Party-bosses vs. party-primaries: Quality of legislature under different selectorates

We compare the legislature quality under an exclusive, centralized selectorate (such as a party-principal) with that under an inclusive, decentralized selectorate (such as a party-primary). In our model, two parties compete over three districts: two are home districts of each party while the third is a battleground district characterized by weaker and uncertain policy preferences. We find that when home districts are “safe,” and the parties' candidate pools are of comparable quality, an equilibrium legislature under party-primaries is always of higher quality than an equilibrium legislature under party-principals. When we extend the model to include a general number of districts with candidates of only high or low quality, we show that, as long as there are not too few nor too many highest-quality candidates, party-primaries still perform better than party-principals.     

Coups,revolutions and efficient policies in autocracies

The purpose of this paper is to explore the interaction of two mechanisms that might constrain the power of dictators: the threat of a coup by the selectorate and a revolution by citizens. Our results help explain a stylized fact, namely that autocracies are far more likely to be either the best or the worst performers in terms of growth and public goods policies. To this end, we focus on accountability within dictatorships using a model where both the selectorate and the citizens are the principals and the autocrat is the agent. Our results highlight that both excessively strong and excessively weak dictators lead to poor economic performances, and that a balanced distribution of de facto political power is required to incentivize the dictator to choose efficient economic policies.     

An Observable Delay Game with Unionised Managerial Firms

The endogenous order of moves is analysed in a unionised Cournot duopoly with managerial delegation and firm‐specific unions, where firms choose whether to set quantities sequentially or simultaneously. It is shown that, in contrast to the standard duopoly with profit‐maximising firms where both firms prefer to be the leader and thus simultaneously chosen quantities emerge as an endogenous equilibrium, a rich set of equilibrium outcomes may occur. In particular, the result of sequential choices, which reverses the conventional wisdom in regard to Cournot duopolies, emerges as the endogenous equilibrium when the union's wage orientation is sufficiently high.     

Financial development and economic growth: long‐run equilibrium and transitional dynamics

We analyze the impact of financial development on economic growth. Differently from previous studies that focus mainly on balanced growth path outcomes, we also analyze the transitional dynamics of our model economy by using a finance‐extended Uzawa–Lucas framework where financial intermediation affects both human and physical capital accumulation. We show that, under certain rather general conditions, economic growth may turn out to be non‐monotonically related to financial development (as suggested by the most recent empirical evidence) and that too much finance may be detrimental to growth. We also show that the degree of financial development may affect the speed of convergence, which suggests that finance may play a crucial role in determining the length of the recovery process associated with exogenous shocks. Moreover, in a special case of the model, we observe that, under a realistic set of parameters, social welfare decreases with financial development, meaning that even when finance positively affects economic growth the short‐term costs associated with financial activities more than compensate their long‐run benefits.     

MONEY IS PRIVACY*

An extensive literature in monetary theory has emphasized the role of money as a record‐keeping device. Money assumes this role in situations where using credit would be too costly, and some might argue that this role will diminish as the cost of information and thus the cost of credit‐based transactions continues to fall. In this article we investigate another use for money, the provision of privacy. That is, a money purchase does not identify the purchaser, whereas a credit purchase does. In a simple trading economy with moral hazard, we compare the efficiency of money and credit, and find that money may be useful even when information is free.     

Transboundary pollution,tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated environmental regulation

Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first‐best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution. However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum (“race to the bottom”). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve international environmental policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. The regulation is inefficiently loose in many cases, but it can be too strict if the decisive voter's capital endowment is above the average. Thus, the possibility of “race to the top” cannot be eliminated. The inefficiency result does not generally depend on the timing of policymaking, although the efficiency may be restored in the limit case where the decisive voter has no capital at all.     

Distorted Input Ratios in Vertical Relationships*

A project leader sources an input from a supporter and combines it with an input produced in-house. The leader has private information about the project's cost environment. We show that if the leader can commit to the in-house input level, the input ratio is distorted upward when the in-house input is not too costly – the in-house input is produced in excess and thus partly wasted. By contrast, without the leader's commitment to the in-house input level, the input ratio is distorted downward when the in-house input is sufficiently costly – the outsourced input is produced in excess and thus partly wasted.     

Should the Carbon Price Be the Same in All Countries?

International differences in fuel taxation are huge, and may be justified by different local negative externalities that taxes must correct, as well as by different preferences for public spending. In this context, should a worldwide uniform carbon tax be added to these local taxes to correct the global warming externality? We address this question in a second best framework à la Ramsey, where public goods have to be financed through distortionary taxation and the cost of public funds has to be weighted against the utility of public goods. We show that when lump‐sum transfers between countries are allowed for, the second best tax on the polluting good may be decomposed into three parts: one, country‐specific, dealing with the local negative externality, a second one, country‐specific, dealing with the cost of levying public funds, and a third one, global, dealing with the global externality and which can be interpreted as the carbon price. Our main contribution is to show that the uniformity of the carbon price should still hold in this second best framework. Nevertheless, if lump‐sum transfers between governments are impossible to implement, international differentiation of the carbon price is the only way to take care of equity concerns.     

Family Policies: What Does the Standard Endogenous Fertility Model Tell Us?

Very few studies have explored the optimality properties of the “standard model” of fertility where parents must determine their optimal trade‐off between quality and quantity. The present paper works to fill that gap and find three main results. First, when there exist positive externalities in the accumulation of human capital, it is optimal to subsidize education and to tax births. Second, when the Social Welfare Function does not consist of the average utility, the social returns on educational investments can be weaker than the private returns when the optimal population growth rate is negative. In this case, the optimal economic policy consists in subsidizing births and taxing education. Finally, when the health expenditure is introduced as another source of positive externalities, it can be optimal to tax the parental health expenditure to decentralize the first‐best path even if this expenditure is always too low at the laissez‐faire equilibrium.     

FREE PARKING FOR ALL IN SHOPPING MALLS

We show why a mall provides parking for free and embed the parking costs in the prices of the goods. Essentially, charging a parking fee to risk‐averse customers means penalizing them for not finding their desired good. This result holds whether the mall has monopoly power or prices competitively, if there is parking validation, and if there is a trade‐off between shopping and parking spaces. It is also the attainable social optimum. The equilibrium lot size is too small, yielding a rationale for minimum parking requirements. However, parking fees may be positive and lots may be too large in urban malls.     

BUREAUCRACY AND TIME CONSISTENCY*

We construct a model that takes seriously the role of bureaucracy in the characterization of time-consistent policies. We argue that if the possibilities for governments to reduce the size of bureaucracy are limited, bureaucracy can be used as a means for influencing future governments. We show that the political process has implications for the size and growth of bureaucracy. Parties in power may hire bureaucrats of the opposite political color. This is a part of the time-consistent policy. Our model also gives an explanation for the growth of bureaucracy. This is a consequence of the time-consistent policies, i.e. policies that partially tie the hands of future governments. We also show that if public sector production is inefficient, the public sector will be too large in the long run. In the short run it may be too small.     

Learning to trust strangers: an evolutionary perspective

What if living in a relatively trustworthy society was sufficient to blindly trust strangers? In this paper we interpret generalized trust as a learning process and analyse the trust game paradox in light of the replicator dynamics. Given that trust inevitably implies doubts about others, we assume incomplete information and study the dynamics of trust in buyer-supplier purchase transactions. Considering a world made of ??good?? and ??bad?? suppliers, we show that the trust game admits a unique evolutionarily stable strategy: buyers may trust strangers if it is not too risky to do so. Examining the situation where some players may play either as trustor or as trustee we show that this result is robust.     

DEVELOPING COUNTRY BORROWING FROM A MONOPOLISTIC LENDER: STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS AND ENDOGENOUS LEADERSHIP*

We develop a two‐period model with endogenous investment and credit flows. Credit is subject to quantitative restrictions. With an exogenous restriction, we analyse the welfare effects of a temporary consumption tax. We then consider three scenarios under which a monopoly lender optimally decides the level of credit and a borrower country chooses a consumption tax: one in which the two parties act simultaneously and two scenarios where one of them is a Stackleberg leader. The equilibrium under the leadership of the borrower country is Pareto superior to the simultaneous move equilibrium but may or may not be to that under the leadership of the lender. If the sequence of moves is itself chosen strategically, leadership by the borrower emerges as the unique equilibrium.     

Global Innovation Races,Offshoring and Wage Inequality

In the 1970s and 1980s the US position as the global technological leader was increasingly challenged by Japan and Europe. In those years the US skill premium and residual wage inequality increased substantially. This paper presents a two‐region, quality‐ladder growth model where the lagging economy progressively catches up with the leader. As the innovation gap closes, the advanced country experiences fiercer foreign technological competition that forces its firms to innovate more. Faster technical change increases the skill premium and residual inequality. Offshoring production and innovation plays a key role in shaping the link between international competition and inequality.     

Sustainability,Optimality, and Development Policy

Considering sustainability a matter of intergenerational welfare equity, this paper examines whether an optimal development path can also be sustainable. It argues that the general “zero‐net‐aggregate‐investment” condition for an optimal development path to be sustainable in the sense of the maximin criterion of intergenerational justice is too demanding to be practical, especially in the context of developing countries. It further argues that while the maximin criterion of sustainability may be appealing to the rich advanced industrial countries, for the poor developing countries it implies equalization of poverty across generations, and as such is too costly a moral obligation to be acceptable. The paper suggests that a compromise development policy that follows the optimal growth approach but adopts certain measures to mitigate both the intergenerational and intragenerational welfare inequalities may be more appropriate for these countries. Some of the principal elements of such a policy are highlighted.     

The logic of hereditary rule: theory and evidence

Hereditary leadership has been an important feature of the political landscape throughout history. This paper argues that hereditary leadership is like a relational contract which improves policy incentives. We assemble a unique dataset on leaders between 1874 and 2004 in which we classify them as hereditary leaders based on their family history. The core empirical finding is that economic growth is higher in polities with hereditary leaders but only if executive constraints are weak. Moreover, this holds across of a range of specifications. The finding is also mirrored in policy outcomes which affect growth. In addition, we find that hereditary leadership is more likely to come to an end when the growth performance under the incumbent leader is poor.     

TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS AND POPULATION GROWTH: DO WE HAVE TOO FEW CHILDREN?

Do we have too few children? We intend to address this question. In developed countries, the fertility rate has declined since WWII. This may cause a slowdown in the growth of GDP in developed countries. However, important factors for the well‐being of individuals are per capita variables, like per capita growth and per capita consumption. In turn, the rate of technological progress determines the growth rates of per capita variables. If the population size is increasing, the labour inputs for R&D activity increase, and thus speed up technological progress. As individuals do not take account of this positive effect when deciding on the number of their own children, the number of children may become smaller than the socially optimal number of children. However, an increase in the number of children reduces the assets any one child owns: that is, there is a capital dilution effect. This works in the opposite direction. We examine this issue using an endogenous growth model where the head of a dynastic family decides the number of children.     

Keynes‐Marx and Keynes‐Wicksell Models of Monetary Growth: A framework for future analysis

This paper reconsiders and generalizes a dichotomizing two-sector real growth model of Marglin which claims that the steady state of capitalist economies is plagued by secular inflation. We show that this implication need not be true from the perspective of a more general steady state analysis and that the Marglin model can be embedded into a general Keynes‐Marx‐Friedman or Keynes‐Wicksell framework where money is superneutral, where therefore inflation is due solely to excessive monetary growth, where the private sector is basically asymptotically stable and where there is a steady state rate of employment that differs from the 'natural' rate of employment of monetarist models of inflation. We consider this model a benchmark model that requires equally general alternatives if the above implications are to be rejected.     

战略性经营者激励选择与国际市场份额竞争

本文首先用具有线性需求和规模收益不变生产技术的Cournot双头模型来刻画国际市场份额竞争。指出 ,如果参与国际竞争的本国企业是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,那么 ,无论竞争对手是否是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,本国企业所有者总是有积极性操纵经营者的激励 ,特别的 ,在只有本国企业作出单边激励选择的情况下 ,这种操纵可以使本国企业生产Stackelberg领先者产量成为可以置信的承诺。它在这里所起到的作用是与出口补贴在战略性贸易政策分析中所起到的作用相一致的。如果考虑到从过去的GATT到现在的WTO都规定政府不得以任何形式参与国际竞争 ,这个结论就更有趣了。因为无须政府帮助 ,本国企业所有者凭借自身的力量就能实现有利于本国企业的竞争结果。这种民间对政府的替代是有意义的。在双边激励选择的情况下 ,两国企业陷入了“囚徒困境”。本国企业只有诉诸于本国政府对国际市场的干预 ,才能重新获得Stackelberg领先者的地位 ;但与对它的传统理解相比 ,这种地位已然弱化。最后 ,我们还证明 ,根据相当一般的条件 ,所有者决定的最优经营者激励只与竞争类型 (数量竞争还是价格竞争 )有关 ,而与企业的产品类型 (替代品还是互补品 )无关。     

OPTIMAL POLICY FOR PRODUCT R&D WITH ENDOGENOUS QUALITY ORDERING: ASYMMETRIC DUOPOLY*

We examine the optimal R&D subsidy/tax policy under a vertically differentiated duopoly. In a significant departure from the existing work, we consider the case of asymmetric costs of product R&D where there is a small technology gap between firms. In our analysis, the endogeneity of quality ordering is explicitly taken into account. We demonstrate the possible anti‐leapfrogging effect of R&D subsidy/tax policy. By committing to a firm‐specific subsidy schedule contingent on firms’ quality choices, the government can not only correct distortions in product quality but also select the socially preferred equilibrium. The latter role is fulfilled by preventing the technologically inferior firm from becoming a quality leader in the industry. Both Bertrand and Cournot cases are analysed.