Of clouds and clocks and Keynes: conceptions of reality and the growth of knowledge function of money ∗

In this paper, John Maynard Keynes' General theoryand the concept of money are given an evolutionary interpretation. This interpretation is based on Karl Popper's delightful essay ‘Of clouds and clocks: an approach to the problem of rationality and the freedom of man’. The essay presents two things: Popper's conception of indeterminism and his general theory of abstractions. Popper's general theory concerns the role of abstractions and rule-governed, hierarchical systems of abstractions in structuring an indeterministic and uncertain world. He applies his general theory to science.Popper maintains that science is an abstract, rule-governed, linguistic process that facilitates criticism as a way of learning about our world. Popper calls this the growth of knowledge function of science. Popper's general theory can be applied to Keynes' General theory. Following Popper, I argue for a conception of the economy as a rule-governed, monetary language of commerce that facilitates critically minded inquiry in the domain of ordinary economic transactions. A monetary system facilitates the growth of commonsense knowledge in the economy. I call this the growth of knowledge function of money. An awareness of indeterminism and a growth of knowledge like function of money seem to pervade Keynes' General theory.     

Keynesian uncertainty and the instability of beliefs

In an influential critique, Coddington (1982) argues that Keynes uses the theme of uncertainty in an opportunistic way in the General theory emphasizing it when it suits his purposes and ignoring it when it does not. This reading is examined in the light of Keynes's earlier Treatise on probability. The first part of the paper argues that Keynes's epistemology differs in important respects from the one Coddington is attacking, and in particular, that Keynes's account contains conceptions of uncertainty not considered by Coddington. The two premises of Coddington's argument are then assessed. These are: 1) that Keynes provides no account of the relative impact of uncertainty in different decision-making contexts; and 2) that uncertainty is not a sufficient condition for unstable beliefs about future outcomes of current (investment) decisions. It is argued that Coddington is mistaken in asserting 1) and, although 2) is correct in principle, that there is nevertheless a strong presumption that uncertainty does lead to unstable beliefs in the particular situations Keynes describes. The conclusion is that the connection between uncertainty and unstable beliefs cannot be regarded as either analytically destructive or somehow beside the point, even on Coddington's terms.     

Endogenous Money: A Note on Some Post-Keynesian Controversies

Keynes's theory of liquidity preference sought to illuminate the essential properties of money under the conditions of uncertainty that often lead to involuntary unemployment. Subsequent Post-Keynesian literature built upon this concept to show that a deregulated financial system could induce phases of endemic financial instability and crises. Keynes's finance motive provides an important starting point in Post-Keynesian theories of endogenous money. This article examines the controversies between two major contending analytical approaches, the Horizontalist and Structuralist schools.     

The Role of credit in a Keynesian monetary economy

Abstract

This paper describes the features of a monetary economy on the basis of Keynes's distinction between a real exchange economy and a monetary economy. In The General Theory, Keynes identifies the reasons for the non-neutrality of money by highlighting the store of wealth function of money; this approach has been adopted by most Keynesian economists. The aim of this paper is to show that such an approach only partially explains the reasons for money non-neutrality and that important elements which demonstrate the relevance of monetary variables emerge when the means of payment function of money is considered. Investigating the role of this function requires that we deal explicitly with how spending decisions are financed. The paper argues that the market for credit must be considered separately from the market for money, and that a viable credit theory can be built from Keynes's post-General Theory writings.     

An overview of probability,expectations, uncertainty and rationality in Keynes's conceptual framework 1

Keynes's writings on the cognate topics of probability, expectations, uncertainty and rationality exhibit considerable complexity. This paper seeks to provide a clarifying overview of his position on these topics, both in his main philosophical workThe treatise on probability, and his main economic workThe general theory. It is argued that the most useful approach for understanding the deeper structure of Keynes's thought in each work is by means of a two-dimensional, two-domain analysis.Such an analysis helps demonstrate some of the ways in which the conceptual framework of The treatise on probability provides an essential part of the philosophical foundations of The general theory, while at the same time recognizing some of the key differences between the two works. It also illuminates Keynes's non-neoclassical theorization of rationality, and his path-breaking attempt to develop a theory of rationality under irreducible uncertainty.     

The logic of Keynes' criticism of the Classical model

The Classics' remedy for unemployment was to lower money wages. Keynes opposes this remedy. Therefore, in The General Theory, he aims at building a model in which a fall in money wages may not cause an increase in employment. Most of the interpretations of Keynes identified this aim, but did not attach enough importance to it. Reading The General Theory in the light of this aim, we discover what Keynes' logic of elaboration is, then what Keynes' ideas about voluntary or involuntary unemployment are.     

KEYNES ON WAGE FLEXIBILITY AND THE AUSTRALIAN WAGES SYSTEM*

Keynes' General Theory briefly discusses the Australian wages system, as an example of a system in which an attempt was made to fix real wages by law. Keynes argues that such a system, strictly enforced, generates an unstable unemployment equilibrium or highly volatile money wages and prices. This paper clarifies Keynes' views on the Australian system, with a view to their wider relevance for the significance of real and money wage flexibility and inflexibility in Keynes' economics. The most striking finding is that money wage stickiness is a conclusion, not an assumption, of Keynes' theory of employment.     

Whither Keynesian probability? Impolite techniques for decision-making

The critical literature on Keynes has provided extensive analysis of why individual agents may find convenient to adopt a “conventional judgement”, and what he meant by “polite techniques” used to save their faces as “rational, economic men.” This paper concentrates instead on impolite techniques of thought suited to deal with Keynesian uncertainty. The paper suggests that the thread going from Keynes's Treatise on Probability to the General Theory and its defence provides a positive analysis of decision-making under uncertainty, and that placing emphasis on this positive analysis simply means adhering to Keynes's long-standing commitment to a (surely peculiar) probabilistic set-up.     

Annual Meeting of the Catholic Economic Association

This paper attempts to demonstrate that Keynes's practical writings on the crisis in the Lancashire cotton spinning industry in the 1920s were consistent with the 1930s theoretical conceptualisation of user costs in the General Theory. It is suggested that the key (common) link between these analyses is Keynes's concern with how uncertainty is distributed, in specific historical circumstances, between institutions at the levels of the firm, industry, the industry-financial institution interface, and the local and global economies. It is this concern which still has important, if not more, research and policy relevance today.     

The Significance of the Monetary Context of Economic Behavior

The dominant paradigm in economics views economic behavior as allocative activity in a neutral, C-M-C' economy. As a consequence, money is treated as a veil that is inessential to the real functioning of the economic system. This paper argues that one of Keynes's fundamental insights is the significance of the monetary context of economic behavior. This insight has been developed by the post-Keynesian theory of money as a "time-machine vehicle" that provides the causal link between uncertainty and unemployment. The Circuitist theory of money as the means of final payment provides a complementary radical perspective on the significance of the monetary context. This paper investigates the methodological and theoretical implications of these radical monetary theories and assesses their contribution towards the development of a general theory of a monetary production, M-C-M' economy.     

Keynes and probability: An assessment

Abstract

Most interpreters agree that Keynes had a wide-ranging, complex, ‘vision of the world’, which underlies his theoretical contributions. Whenever this is forgotten, as happens in the so-called neoclassical synthesis, not only the original Keynesian spirit goes lost but also, and especially, we lose substantive bricks for our theoretical constructions. The paper considers an important instance of this general rule; namely Keynes's views on the logic of probability, meant as the field concerning human behaviour in an uncertain world (hence connected to, but distinct from, the pure theory of probability, meant as a field of mathematics). The paper begins by recalling the main aspects of the classical and frequentist approaches to probability and the main criticisms they received, pertaining among other things to the limits of their applicability. We then consider Keynes's own views, stressing three aspects: the definition of probability as pertaining to the field of logic, the notion of uncertainty and of the ‘weight of the argument’, the ‘theory of groups’. We then discuss the subjective approach of de Finetti, Ramsey and Savage, and contrast it with Keynes's own views. Finally, we consider the implications of our analysis for the interpretation of Keynes's General Theory, and of his attitude towards econometrics.     

A Reconsideration of Keynes' Finance Motive*

Keynes' finance motive is a much neglected part of monetary theory. This paper reassesses the meaning and importance of the finance motive and examines the distinction between it and the transactions motive. A specification of the demand function for money is proposed that takes account of the finance motive. The advantages of this specification for analytical and empirical purposes are explained. Finally, it is shown that this specification provides a satisfactory theoretical explanation for the evidence on timing between the real and monetary sectors; evidence thought by some to be inconsistent with Keynes' theory of liquidity preference.     

On exogenous money and bank behaviour: the Pandora's box kept shut in Keynes' theory of liquidity preference?

This essay examines Keynes' views on banking behaviour and the relationships between central banks and banks as they evolved from his Tract on Monetary Reform to The General Theory. The objective is to clarify in what sense money may be exogenous in his final work. We identify a distinctly Keynesian position on the money-supply process, featuring money exogeneity due to bank behaviour. Our findings run counter to both neoclassical synthesis view on exogenous money cum passive banks as well as the post Keynesian challenge of endogenous money cum passive banks.     

Involuntary unemployment: the missing piece in Keynes's General Theory *

Using a retrospective methodology, my paper examines critically the insights on involuntary unemployment offered by Keynes in his General Theory. Keynes, it is argued, gave involuntary unemployment a modern micro-founded definition yet — quite opportunely, in view of the difficulty of the task—did not attempt to provide a direct microeconomic explanation of it Rather, his claim to the demonstration of its existence rests on an indirect argument, where involuntary unemployment emerges at the corollary of effective demand falling short of its full employment level. This justification is based on the more or less tacit assumption that involuntary unemployment and effective demand-deficiency are equivalent. This claim of equivalence, it will be argued, is wanting. Hence the view that involuntary unemployment may have been demonstrated through the proxy of demand-deficiency falls. My paper evaluates whether Keynes's other arguments in favour of involuntary unemployment are robust. Several alternative interpretations of his General TheoryChapter Two ‘fundamental observation’, focusing respectively on money illusion, adjustment flaws, and resistance to cuts in nominal wages, are discussed. Here also the verdict will be negative. The general conclusion then follows that no solid explanation for the existence of involuntary unemployment is to be found in theGeneral Theory.     

Marx and the Development of Critical Political Economy

Abstract

Although relevant analytical developments were provided over time by the critique of economic theory, they did not succeed in inhibiting the occurrence of a full-fledged revival of the neoclassical interpretation of capitalism. The development of critical economics and its capability of checking the influence of the dominant economic culture have been especially prejudiced by the failed integration between the analyses of Marx and Keynes. Following Keynes, once the ‘inducement to invest’ had been singled out as the central question for the explanation of output levels, one should have promptly acknowledged that on this very question Marx's analysis was significantly richer and more relevant than Keynes's—the richness and relevance of the former ultimately resting on the great attention Marx dedicated to the complex question of the influence of income distribution on the capitalists’ incentive to invest. It is argued in the article that through the study of this influence Marx succeeded in putting together the essential elements of a critical theory of effective demand, based on the principles and mechanisms that govern the distribution of income between profits and wages.     

A historiographical exhumation of J.A. Hobson's Over-Saving Thesis: General theory versus historiography

Abstract

The discussion of J.A. Hobson's understanding of over-saving has been largely confined within John Maynard Keynes' famous critique in the General Theory. I argue that gauging Hobson's contribution by ‘general theory’, that is, by an ahistorical, non-evolutionary yardstick, is to miss the larger part of Hobson's achievement. Hobson's conception of over-saving was contained within an evolving historiography of capital accumulation and took on various meanings depending on whether Hobson was discussing a competitive or monopolistic environment. I show that Keynes' ‘corrected’ version of over-saving was implicitly contained within Hobson's analysis of an evolving monopolistic industrial structure.     

Sraffa,Keynes and 'The Years of High Theory'

This paper argues that Shackle's interpretation of 'the years of high theory' is flawed. Shackle (1967) sees Sraffa's critique of the Marshallian theory of value only as a step in the development of the theory of imperfect competition. In the same vein, Shackle reduces the message of Keynes's General Theory to the claim that unemployment results from the existence of uncertainty and irrational expectations. Thus, Shackle leaves open the possibility that both Sraffa's critique of Marshall and Keynes's theory of effective demand do not question the internal coherence of neoclassical theory, but instead merely assert that market imperfections render it irrelevant for the analysis of the real world. This paper argues, in contrast, that the theories of Sraffa and Keynes should be interpreted as radical departures from marginalism, and represent a return to the surplus approach of classical political economy.     

What about the Elephant in the Room? Varieties of Capitalism,Varieties in Capitalism

Conceived as considerably broader than simply the Varieties of Capitalism framework, I argue that the varieties of capitalism literature is premised upon an institutional reductionism which necessitates the search for a more holistic approach. In brief, if we are to explain convincingly the evolution of national political economies, then we must acknowledge that varieties of capitalism are also varieties in capitalism. In particular, Antonio Gramsci's writings on common sense enable us to focus on the role of institutions as a historical force without abandoning the system of production that they are part of. I then provide an alternative explanation, compared to the varieties of capitalism literature, of the evolution of the Dutch and German political economies in order to demonstrate the advantages of the framework I develop.     

The Fault Line between Keynes and the Cambridge Keynesians: A Review Essay

This essay reviews Michael Ambrosi's important but neglected book on the formative period of Keynesian economics. The book traces the evolution of a Cambridge macroeconomic tradition running from Marshall and Pigou to Keynes, and interprets The General Theory as a response to Pigou's analysis of unemployment. Ambrosi also argues that Keynes's disciples, Richard Kahn, Nicholas Kaldor and Joan Robinson, were, in the 1930s, wedded to a Pigovian methodology and did not immediately recognise that Keynes had redefined the meaning of equilibrium in The General Theory. Keynes's attempt to redefine the analytical basis of neoclassical economics was thwarted, not merely by the neoclassical synthesis, but by those who claimed to be the inheritors and guardians of his vision.     

A Post-Keynesian Response to Piketty's ‘Fundamental Contradiction of Capitalism’

In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty presents a rich set of data that deals with income and wealth distribution, output-wealth dynamics and rates of return. He also proposes some ‘laws of capitalism’. At the core of his argument lies the ‘fundamental inequality of capitalism’, an empirical regularity stating that the rate of return on wealth is greater than the growth rate of the economy. This simple construct allows him to conclude that increasing wealth (and income) inequality is an inevitable outcome of capitalism. While we share some of his conclusions, we will highlight some shortcomings of his approach based on a Cambridge post-Keynesian growth-and-distribution model. The paper makes four points. First, r?>?g is not necessarily associated with increasing inequality in functional distribution. Second, Piketty succumbs to a fallacy of composition when he claims that a necessary condition for r?>?g is that capitalists save a large share of their capital income. Third, post-Keynesians can learn from Piketty's insights about personal income distribution and incorporate them into their models. Fourth, we reiterate the post-Keynesian argument that a well-behaved aggregate production function does not exist and cannot explain income distribution.