英国医改：让公众有权“用脚投票”

英国卫生大臣安迪·伯纳姆近日表示．英国将在医疗体制改革中打破原有的分区就诊制．允许公众“用脚投票”．即人们可以自由选择全科医生．远离那些服务质量不好的社区全科诊所。由于英国国家医疗服务系统按病人数量为全科医生划拨资金，这一改革将为英国医疗系统注入更多竞争机制，引起各方热议。     

逃命,逃什么命?

最近"逃命"的呼声不绝于耳。特别是一位著名的空头司令,他虽然在去年一度曾经表示不再唱空中国,但是,今年以来却一再地发出"熊来了"的惊呼,近日更是公开主张趁反弹出货,换句话说,也就是赶快逃命。     

公司治理模式对财务报告的影响

由于文化传统、经济发展道路和政治法律制度的不同，不同国家形成了各具特色的公司治理模式。在发达的市场经济国家，公司治理的模式大体上可以分为两类：一类是以英美为代表的强调公司股东通过市场对公司经营者进行约束的外部治理型模式；另一类是以德日为代表的强调公司股东通过在公司内部建立权力的监督和制衡机制来约束公司经营者的内部治理型模式。前者被形象地称为“用脚投票”，后者则被称为“用手投票”。     

Vote Trading and Information Aggregation

The standard analysis of corporate governance assumes that shareholders vote in ratios that firms choose, such as one share‐one vote. However, if the cost of unbundling and trading votes is sufficiently low, then shareholders choose the ratios. We document an active market for votes within the U.S. equity loan market, where the average vote sells for zero. We hypothesize that asymmetric information motivates the vote trade and find support in the cross section. More trading occurs for higher‐spread and worse‐performing firms, especially when voting is close. Vote trading corresponds to support for shareholder proposals and opposition to management proposals.     

电子投票制度的前景与政策建议

改进股东投票制度是保护中小股东利益的必然要求 一、投票权是股东各项权利的基础 上市公司股东的基本权利可以分为收益权(即剩余索取权)和控制权，股东的各项权利一般都是根据同股同权的原则投票确定，即通过股东投票选举和更换董事等实现对公司实际控制……     

信托业的特色业务:表决权信托

表决权信托作为信托投资公司的一项特色业务，可以在股权类国有资产运作、优化上市公司法人治理结构、保护中小股东利益和保持公司股权结构的相对稳定中发挥重要作用。开展此项业务，信托投资公司具有自身优势，但在某些方面尚需完善。     

One Share - One Vote: the Theory

The theoretical literature on security-voting structure canbe organized around three questions: What impact do nonvotingshares have on takeover outcomes? How does disproportional votingpower affect the incentives of blockholders? What are the repercussionsof mandating one share - one vote for firms' financing and ownershipchoices? Overall, the costs and benefits of separating cashflow and votes reflect the fundamental governance trade offbetween disempowering blockholders and empowering managers.It is therefore an open question whether mandating one share- one vote would improve the quality of corporate governance,notably in systems that so far relied on active owners.     

类别股东投票制度为"弱势群体"发出强音发出强音

类别股东投票作为一项新的制度已经被我国一些上市公司所采纳,并引起了广泛的关注.     

The Vote Is Cast: The Effect of Corporate Governance on Shareholder Value

This paper investigates whether improvements in the firm's internal corporate governance create value for shareholders. We analyze the market reaction to governance proposals that pass or fail by a small margin of votes in annual meetings. This provides a clean causal estimate that deals with the endogeneity of internal governance rules. We find that passing a proposal leads to significant positive abnormal returns. Adopting one governance proposal increases shareholder value by 2.8%. The market reaction is larger in firms with more antitakeover provisions, higher institutional ownership, and stronger investor activism for proposals sponsored by institutions. In addition, we find that acquisitions and capital expenditures decline and long‐term performance improves.     

Do Shareholders Vote Strategically? Voting Behavior, Proposal Screening, and Majority Rules

We analyze how shareholders screen management proposals at annualgeneral meetings. First, we use a simple model of strategicvoting to develop a theoretical benchmark of effective informationaggregation through voting. Then, we derive testable implicationsand provide structural estimates of the model parameters. Themain conclusions are that shareholders vote strategically andthat proposal screening increases value. Shareholders largelyneutralize the lock-in effect of supermajority rules, therebypreventing the incorrect rejection of proposals.