What's wrong with strategy?

Why is it that successful strategies are rarely developed as a result of formal planning processes? What is wrong with the way most companies go about developing strategy? Andrew Campbell and Marcus Alexander take a common sense look at why the planning frameworks managers use so often yield disappointing results. Companies often fail to distinguish between purpose (what an organization exists to do) and constraints (what an organization must do in order to survive), the authors say. Many executives mistakenly believe, for example, that satisfying stakeholders is an objective that drives thinking about strategy. In fact, it's a constraint, not an objective. Companies that don't win the loyalty of stakeholders will go out of business. Strategy is not about plans but about insights, the authors add. Strategy development is the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with planning, which is about turning insights into action. Furthermore, because executives develop most of their insights while actually doing the real work of running a business, it is important for companies not to separate strategy development from implementation. Is there a better way? The answer is not new planning processes or more effort. Instead, managers must understand two fundamental points: the benefit of having a well-articulated, stable purpose and the importance of discovering, understanding, documenting, and exploiting insights about how to create value.     

Kill a brand, keep a customer

Most brands don't make much money. Year after year, businesses generate 80% to 90% of their profits from less than 20% of their brands. Yet most companies tend to ignore loss-making brands, unaware of the hidden costs they incur. That's because executives believe it's easy to erase a brand; they have only to stop investing in it, they assume, and it will die a natural death. But they're wrong. When companies drop brands clumsily, they antagonize loyal customers: Research shows that seven times out of eight, when firms merge two brands, the market share of the new brand never reaches the combined share of the two original ones. It doesn't have to be that way. Smart companies use a four-step process to kill brands methodically. First, CEOs make the case for rationalization by getting groups of senior executives to conduct joint audits of the brand portfolio. These audits make the need to prune brands apparent throughout the organization. In the next stage, executives need to decide how many brands will be retained, which they do either by setting broad parameters that all brands must meet or by identifying the brands they need in order to cater to all the customer segments in their markets. Third, executives must dispose of the brands they've decided to drop, deciding in each case whether it is appropriate to merge, sell, milk, or just eliminate the brand outright. Finally, it's critical that executives invest the resources they've freed to grow the brands they've retained. Done right, dropping brands will result in a company poised for new growth from the source where it's likely to be found--its profitable brands.     

Pricing and the psychology of consumption

Most executives know how pricing influences the demand for a product, but few of them realize how it affects the consumption of a product. In fact, most companies don't even believe they can have an effect on whether customers use products they have already paid for. In this article, the authors argue that the relationship between pricing and consumption lies at the core of customer strategy. The extent to which a customer uses a product during a certain time period often determines whether he or she will buy the product again. So pricing tactics that encourage people to use the products they've paid for help companies build long-term relationships with customers. The link between pricing and consumption is clear: People are more likely to consume a product when they are aware of its cost. But for many executives, the idea that they should draw consumers' attention to the price that was paid for a product or service is counterintuitive. Companies have long sought to mask the costs of their goods and services in order to boost sales. And rightly so--if a company fails to make the initial sale, it won't have to worry about consumption. So to promote sales, health club managers encourage members to get the payment out of the way early; HMOs encourage automatic payroll deductions; and cruise lines bundle small, specific costs into a single, all-inclusive fee. The problem is, by masking how much a buyer has spent on a given product, these pricing tactics decrease the likelihood that the buyer will actually use it. This article offers some new approaches to pricing--how and when to charge for goods and services--that may boost consumption.     

The right mind-set for managing information technology

Too many managers in the West are intimidated by the task of managing technology. They tiptoe around it, supposing that it needs special tools, special strategies, and a special mind-set. Well, it doesn't, the authors say. Technology should be managed-controlled, even--like any other competitive weapon in a manager's arsenal. The authors came to this conclusion in a surprising way. Having set out to compare Western and Japanese IT-management practices, they were startled to discover that Japanese companies rarely experience the IT problems so common in the United States and Europe. In fact, their senior executives didn't even recognize the problems that the authors described. When they dug deeper into 20 leading companies that the Japanese themselves consider exemplary IT users, they found that the Japanese see IT as just one competitive lever among many. Its purpose, very simply, is to help the organization achieve its operational goals. The authors recognize that their message is counterintuitive, to say the least. In visits to Japan, Western executives have found anything but a model to copy. But a closer look reveals that the prevailing wisdom is wrong. The authors found five principles of IT management in Japan that, they believe, are not only powerful but also universal. M. Bensaou and Michael Earl contrast these principles against the practices commonly found in Western companies. While acknowledging that Japan has its own weaknesses with technology, particularly in white-collar office settings, they nevertheless urge senior managers in the West to consider the solid foundation on which Japanese IT management rests.     

Disruptive change. When trying harder is part of the problem

When a company faces a major disruption in its markets, managers' perceptions of the disruption influence how they respond to it. If, for instance, they view the disruption as a threat to their core business, managers tend to overreact, committing too many resources too quickly. But if they see it as an opportunity, they're likely to commit insufficient resources to its development. Clark Gilbert and Joseph Bower explain why thinking in such stark terms--threat or opportunity--is dangerous. It's possible, they argue, to arrive at an organizational framing that makes good use of the adrenaline a threat creates as well as of the creativity an opportunity affords. The authors claim that the most successful companies frame the challenge differently at different times: When resources are being allocated, managers see the disruptive innovation as a threat. But when the hard strategic work of discovering and responding to new markets begins, the disruptive innovation is treated as an opportunity. The ability to reframe the disruptive technology as circumstances evolve is not an easy skill to master, the authors admit. In fact, it might not be possible without adjusting the organizational structure and the processes governing new business funding. Successful companies, the authors have determined, tend to do certain things: They establish a new venture separate from the core business; they fund the venture in stages as markets emerge; they don't rely on employees from the core organization to staff the new business; and they appoint an active integrator to manage the tensions between the two organizations, to name a few. This article will help executives frame innovations in more balanced ways--allowing them to recognize threats but also to seize opportunities.     

In praise of middle managers

Middle managers have often been cast as dinosaurs. Has-beens. Mediocre managers and intermediaries who defend the status quo instead of supporting others' attempts to change organizations for the better. An INSEAD professor has examined this interesting breed of manager--in particular, middle managers' roles during periods of radical organizational change. His findings will surprise many. Middle managers, it turns out, make valuable contributions to the realization of radical change at companies--contributions that go largely unrecognized by most senior executives. Quy Nguyen Huy says these contributions occur in four major areas. First, middle managers often have good entrepreneurial ideas that they are able and willing to realize--if only they can get a hearing. Second, they're far better than most senior executives at leveraging the informal networks at companies that make substantive, lasting change. Because they've worked their way up the corporate ladder, middle managers' networks run deep. Third, they stay attuned to employees' emotional needs during organizational change, thereby maintaining the transformation's momentum. And finally, they manage the tension between continuity and change--they keep the organization from falling into extreme inertia or extreme chaos. The author examines each of these strengths, citing real-world examples culled from his research. Of course, not every middle manager in an organization is a paragon of entrepreneurial vigor and energy, Huy acknowledges. But cavalierly dismissing the roles that middle managers play--and carelessly reducing their ranks--will drastically diminish senior managers' chances of realizing radical change at their companies. Indeed, middle managers may be the most effective allies of corner office executives when it's time to make major changes in businesses.     

A new game plan for C players

It's a big driver of business success, but one that executives are loath to talk about: upgrading the talent pool by weeding out "C" players from management. These aren't the incompetent or unethical managers whom organizations dismiss without a backward glance; C performers deliver results that are acceptable--barely--but they fail to innovate or to inspire the people they lead. The authors of The War for Talent have studied what it takes to upgrade an organization's talent pool. In this article, they explore the hidden costs of tolerating under-performance and acknowledge the reasons why executives may shy away from dealing decisively with C players. They recommend that organizations take an "iron hand in a velvet glove" approach to managing subpar performers. That is, companies should establish rigorous, disciplined processes for assessing and dealing with low-performing managers but still treat them with respect. The authors outline three ironhanded steps. First, executives must identify C players by evaluating their talents and distributing employee performances along an assessment curve. Second, executives must agree on explicit action plans that articulate the improvements or changes that C performers must achieve within six to 12 months. And third, executives should hold managers accountable for carrying out the action plans. Without such discipline, procrastination, rationalization, and inaction will prevail. The authors also emphasize the need for the "velvet glove." Executives must ensure that low performers are treated with dignity, so they should offer candid feedback, instructive coaching, and generous severance packages and outplacement support. The authors' approach isn't about being tough on people; it's about being relentlessly focused on performance.     

Fair process: managing in the knowledge economy

Unlike the traditional factors of production--land, labor, and capital--knowledge is a resource that can't be forced out of people. But creating and sharing knowledge is essential to fostering innovation, the key challenge of the knowledge-based economy. To create a climate in which employees volunteer their creativity and expertise, managers need to look beyond the traditional tools at their disposal. They need to build trust. The authors have studied the links between trust, idea sharing, and corporate performance for more than a decade. They have explored the question of why managers of local subsidiaries so often fail to share information with executives at headquarters. They have studied the dynamics of idea sharing in product development teams, joint ventures, supplier partnerships, and corporate transformations. They offer an explanation for why people resist change even when it would benefit them directly. In every case, the decisive factor was what the authors call fair process--fairness in the way a company makes and executes decisions. The elements of fair process are simple: Engage people's input in decisions that directly affect them. Explain why decisions are made the way they are. Make clear what will be expected of employees after the changes are made. Fair process may sound like a soft issue, but it is crucial to building trust and unlocking ideas. Without it, people are apt to withhold their full cooperation and their creativity. The results are costly: ideas that never see daylight and initiatives that are never seized.     

Six dangerous myths about pay

Every day, executives make decisions about pay, and they do so in a landscape that's shifting. As more and more companies base less of their compensation on straight salary and look to other financial options, managers are bombarded with advice about the best approaches to take. Unfortunately, much of that advice is wrong. Indeed, much of the conventional wisdom and public discussion about pay today is misleading, incorrect, or both. The result is that business people are adopting wrongheaded notions about how to pay people and why. In particular, they are subscribing to six dangerous myths about pay. Myth #1: labor rates are the same as labor costs. Myth #2: cutting labor rates will lower labor costs. Myth #3: labor costs represent a large portion of a company's total costs. Myth #4: keeping labor costs low creates a potent and sustainable competitive edge. Myth #5: individual incentive pay improves performance. Myth #6: people work primarily for the money. The author explains why these myths are so pervasive, shows where they go wrong, and suggests how leaders might think more productively about compensation. With increasing frequency, the author says, he sees managers harming their organizations by buying into--and acting on--these myths. Those that do, he warns, are probably doomed to endless tinkering with pay that at the end of the day will accomplish little but cost a lot.     

Uncovering your hidden occupancy costs

Senior managers at large companies may not believe that they can have much impact on the "bricks and mortar" of their cost structure. They may even think that occupancy costs are too insignificant to worry about, too technical to analyze, and too fixed to control. But as real estate consultant Mahlon Apgar argues, occupancy costs can hurt a company's earnings, share value, and overall performance. On the other hand, every dollar saved drops straight to the bottom line. Shearson Lehman Brothers, for example, has found that it can save as much as $20 million annually by reducing occupancy costs in its branch offices and headquarters. Managing occupancy costs isn't easy. But it is timely. As companies strive to improve productivity by consolidating functions and downsizing staff, they are saddled with excess office space. Expansions abroad present completely different market conditions that put a premium on reducing occupancy costs. At the same time, the changing nature of work is challenging deeply held beliefs about the workplace, and, consequently, traditional expectations of office space are giving way to innovations that are less costly and more productive. To manage occupancy costs, managers must be able to identify their components, measure their impact, understand what drives them, and develop options to change them. Four basic tools help diagnose problems: a cost history, a loss analysis, a component analysis, and a lease aging profile. Understanding cost drivers like leasing, location, and layout can give executives the insights they need to reduce occupancy costs while improving the effectiveness of facilities to support day-to-day operations.     

Connectivity and control in the year 2000 and beyond

By now, most executives are familiar with the famous Year 2000 problem--and many believe that their companies have the situation well in hand. After all, it seems to be such a trivial problem--computer software that interprets "oo" to be the year 1900 instead of the year 2000. And yet armies of computer professionals have been working on it--updating code in payroll systems, distribution systems, actuarial systems, sales-tracking systems, and the like. The problem is pervasive. Not only is it in your systems, it's in your suppliers' systems, your bankers' systems, and your customers' systems. It's embedded in chips that control elevators, automated teller machines, process-control equipment, and power grids. Already, a dried-food manufacturer destroyed millions of dollars of perfectly good product when a computer counted inventory marked with an expiration date of "oo" as nearly a hundred years old. And when managers of a sewage-control plant turned the clock to January I, 2000 on a computer system they thought had been fixed, raw sewage pumped directly into the harbor. It has become apparent that there will not be enough time to find and fix all of the problems by January I, 2000. And what good will it do if your computers work but they're connected with systems that don't? That is one of the questions Harvard Business School professor Richard Nolan asks in his introduction to HBR's Perspectives on the Year 2000 issue. How will you prepare your organization to respond when things start to go wrong? Fourteen commentators offer their ideas on how senior managers should think about connectivity and control in the year 2000 and beyond.     

When to walk away from a deal

Deal making is glamorous; due diligence is not. That simple statement goes a long way toward explaining why so many companies have made so many acquisitions that have produced so little value. The momentum of a transaction is hard to resist once senior management has the target in its sights. Companies contract "deal fever," and due diligence all too often becomes an exercise in verifying the target's financial statements rather than conducting a fair analysis of the deal's strategic logic and the acquirer's ability to realize value from it. Seldom does the process lead managers to kill potential acquisitions, even when the deals are deeply flawed. In a recent Bain & Company survey of 250 international executives with M&A responsibilities, only 30% of them were satisfied with the rigor of their due diligence. And fully a third admitted they hadn't walked away from deals they had nagging doubts about. In this article, the authors, all Bain consultants, emphasize the importance of comprehensive due diligence practices and suggest ways companies can improve their capabilities in this area. They provide rich real-world examples of companies that have had varying levels of success with their due diligence processes, including Safeway, Odeon, American Sea-foods, and Kellogg's. Effective due diligence requires answering four basic questions: What are we really buying? What is the target's stand-alone value? Where are the synergies--and the skeletons? And what's our walk-away price? Each of these questions will prompt an even deeper level of querying that puts the broader, strategic rationale for acquisitions under a microscope. Successful acquirers pay close heed to the results of such in-depth investigations and analyses--to the extent that they are prepared to walk away from a deal, even in the very late stages of negotiations.     

Making strategy: learning by doing

Companies find it difficult to change strategy for many reasons, but one stands out: strategic thinking is not a core managerial competence at most companies. Executives hone their capabilities by tackling problems over and over again. Changing strategy, however, is not usually a task that they face repeatedly. Once companies have found a strategy that works, they want to use it, not change it. Consequently, most managers do not develop a competence in strategic thinking. This Manager's Tool Kit presents a three-stage method executives can use to conceive and implement a creative and coherent strategy themselves. The first stage is to identify and map the driving forces that the company needs to address. The process of mapping provides strategy-making teams with visual representations of team members' assumptions, those pictures, in turn, enable managers to achieve consensus in determining the driving forces. Once a senior management team has formulated a new strategy, it must align the strategy with the company's resource-allocation process to make implementation possible. Senior management teams can translate their strategy into action by using aggregate project planning. And management teams that link strategy and innovation through that planning process will develop a competence in implementing strategic change. The author guides the reader through the three stages of strategy making by examining the case of a manufacturing company that was losing ground to competitors. After mapping the driving forces, the company's senior managers were able to devise a new strategy that allowed the business to maintain a competitive advantage in its industry.     

Selling the brand inside

When you think of marketing, chances are your mind goes right to your customers--how can you persuade more people to buy whatever it is you sell? But there's another "market" that's equally important: your employees. Author Colin Mitchell argues that executives by and large ignore this critical internal audience when developing and executing branding campaigns. As a result, employees end up undermining the expectations set by the company's advertising--either because they don't understand what the ads have promised or because they don't believe in the brand and feel disengaged or, worse, hostile toward the company. Mitchell offers three principles for executing internal branding campaigns--techniques executives can use to make sure employees understand, embrace, and "live" the brand vision companies are selling to the public. First, he says, companies need to market to employees at times when the company is experiencing a fundamental challenge or change, times when employees are seeking direction and are relatively receptive to new initiatives. Second, companies must link their internal and external marketing campaigns; employees should hear the same messages that are being sent to the market-place. And third, internal branding campaigns should bring the brand alive for employees, creating an emotional connection to the company that transcends any one experience. Internal campaigns should introduce and explain the brand messages in new and attention-grabbing ways and then reinforce those messages by weaving them into the fabric of the company. It is a fact of business, writes Mitchell, that if employees do not care about or understand their company's brands, they will ultimately weaken their organizations. It's up to top executives, he says, to give them a reason to care.     

Avoid the four perils of CRM

Customer relationship management is one of the hottest management tools today. But more than half of all CRM initiatives fail to produce the anticipated results. Why? And what can companies do to reverse that negative trend? The authors--three senior Bain consultants--have spent the past ten years analyzing customer-loyalty initiatives, both successful and unsuccessful, at more than 200 companies in a wide range of industries. They've found that CRM backfires in part because executives don't understand what they are implementing, let alone how much it will cost or how long it will take. The authors' research unveiled four common pitfalls that managers stumble into when trying to implement CRM. Each pitfall is a consequence of a single flawed assumption--that CRM is software that will automatically manage customer relationships. It isn't. Rather, CRM is the creation of customer strategies and processes to build customer loyalty, which are then supported by the technology. This article looks at best practices in CRM at several companies, including the New York Times Company, Square D, GE Capital, Grand Expeditions, and BMC Software. It provides an intellectual framework for any company that wants to start a CRM program or turn around a failing one.     

Strategies for surviving a shakeout

Shakeouts are a fact of life in almost every industry-witness the shrinking number of players in areas as diverse as banking, software, and hospital supply distribution. The key to survival is sensing your industry's shakeout before the competition does. And the first hurdle for managers to overcome is the belief that it can't happen to them. It can and it probably will. George Day describes two shakeout syndromes that affect different types of industries. A boom-and-bust shakeout afflicts hot emerging markets or highly cyclical businesses. A glut of competitors enter the market during boom times, but many of them fail when growth slows or a dominant design emerges. A seismic-shift shakeout strikes mature industries that have enjoyed years of protected prosperity as a result of, for example, local regulations or import barriers. But deregulation, globalization, or technological change can pull the rug out from under them. Day outlines how companies can detect the early warning signs of a shakeout. He explains how adaptive survivors, such as Dell Computer, successfully adjust their businesses in the midst of a bust, and how aggressive amalgamators, such as Arrow Electronics, cut costs and acquire smaller rivals in order to remain standing after a seismic shift. But the fact remains that most companies will get squeezed out during a consolidation. Although it is enormously difficult for executives to come to terms with the grim news, the sooner they do so, the better. And, as Day points out, all is not necessarily lost: with the right timing, also-rans can make a profitable exit from an industry.     

MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND CORPORATE DIVERSIFICATION STRATEGIES

Because the break-up of conglomerates typically produces substantial increases in shareholder wealth, many commentators have argued that the conglomerate form of organization is inefficient. This article reports the findings of a number of recent academic studies, including the authors' own, that examine the causes and consequences of corporate diversification. Although theoretical arguments suggest that corporate diversification can have benefits as well as costs, several studies have documented that diversified firms trade at a significant discount from their single-segment peers. Estimates of this discount range from 10–15% of firm value, and are larger for “unrelated” diversification than for “related” diversification. If corporate diversification has generally been a value-reducing managerial strategy, why do firms remain diversified? One possibility, which the authors label the “agency cost” hypothesis, is that top executives without substantial equity stakes may have incentives to maintain a diversification strategy even if doing so reduces shareholder wealth. But, as top managers' ownership stakes increase, they bear a greater fraction of the costs associated with value-reducing policies and are therefore less likely to take actions that reduce shareholder wealth. Also, to the extent that outside blockholders monitor managerial behavior, the agency cost hypothesis predicts that diversification will be less prevalent in firms with large outside blockholders. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that companies in which managers own a significant fraction of the firm's shares, and in which blockholders own a large fraction of shares, are significantly less likely to be diversified. If agency problems lead managers to maintain value-reducing diversification strategies, what is it that leads some of these same firms to refocus? The agency cost hypothesis predicts that managers will reduce diversification only if pressured to do so by internal or external mechanisms that reduce agency problems. Consistent with this argument, the authors find that decreases in diversification appear to be precipitated by market disciplinary forces such as block purchases, acquisition attempts, and management turnover.     

Women as a business imperative

In 1989, Felice N. Schwartz's HBR article "Management Women and the New Facts of Life" generated a huge debate over the rules established by corporations in their handling of women executives. Now in "Women as a Business Imperative," Schwartz follows up with practical insights about the costs companies incur in passing over qualified businesswomen. In the form of a memo to a fictional CEO, Schwartz describes how the atmosphere within most companies is corrosive to women and must change. Preconceptions harbored by male senior managers about women are so deeply ingrained that many men are not even aware of them. Yet senior managers must help women advance. Those companies that accept their responsibility to make radical change--both in women's treatment and in family support--can improve their bottom lines enormously. Treating women as a business imperative is the equivalent of creating a unique R&D product for which there is great demand. Most companies ignore child care and other family concerns. Many companies hire women to ensure mere adequacy and avoid litigation. Women's ambitions and energies are stifled by such businesses at the same time that women have demonstrated their competence and potential in the best business schools. High turnover results. However, the restraints that now hold women back can be loosened easily. CEOs and other senior managers must support their female employees by (1) acknowledging the fundamental difference between women and men--the biological fact of maternity; (2) allowing flexibility for women and men who need it; (3) providing training that takes advantage of women's leadership potential; and (4) eliminating the corrosive atmosphere and the barriers that exist for women in the workplace.     

No ordinary boot camp

Many companies now run boot camps--comprehensive orientation programs designed to help new hires hit the ground running. They're intense and intimidating, and new employees emerge from them with strong bonds to other recruits and to the organization. But at Trilogy, organizational consultant Noel Tichy discovered one program that's a breed apart. In this article, Tichy gives us a detailed tour of Trilogy's boot camp, Trilogy University, to demonstrate why it's so different--and so effective. Like the best boot camps, it serves as an immersion in both the technical skills new recruits will need for their jobs and Trilogy's corporate culture, which emphasizes risk-taking, teamwork, humility, and a strong customer focus. But this is a new-employee orientation session that's so fundamental to the company as a whole that it's presided over by the CEO and top corporate executives for fully six months of the year. Why? In two three-month sessions, these top executives hone their own strategic thinking about the company as they decide what to teach the new recruits each session. They also find the company's next generation of new products as they judge the innovative ideas the recruits are tasked with developing--making the program Trilogy's main R&D engine. And they pull the company's rising technical stars into mentoring roles for the new recruits, helping to build the next generation of top leadership. After spending months on-site studying Trilogy University, Tichy came away highly impressed by the power of the virtuous teaching cycle the program has set in motion. Leaders of the organization are learning from recruits at the same time that the recruits are learning from the leaders. It's a model, he argues, that other companies would do well to emulate.     

THE INTERVENING EFFECTS OF PARTICIPATION ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND MANAGERIAL PERFORMANCE

Prior studies have suggested that the subordinates’ perception of fairness in their organizations’ procedures is related to improvements in the subordinates’ performance. However, the positive relationship between perception of justice and performance may not be a direct one, but is indirect via the intervening variable of participation. It is likely that the importance of maintaining procedural fairness in the organization will lead senior managers (superiors) to select procedures that allow their subordinates more participation privileges in the organization’s affairs because high participative procedures are perceived to be fair. This increase in participation, in turn, is likely to improve the subordinates’ performance. The results, based on a path analytical model and a sample of 83 senior managers, indicate that procedural justice has an indirect effect on performance via participation. On the basis of these results, it is possible to conclude that the importance of procedural fairness in the organization leads to the selection of procedures with high subordinates’ participation, which, in turn, leads to high managerial performance.