Moral Hazard in Home Equity Conversion

Home equity conversion as presently constituted or proposed usually does not deal well with the problem of moral hazard. Once homeowners know that the risk of poor market performance of their homes is borne by investors, they have an incentive to neglect to take steps to maintain the homes values. They may thus create serious future losses for the investors. A calibrated model for assessing this moral-hazard risk is presented that is suitable for a number of home equity conversion forms: (1) reverse mortgages, (2) home equity insurance, (3) shared-appreciation mortgages, (4) housing partnerships, (5) shared-equity mortgages and (6) sale of remainder interest. Modifications of these forms involving real estate price indexes are proposed that might deal better with the problem of moral hazard.     

Equity and Nonequity Determinants of FHA Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures in the 1980s

We examine foreclosures on FHA single-family mortgages insured during the 1975–87 period. The importance of the market value of borrower equity and national house price dispersion support much earlier work emphasizing the key role of negative equity in triggering default. The lower is "mean" market-value equity, and the greater is dispersion, the greater is the fraction of borrowers likely to have negative equity. The unemployment rate and the book value of borrower equity are also shown to be significant determinants of default. Unemployment is one of those events that can force borrowers to move. The moving decision increases the likelihood of default because moving costs no longer deter default, and the costs of selling the house reduce the effective equity in the house. The book value of equity is relevant to this decision because it is what the sellers receive if they move without defaulting. Not only are both of these variables significant determinants of default, but the smaller is book equity, the greater is employment impact (with large book equity, unemployment should not matter because selling the house is preferred to default).     

A Simple Model of Mortgage Insurance

This paper uses a two-period model to analyze the borrower's choice of an optimal time pattern of mortgage payments in a world where future house values are uncertain. Since a decline in values can make the borrower's equity negative, leading to default on the mortgage, lenders in the model will require the purchase of mortgage insurance. The premium on the insurance policy will depend on the riskiness of the mortgage, which in turn depends on the magnitude of the initial mortgage payment. Mortgages with large (small) first payments will carry low (high) insurance premiums. Taking this fact into account, the borrower decides on the optimal riskiness of his mortgage. Borrowers who discount the future heavily choose risky mortgages carrying high insurance premiums, while those who place a higher value on future consumption opt for less risky contracts carrying low (or zero) premiums.     

Lender Forbearance: Evidence from Mortgage Delinquency Patterns

The length of time that residential mortgages remain in delinquency prior to foreclosure is examined using an Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) model and a database of 207 foreclosed conventional and Veteran's Administration (VA) mortgages. The results suggest that the primary factors influencing the timing of the lender's foreclosure decision are the borrower's equity position and the erosion of that position with continuing delinquency. Borrower bankruptcy and VA guarantees also lengthen the delinquency period. Delinquency periods for fixed rate mortgages (FRM) decrease when the market interest rate increases.     

A Dynamic Double-Trigger Model of Multifamily Mortgage Default

This study advances the commercial mortgage literature by providing theory and methods for incorporating both equity and cash-flow considerations in default models. We use local market conditions to compute a (joint) probability that default is in-the-money, based on both equity and cash-flow considerations. Statistical analysis is performed using data on multifamily mortgages originated in the 1980s and early 1990s. Simulations based on statistical modeling show advantages of the probabilistic double-trigger approach over other measures of equity and cash flow.     

Housing Price Dynamics,Mortgage Credit and Reverse Mortgage Demand: Theory and Empirical Evidence

This article presents some theoretical and empirical approaches for identifying interactions among fundamental economic variables that determine housing prices. Using home equity conversion mortgage (HECM) loan‐level data, this study quantifies the major risks of reverse mortgages and shows that higher housing prices induce higher demand for reverse mortgages among elderly homeowners. Senior citizens rationally hold pessimistic expectations about future housing price appreciation and lock in their home‐equity gains by obtaining reverse mortgages, which in turn led to the substantial HECM growth prior to the financial crisis of 2008. A novel simulation also forecasts HECM loans under various economic scenarios. From a mortgage credit perspective, these findings generate several policy implications for the implementation of “HECM 3.0.”     

Potential Beneficiaries from Reverse Mortgage Products for Elderly Homeowners: An Analysis of American Housing Survey Data

A variety of reverse mortgage loan programs have been available to elderly households for over a decade. The number of unrestricted reverse mortgage loans issued by the private sector has been quite small. About 12,000 loans have been issued through mid-1992. Some researchers take this to mean that the size of the potential market for reverse mortgages is also quite small. Other researchers claim that current low levels of activity reflect supply and demand problems, but that the potential market is in fact quite large. This paper uses American Housing Survey (AHS) data to estimate the potential size of the market for unrestricted reverse mortgages. The 1989 national AHS shows that there are over twelve million elderly homeowners (age 62 and over) who own their homes free and clear. Depending on their income, age and the level of home equity, the group of households most likely to benefit from reverse annuity mortgages is considerably smaller. As one approach to defining a lower bound of the estimate of potential beneficiaries from reverse mortgages, we count the number of homeowners in a prime group consisting of the older elderly, aged 70 or above, with an annual income of $30,000 or less, with home equity between $100,000 and $200,000, who have lived in their homes for over ten years. We estimate that there are about 800,000 elderly households in this prime group. For such households, reverse mortgage payments could represent a substantial percentage increase in income; other definitions of target groups can also be explored using the tables provided. The paper uses the 1985 through 1988 AHS Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) surveys to identify areas that have a large number of elderly homeowners in the prime target group, and in which these homeowners represent a large fraction of the elderly homeowner population. These locations are likely targets for introduction of reverse mortgage products because any campaign can be targeted towards a high concentration of likely eligible beneficiaries.     

The Performance of Low-Income and Minority Mortgages

This article analyzes the performance of low-income and minority mortgages (LIMMs) from a large sample of fixed-rate conventional conforming mortgages. We find that low-income borrowers are less likely to prepay when it is optimal, whereas black and Hispanic borrowers prepay more slowly than other borrowers, regardless of the option's value. After controlling for equity, credit history and some other variables, LIMMs default slightly more frequently and have about the same loss severity as other loans. Our results suggest that, for most yield curve situations, differences in LIMM prepayment behavior have little effect on pricing.     

An Analysis of Home Equity Conversion in the RAM Program

Home equity conversion by elderly homeowners is described and analyzed. The transactions were completed under the California RAM Program. One hundred twenty-six of 345 applicants elected to enter into reverse mortgages or sale-leasebacks. Data from interviews conducted as part of the application/counseling process are analyzed to discern the most important variables in the equity conversion decision.     

Reverse Mortgages and the Liquidity of Housing Wealth

Housing wealth constitutes most of the non-pension wealth of the elderly population. This study analyzes the potential of reverse mortgages to increase the income and liquid wealth of the elderly by identifying households with relatively high levels of housing equity. Because this article looks at the whole distribution of elderly households and considers debt as well as income, it finds a larger potential market for reverse mortgages than previous studies.
Calculations from the 1990 Survey of Income and Program Participation and Census population estimates show that over six million homeowners in the United States could increase their effective monthly income by at least 20% by using a reverse mortgage. Of these, more than 1.3 million have no children. Furthermore, a reverse mortgage would allow over 1.4 million poor elderly persons to raise their incomes above the poverty line.     

Home Equity Conversion Instruments with Fixed Term to Maturity: Alternatives to End of Term Pay-Off

Standard reverse annuity mortgages obligate the lender to take on the risk that an elderly homeowner will desire to remain in a residence after the RAM has reached maturity. In this case, the best the lender can hope for is that the property will have appreciated sufficiently that the loan can be carried at interest only. There is a possibility for lender loss but not gain over contracted return.
Alternatives to the standard RAM are explored in this paper with most attention devoted to shared appreciation and shared equity RAMs. These alternative instruments appear to solve the problem of maturity risk.     

Do Homeowners Mark to Market? A Comparison of Self‐Reported and Estimated Market Home Values During the Housing Boom and Bust

This article examines homeowners’ self‐reported values in the American Housing Survey and the Health and Retirement Study from the start of the recent housing price run‐ups through recent price declines. We compare ZIP‐Code‐level market‐based estimates of housing prices to those derived from homeowners’ self‐reported values. We show that there are systematic differences which vary with market conditions and the amount of equity owners hold in their homes. When prices have fallen, homeowners systematically state that their homes are worth more than market estimates suggest, and homeowners with little or no equity in their homes state values above the market estimates to a greater degree. Over time, homeowners appear to adjust their assessments to be more in line with past market trends, but only slowly. Our results suggest that underwater borrowers are likely to understate their losses and either may not be aware that their mortgages are underwater or underestimate the degree to which they are.     

Reverse Mortgages and Borrower Maintenance Risk

This paper develops a theoretical model of the problem of maintenance risk in reverse mortgages (RMs) and home equity conversion instruments generally. By maintenance risk, we refer to the incentive homeowners will have to reduce maintenance expenditures as their equity in the house falls during the term of the RM. The underlying reason for this tendency is the limited liability feature of RMs, given that a borrower's obligation to the lender at. maturity is limited to the value of the house.
The results of the model show that lenders will respond to this problem either by limiting the amount of RM loans to guarantee that maintenance risk is not a threat, or by charging an interest rate premium to cover the expected cost of default. Unfortunately, there do not exist data to test the importance of maintenance risk as a possible limitation on the extent of the RM market.     

The Cap Rate Spread: A New Metric for Commercial Underwriting

This study introduces the cap rate spread as a novel metric for underwriting commercial mortgages. Cap rate spread is the difference between the cap rate and the fixed coupon rate. The spread predicts performance risk in a sample of 24,951 commercial mortgage‐backed securities loans during 1993–2011. We demonstrate that the cap rate spread includes crucial information about performance risk. The results arise from the role of the cap rate spread in generating positive or negative leveraged returns to equity in situations where additional equity is required. Incorporating simplistic cap rate spread requirements in commercial underwriting is expected to reduce loan performance risk.     

REIT Stock Price Volatility and the Effects of Leverage

This article sheds light on several puzzling empirical observations. We examine the volatility implications of equity Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) stock returns over the sample period from January 1985 through October 2012. We find a negative “leverage effect” in the pre‐ and post‐Greenspan era, but not during the Greenspan era (circa 1994–2006). We argue that the positive elasticity of variance with respect to the value of equity during the Greenspan era can be explained by a decline in the spread between the yield on commercial mortgages and 10‐year Treasuries, which triggered a wealth transfer from REIT equity holders to REIT debt holders. We also argue that the declining commercial‐mortgage‐10‐year‐Treasury yield spread during the Greenspan era allowed REITs to take on far more risk than most people realized. We then document that average REIT stock return volatility increased significantly in the 2007–2010 period in the midst of a historic decline in REIT stock prices. The results have significant implications for the good deal of interest and debate in the media over the status of REITs and whether equity REITs have become excessively risky relative to the returns they generate.     

Bankruptcy Exemption,Home Equity and Mortgage Credit

This article examines the impact of state bankruptcy homestead exemptions on mortgage application outcomes. The empirical analysis controls for endogeneity problems by focusing on 55 urban areas that cross state borders using the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act files from 2001 to 2008. The results indicate that holding the loan‐to‐value ratio constant, a more generous homestead exemption encourages borrowers to buy more housing and take out larger mortgages. However, holding house value constant, a more generous homestead exemption discourages mortgage borrowing and results in more home equity. Moreover, benefits of the homestead exemption outweigh the costs of it to mortgage lenders.     

Refinancing Trends among Lower Income and Minority Homeowners during the Housing Boom and Bust

This article examines trends in mortgage refinancing activity during the housing boom and bust, with a focus on homeowners in lower income and minority market (LIMM) areas. Unlike any other period in recent history, during the boom LIMM homeowners refinanced their mortgages more frequently than non‐LIMM homeowners. This occurred primarily among borrowers for whom the refinance option was not in‐the‐money, and it is likely attributable to the concurrent growth of subprime, cash‐out refinancing. Following the 2007 mortgage market collapse, however, LIMM homeowners were less likely to refinance. This can be explained in part by systematic differences in home equity levels across borrowers.     

Stochastic Modeling of Federal Housing Administration Home Equity Conversion Mortgages with Low-Cost Refinancing

Federal Housing Administration-insured reverse mortgages, known as Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECMs), did not originally have a provision for low-cost refinancing. If a borrower's house value increased faster than expected, the borrower could not tap that additional equity without terminating the first loan and originating a new HECM loan with full closing costs. We test several low-cost refinancing options using a stochastic simulation model that allows interest rates and house prices to vary in historically accurate patterns. Low-cost refinancing decreases the net value of the fund by 54% to $98.5 million, but it remains positive in 80% of the trials.     

Mortgage Default Risks and the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake

The paper is based on a study of mortgage default risks associated with natural disasters. These risks are faced by holders of mortgages when forced by default to acquire damaged properties. A sample of residential mortgage properties damaged in the 1971 San Fernando, California earthquake is studied. Some of the mortgagors defaulted while others did not. The paper identifies and analyzes those variables associated with default using discriminant and probit regression analysis. The study concentrates on earthquake exposures in California, but has implications for all major disasters.     

Privatized Default Risk and Real Estate Recessions: The U.K. Mortgage Market

A mortgage pricing model is developed when a borrower goes through a series of distress states, including delinquency, long-term nonpayment and ultimate default. These steps are sequential, and depend on prices and alternatives faced by the borrower. The multistate default model is applied to the mortgage market in the United Kingdom. As a byproduct, a pricing structure for the U.K. endowment mortgage, which combines a good and a life insurance policy, is developed. Income and liquidity constraints are shown to affect the decision to keep a mortgage current in different states of distress. Solvent borrowers may thus keep their mortgages current, even when equity is negative.