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1.
Summary. This paper describes conditions under which one investment project dominates a second project in terms of net present value,
irrespective of the choice of the discount rate. The resulting partial ordering of projects has certain similarities to stochastic
dominance. However, the structure of the net present value function leads to characterizations that are quite specific to
this context. Our theorems use Bernstein's (1915) innovative results on the representation and approximation of polynomials,
as well as other general results from the theory of equations, to characterize the partial ordering. We also show how the
ranking is altered when the range of discount rates is limited or the rate varies period by period.
Received: January 5, 2002; revised version: October 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Robert Driskill, Andrea Maneschi, Roy Radner, and participants of seminars at NYU, Notre Dame, Purdue, and
Washington University for helpful comments. The present version of the paper has benefited from comments by a referee and
the editor. Foster is grateful for support from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation through its network on Inequality
and Poverty in Broader Perspective.
Correspondence to: T. Mitra 相似文献
2.
Ross M. Starr 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):455-474
Summary. The monetary character of trade, use of a common medium of exchange, is shown to be an outcome of an economic general equilibrium.
Monetary structure can be derived from price theory in a modified Arrow-Debreu model. Two constructs are added: transaction
costs and market segmentation in trading posts (with a separate budget constraint at each transaction). Commodity money arises
endogenously as the most liquid (lowest transaction cost) asset. Government-issued fiat money has a positive equilibrium value
from its acceptability for tax payments. Scale economies in transaction cost account for uniqueness of the (fiat or commodity)
money in equilibrium.
Received: February 15, 2002; revised version: August 12, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper has benefited from seminars and colleagues' helpful remarks at the University of California - Santa Barbara,
University of California - San Diego, NSF-NBER Conference on General Equilibrium Theory at Purdue University, Society for
the Advancement of Behavioral Economics at San Diego State University, Econometric Society at the University of Wisconsin
- Madison, SITE at Stanford University-2001, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, Midwest
Economic Theory Conference at the University of Illinois - Urbana Champaign, University of Iowa, Southern California Economic
Theory Conference at UC - Santa Barbara, Midwest Macroeconomics Conference at University of Iowa, University of California
- Berkeley, European Workshop on General Equilibrium Theory at University of Paris I, Society for Economic Dynamics at San
Jose Costa Rica, World Congress of the Econometric Society at University of Washington, Cowles Foundation at Yale University.
It is a pleasure to acknowledge comments of Henning Bohn, Harold Cole, James Hamilton, Mukul Majumdar, Harry Markowitz, Chris
Phelan, Meenakshi Rajeev, Wendy Shaffer, Bruce Smith, and Max Stinchcombe. 相似文献
3.
Nigar Hashimzade 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):907-912
Summary. In this paper I analyze the general equilibrium in a random Walrasian economy. Dependence among agents is introduced in the
form of dependency neighborhoods. Under the uncertainty, an agent may fail to survive due to a meager endowment in a particular
state (direct effect), as well as due to unfavorable equilibrium price system at which the value of the endowment falls short
of the minimum needed for survival (indirect terms-of-trade effect). To illustrate the main result I compute the stochastic
limit of equilibrium price and probability of survival of an agent in a large Cobb-Douglas economy.
Received June 7, 2001; revised version: January 7, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar and Thomas DiCiccio for helpful discussion and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions. 相似文献
4.
Firm reputation with hidden information 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
Steven Tadelis 《Economic Theory》2003,21(2-3):635-651
Summary. An adverse selection model of firm reputation is developed in which short-lived clients purchase services from firms operated
by overlapping generations of agents. A firm's only asset is its name, or reputation, and trade of names is not observed by
clients. As a result, names are traded in all equilibria regardless of the economy's horizon The general equilibrium analysis
links the value of a name to the market for services. This causes a non-monotonicity that precludes higher types from sorting
themselves through the market for names, and leads to “sensible” dynamics: reputations, and name prices, increase after success
and decrease after failure.
Received: July 31, 2001; revised version: December 20, 2001
RID="*"
ID="*" I thank Jon Levin, Eric Maskin and Drew Fudenberg for valuable discussions, and Heski Bar-Isaac for comments on an
earlier draft. Financial support from the National Science Foundation (NSF grants SBR-9818981 and SES-0079876) is gratefully
acknowledged. This paper replaces an older (and incomplete) working paper titled “Reputation with Hidden Information”. 相似文献
5.
Alex Possajennikov 《Economic Theory》2003,21(4):921-928
Summary. I show that aggregate-taking behavior is often evolutionarily stable for finite population in symmetric games in which payoff
depends only on own strategy and an aggregate. I provide economic examples exhibiting this phenomenon.
Received: August 27, 2001; revised version: January 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" The paper has profited from the comments of Maria Montero, Burkhard Hehenkamp, Wolfgang Leininger, and Dave Furth.
Financial support from the DFG via Postgraduate Programme at the University of Dortmund and via SFB 504 at the University
of Mannheim is acknowledged.
RID="*"
ID="*" Present address: University of Mannheim, SFB 504, L 13, 15, 68131 Mannheim, Germany (e-mail: possajen@sfb504.uni-mannheim.de) 相似文献
6.
Summary. Using a general equilibrium framework, this paper analyzes the equilibrium provision of a pure public bad commodity (for
example pollution). Considering a finite economy with one desired private good and one pure public “bad” we explicitly introduce the concept of Lindahl equilibrium and the Lindahl prices into a pure public bad economy. Then, the Lindahl provision
is analyzed and compared with the Cournot-Nash provision. The main results for economies with heterogeneous agents state that
the asymptotic Lindahl allocation of the pure public bad is the null allocation. In contrast, the asymptotic Cournot-Nash
provision of the public bad might approach infinity. Other results were obtained in concert with the broad analysis of the
large finite economies with pure public bad commodities.
Received: July 26, 2001; revised version: March 12, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are indebt to Nicholas Yannelis and anonymous referee for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Correspondence to: B. Shitovitz 相似文献
7.
Summary. We consider a model of political competition among two ideological parties who are uncertain about the distribution of voters.
The distinguishing feature of the model is that parties can delegate electoral decisions to candidates by nomination. It is
shown that if the credible platform commitments of the candidates is feasible, then at least one of the parties nominates
in equilibrium to a candidate who has an ideology that is more radical than the delegating party's ideology. In a variety
of circumstances, this, in turn, yields a polarization of equilibrium policy choices of the candidates. It is thus argued
formally here that strategic nomination of the candidates may well be one of the major reasons behind the well documented
observation that the platforms associated with the political parties in two-party democracies are often surprisingly polarized.
Received: January 10, 2002; revised version: May 8, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Alberto Alesina, Levent Ko?kesen, Antonio Merlo, Ronny Razin, Vijay Krishna, Alessandro Lizzeri, and seminar
participants at Alicante, Columbia, Copenhagen, and NYU for helpful comments. We also thank an anonymous referee for its useful
suggestions. A good fraction of this research was conducted while Ok was a visitor in the Department of Economics at University
of Alicante; he thanks for the kind hospitality of this institution. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from
the Spanish Ministry of Education through grant CICYT BEC2001-0535 (Faulí-Oller) and BEC2001-0980 (Ortu?o-Ortín).
Correspondence to:I. Ortu?o-Ortin 相似文献
8.
Summary. In the context of differential information economies, with and without free disposal, we consider the concepts of Radner
equilibrium, rational expectations equilibrium, private core, weak fine core and weak fine value. We look into the possible
implementation of these concepts as perfect Bayesian or sequential equilibria of noncooperative dynamic formulations. We construct
relevant game trees which indicate the sequence of decisions and the information sets, and explain the rules for calculating
ex ante expected payoffs. The possibility of implementing an allocation is related to whether or not it is incentive compatible.
Implementation through an exogenous third party or an endogenous intermediary is also considered.
Received: November 19, 2001; revised version: April 17, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper comes out of a visit by Nicholas Yannelis to City University, London, in December 2000. We are grateful
to Dr A. Hadjiprocopis for his invaluable help with the implementation of Latex in a Unix environment. We also thank Leon
Koutsougeras and a referee for several, helpful comments.
Correspondence to: N.C. Yannelis 相似文献
9.
Massimiliano Amarante 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):353-374
Summary. In each stage of a repeated game with private monitoring, the players receive payoffs and privately observe signals which
depend on the players' actions and the state of world. I show that, contrary to a widely held belief, such games admit a recursive
structure. More precisely, I construct a representation of the original sequential problem as a sequence of static games with
incomplete information. This establishes the ground for a characterization of strategies and, hence, of behavior in interactive-decision
settings where private information is present. Finally, the representation is used to give a recursive characterization of
the equilibrium payoff set, by means of a multi-player generalization of dynamic programming.
Received: February 11, 2002; revised version: July 22, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I am very grateful to In-Koo Cho, Larry Epstein, Denis Gromb, Stephen Morris, Paolo Siconolfi, Lones Smith and Max
Stinchcombe for several insights and suggestions. A referee's comments helped improving the exposition. Finally, I wish to
thank the participants to the seminars at MEDS, NYU, Columbia University, Caltech, UCLA, University of Rochester, University
of Texas-Austin, Northwestern Summer Microeconomics Conference 98, Summer in Tel Aviv 98, and NASM98. 相似文献
10.
Summary. We consider a linear exchange economy and its successive replicas. We study the notion of Cournot-Walras equilibrium in which
the consumers use the quantities of commodities put on the market as strategic variables. We prove that, generically, if the
number of replications is large enough but finite, the competitive behaviour is an oligopoly equilibrium. Then, under a mild
condition, which may be interpreted in terms of market regulation and/or market activity, we show that any sequence of oligopoly
equilibria of successive replica economies converges to the Walrasian outcome and furthermore that every oligopoly equilibrium
of large, but finite, replica is Pareto optimal. Consequently, under the same assumptions on the fundamentals of the economy,
one has an asymptotic result on the convergence of oligopoly equilibria to the Walras equilibrium together with a generic
existence result for the Cournot-Walras.
Received: June 20, 2002; revised version: November 20, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Part of this paper was written while the second author was visiting the Universidad de Vigo. The support of the department
of mathematics is gratefully acknowledged.
Correspondence to: J.M. Bonnisseau 相似文献
11.
The proper panel econometric specification of the gravity equation: A three-way model with bilateral interaction effects 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
We argue that the proper specification of a panel gravity model should include main (exporter, importer, and time) as well
as time invariant exporter-by-importer (bilateral) interaction effects. In a panel of 11 APEC countries, the latter are highly
significant and account for the largest part of variation.
First version received: February 2001/Final version received: June 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful to two anonymous referees and Robert Kunst for their helpful comments. 相似文献
12.
Summary. This paper studies the equilibria of a stochastic OLG exchange economies consisting of identical agents living for two periods,
and having the opportunity to trade a single infinitely-lived asset in constant supply. The agents have uncertain endowments
and the stochastic process determining the endowments is Markovian. For such economies, the literature has focused on studying
strongly stationary equilibria in which quantities and prices are functions of the exogenous states of nature which describe
the uncertainty: such equilibria are generalizations of deterministic steady states, and this paper investigates if they have
the same special status as asymptotic limits of other equilibrium paths. The difficulty in extending the analysis of equilibria
beyond the class of strongly stationary equilibria comes from the presence of indeterminacy: we propose a procedure for overcoming
this difficulty which can be decomposed into two steps. First backward induction arguments are used to restrict the domain
of possible prices; then if some indeterminacy is left, expectation functions are introduced to make the forward equilibrium
equations determinate. The properties of the resulting trajectories, in particular their asymptotic properties, can then be
studied. For the class of models that we study this procedure provides a justification for focusing on strongly stationary
equilibria. For the model with positive dividends (equity or land) the justification is complete, since we show that the strongly
stationary equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. For the model with zero dividends (money) there is a continuum of self-fulfilling
expectation functions resulting in a continuum of equilibrium paths starting from any admissible initial condition: under
conditions given in the paper, these equilibrium paths converge almost surely to one of the strongly stationary equilibria-either
autarchy or the stochastic analogue of the Golden Rule.
Received: November 19, 2001; revised version: March 22, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We are grateful for the stimulating environment and research support provided by the Cowles Foundation at Yale University
during the Fall 2000 when this paper was first conceived. We are also grateful to the participants of the SITE Workshop at
Stanford University and the Incomplete Markets Workshop at SUNY Stony Brook during the summer 2001 for helpful discussions.
Correspondence to: M. Magill 相似文献
13.
Summary. A well-known result in the medical insurance literature is that zero co-insurance is never second-best for insurance contracts
subject to moral hazard. We replace the usual expected utility assumption with a version of the rank-dependent utility (RDU)
model that has greater experimental support. When consumers exhibit such preferences, we show that zero co-insurance may in
fact be optimal, especially for low-risk consumers. Indeed, it is even possible that the first-best and second-best contracts
are identical. In this case, there is no “market failure”, despite the informational asymmetry. We argue that these RDU results are in
better accord with the empirical evidence from US health insurance markets.
Received: February 26, 2001; revised version: October 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"The authors would particularly like to thank Simon Grant, John Quiggin, Peter Wakker and an anonymous referee for valuable
comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. The paper has also benefitted from the input of seminar audiences at The Australian
National University, University of Auckland, University of Melbourne and University of Sydney. Ryan also gratefully acknowledges
the financial support of the ARC, through Grant number A000000055.
Correspondence to:R. Vaithianathan 相似文献
14.
Oleksii Birulin 《Economic Theory》2003,22(3):675-683
Summary. I consider a single-object English auction with two asymmetric bidders and show that it has a continuum of inefficient undominated
ex-post equilibria. The result extends for the generalized VCG mechanism, Dasgupta-Maskin auction and, generally, for every
auction that has an efficient ex-post equilibrium.
Received: November 5, 2001; revised version: June 10, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*"I am grateful to Vijay Krishna, Sergei Izmalkov and anonymous referee for many important comments. 相似文献
15.
Steven Russell 《Economic Theory》2003,22(1):111-140
Summary. This paper uses a general equilibrium model to study the determination of the exchange rate in an economy with fundamental
uncertainty. The model has steady state equilibria in which the exchange rate is constant. These equilibria may coexist with
“quasi-fundamental” equilibria – nonstationary equilibria in which the exchange rate displays stochastic fluctuations that
are correlated with the fluctuations in fundamental random variables. The quasi-fundamental equilibria are Pareto dominated
by the corresponding constant-exchange-rate steady states. They also converge to these steady states, inevitably or with positive
probability.
Received: October 2, 1999; revised version: March 26, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This paper began as a joint project with Alex Mourmouras, who has made many helpful comments and suggestions but is
not responsible for any errors or deficiencies. In addition, I thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 相似文献
16.
Summary. In a game with rational expectations, individuals simultaneously refine their information with the information revealed by
the strategies of other individuals. At a Nash equilibrium of a game with rational expectations, the information of individuals
is essentially symmetric: the same profile of strategies is also an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information; and
strategies are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a minimum payoff that no other profile of strategies
attains, then the veto profile is the only Nash equilibrium, and it is is an equilibrium with rational expectations and essentially
symmetric information; which accounts for the impossibility of speculation.
Received: June 20, 2001; revised version: January 9, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We wish to thank Pierpaolo Battigalli, Fran?oise Forges, Franco Donzelli, Leonidas Koutsougeras, Aldo Rustichini, Rajiv
Vohra and Nicholas Yannelis for their comments.
Correspondence to: H. Polemarchakis 相似文献
17.
Gautam Bose 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):457-467
Summary. An explanation is provided for the evolution of segmented marketplaces in a pairwise exchange economy. Large traders operating
in a pairwise exchange market prefer to meet other similar traders, because this enables them to trade their endowments in
a smaller number of encounters. Large and small traders, however, cannot be distinguished a priori, and the existence of the small traders imposes a negative externality on the large traders. We show that, under conditions
which are not very restrictive, establishing a separate market (perhaps with an entry fee) designated for the large traders
induces the two types of traders to segment themselves. However, this segmentation is not necessarily welfare improving.
Received: January 12, 2001; revised version: July 17, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" I wish to thank the participants in the Friday Theory Workshop at the University of Sydney, and the participants at
the 17th Australian Theory Workshop at the University of Melbourne for comments and discussion. John Hillas and Stephen King
pointed out an omission in an earlier version, and Catherine de Fontenay and Hodaka Morita made extensive comments on earlier
drafts. This work was initiated while I was a short-term visitor at the University of Southern California. 相似文献
18.
Equilibrium in a decentralized market with adverse selection 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Max R. Blouin 《Economic Theory》2003,22(2):245-262
Summary. This paper deals with trade volume and distribution of surplus in markets subject to adverse selection. In a model where
two qualities of a good exist, I show that if trade is decentralized (i.e. conducted via random pairwise meetings of agents),
then all units of the good are traded, and all agents have positive ex-ante expected payoffs. This feature is present regardless
of the quality distribution, and persists in the limit as discounting is made negligible. This offers a sharp contrast to
models of centralized trade with adverse selection (Akerlof, Wilson).
Received: April 2, 2001; revised version: March 29, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" This research was funded by a grant from UQAM. I wish to thank Roberto Serrano and seminar participants at UQAM, Queen's
University at Kingston, the 2001 CEME General Equilibrium Conference (Brown University), and the 2001 North American Summer
Meeting of the Econometric Society (University of Maryland) for comments. 相似文献
19.
Manuel A. Gómez 《Economic Theory》2003,22(4):917-925
Summary. This paper devises a fiscal policy by means of which the first-best optimum equilibrium is attained as a market equilibrium
in the Uzawa-Lucas model when average human capital has an external effect on productivity. The optimal policy requires the
use of a subsidy to investment in human capital which can be financed by a tax on labor income. Lump-sum taxation is not required
to balance the government budget either in the steady state or in the transitional phase. Physical capital income should not
be taxed. Alternatively, the optimal growth path can be attained by means of a subsidy to human capital.
Received: March 21, 2002; revised version: September 4, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology through PNICDYIT grant SEC2002-03663 is gratefully
acknowledged. 相似文献
20.
>P>Summary. We provide a set of simple and intuitive set of axioms that allow for a direct and constructive proof of the Choquet Expected
Utility representation for decision making under uncertainty.
Received: October 29, 2002; revised version: November 13, 2002
RID="*"
ID="*" We thank Matthew Ryan for very useful comments and suggestions on related work and for encouraging us to write this
note.
Correspondence to: S. Grant 相似文献