Nonlinear Models in Corporate Finance Research: Review,Critique, and Extensions

Since the work of Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), nonlinear model specification has gained more attention in corporate finance research. In this paper, we provide a detailed review of the previous studies that have examined nonlinear relations in corporate finance. We review the theory and evidence in these studies and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of the various methodologies used to detect nonlinearity. We also suggest two possible methodological extensions, which we apply in the empirical analysis of R&D investment and firm value.     

A Tribute to Joel Stern

The co‐founder of corporate finance consulting firm Stern Stewart and Co. pays tribute to Joel Stern, the well‐known popularizer of “modern corporate finance” and consultant to hundreds of companies worldwide who died on May 21, 2019. During a 45‐year career that spanned his graduation from the University of Chicago's School of Business in 1964, a 14‐year stint at the Chase Manhattan Bank, and the formation of Stern Stewart (and its successor, Stern Value Management), Stern traveled the world over, always eager to address and make converts among legions of corporate executives, board members, and MBA students. One key to his success was a passionate reverence for the academic scholars who developed modern finance. Joel's translation of the Miller‐Modigliani valuation model into a practical framework for evaluating corporate performance gained a following among a generation or two of corporate leaders, leading ultimately to the development of EVA, or Economic Value Added, a practical framework for value‐based financial management.     

Narratives in managers’ corporate finance decisions

This article uses the extended case method to explore senior executives’ corporate finance decisions. We quantified firm’s finance practices using a mail survey, and then – to resolve puzzles in managers’ decision processes – conducted face‐to‐face interviews with chief finance officers of large listed firms. The interviews identified six themes as consistent influences on finance decisions: pressures imposed by clienteles; constraints on resources; risk management; heuristics; real options; and sustainability. We conclude that managers are logical and rational in their decisions, but employ a wider range of criteria than assumed in conventional finance theories.     

Trust,Owner Rights,Employee Rights and Firm Performance

This is a study of variations in trust relationships according to institutional setting. A wide body of comparative institutional literature within economics and finance engages with trust. However, as most of this literature uses macro‐level data and/or stylistic ideal types, it normally neglects intra‐firm trust. This paper redresses this lacuna by using both macro‐level data and comparative firm‐level evidence. We found that both country trust and firm trust increase firm performance, but that there is a trade‐off between the two as high levels of both reduce performance. Finally, both employee rights and investor rights are negatively correlated with country trust.     

The Three‐Factor Model: A Practitioner's Guide

The three‐factor model (3FM) has slowly but steadily become a popular alternative to the CAPM for measuring risk from the perspective of both corporate finance and portfolio management. The evidence clearly shows a negative relationship between market capitalization and returns, and a positive relationship between the book‐to‐market ratio and returns. Under the assumption that size and value are risk factors, the 3FM incorporates a market risk premium, a size premium, and a value premium into a model that aims to assess risk in a more comprehensive way, and ultimately to provide a more reliable estimation of required return. The required return produced by the 3FM has corporate finance applications (such as cost of capital estimation, project evaluation, and firm valuation) as well as portfolio management applications (such as performance evaluation). This article discusses the foundations and intuition behind the 3FM, as well as its application to the estimation of the cost of equity and excess returns.     

Financial Globalization,Governance, and the Evolution of the Home Bias

We merge portfolio theories of home bias with corporate finance theories of insider ownership to create the optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias. The theory has two components: (1) foreign portfolio investors exhibit a large home bias against countries with poor governance because their investment is limited by high optimal ownership by insiders (the “direct effect” of poor governance) and domestic monitoring shareholders (the “indirect effect”) in response to the governance and (2) foreign direct investors from “good governance” countries have a comparative advantage as insider monitors in “poor governance” countries, so that the relative importance of foreign direct investment is negatively related to the quality of governance. Using both country‐level data on U.S. investors' foreign investment allocations and Korean firm‐level data, we find empirical evidence supporting our optimal corporate ownership theory of the home bias.     

VALUE MAXIMIZATION, STAKEHOLDER THEORY, AND THE CORPORATE OBJECTIVE FUNCTION

This paper examines the role of the corporate objective function in corporate productivity and efficiency, social welfare, and the accountability of managers and directors. The author argues that because it is logically impossible to maximize in more than one dimension, purposeful behavior requires a single‐valued objective function. Two hundred years of work in economics and finance implies that, in the absence of externalities and monopoly, social welfare is maximized when each firm in an economy maximizes its total market value. The main contender to value maximization as the corporate objective is stakeholder theory, which argues that managers should make decisions so as to take account of the interests of all stakeholders in a firm, including not only financial claimants, but also employees, customers, communities, and governmental officials. Because the advocates of stakeholder theory refuse to specify how to make the necessary tradeoffs among these competing interests, they leave managers with a theory that makes it impossible for them to make purposeful decisions. With no clear way to keep score, stakeholder theory effectively makes managers unaccountable for their actions (which helps explain the theory's popularity among many managers). But if value creation is the overarching corporate goal, the process of creating value involves much more than simply holding up value maximization as the organizational objective. As a statement of corporate purpose or vision, value maximization is not likely to tap into the energy and enthusiasm of employees and managers. Thus, in addition to setting up value maximization as the corporate scorecard, top management must provide a corporate vision, strategy, and tactics that will unite all the firm's constituencies in its efforts to compete and add value for investors. In clarifying the proper relation between value maximization and stakeholder theory, the author introduces a somewhat new corporate objective called “enlightened value maximization.” Enlightened value maximization uses much of the structure of stakeholder theory—notably the need to consider the interests of all corporate stakeholders—while continuing to posit maximization of long‐run firm value as the criterion for making the necessary tradeoffs among stakeholders. The paper comes to similar conclusions about the Balanced Scorecard, which is described as the managerial equivalent of stakeholder theory. Although the Balanced Scorecard can add value by helping managers better understand the drivers of shareholder value, it should not be used as a performance measurement and incentive compensation system because it fails to provide a single valued score, a clear way of distinguishing superior from substandard performance.     

Bank Finance versus Bond Finance

We present a model with agency costs where heterogeneous firms raise finance through either bank loans or corporate bonds and where banks are more efficient than the market in resolving informational problems. We document some major long‐run differences in corporate finance between the United States and the euro area, and show that our model can explain those differences based on information availability. The model fits the data best when the euro area is characterized by lower availability of public information about corporate credit risk relative to the United States, and when European firms value more than United States firms banks’ flexibility and information acquisition role.     

宏观经济政策与微观企业行为——拓展会计与财务研究新领域

本文首先回顾国际主流会计学术研究近年来遇到的挑战与质疑,然后提出以宏观经济政策与微观企业行为互动为基础的会计与财务研究框架,并以货币政策变动对企业融资、会计选择、经营业绩的影响为例说明这个框架对会计与财务研究可能产生的影响。本文认为结合宏观经济政策与微观企业行为互动作用的研究可能拓展会计与财务研究的新领域。     

Agency Conflicts and Cash: Estimates from a Dynamic Model

Which agency problems affect corporate cash policy? To answer this question, we estimate a dynamic model of finance and investment with three mechanisms that misalign managerial and shareholder incentives: limited managerial ownership of the firm, compensation based on firm size, and managerial perquisite consumption. We find that perquisite consumption critically impacts cash policy. Size‐based compensation also matters, but less. Firms with lower blockholder and institutional ownership have higher managerial perquisite consumption, low managerial ownership is a key factor in the secular upward trend in cash holdings, and agency plays little role in small firms' substantial cash holdings.     

Value-Enhancing Capital Budgeting and Firm-specific Stock Return Variation

We document a robust cross‐sectional positive association across industries between a measure of the economic efficiency of corporate investment and the magnitude of firm‐specific variation in stock returns. This finding is interesting for two reasons, neither of which is a priori obvious. First, it adds further support to the view that firm‐specific return variation gauges the extent to which information about the firm is quickly and accurately reflected in share prices. Second, it can be interpreted as evidence that more informative stock prices facilitate more efficient corporate investment.     

The determinants of high‐interest entrusted loans in China

We examine the determinants of high‐interest entrusted loans in China from the perspective of corporate risk‐taking. The results of a baseline model illustrate that the propensity to offer high‐interest entrusted loans increases with loose monetary policies, corporate cash holdings and firm age, and it decreases with firm size and growth opportunity. These findings support the claim that firms offer high‐interest entrusted loans mainly for short‐term profits. Other determining factors include CEO behavior traits, market imperfections and the intensity of corporate governance. Specifically, market imperfections create an opportunity for risk‐taking while CEO behavior and the intensity of corporate governance affect a firm's tendency to take risk and engage in high‐interest entrusted loans.     

Growth opportunities,capital structure and dividend policies in Japan

This paper, using 5308 observations of listed Japanese firms between the years 1988–1992, provides additional evidence on contracting theory arguments for the relation between growth opportunities, capital structure and dividend policies. To avoid the problems of using cross-sectional proxies for time-sequenced variables, this study uses (1) pooled cross-sectional time-series analysis and (2) time-series analysis with a one-year lag for the dependent variables. Results show significant negative relations between growth opportunities and levels of both debt financing and dividend yields after controlling for firm size, profitability, firm keiretsu affiliations and industry regulation. The results are consistent with contracting cost arguments for corporate finance and dividend policies and confirm the importance of growth opportunities in corporate finance theory.     

Tax reform, the informal economy, and bank financing of capital formation

This paper develops a model that relates businesses’ entry into the underground economy to tax rates and the need to access the banking system. The model uses a dynamic approach in which both firms and banks optimize and in which the benefits to a firm of accessing the banking system are endogenous. A firm compares the return to capital with the marginal tax rate on capital income and uses the difference to determine how much of the tax to pay. At the same time, banks use a firm’s capital tax payments, combined with the capital tax rate to obtain an estimate of the firm’s minimum capital value. If the firm pays at least some taxes then it will have access to the banking system, which will allow it to finance investment. If the firm pays no taxes, then it cannot access the banks and cannot invest. We compare the equilibria resulting from tax compliance and tax evasion. We calibrate the model to a highly stylized version of the Russian economy, and analyze the effect of potential tax changes on the underground economy. We compute a dynamic equilibrium for our model, and note that it tracks the path of certain macroeconomic variables of the Russian economy (GDP, budget and trade balances, price level and interest rate) with some accuracy for the years 2001–2008. We are unable to track the underground economy, as this data is unobservable. We then carry out a series of counterfactual simulations, first asking if non-capital intensive firms have an incentive to evade taxes under existing value added tax rates. We find that they do, and that the incentive would have been greatly reduced if the value added tax rate had been selectively reduced for the non-capital intensive sectors. We then ask what the effect would be if the corporate tax rate were raised on capital intensive sectors. The simulations indicate that the capital intensive sectors would not increase their entry into the underground economy.     

Debt Dynamics

We develop a dynamic trade‐off model with endogenous choice of leverage, distributions, and real investment in the presence of a graduated corporate income tax, individual taxes on interest and corporate distributions, financial distress costs, and equity flotation costs. We explain several empirical findings inconsistent with the static trade‐off theory. We show there is no target leverage ratio, firms can be savers or heavily levered, leverage is path dependent, leverage is decreasing in lagged liquidity, and leverage varies negatively with an external finance weighted average Q. Using estimates of structural parameters, we find that simulated model moments match data moments.     

Corporate political strategies

The paper offers a comprehensive and integrative review of the current literature on corporate political strategies sharing common boundaries with finance, accounting and corporate governance. While there appears to be a heightened interest among researchers in studying the value relevance of corporate political strategies [ Chen et al. (2010) , Goldman et al. (2009) , Cooper et al. (2010) , Richter et al. (2008) , Hochberg et al. (2007) , de Figueiredo and Edwards (2007) , Faccio and Parsley (2009) , and Myers (2009) among others], interestingly, finance and corporate governance scholars have yet to embrace the research on political strategies as part of their mainstream research. Taking a micro perspective at the firm level, we review the major scholarly works in the economics, finance and management disciplines with respect to the firm attributes shaping the corporate decision to engage politically, modes of corporate political participation, and the value impact of corporate political activity. The overarching theme of the review article is to integrate diverse – political economy and management – paradigms of corporate political participation and rationalize the value relevance within the corporate finance and corporate governance perspective. The paper also presents focused preliminary evidence on the determinants and value impact of corporate lobbying strategies. For the sample of 5452 firm‐year observations, the results indicate that while for large firms corporate lobbying may not be agency driven and may create value, for small firms, despite low shareholder rights associating with higher lobbying engagements, lobbying still relates positively to value added.     

HOW WELL DO MARKET TIMING,CATERING, AND CLASSICAL THEORIES EXPLAIN CORPORATE DECISIONS?

An important debate in corporate finance is whether chief executive officers (CEOs) exploit equity mispricing. In this article I construct a measure of the unexplained change in the CEO's stockholdings of the firm to empirically test the contrasting predictions of market timing, catering, and classical theories of corporate decisions. Consistent with the predictions of classical theories, I find that the firm increases its investments and even uses expensive capital to finance investments when there is an unexplained increase in the CEO's stockholdings. However, I find no empirical support for catering predictions and weak empirical support for market timing predictions.     

Corporate governance,life cycle,and payout precommitment: An emerging market study

We analyze the role of firm‐level corporate governance in determining the precommitment payout policy of emerging market firms and investigate whether there is a precommitment life‐cycle effect. Unlike previous studies of U.S. firms, we find evidence of precommitment only among relatively well‐governed firms, which combine good governance with large dividend payouts to shareholders and large debt‐related repayments to creditors. We also document a strong precommitment life‐cycle effect. Firms in the growth and mature stages of their life cycle tend to use both debt and dividends to precommit to investors, with an increasing proportion of dividends in total payout measures. Our results are robust to an array of control variables, alternate payout proxies, market setting, and firm‐level corporate governance, and it addresses potential endogeneity concerns in the sample.     

Interest Rates and Credit Risk

This paper explores the effects of shifts in interest rates on corporate leverage and default in the context of a dynamic model in which the link between leverage and default risk comes from the lower incentives of overindebted entrepreneurs to guarantee firm survival. The need to finance new investment pushes firms' leverage ratio above some state‐contingent target toward which firms gradually adjust through earnings retention. The response to interest rate rises and cuts is both asymmetric and heterogeneously distributed across firms. Our results help rationalize some of the evidence regarding the risk‐taking channel of monetary policy.     

Capital Structure,Corporate Taxation and Firm Age*

This paper analyses the relationship between corporate taxation, firm age and debt. We adapt a standard model of capital structure choice under corporate taxation, focusing on the financing and investment decisions typically faced by a firm. Our model suggests that the debt ratio is associated positively with the corporate tax rate and negatively with firm age. Further, we predict that the tax-induced advantage of debt is more important for older firms than for younger ones. To test these hypotheses empirically, we use a cross-section of around 405,000 firms from 35 European countries and 127 NACE three-digit industries. In line with previous research, we find that a firm's debt ratio increases with the corporate tax rate. Further, we observe that older firms exhibit smaller debt ratios than their younger counterparts. Finally, consistent with our theoretical model, we find a positive interaction between corporate taxation and firm age, indicating that the impact of corporate taxation on debt increases over a firm's lifetime.