Corporate Transparency and Firm Growth: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts

Using a panel data set of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), we find corporate transparency to be positively associated with REIT growth. These results suggest that greater transparency facilitates firm growth by relaxing information‐based constraints on external financing. The magnitude of this effect is larger in the equity market than in the debt market. Moreover, the sensitivity of investment to cash flows is decreasing in transparency, evidence that transparency relaxes liquidity constraints. Finally, we find more transparent REITs are less likely to crash.     

The Effects of Business-to-Business E-Commerce on Transaction Costs

This paper studies transaction costs changes arising from the introduction of the Internet in transactions between firms. We divide transaction costs into coordination costs and motivation costs. We classify coordination efficiencies into three categories: process improvements, marketplace benefits, and indirect improvements. For motivation costs, we focus on informational asymmetries. We apply this framework to internal data from an Internet-based firm to measure process improvements, marketplace benefits, and motivation costs. Our results suggest potentially large process improvements and marketplace benefits. We find little evidence that informational asymmetries are more important in the electronic marketplace than in the existing physical ones.     

A review of: “ENGINEERING ECONOMICS” by James L. Riggs,McGraw-Hill Book Company: New York, 1977, 609 pages, $19.50 list.

The relevance of corporate investment decisions lies in their impact on shareholder wealth. It not only depends on the investment project but also on the corporate dynamics that turns it into the sequence of shareholders’ capital contributions, dividends, and gross terminal value that constitutes the shareholders’ investment project (SIP). We develop a model to calculate the SIP cash flows and the values of its interim capitals following the average internal rate of return (AIRR) paradigm. The shareholders’ final value depends on two reinvestment rates that, respectively, capture the returns obtained by the retained cash flows and the dividends reinvested by shareholders. On this basis, we approach the analysis of value creation combining both reinvestment rates in the shareholders’ net present value (SNPV). This model enables us to obtain the AIRR of the SIP and a variant of it, the equity growth rate that embeds the impact of internal and external reinvestment on the shareholders’ final value.     

Inside Ownership, Risk Sharing and Tobin's q-Ratios: Evidence from REITs

We investigate relations among inside ownership, managerial expenses, risk sharing and equity valuations. Our engine of analysis—Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)—provides a unique and rich framework for analysis since we can calculate extremely accurate measures of asset replacement costs, and hence relative valuation (Tobin's q ). Further, the nature of the financial statements allows us to examine the impact of insider ownership on agency costs since we can accurately measure the costs of the entire management team. Our results show that firms with greater insider holdings tend to invest in assets with lower systematic risk and use less debt in their capital structure. At the same time, managerial expenses are lower as inside ownership increases. Finally, higher levels of insider ownership are associated with higher relative valuation as measured by both higher premiums to net asset value and higher multiples of cash flows. The results have implications for the design of optimal management contracts for both REITs and firms in general.     

Partial adjustment toward target R&D intensity

Existing research assumes that once firms have determined their target R&D intensity, they can adjust instantaneously and fully to their target R&D intensity, regardless of their past R&D intensity. In this study, we draw on the partial adjustment framework to examine the dynamics of firms' adjustment toward their target R&D intensity. We find that firms usually do not adjust instantaneously or fully to their target R&D intensity; they typically close half of the gap between their past and target R&D intensity in a year. Furthermore, we find that the speed of adjustment varies widely across firms. Firms with more cash flows, less debt, and more new equity financing have higher speed of adjustment. We draw implications for the dynamics of R&D investments and Schumpeterian competition.     

Business groups and corporate transparency in emerging markets: Empirical evidence from India

This study examines the difference in corporate transparency of firms affiliated with business groups and unaffiliated firms in India. Based on previous studies we measured corporate transparency using equity analysts’ forecast error and dispersion. We find that firms affiliated with business groups are less transparent than unaffiliated firms. Lack of transparency leads to higher analyst forecast error and dispersion. This study also finds that business group-affiliated firms with more intra-group capital transactions have higher forecast error and dispersion. The findings of this study suggest that firms affiliated with business groups are less transparent due to their reliance on internal capital markets, and therefore lack incentives to disclose information to market participants. As a result, the information asymmetry between business groups and the capital market is higher, restricting the activities of information intermediaries such as equity analysts, who play an important role in the external capital market.     

When is cash good or bad for firm performance?

Research summary: Cash can create shareholder value when used for adaptation to unfolding contingencies, but can also reduce value when appropriated by other stakeholders. We synthesize arguments from the behavioral theory of the firm, economic perspectives like agency theory, and the value‐creation versus value‐appropriation literatures to argue that the implications of cash for firm performance are context‐specific. Cash is more beneficial for firms operating in highly competitive, research‐intensive, or growth‐focused industries that are typical of contexts requiring adaptation in the face of uncertainties. Conversely, cash is more detrimental to performance in firms that are poorly governed, diversified, or opaque, as are typical of contexts where stakeholder conflicts, information asymmetries, or power imbalances can encourage value appropriation by other stakeholders. Managerial summary: Cash can create shareholder value when used for adaptation to unfolding contingencies, but can also reduce value when appropriated by other stakeholders. While cash‐rich firms have higher performance on average, with those in the 75th percentile having a market‐to‐book value 15 percent higher than those in the 25th percentile, we find that the performance benefits of cash depend on the context. Cash is more beneficial for firms operating in highly competitive, research‐intensive, or growth‐focused industries that are typical of contexts requiring adaptation in the face of uncertainties. Conversely, cash is more detrimental to performance in firms that are poorly governed, diversified, or opaque, as are typical of contexts where stakeholder conflicts, information asymmetries, or power imbalances can encourage value appropriation by other stakeholders. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When do firms undertake R&D by investing in new ventures?

We explore the conditions under which firms are likely to pursue equity investment in new ventures as a way to source innovative ideas. We find that firms invest more in new ventures—commonly referred to as ‘corporate venture capital’—in industries with weak intellectual property protection and, to some extent, in industries with high technological ferment and where complementary distribution capability is important. Furthermore, we find that the greater a firm's cash flow and absorptive capacity, the more likely it is to invest. Our results suggest that in Schumpeterian environments incumbents may supplement their innovative efforts by tapping into the knowledge generated by new ventures. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Who does private equity buy? Evidence on the role of private equity from buyouts of divested businesses

Research Summary: We examine the role of nonventure private equity firms in the market for divested businesses, comparing targets bought by such firms to those bought by corporate acquirers. We argue that a combination of vigilant monitoring, high‐powered incentives, patient capital, and business independence makes private equity firms uniquely suited to correcting underinvestment problems in public corporations, and that they will therefore systematically target divested businesses that are outside their parents’ core area, whose rivals invest more in long‐term strategic assets than their parents, and whose parents have weak managerial incentives both overall and at the divisional level. Results from a sample of 1,711 divestments confirm these predictions. Our study contributes to our understanding of private equity ownership, highlighting its advantage as an alternate governance form. Managerial Summary: Private equity firms are often portrayed as destroyers of corporate value, raiding established companies in pursuit of short‐term gain. In contrast, we argue that private equity investors help to revitalize businesses by enabling investments in long‐term strategic resources and capabilities that they are better able to evaluate, monitor, and support than public market investors. Consistent with these arguments, we find that when acquiring businesses divested by public corporations, private equity firms are more likely to buy units outside the parent's core area, those whose peers invest more in R&D than their parents, and those whose parents have weak managerial incentives, especially at the divisional level. Thus, private equity firms systematically target those businesses that may fail to realize their full potential under public ownership.     

Asset Growth and Stock Performance: Evidence from REITs

In this article, we examine the impact of asset growth rates on the future stock performance of 308 publicly traded real estate investment trusts (REITs). We observe that fast‐growing REITs tend to underperform slow growing REITs. However, we find evidence that the growth effect is significantly less negative for REITs selling at a premium to net asset value. In addition, we observe the asset growth effect only in the subsample of REITs that engages in equity issuance over the next 12 months. The combined evidence suggests contemporaneous equity dilution, which has not been considered in previous studies, may provide an explanation for the underperformance of fast‐growing firms.     

Entrepreneurial finance meets organizational reality: comparing investment practices and performance of corporate and independent venture capitalists

This paper investigates the effect of compensation of corporate personnel on their investment in new technologies. We focus on a specific corporate activity, namely corporate venture capital (CVC), describing minority equity investment by established‐firms in entrepreneurial ventures. The setting offers an opportunity to compare corporate investors to investment experts, the independent venture capitalists (IVCs). On average, we observe a performance gap between corporate investors and their independent counterparts. Interestingly, the performance gap is sensitive to CVCs' compensation scheme: it is the largest when CVC personnel are awarded performance pay. Not only do we study the association between incentives and performance but we also document a direct relationship between incentives and the actions managers undertake. For example, we observe disparity between the number of participants in venture capital syndicates that involve a corporate investor, and those that consist solely of IVCs. The disparity shrinks substantially, however, for a subset of CVCs that compensate their personnel using performance pay. We find a parallel pattern when analyzing the relationship between compensation and another investment practice, staging of investment. To conclude, the paper investigates the three elements of the principal‐agent framework, thus providing direct evidence that compensation schemes (incentives) shape investment practices (managerial action), and ultimately investors' outcome (performance). Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

企业债务期限结构与自由现金流的门限关系研究

文章创新性地运用了微观企业数据,通过构建面板门限模型考察了企业债务期限结构与企业自由现金流的非线性关系,并进一步揭示了宏观经济波动对企业债务期限结构与自由现金流关系的影响。研究发现：第一,企业债务期限结构与企业现金流的关系因为债务利息的不同呈现出双重门限效应。主要表现为当企业债务利息处于较低水平时,企业自由现金流与债务期限结构呈反向相关关系;当企业债务利息处于较高水平时,企业债务期限结构与债务期限结构呈正向相关关系;第二,宏观经济波动影响企业债务期限结构与自由现金流关系的敏感性。最后,从提高自由现金流的利用率、完善多层次资本市场建设以及降低融资杠杆等方面提出对策建议。     

Financing Choice and Liability Structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts

We conduct an analysis of public financial offerings of equity Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), with a focus on liability structure effects and whether or not firms target longer-run debt ratios. Our major findings are that (1) proceeds from equity offers are more likely to fund investment, whereas public debt offer proceeds are typically used to reconfigure the liability structure of the firm; (2) public debt issuers are often capital constrained and target total leverage ratios to retain an investment grade credit rating; and (3) the preoffer liability structure affects the issuance choice decision, in that firms with higher preoffer levels of secured (unsecured) debt tend to issue equity (public debt). Other notable findings are that the market for public REIT debt is integrated with the broader debt markets and that higher credit quality firms issue longer-maturing bonds.     

Real Assets,Liquidation Value and Choice of Financing

We use real estate firms to examine how asset liquidation values influence a firm's financing choice, because the productivity and quality of each asset is observable and potential measures of an asset's liquidation value are easier to ascertain ex ante. We show that compared to firms that issue equity, firms that issue debt have higher asset quality. The effect of their expected asset liquidation value is significant, even after we control for other factors that influence financing decisions. For firms whose assets' quality is not easily observable, we find that firms' financing choices depend heavily on conditions in the overall real estate market.     

Switching costs in local credit markets

Switching costs are a key determinant of market performance. This paper tests their existence in the corporate loan market in which they are likely to play a central role because of the complexity of contracts and the relevance of informational problems. Using very detailed data at bank-firm level on four Italian local credit markets we empirically show that firms tend to iterate their choice of the main bank over time. This inertia is not related to unobserved and time invariant firms' preferences across banks and can be attributed to the existence of switching costs. Moreover these costs are higher for single-bank firms. We also offer evidence that banks price discriminate between new and old borrowers by charging lower interest rates to the former in order to cover part of the switching costs. The discount amounts to about 44 basis points and is equal to 7% of the average interest rate. These results prove robust to a number of other potential identification drawbacks.     

Near and dear? The role of location in CSR engagement

Research summary : Building on economic geography and institutional theory, we develop and test theory relating geographic variables to the strength of corporate social responsibility (CSR) engagement and the cost of equity capital. For a large sample of U.S. firms over the period 1998–2009, we find strong and robust evidence that firms located in areas characterized by high levels of local CSR density score higher in CSR engagement. In addition, firms located close to major cities and financial centers exhibit higher CSR engagement compared to firms located in more remote areas. Moreover, the effect of CSR engagement on reducing equity financing costs is even greater for firms in high CSR density areas than for firms in low CSR density areas. Managerial summary : Does the location of CSR engagement by firms affect the strength of CSR engagement by their neighbors? Does the geography of engagement have an impact on financial performance? Our findings show that a firm's CSR engagement increases in areas where there is dense CSR engagement and when it is located near large cities. In these areas, norms, values, and knowledge related to CSR are transmitted to firms through face‐to‐face meetings and frequent social interactions with groups such as peers, labor unions, news media, universities, and community organizations, which tend to be concentrated in large cities. Our findings further highlight that CSR engagement reduces equity financing costs for firms in areas where CSR is widely practiced. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Corporate Governance and Performance: The REIT Effect

Real estate investment trusts (REITs) offer a natural experiment in corporate governance due to the fact that they leave little free cash flow for management, which reduces agency problems. We exploit a unique and leading corporate governance database to test whether corporate governance matters for the performance of U.S. REITs. We document for a sample including governance ratings of more than 220 REITs that firm value is significantly related to firm-level governance for REITs with low payout ratios only. Repeating the analysis with the complete database that includes more than 5,000 companies and a control sample of firms with high corporate real estate ratios, we find a strong and significantly positive relation between our governance index and several performance variables, indicating that the partial lack of a relation between governance and performance in the real estate sector might be explained by a REIT effect.     

A Model of the Asset Disposition Decision of the RTC

The purpose of this paper is to develop a model of the asset disposition decision for the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). In this paper, we focus on the primary goal of the RTC—to maximize the net present value of the cash flows generated through holding and selling the assets it acquires. A major decision it faces is whether to hold or sell assets. This decision ultimately depends on the RTC's discount rate versus that of the marginal buyer. A second question relates to the decision of which assets to sell first and which ones to delay sale. The model developed in this paper characterizes the asset disposition decision process of the RTC for different types of assets. We develop a set of optimal disposition rules based on the simple premise of a multi-period cash flow maximization. In addition, we test some of these rules by analyzing RTC disposition performance. Through this exercise, we hope to provide some guidance to the RTC in implementing its enormous task as well as to policy makers in charting the progress of the RTC. The main results of this analysis indicate that liquid assets and retail deposit franchises should be sold as quickly as possible. Illiquid assets that are performing and do not have high servicing costs are good candidates to finance through senior/subordinated securities or sale with seller financing by the RTC. Illiquid non-performing assets are good candidates for equity participation financing by the RTC. The sales proceeds obtained by the RTC will be increased if buyers have greater certainty with respect to expected cash flows and RTC sales policies.     

The effects of ownership concentration and corporate debt on corporate divestitures in Chinese listed firms

This study examines how ownership concentration and corporate debt impact corporate divestitures in China. Corporate divestitures reduce the asset base of a company and the opportunity for expropriation by majority shareholders. In emerging economies, weak legal institutions, combined with equity ownership concentration and high corporate debt, allow majority shareholders to avoid such disciplines. Consequently, the relationship between these governance mechanisms and divestiture activity exhibits a pattern that is different from that in developed economies. Using archival data collected from 1,210 Chinese listed companies during 1999–2003, we found that ownership concentration by the largest shareholder depressed corporate divestitures both in state-controlled and in non-state-controlled firms. The negative effect of corporate debt on divestitures only existed for state-controlled firms. Our finding provides corroborating evidence for principal–principal conflicts in emerging economies. It suggests that corporate strategy in these countries can be better explained by taking into account the unique agency problems that are prevalent in these economies.     

Equity stakes and exit: An experimental approach to decomposing exit delay

Research summary : Exit delay is an important problem for entrepreneurs and managers alike, yet relatively little is known about its causes. We conduct a laboratory experiment in which optimal exit is well defined, and in which a treatment group with equity stakes—the actual cash flows of a firm and decision rights over its continuation—is compared to a control group whose compensation is based solely on its assessment of the firm's profitability. While treatment group participants make exit decisions that are nearly optimal given their beliefs, their beliefs are significantly distorted relative to the control group. The pattern of distortion is consistent with confirmatory bias and motivated reasoning. A fundamental finding of our study is that incentives may not only affect behavior, but belief formation as well. Managerial summary : Managers and entrepreneurs frequently destroy significant value by failing to shut down underperforming businesses in a timely manner. To address this problem, we must understand the mechanisms causing exit delay. We examine behavioral mechanisms causing delay through a laboratory experiment in which subjects make decisions about when to exit a failing venture. We find that “equity stakes”—receiving the firm's cash flows and having decision rights over exit—cause participants to discount negative performance information, retain overly optimistic beliefs, and delay exit. By contrast, participants without these high‐powered incentives exit nearly optimally. Our findings suggest ways to reduce exit delay in managerial settings, including implementing automated decision rules, removing equity‐based compensation, and recruiting managers less susceptible to knowledge overconfidence, a trait associated with exit delay. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.