Discretionary Accounting Choices and CEO Compensation*

This paper makes four contributions to the literature relating accounting choices to CEO compensation. First, it shows that discretionary accruals are associated with CEO cash compensation, a result that holds after controlling for both the nondiscretionary components of income and increases in shareholder wealth. Although significant, the coefficient on discretionary accruals is significantly lower than that on nondiscretionary accruals, which in turn is significantly lower than the coefficient on operating cash flows. Second, the paper shows a differential reaction to positive and negative discretionary accruals —- the association between positive discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation is significantly greater than the association between negative discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation. Third, the paper shows the association between discretionary accruals and CEO cash compensation varies depending upon the circumstances of the firm. In particular, when positive discretionary accruals allow the firm to reduce or avoid a loss, the association between CEO cash compensation and discretionary accruals is significantly greater. Finally, this paper shows that the association of CEO cash compensation with reported income generally increases with the level of discretionary accruals, consistent with management responding to the incentives provided.     

Inferring Accounting Information from Corporate Financing Choices: An Examination of Security Issuances in the Banking Industry*

This study examines the impact of regulatory capital and several of its determinants (i.e., earnings, loan loss provisions, charge‐offs and growth) on bank managers' financing decisions and investors' interpretations of those decisions. The analysis is related to two streams of research. We add to the corporate finance literature that seeks to explain the market's reaction to security issuances by developing and testing a refined set of predictions of the demand for debt and equity capital using a sample of capital‐regulated firms (banks). We extend the accounting literature that links regulatory capital‐management decisions with bank performance by examining whether investors infer that performance. We find that bank managers' financing choices reflect their private information regarding the levels of regulatory capital, earnings, and charge‐offs in the issuance year. We document a negative market reaction to capital‐increasing issuances and a positive reaction to capital‐decreasing issuances. A cross‐sectional analysis of that market reaction indicates that investors infer managers' expectations of earnings in the issuance year.     

Accounting Choices of Issuers of Initial Public Offerings*

Abstract. Because there are no market-determined prices for IPO shares before they are sold to investors, issuers and underwriters must use nonprice information about the firm to set the offering price. Accounting-based measures are frequently identified as particularly useful in valuing untraded securities. This paper reports evidence that IPO issuers make income-increasing discretionary accruals in the financial statements released before the offering. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that issuers believe that financial statement information affects IPO offering prices. Résumé. Les actions émises dans le cadre d'un premier appel, public à l'épargne n'ayant pas de prix fixé par le marché avant d'être vendues aux investisseurs, les émetteurs et les preneurs ferme doivent utiliser l'information relative à l'entreprise n'ayant pas trait au prix pour établir le prix d'émission. Les mesures d'origine comptable sont souvent considérées comme étant particulièrement utiles dans revaluation de valeurs mobilières non encore négociées. L'auteur démontre que dans les états financiers qu'elles publient avant l'émission, les entreprises qui procèdent à un premier appel public à l'épargne traitent les charges abonnées sur lesquelles elles exercent un pouvoir discrétionnaire de façon à hausser les bénéfices. Cette constatation est conforme à l'hypothèse selon laquelle les émetteurs estiment que l'information contenue dans les états financiers a une incidence sur le cours des actions émises dans le cadre d'un premier appel public à l'épargne.     

Initial Public Offerings,Accounting Choices,and Earnings Management*

Abstract. This paper investigates whether entrepreneurs manipulate earnings in the periods prior to taking their firms public through the choice of accounting conventions. The preponderance of evidence, using powerful accrual tests that were able to detect earnings management in other contexts, indicates little, if any, manipulation. To the extent that there is earnings management, the results suggest that this phenomenon is more pronounced among small firms and among firms with large financial leverage and is to a lesser degree related to the quality of the underwriters and auditors employed when going public. Résumé. Les auteurs ont voulu savoir si les entrepreneurs manipulaient les bénéfices dans les exercices précédant un appel public à l'épargne par le truchement du choix des normes et conventions comptables. La prépondérance des preuves recueillies à l'aide des puissantes techniques existantes de sondage des produits et des charges visant à déceler les cas d'? accommodation » des bénéfices dans d'autres contextes, révèle une faible manipulation, sinon aucune. Dans la mesure où il y a accommodation des bénéfices, les résultats obtenus donnent à penser que le phénomène est davantage accentué chez les entreprises de petite taille ou dont le levier financier est élevé, et qu'il est relié de façon plus ténue à la qualité des preneurs fermes et des vérificateurs à qui l'entreprise a recours lorsqu'elle fait appel public à l'épargne.     

Audit Qualifications of Income‐Decreasing Accounting Choices*

In this study we conduct an experiment to examine how qualifying an income‐decreasing accounting change in years of strong financial performance affects financial report users' assessments of strategic reporting, current financial performance, and future financial performance (performance over the next three years). We find that without the qualification, users viewed the income‐decreasing accounting change as relatively nonstrategic and that user assessments of current and future performance were not different. In the presence of the qualification, users believed that the accounting change was relatively strategic, and they discounted the income effect of the accounting change. We find further that their assessments of future performance were below their assessments of current performance but no different from the assessments of future performance in the absence of the qualification. Although our findings suggest that audit qualifications encourage users to be skeptical of income‐decreasing accounting changes, we find no evidence that they impose negative consequences on management in terms of lower assessments of financial performance.     

会计政策选择与会计信息质量

随着我国企业会计与国际会计接轨,企业会计准则与会计制度赋予企业会计的选择权逐渐加大,会计工作中的职业判断事项不断增多。企业会计政策选择就是其中的一个重要内容,它贯穿于企业从会计要素确认到计量、记录、报告各环节的整个会计过程,它并不单纯是会计技术、方法问题,它是企业管理当局和会计人员处理、协调各利害关系的矛盾,分配经济利益的一项重要措施。对企业投资者、债权人及各关联方的相关决策都会产生重要影响。     

Discontinuities and Earnings Management: Evidence from Restatements Related to Securities Litigation*

A heated debate exists as to whether discontinuities in earnings distributions are indicative of earnings management. While many studies attribute discontinuities in earnings distributions to earnings management, other studies argue that earnings discontinuities are artifacts of sample selection and research design. Overall, there is limited direct evidence of a connection between earnings discontinuities and earnings management. In this study, we provide direct evidence linking earnings management to earnings discontinuities for a sample of firms that settle securities class action lawsuits and restate earnings from the alleged GAAP violation period. We compare the distribution of restated (“unmanaged”) earnings to originally reported (“managed”) earnings. We find that discontinuities are not present in the distribution of analyst forecast errors and earnings changes using unmanaged earnings but are present using managed earnings. The discontinuity in the earnings level distribution is attenuated, but not eliminated, on an unmanaged basis. These shifts among our sample of firms are caused by earnings management and cannot be explained by sample selection or research design issues. Our findings are important because many studies use earnings discontinuities as a proxy for intentional earnings manipulations and we provide the first direct evidence of a link between these two phenomena.     

Accounting Choices and Risk Management: SFAS No. 115 and U.S. Bank Holding Companies*

This paper provides evidence that regulatory contracts affect firms' accounting choices and risk‐management decisions. Specifically, we investigate whether an exogenous shock to regulatory risk induced by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115, “Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities” (SFAS 1993), encouraged U.S. banks to deviate from portfolio and risk benchmarks when they adopted the standard. Because we cannot observe relevant benchmarks, we model portfolio and risk decisions as functions of macroeconomic and firm‐specific factors using data from a period when regulatory capital was immune to SFAS No. 115 accounting. We examine a sample of 230 publicly traded banks and find that (1) irrespective of adoption timing, banks classified too few securities available for sale (AFS) relative to estimated benchmarks; (2) weaker banks that adopted the standard early classified far more securities as AFS relative to benchmarks; (3) banks altered the size of their securities portfolios along with the levels of interest‐rate risk and credit risk as regulatory capital decreased; and (4) the level of interest‐rate risk on banks' loan portfolios increased at the time of SFAS No. 115 adoption. We also explore the 1995 Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) amnesty when firms could “readopt” SFAS No. 115. We find that banks used the 1995 FASB amnesty to undo strategic initial SFAS No. 115 adoption decisions. Taken together, our findings suggest that SFAS No. 115 caused some of the accounting and economic consequences predicted by bankers, analysts, and academics.     

谈谈企业会计政策的选择

会计政策的选择关系到企业会计信息质量,进而影响到债权人、投资者及其他会计信息使用者的决策。可选择性会计政策是留给企业一定选择余地的会计政策,这些政策多数体现为具体会计政策。企业在选择会计信息时应遵循合法性、实用性、一致性、重要性、谨慎性、成本性原则。     

The Circumstances and Legal Consequences of Non‐GAAP Reporting: Evidence from Restatements*

Our study examines the circumstances of non‐GAAP financial reporting by 492 U.S. companies that announced restatements from 1995 to 1999. We focus on income statements to analyze the occurrence and resolution of litigation over restatements and explore the role of accounting items in bringing and resolving this litigation. We provide evidence on the pervasiveness of accounting misstatements, describe their nature, and show how, if at all, they affect litigation. We assess the nature of restatements by determining whether regular, recurring earnings from primary operations (core) or other components of earnings (noncore) are misstated, and we assess their pervasiveness by estimating the number of primary accounts misstated. In our sample, companies with core restatements have higher frequencies of intentional misstatements (fraud) and subsequent bankruptcy or delisting. Likewise, these companies have, on average, more material misstatements, more negative security price reactions to restatement announcements, and more negative security price changes over the six months preceding and following restatement announcements. However, controlling for these and other factors, we find a significant association between accounting items and litigation, whether occurrences or resolutions. Specifically, core restatements — driven primarily by misstatements of revenue, a component of core earnings — and more pervasive restatements each play a role, while misstatements of noncore earnings alone do not.     

中国证券市场与上市公司融资选择问题探析

企业的融资选择会受到众多因素的影响，而一国证券市场发展水平与波动趋势已成为重要影响因素之一。本文在分析上市公司融资现状的基础之上，从财富效应、股价波动和证券市场政策三方面分析了中国证券市场对上市公司融资选择的约束，总结出上市公司融资规律，并针对其在证券市场融资中存在的问题提出了深入发展证券市场、提高上市公司债券融资比重和加快调整股权结构三点建议。     

Voluntary Income-Increasing Accounting Changes*

Abstract. This article presents an explanation of the reasons that managers might elect to change accounting methods. Facing adversity with a nontrivial probability of technical default on the debt covenants, the manager is motivated to effect an income-increasing accounting change to circumvent a technical default. Under rational expectations, if investors do not have any prior information about the firm's adversity, the market reaction on an accounting change announcement is predicted to be negative. We postulate that the market impact on the date of change announcement is negatively correlated with the amount of information the investors may have. A sample of 77 firms was selected to test the economic arguments. Investors' reaction to the accounting change was tested by abnormal returns on dates of announcement. Cross-sectional tests associate the investors' reaction with their prior information about the financial status of the sample firms. On the date of the change announcement, the sample firms did not experience a statistically significant negative market reaction. However, in a cross-sectional analysis, the market impact parameter was found to be significantly correlated in a negative manner with the prior information proxy variable.