ANOMALOUS BIDDING IN SHORT‐TERM TREASURY BILL AUCTIONS*

We show that Treasury bill auction procedures create classes of price‐equivalent discount rates for bills with less than 72 days to maturity. We argue that it is inefficient for market participants to bid at a discount rate that is not the minimum rate in its class. The inefficiency of bidding at other than the minimum rate is related to a quantity shortfall rather than an unexploited profit opportunity. Auction results for weekly offerings of four‐week bills and occasional offerings of cash management bills show that market participants frequently bid at inefficient rates. However, they are more likely to bid at efficient rates than chance would suggest.     

WHEN‐ISSUED SHARES,SMALL TRADES,AND THE VARIANCE OF RETURNS AROUND STOCK SPLITS

The increases in volatility after stock splits have long puzzled researchers. The usual suspects of discreteness and bid‐ask spread do not provide a complete explanation. We provide new clues to solve this mystery by examining the trading of when‐issued shares that are available before the split. When‐issued trading permits noise traders to compete with a more homogenous set of traders, decreasing the volatility of the stock before the split. Following the split, these noise traders reunite in one market and volatility increases. Thus, the higher volatility after the ex date of a stock split is a function of the introduction of when‐issued trading, the new lower price level after the split date, and the increased activity of small‐volume traders around a stock split.     

Emerging from Bankruptcy with When‐Issued Trading

We examine the set of firms that emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy and traded on a when‐issued basis before their official return to the regular way in NASDAQ, Amex, or NYSE. We find that this when‐issued market is liquid and price efficient. The when‐issued closing price is a good indicator of the first closing price in the regular way market. Emerging firms that have when‐issued trading experience lower regular way volatility and smaller relative spreads than those without when‐issued trading. Our probit regressions show that firm size is an important determinant of the adoption of when‐issued trading.     

Auctions with ex post uncertainty

Uncertainty about ex post realized values is an inherent component in many auction environments. In this article, we develop a structural framework to analyze auction data subject to ex post uncertainty as a pure risk. We consider a low‐price sealed‐bid auction model with heterogeneous bidders' preferences and ex post uncertainty. The uncertainty can be common to all bidders or idiosyncratic. We derive the model restrictions and study nonparametric and semiparametric identification of the model primitives under exogenous and endogenous participation. We then develop multistep nonparametric and semiparametric estimation procedures in both cases.     

END‐OF‐DAY PRICING IN THE U.S. TREASURY MARKET: A COMPARISON OF GovPX AND THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF NEW YORK

We compare end‐of‐day indicative U.S. Treasury prices from GovPX and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY). We find that the two sources rarely quote identical prices, and differences are not simply due to noise or rounding. The average bid price differential is 2 cents for notes and bonds, but it is only ¹/₁₀ of 1 cent for bills. Bid‐ask spreads in both sources appear to be largely artificial and contain limited information. Finally, we find that the end‐of‐day indicative FRBNY bid prices are closer to true intraday GovPX market quotes than end‐of‐day indicative quotes provided by GovPX itself.     

Price Discovery in Near‐ and Away‐from‐the‐Money Option Markets

This paper examines the relative price discovery roles of near‐ and away‐from‐the‐money option markets. The evidence shows that, when considering multiple options with different strike prices jointly, option markets have an average information share of 17.6%. However, no individual option market dominates in the price discovery process, higher and lower trading activity options (i.e., near‐ and away‐from‐the‐money options, respectively) each contribute approximately equally to this process. The main implications of these results are that (1) collectively, option markets process a substantial amount of new stock price‐related information, and (2) looking across strike prices, option markets appear to be informationally nonredundant.     

DAY‐END EFFECT ON THE PARIS BOURSE

We study the day‐end effect on the Paris Bourse, a computerized order‐driven market with competing dealers. The day‐end return is approximately double the magnitude found in U.S. data and is nearly four times larger for stocks trading with a registered dealer. However, this is largely explained by the time between trades and the bid‐ask spread. Unlike the U.S. data, the effect does not decline as stock price increases, probably because of a variable tick size in the Paris market. Finally, a change to a closing call auction in May 1996 for a subset of stocks did not reduce the day‐end effect.     

INFORMATION AND NOISE IN FINANCIAL MARKETS: EVIDENCE FROM THE E‐MINI INDEX FUTURES

I examine the informational contributions and effects on transitory volatility of trades initiated by different types of traders in three actively traded index futures markets. The results show that trades initiated by exchange member firms account for more than 60% of price discovery during the trading day. These institutional trades appear to be more informative than trades of individual exchange members or off‐exchange traders. I also find that off‐exchange traders introduce more noise into the prices than do exchange members. My findings provide new evidence on the role of different types of traders in the price formation process.     

Order dynamics: Recent evidence from the NYSE

We examine investor order choices using evidence from a recent period when the NYSE trades in decimals and allows automatic executions. We analyze the decision to submit or cancel an order or to take no action. For submitted orders, we distinguish order type (market vs. limit), order side (buy vs. sell), execution method (auction vs. automatic), and pricing aggressiveness. We find that the NYSE exhibits positive serial correlation in order type on an order-by-order basis, which suggests that follow-on order strategies dominate adverse selection or liquidity considerations at a moment in time. Aggregated levels of order flow also exhibit positive serial correlation in order type, but appear to be non-stationary processes. Overall, changes in aggregated order flow have an order-type serial correlation that is close to zero at short aggregation intervals, but becomes increasingly negative at longer intervals. This implies a liquidity exhaustion–replenishment cycle. We find that small orders routed to the NYSE's floor auction process are sensitive to the quoted spread, but that small orders routed to the automatic execution system are not. Thus, in addition to foregoing price improvement, traders selecting the speed of automatic executions on the NYSE do so with little regard for the quoted cost of immediacy. As quoted depth increases, traders respond by competing on price via limit orders that undercut existing bid and ask prices. Limit orders are more likely and market sells are less likely late in the trading day. These results are helpful in understanding the order arrival process at the NYSE and have potential applications in academics and industry for optimizing order submission strategies.     

An evolutionary multi‐objective optimization of trading rules in call markets

We evaluate an agent‐based model featuring near‐zero‐intelligence traders operating in a call market with a wide range of trading rules governing the determination of prices and which orders are executed, as well as a range of parameters regarding market intervention by market makers and the presence of informed traders. We optimize these trading rules using a multi‐objective population‐based incremental learning algorithm seeking to maximize the trading volume and minimize the bid–ask spread. Our results suggest that markets should choose a small tick size if concerns about the bid–ask spread are dominating and a large tick size if maximizing trading volume is the main aim. We also find that unless concerns about trading volume dominate, time priority is the optimal priority rule. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Simultaneous Pooled Auctions

Suppose a seller wants to sell k similar or identical objects and there are n > k potential buyers. Suppose that each buyer wants only one object. In this case, we suggest the use of a simultaneous auction that would work as follows. Players are asked to submit sealed bids for one object. The individual with the highest bid chooses an object first; the individual with the second-highest bid chooses the next object; and this process continues until the individual with the kth highest bid receives the last object. Each individual pays the equivalent to his or her bid. When objects are identical, we show that the proposed auction generates the same revenue as a first-price sealed-bid sequential auction. When objects are perfectly correlated, there is no known solution for sequential auctions, whereas we can characterize bidding strategies in the proposed auction. Moreover, the proposed auction is optimal (given an appropriately chosen reserve price), and it may be easier and cheaper to run than a sequential auction.     

Transparency and Liquidity: A Comparison of Auction and Dealer Markets with Informed Trading

Trading systems differ in their degree of transparency, here defined as the extent to which market makers can observe the size and direction of the current order flow. We investigate whether greater transparency enhances market liquidity by reducing the opportunities for taking advantage of uninformed participants. We compare the price formation process in several stylized trading systems with different degrees of transparency: various types of auction markets and a stylized dealer market. We find that greater transparency generates lower trading costs for uninformed traders on average, although not necessarily for every size of trade.     

Field experiments on the effects of reserve prices in auctions: more Magic on the Internet

I present experimental evidence on the effects of minimum bids in first‐price, sealed‐bid auctions. The auction experiments manipulated the minimum bids in a preexisting market on the Internet for collectible trading cards from the game Magic: the Gathering. I examine a number of outcomes, including the number of participating bidders, the probability of sale, the levels of individual bids, and the auctioneer's revenues. The benchmark theoretical model is one with symmetric, risk‐neutral bidders with independent private values. The results verify a number of the predictions concerning equilibrium bidding. Many bidders behave strategically, anticipating the effects of the reserve price on others' bids.     

Can Island Provide Liquidity and Price Discovery in the Dark?

On September 23, 2002, facing a regulatory mandate issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Island teminated the position of the Nasdaq 100 Index Tracking Stock (QQQ) on its book. While the market volume remained almost the same, Island's market share in the QQQ fell significantly. However, Island still dominates other trading centers in the price discovery process and volatility spillovers. The spreads on most trading centers became narrower after Island removed its quotes from the public view. The overall results suggest that the decrease in market transparency does not compromise market liquidity. Informed traders who provide price discovery in the QQQ are willing to sacrifice potential price improvements for the fast speed and reliable execution that Island offers, and are able to trade in the absence of displayed quotes.     

Price Movement Effects on the State of the Electronic Limit‐Order Book

This paper investigates public‐trader order‐placement strategies by examining the relations between the state of the limit‐order book and previous price movements. There is support for an information effect, as traders become more aggressive in buying and more patient in selling after previous positive stock returns. The widening of the bid‐ask spread also causes traders to place less aggressive orders. However, there is no evidence of the options effect on limit‐order trading. This study also reveals that orders at the best quotes react faster and complete the adjustment earlier than orders that are far away from the best quotes.     

The price discovery role of day traders in futures market: Evidence from different types of day traders

Using proprietary account-level transaction data in the futures market where day traders are self-declared ex ante, this study investigates whether day traders enhance price discovery at the market level. From a natural classification of day traders, we find that heterogeneous day traders have differential effects on price discovery. Self-declared day traders, who benefit from low margin requirement, do not improve price discovery measured by information share. In contrast, non-declared traders, who are not self-declared as day traders, improve price discovery. Their positive impacts on price discovery are particularly significant during periods of high volatility and arrival of new information. Overall, a margin stimulating policy may encourage more day trading, but may also attract overconfident investors, especially inexperienced ones, and who do not enhance price discovery.     

开盘集合竞价透明度与市场质量

通过采用个股与市场同步法和价格反转的分析方法研究开盘集合竞价透明度与市场质量之间的关系,发现从日内效应来看,开盘集合竞价透明度提高以后,交易者的执行成本增加,整体来说市场的流动性是降低了;从事件前后市场模型的拟合优度比较结果来看,开盘集合竞价透明度提高以后股票个股与市场反应不一致,价格发现效率降低,市场质量降低。     

The Determinants of Execution Costs in Short‐Term Money Markets

Prior research attributes the observed negative relation between execution costs and trade size in opaque markets to two factors—information asymmetry and broker‐client relationships. We provide evidence that a trader's ex ante transaction price information and the relationship traders have with their brokers are both significant determinants of a trader's execution costs in an opaque market; however, traders who establish strong relationships with their brokers will achieve a greater reduction in execution costs than traders with ex ante transaction price information. We also find evidence that trade size has little explanatory power after controlling for a trader's ex ante transaction price information and broker‐client relationships.     

Price Discovery without Trading: Evidence from Limit Orders

We analyze the contribution to price discovery of market and limit orders by high‐frequency traders (HFTs) and non‐HFTs. While market orders have a larger individual price impact, limit orders are far more numerous. This results in price discovery occurring predominantly through limit orders. HFTs submit the bulk of limit orders and these limit orders provide most of the price discovery. Submissions of limit orders and their contribution to price discovery fall with volatility due to changes in HFTs’ behavior. Consistent with adverse selection arising from faster reactions to public information, HFTs’ informational advantage is partially explained by public information.