firm to suffer losses in rolling over its maturing debt, equity holders bear the losses while maturing debt holders are paid in full. This conflict leads the firm to default at a higher fundamental threshold. Our model demonstrates an intricate interaction between the liquidity premium and default premium and highlights the role of short‐term debt in exacerbating rollover risk.