A Model of Localized Mortgage Lending Behavior*

Loan administration costs and the costs of search for information about risk are found to be determinants of spatial interest rate differentials. These costs are independent of dollar loan size; therefore, rational lending policies can produce higher interest rates (or lower term to maturity) in low-income communities. But the premium (lower maturity) should be related to lower loan size and risk differentials. Public policy should be directed toward compiling and verifying an information bank which would allow lenders to search efficiently for information about risk. An empirical methodology designed to test for mortgage deficiency in minority areas was developed through case studies. This indicated the utility of specifying the supply and demand for mortgages at the neighborhood level of aggregation. Trends in neighborhood property values were identified as important and overlooked measures of lending risk. Further exploration of the hypothesis that Spanish-speaking areas are mortgage deficient is suggested by the cases.     

Reduced Form Coefficients, Structural Coefficients, and Mortgage Redlining

Empirical studies of redlining have long been plagued with the identification problem. Observed behavior in alleged redlined areas is ultimately a combination of both demand and supply influences coming from both mortgage and housing markets. How then can inferences from reduced form experiments be utilized to provide unambiguous structural information concerning purely lender behavior? This problem is analyzed in detail with the help of an implicitly specified skeletal model of the mortgage and housing markets. The results suggest that structural inferences from reduced form information are, indeed controversial at best. Although this fact is fairly widely known at present, many research techniques still utilize an underlying reduced form methodology. It is hoped that the methodology employed in this paper highlights the identification problem in a manner that will generate greater insight into this issue. Some remedies are suggested in line with the general econometric literature dealing with structural identification.     

A Research Note on Discrimination in Mortgage Lending

This paper examines the hypothesis that mortgage lenders rank applications from better to worst and encourage the better ones to apply. A second ranking occurs when the application is ranked by the loan committee and funds are approved from the top of the list until exhausted. A theoretically correct procedure for analyzing the resulting multivariate ordinal data is the little known rank multiple discriminant analysis. Preliminary results have revealed that this technique produces a "best" model with fewer variables and a higher classification rate than the commonly known multiple discriminant analysis, logit, or probit.     

The Integration of Mortgage Markets and Capital Markets

In this paper, we develop a model to predict the impact of deregulation in the form of relaxing interest rate control on the integration between the mortgage credit market and the general credit market. The model is tested through the examination of the long-term Granger-like equilibrium relationship between mortgage interest rates and general interest rates in the pre-1980 regulated vs. the post-1980 deregulated periods. It is shown that the level of regulation, in the form of targeting general interest rate levels, contributes to the segmentation of the mortgage market from the capital market. To test this model, we compare the relationship between mortgage interest rates and general interest rates around 1980 where major control on interest rate levels in capital markets was lifted. Using Engle and Granger's procedure to overcome the estimation problem from nonstationarity in the interest rate series, we are able to find that the two interest rates were cointegrated after 1980 but not before. More importantly, it appears that the two markets were already integrated before the full development of the secondary mortgage markets between 1984 and 1987. Therefore, we conclude that the bulk of the integration between the mortgage and capital markets was completed as a result of the removal of interest rate controls around 1980, in contrast with previous studies that find integration occurred during the mid-1980s primarily as a result of the rapid development of the secondary mortgage markets.     

A Note on Identification of Discrimination in Mortgage Lending

This paper shows how reduced form estimates of discrimination in mortgage lending may be biased by race differences in loan demand. The result, which follows formally from the model of the mortgage lending process developed in the seminal paper by Maddala and Trost (1982), has important implications for the regulation of financial institutions. It also reinforces findings of Rachlis and Yezer (1993) and Yezer, Phillips and Trost (1994). A review of recent empirical evidence on race differences in loan demand suggests that this factor may help explain mortgage loan application differentials.     

Residential Mortgage Markets and the Cost of Mortgage Funds

Early federal housing finance policy appears to have been largely directed at making mortgages more marketable. The creation of FHA, FNMA and FHLMC were designed to homogenize the mortgage instrument and to develop a secondary market for it. Apparently because of a lack of demand for marketability by investors, extensive trading of mortgages has not developed. Nonetheless, the fantastic growth in mortgage pools (as well as the unanticipated growth in FNMA holdings) has increased competition in the supplying of some intermediation functions (mortgage bankers have greatly expanded originations and servicing), has improved interregional flows of mortgage funds, and has given mortgage borrowers a greater access to capital markets generally. The principal result has been a decline in the mortgage rate relative to other market rates, although the inflation-triggered explosion in the demand for mortgage funds in recent years appears to be offsetting the impact of the growth in federal credit broadly defined.     

Mortgage Lending, Sample Selection and Default

Traditional models of mortgage default suffer from sample-selection bias because they do not control for the loan approval process. This paper estimates a sample-selection-corrected default model using the 1990 Boston Federal Reserve loan application sample and the 1992 Federal Housing Authority (FHA) foreclosure sample. A single-equation FHA default model appears to suffer from substantial selection bias, but the bias primarily arises from the omission of credit history and other variables that are only in the application sample. Therefore, default models that contain detailed information on applicants may not suffer from substantial selection bias. Finally, a test for prejudice-based discrimination is developed and conducted, but the findings are inconclusive.     

Mortgage Markets and Inter-Regional Differences in Conventional Mortgage Terms

One of the purposes of the secondary mortgage market is to move funds from areas of capital surplus to areas of capital shortage. If mortgage funds move freely throughout the economy then the price of mortgage funds (the terms of the mortgage) should be the same everywhere. Thus, if the secondary mortgage market is efficient, mortgage terms should show less geographic variation after the secondary market began in 1970 than they showed before. In this paper, the efficiency of the market is tested in two stages. In the first, the average terms of mortgage loans in 1968 and 1978 are examined to determine whether they became more homogeneous after the secondary market was begun. In the second stage, the terms are modeled as a function of region, year by region interaction variables, foreclosure rates, the usury ceiling and the average cost of funds. This model is estimated and analyzed using a multivariate multiple regression technique.     

Evaluating Statistical Models of Mortgage Lending Discrimination: A Bank-Specific Analysis

We present our efforts to develop bank-specific models to test for the presence of mortgage lending discrimination. We discuss the potential for selection and simultaneity biases and delineate the conditions under which a single-equation model is appropriate. The results from three national banks demonstrate that, by incorporating the specific underwriting guidelines of each bank, our alternative approach significantly improves the ability of the model to explain the outcomes of the mortgage lending decision process when compared to a single generic specification applied across all banks. Our results also demonstrate the difficulties encountered in attempting to incorporate the specifics of a bank's underwriting criteria and the remaining potential for omitted-variables problems.     

Mortgage Lending Discrimination and the Decision to Apply: A Methodological Note

Previous studies of lenders' decisions to accept or reject loan applications have not accounted for the possibility that lenders discourage written applications from members of protected classes, i.e., prescreening. This paper discusses how prescreening and self-selection may bias the measurement of discrimination. Estimation techniques are developed that test and correct for such bias whether or not information is available on non-applicants.     

On the Assessment of Default Risk in Commercial Mortgage Lending

This paper takes an initial step toward the development of an empirically-based model of default risk assessment in the commercial mortgage market. A review of existing empirical studies of residential mortgage and commercial loan default provides evidence for appropriate model specification and estimation. A simple default risk model for commercial mortgages is then developed based upon the generalized default risk models of Jackson and Kaserman [1980] and Vandell [1981]. The model is then examined for its ability to successfully handle a variety of situations and used to test the validity of traditional ratio analysis "rules-of-thumb" employed in commercial lending. Ratio tests are found generally to be inconsistent with an objective of constraining default risk below some maximum. Finally, a modified ratio analysis consistent with the model and with a constrained default risk strategy is introduced.     

Residential Mortgage Markets: Current Developments and Future Prospects

Historical developments as well as current innovations have generated significant changes in the structure and operation of the residential mortgage market. General economic stability, a low inflation rate, growth of savings and loan associations, and strong consumer demand marked the fifteen-year period immediately following World War II. In contrast, the decade of the sixties was characterized by increased competition in the mortgage market, a series of credit crunches, and increased governmental activity. In reaction to these and related developments, current innovations affecting the mortgage market focus on design of new mortgage instruments, improvements in market efficiency, and reform of financial institutions. If history is a guide, it suggests that the residential mortgage market responds flexibly to adverse conditions.     

The Role of Home Equity Lending in the Recent Mortgage Crisis

Home equity lending grew rapidly from 2000 to 2008 with balances more than tripling. In this article, we examine the role this phenomenon may have played in increasing aggregate default risk during the mortgage crisis. We also document a relationship between growth in home equity lending and high house price depreciation and first mortgage default during the downturn of 2006–2009. Line of credit growth is shown to be associated with large increases in nonowner‐occupied property purchases, suggesting that home equity lines of credit were tapped to fund such investments, exacerbating default rates during the market downturn.     

Price Expectations,Distressed Mortgage Markets and the Housing Wealth Effect

Using a unique combination of regulatory and survey microdata, we examine the importance of the life cycle theory of consumption in estimating housing wealth effects for the Irish mortgage market. Since the recent financial crisis, this market has experienced substantial house price declines and negative equity. Thus, house price expectations are likely to be important in influencing housing wealth effects. We find a positive correlation between consumption and changes in housing wealth among our sample of mortgaged Irish households. Furthermore, we find that this positive association only exists when housing wealth changes are perceived to be of a permanent nature.     

A Comparison of the Reinvestment Risk of the Price Level Adjusted Mortgage and the Standard Fixed Payment Mortgage

The purpose of this paper is to increase the understanding of the risk of the indexed mortgage, commonly referred to as the price level adjusted mortgage (PLAM). This is accomplished by comparing, analytically, the reinvestment risk of the PLAM and the standard fixed-payment mortgage (FPM) under conditions of stochastic inflation and real interest rates. The conclusion is that the PLAM has less reinvestment risk. From the viewpoint of an investor concerned with periodically reinvesting payment streams, the PLAM is the superior mortgage.     

Mortgage Credit Availability, Housing Starts and the Integration of Mortgage and Capital Markets: New Evidence Using Linear Feedback

This paper employs linear feedback measures to examine the relationship between housing starts and the availability of mortgage credit. Estimates are obtained using monthly data with samples ending with May 1978 and beginning with June 1978. The results indicate that mortgage credit availability contributed significantly to short-run cycles in housing starts in the earlier sample. Such feedback is considerably smaller, however, in the later sample. The results suggest the housing finance sector has become integrated with the overall capital market as the result of the deregulation of thrift deposit rates and the development of the securitized mortgage market.     

An Indirect Test for Differential Treatment of Borrowers in Mortgage Markets

The indirect test implemented in this paper is based on the economics of discrimination which hypothesizes that differential treatment of borrowers, on the basis of age, race, sex, or property location, at any stage of the mortgage transaction, including prescreening, results in segregation of those getting less favorable treatment. Borrowers who perceive that they are receiving less favorable treatment based on age, race, sex, or property location would be segregated into the FHA-in-sured sector. Estimates of an FHA participation equation show no evidence of such segregation by sex, race, or center city property location. Younger borrowers do appear to be differentially concentrated in the FHA programs.     

Managing Mortgage Interest-Rate Risks in Forward, Futures, and Options Markets

This article reviews the Housing Commission's perspective and recommendations on management of interest-rate risks in housing finance, and considers the relative advantages of various techniques by which institutions on the supply side of mortgage markets can absorb or shift such risks. It is argued that exchange-based options can provide a more reliable way than cash forward contracting for originators or purchasers of mortgages to manage commitment-period risk, but that commitment fees charged household borrowers should not fully correspond to premiums for put options "traded" on the exchanges. It also is argued that exchange-based futures can provide a more effective and economical way than asset-liability maturity matching in cash markets for thrift institutions to manage portfolio interest-rate risks; in particular, futures trading can permit these institution to meet the maturity preferences of liquidity-conscious creditors and risk-averse borrowers, to reduce the risk associated with unexpected shifts of the yield curve, and to maintain a higher degree of asset quality. The capacity of futures markets to handle large-scale hedging by mortgage market participants will depend upon heavy participation by highly leveraged speculators who are willing to take long positions without the receipt of substantial risk premiums from hedgers.     

Major Developments in Residential Mortgage and Housing Markets Since the Hunt Commission

A number of important changes have been made to the mortgage finance system since the Hunt Commission filed its report, and the economic environment has been altered substantially. This paper examines shifts in the relative importance of public and private institutions in the residential mortgage markets during the past decade, within the context of Hunt Commission recommendations. Changes in the cyclical sensitivity of mortgage and housing activity, and the implications of rapid inflation for the growth of these markets, also are considered.     

Alternative Lending Channels and the Crisis in U.S. Housing Markets

To what degree has the development of alternative mortgage funding channels promoted the recent boom and bust in U.S. housing markets? Past research examined whether Alt‐A and subprime market shares are correlated with the housing bubble. This article expands the analysis to include the share of specific “alternative” lending terms and finds that the shares of interest‐only and negative amortization loans are important factors in explaining the housing bubble. This result suggests that research on the housing market bubble should focus on the impacts of loan contract terms rather than loan channel.