Property rights in land and output growth in Russia

This paper tests whether the implementation of a key market‐oriented reform in post‐Soviet Russia, property rights in land, proxied by the percent of privatized land by region, affected the pace of sub‐national economic growth during two unprecedented expansion periods: 2001–2008 and 2010–2014. Individuals gained the Constitutional right to own land in 1993, but implementation was stalled. The pace of land privatization can be explained by arguably exogenous factors such as distance to Moscow, as well as climate and also regional political culture, proxied by concentration of votes in the 2004 presidential election. We show that this rate of land privatization in Russia's regions was significantly associated with output growth in 2010–2014, confirming the policy importance of this measure for developing economies. Regions where private holdings expanded most rapidly with the enforcement of property rights in land, gained a competitive advantage in the growth process through increased investment in fixed assets and private consumption.     

Intellectual Property Government Open Data: Australian Business Number Links to All Intellectual Property Data in Australia

Intellectual property rights protect the fruits of investment in intangible assets, such as inventions and innovations, creative content, designs, brand recognition and reputation, through five broad arms: patents, trade marks, design rights, plant breeder's rights and copyright. All of these rights, with the exception of copyright, are administered by IP Australia. To facilitate analysis of these rights, IP Australia released Intellectual Property Government Open Data (IPGOD) on < data.gov.au >. IPGOD is a weekly updated, publically accessible database that provides access to 100‐plus years of non‐sensitive administrative data on intellectual property rights held in IP Australia's databases that are linked to Australian Business Numbers and Australian Company Numbers.     

Uncovering asset stripping during China's privatization

This paper empirically studies the occurrence and extent of asset stripping via undervaluing public assets during the mass privatization of state-owned and collectively owned enterprises in China. Using three waves of a national survey of private firms, we provide evidence that state-owned and collectively owned assets were substantially underpriced, indicating the presence of corruption during privatization. Further analysis shows that the extent of underpricing is more severe in regions with less market competition or weaker property rights protection, and more pronounced for intangible assets such as intellectual property rights and land use rights. When comparing firm efficiency between privatized firms and de novo private firms, we find that the former group continues to enjoy considerable preferential treatments, yet significantly underperforms the latter, possibly due to continued government control and intervention. Finally, we provide evidence that insider privatization is an important source of corruption during the privatization process.     

On the macroeconomic effects of establishing tradability in weak property rights

The New Economy is closely associated with computing & communications technology, notably the Internet. We discuss property rights to, and trade in, the difficult-to-define intangible assets increasingly dominating the New Economy, and the possibility of under-investment in these assets. For a realistic analysis we introduce a Schumpeterian market environment (the experimentally organized economy). Weak property rights prevail when the rights to access, use, andtrade in intangible assets cannot be fully exercised. The trade-off between the benefits of open access on the Internet, and the incentive effects of strengthened property rights, depend both on the particular strategy a firm employs to secure property rights, and the protection offered by law. Economic property rights can be strengthened if the originator can find innovative ways to charge for the intangible assets. The extreme complexity of the New Economy and the large number of possible innovative private contract arrangements make it more important to facilitate the use and enforcement of private individualized contracts to protect intellectual property than to rely only on standard patent and copyright law. Enabling law is one proposed solution. Current patent legislation in the US has led to costly litigation processes weakening the position of small firms and individuals in patent disputes. The property rights of such firms and individuals could be strengthened with insurance or arbitration procedures.JEL Classification: D21, D23, D52, D82, H54, K11, K22, K41, L11, L23, M13, O14, O33An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 9th Congress of the International Joseph A. Schumpeter Society (ISS), Gainesville, Florida, USA, March 28-30, 2002. The paper is part of the Nödfor project on Schumpeterian Creative Destruction, notably the exit and bankruptcy process, based at the Ratio Institute, Stockholm.     

IT INVESTMENT AND INTANGIBLES: EVIDENCE FROM BANKS

This paper models the investment behavior of a multi‐asset firm with market power that accumulates valuable intangible assets to complement the IT capital. The investment model is estimated using data from Spanish banks on assets of different nature: material (branches, financial), immaterial (advertising and IT), and intangible (training of workers). The paper estimates that the representative bank spends five additional Euros per Euro invested in IT‐related assets in complementary intangible assets or, equivalently, intangibles amount to approximately 10 percent of the economic value of the representative bank. The remaining economic value is distributed between 28 percent from rents attributed to market power, and 62 percent to the cost of market‐purchased assets.     

Cross‐Country Income Differences Revisited: Accounting for the Role of Intangible Capital

This paper develops a new intangible investment database that is consistent and internationally comparable for a set of 60 economies over the period 1995–2011. I find that over time a growing share of total investment consists of intangible assets, rather than investment in tangible assets, like machinery and buildings. Across countries, the level of economic development of a country is positively associated with its investment intensity in intangibles. By including intangible capital as an additional production factor, this paper finds that we can account for substantially more of the variation in cross‐country income levels. Depending on the assumptions regarding the output elasticities of factor inputs, the observed differences in intangible capital can account for up to 16 percentage points of the cross‐country income variation.     

产权、代理成本和代理效率

本文选择政府管制较少、竞争较为充分的电子电器行业作为研究对象,考察了产权制度与代理成本和代理效率的关系,得到以下结论:(1)在代理成本上,国有产权企业普遍高于混和产权企业,混和产权企业高于个人产权企业;在代理成本差异上,混和产权企业与个人产权企业的差异小于与国有产权企业的差异。(2)长期投资率和职工人数与代理成本呈显著正相关关系,而长期投资率、财务杠杆比率、职工人数等与代理效率呈显著负相关关系。(3)企业规模越大,不同产权的代理成本差异越小;反之代理成本差异越大。(4)随着市场竞争程度的提高,各类产权企业的代理成本都呈现下降趋势,其代理效率呈现提高趋势。我们研究的启示是国有企业改革的突破口应考虑如何降低其代理成本,解决的措施之一是产权改革,尤其是产权多元化的改革,其次是完善对投资和负债及冗员的监督和控制机制,以促进代理成本的降低和代理效率的提高。     

产权约束、投资低效与通货紧缩

本文从产权逻辑来诠释 2 0 0 3年以来的投资膨胀。文章认为 ,在土地转让权含糊不清和银行产权约束不力的背景下 ,土地和信贷市场的价格机制无法给出市场定价 ,客观造成了巨大套利空间的存在。当经济景气时 ,一些地方政府、企业和银行三方共谋土地和贷款这两种最关键的生产要素 ,从而导致投资的非理性膨胀 ,并通过金融加速器效应带来宏观经济的大幅波动。从根源上讲 ,过度投资和投资低效的本质是产权约束和地方政府政绩观导向的问题。因而 ,本文提出的相应政策含义是 ,在短期内主要以经济杠杆来控制总量 ;在中长期应转变政府职能 ,推进产权改革。     

中国企业产权改革浅析

在西方现代产权制度理论的基础上,剖析中国现代企业在产权制度改革上的不足,进一步探讨在新经济中,如何深化对国有产权制度的改革,塑造符合社会主义市场经济的又有活力的国有资产产权结构,以及充分认识私营企业在产权发展中的弊端,如何帮助私营企业引进先进的现代产权管理方式,打破现有的产权束缚,完善企业治理机制,发挥私营企业的巨大潜力。     

G VC嵌入、无形资产要素与装备制造企业价值创造效率

将GVC因素引入企业价值创造体系中,基于效率视角揭示无形资产对企业价值创造的影响机理,以及GVC对该影响的调节机理,构建机理框架模型并提出研究假设。基于效率视角,选择无形资产对企业价值创造影响的评价方法并构建相应测度模型。基于中国装备制造企业数据进行实证研究,测度各无形资产要素对企业价值创造的影响方向和影响强度,以及GVC对无形资产影响的调节作用。最后,提出GVC下提升中国企业价值创造效率的策略建议。结果发现：品牌资产、知识产权、技术创新、产品功能和人力资源质量对企业价值创造均具有正向影响,而人力资源数量和有形资产则具有负向影响;GVC因素对企业价值创造具有正向影响,但影响强度不大;GVC对无形资本对企业价值创造效率的影响具有正向调节作用;通过嵌入GVC、重视企业品牌建设、加强企业技术创新和知识产权积累、提升企业人力资源质量等策略,可以有效提升企业价值创造效率。     

The Emergence of Concentrated Ownership Structures in East Germany: the implications for enterprise restructuring ∗

In the transitional economies of East and Central Europe, privatization is widely considered essential for transforming the large state-owned enterprises. However, eager to expose the public enterprises to ‘hard budget constraints’, economists have neglected the importance of who the owners are. Studies of ownership structures and post-privatization restructuring in east Germany provide evidence that ownership matters for transformation success. The adoption of west German institutions in the east and the sale of state industrial property in concentrated shares to ‘insider’ investors seem to have created good conditions for the long-term committed investments essential for the rebuilding of tangible and intangible assets in east German enterprises. However, the control structures of a sample of enterprises reveal a wide range of investment strategies between types of corporate investors. Just as legal and financial institutions set constraints on ownership structure, the ownership structure sets constraints on the range of investment choices. Whether committed investments occur will depend on constrained strategic decisions of the new private owners.     

Consumption Values of Trade Unions

The widening of the U.S. market following the adoption of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution stimulated changes in methods of production and business organization. These changes required a radical change in finance that prompted the Supreme Court to adopt exchange value as the accepted principle of property rights. These rights did not rest on tangible material, but on incorporeal and intangible assets. This legalized the firm as a going concern instead of a bundle of things and enhanced the role of finance relative to production. These evolving business practices and supporting judicial decisions set the U.S. economy on the path that has resulted in our current financial economy. The steps along this path are discussed in this article and we conclude that an economic theory based on intangible property is needed.     

中国上市公司无形资产投资实证分析

针对中国上市公司对无形资产管理的现状,结合无形资产特点,对中国部分上市公司的无形资产投资进行了实证分析,并对无形资产投资前提、投资额及投资时机进行了研究,以此来构建一个无形资产投资体系。     

Exchange Rate Uncertainty, Sociopolitical Instability and Private Investment: Empirical Evidence from Latin America

Using exchange rate uncertainty (ERU) and sociopolitical instability (SPI) as measures of macroeconomic imbalances and political disorder, respectively, we investigate the link between these two factors and private investment in Latin America. The analysis shows that while ERU and SPI negatively impact private investment jointly, the individual impact of ERU is much greater than that of SPI. Our results should prove useful both to policymakers and others interested in understanding the impact of uncertainty on private investment. Most importantly, macroeconomic policies that limit excess volatility in relative prices should lessen an economy’s general level of investment risk leading to enhanced private investment. Further, though lesser in degree, institutional reforms that reduce social tensions and strengthen property rights should also stimulate private investment. Finally, structural reforms that combine these two are likely to foster a robust market for private investment thus contributing to an economy’s growth potential.     

Spring cleaning: rural water impacts, valuation, and property rights institutions

Using a randomized evaluation in Kenya, we measure health impacts of spring protection, an investment that improves source water quality. We also estimate households' valuation of spring protection and simulate the welfare impacts of alternatives to the current system of common property rights in water, which limits incentives for private investment. Spring infrastructure investments reduce fecal contamination by 66%, but household water quality improves less, due to recontamination. Child diarrhea falls by one quarter. Travel-cost based revealed preference estimates of households' valuations are much smaller than both stated preference valuations and health planners' valuations, and are consistent with models in which the demand for health is highly income elastic. We estimate that private property norms would generate little additional investment while imposing large static costs due to above-marginal-cost pricing, private property would function better at higher income levels or under water scarcity, and alternative institutions could yield Pareto improvements.     

SOCIAL SECURITY INVESTMENT POLICY AND CAPITAL FORMATION

Large recent surpluses in the social security trust fund accounts provide the potential to increase overall national saving and capital formation. However, these surpluses instead have allowed politicians to increase the non-social security deficit and government consumption.
This paper argues that investing the trust funds in private assets could bring into focus the magnitude of the non-social security deficit and force Congress to cut it. Evidence presented here indicates that the trade deficit, output, and monetary policy are systematic macroeconomic variables that affect relative asset prices. The evidence also supports arguments of Nordhaus and others that a change in trust fund investment policy could lower the trade deficit, raise output, and produce looser monetary policy, thereby increasing Tobin's a and, thus, capital formation. Investing the trust funds in private assets could increase national investment and give the baby-bust generation more capital to use in producing goods and services for themselves and for retired baby-boomers.     

ESTIMATES OF INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT BY INDUSTRY AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH IN JAPAN

In estimating intangible investment in Japan at the industry level, we find a high intangible investment/gross value added ratio in the information technology (IT) sector and negative growth rates in intangible capital in 13 industries over the decade from 2000. When we examine the impacts of intangible investment on total factor productivity growth, we find a significant and positive effect on total factor productivity growth in the market economy. In a revised estimation that considers intertemporal knowledge spillovers, the estimated rate of return on intangibles in the IT sector is quite high after the IT revolution. The results imply that intangible assets have been underinvested in the IT sector.     

Intangible Investment and Market Valuation

This study derives performance‐ and expenditure‐based estimates of intangible capital and measures the extent to which intangible capital is captured by the equity market measures of firm value. Intangible capital is evaluated using occupational information available in the Finnish linked employer–employee data for the 1997–2011 period. The performance‐based organizational investment in value added is approximately 3 percent; R&D and ICT investment shares are lower, at 1.5 percent, and all are clustered in intangible‐intensive sectors that represent 40 percent of the private sector. Expenditure‐based organizational capital also exists in clusters other than that intensively investing in managerial and marketing effort, and performance‐based R&D capital is concentrated in the cluster with intensive R&D activity; both increase the market value of firms beyond the level that can be explained by standard economic analysis.     

Ownership,Access, and Sequential Investment

We extend the property‐rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this cost‐sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property‐rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary.     

WHAT HAPPENED TO THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY? ICT,INTANGIBLE INVESTMENT,AND BRITAIN'S PRODUCTIVITY RECORD REVISITED

Despite the apparent importance of the "knowledge economy," U.K. macroeconomic performance appears unaffected: investment rates are flat, and productivity has slowed. We investigate whether measurement issues might account for this puzzle. The standard National Accounts treatment of most spending on "knowledge" or "intangible" assets is as intermediate consumption. Thus they do not count as either GDP or investment. We ask how treating such spending as investment affects some key macro variables, namely, market sector gross value added (MGVA), business investment, capital and labor shares, growth in labor and total factor productivity (TFP), and capital deepening. We find: (a) MGVA was understated by about 6 percent in 1970 and 13 percent in 2004; (b) instead of the business investment/MGVA ratio falling since 1970 it has been rising; (c) instead of the labor share being flat since 1970 it has been falling; (d) growth in labor productivity and capital deepening has been understated and growth in TFP overstated; and (e) TFP growth has not slowed since 1990 but has been accelerating.