Taxation and Capital Structure Choice: The Role of Ownership

Applying firm fixed‐effects estimations to European firm‐level data, I analyze how ownership structure affects the relationship between taxation and capital structure. I find that an increase in the corporate tax rate affects the debt‐to‐assets ratio positively, and that this effect is stronger for firms with concentrated ownership. These results hold independently of whether firms are standalone or subsidiaries, and are also valid if subsidiaries are divided into those that are foreign‐owned and those domestically owned. Lastly, ownership plays a role even when controlling for other potentially important determinants of the relation between corporate taxation and capital structure.     

西部大开发税收优惠政策实施效果评估

本文通过对西部开发税收优惠政策与地区经济增长、企业生产经营行为以及地方财政收入关系的评估分析,认为西部开发税收优惠政策对经济增长具有明显促进作用,对企业资产利润率提高也具有显著正效应.但从2002年到2004年西部开发税收政策对西部经济增长促进效应不断降低.最主要的原因是政策涉及的垄断企业多,市场化企业少;能源开发、环境污染严重企业享受多,实现地方可持续发展企业享受少;优惠税额主要促进了中央大型能源开采垄断企业,大多数有利于西部地区经济可持续发展的支柱产业得不到有效支持.所以提出:西部开发税收优惠政策在覆盖面上应做有增有减,并做出延长政策时效等调整.     

Does Taxation Stifle Corporate Investment? Firm‐Level Evidence from ASEAN Countries

This article conducts a firm‐level analysis of the effect of taxation on corporate investment, using large‐scale panel data on non‐financial firms over the period 1990–2014, and controlling for macrostructural differences among ASEAN countries. We find a significant degree of persistence in fixed investment over time, which varies with firm characteristics, such as size, growth prospects, profitability and leverage. The non‐linear estimations indicate that taxation facilitates business investment (possibly by enabling public investment in infrastructure and human capital, and the proper functioning of government institutions), but this effect turns negative and stifles private investment growth as the tax burden increases.     

Using surveys of business perceptions as a guide to growth‐enhancing fiscal reforms

This paper assesses the merits of using business perceptions of growth constraints as a guide to growth‐enhancing fiscal policy reforms. Using endogenous growth models in which the government levies an income tax to provide public inputs to the production of private firms, the paper demonstrates that such perceptions of growth constraints may be misleading from a policy perspective. In particular, firms can be expected to systematically overestimate the growth‐enhancing effects of lower tax rates relative to public services and public capital, and underestimate the growth‐enhancing effects of greater provision of public capital relative to taxation and public services. In addition, we show that firms rank different public services and different types of public capital according to the actual costs they impose on firms. It is then shown that these theoretical predictions regarding how firms rank constraints correspond closely to the observed ranking of constraints by firms in the World Bank's Enterprise Surveys.     

Corporate taxation, debt financing and foreign-plant ownership

This paper compares domestically and foreign-owned plants with respect to their debt-to-assets ratio and analyzes to which extent the difference is systematically affected by corporate taxation. To derive hypotheses about influence of corporate taxation on a firm's debt financing we adapt a standard model of taxation and financing decisions of firms for the case of international debt shifting activities of foreign-owned firms. We estimate the average difference between a foreign-owned and a domestically owned firm's debt ratio, treating the mode of ownership as endogenous. Using data from 32,067 European firms, we find that foreign-owned firms on average exhibit a significantly higher debt ratio than their domestically owned counterparts in the host country. Moreover, this gap in the debt ratio increases with the host country's statutory corporate tax rate.     

Taxing the Financially Integrated Multinational Firm

This paper develops a theoretical model of corporate taxation in the presence of financially integrated multinational firms. Under the assumption that multinational firms use some measure of internal loans to finance foreign investment, we find that the optimal corporate tax rate is positive from the perspective of a small, open economy. This finding contrasts the standard result that the optimal‐source‐based capital tax is zero. Intuitively, when multinational firms finance investment in one country with loans from affiliates in another country, the burden of the corporate taxes levied in the latter country partly falls on investment and thus workers in the former country. This tax exporting mechanism introduces a scope for corporate taxes, which is not present in standard models of international taxation. Accounting for the internal capital markets of multinational firms thus helps resolve the tension between standard theory predicting zero capital taxes and the casual observation that countries tend to employ corporate taxes at fairly high rates.     

Taxing Nothing – Tax Arbitrage and the Vanishing Revenue from Capital Income Taxation

In a one-period model the implications of the German tax code, concerning capital taxation, onto the capital market equilibrium are examined. Therefore, we model a corporation sector subject to the corporation tax and private investors liable to private income taxation. We show that there neither exist any possibilities for local tax arbitrage nor tax clienteles. Extending the model for stocks and derivative financial instruments, the tax base for private capital income taxation vanishes and the tax revenue drops to zero.revised version received September 3, 2003     

Informality,innovation, and aggregate productivity growth

This paper investigates how the costs of innovation in the formal sector temper or magnify the impacts of traditional policy levers such as taxation on sectoral choice. I embed a decision whether to operate formally or informally into a richer, general equilibrium model. Formal firms are subject to taxation, but they can improve their productivity through process innovation. Informal firms can potentially avoid taxation, and their productivity is determined by productivity growth in the formal sector. I find that changing tax rates from 50% to 60% decreases formal‐sector participation by 20.9%; however, this percentage falls by 10% when the cost of innovation is lower in the formal sector. The model also illustrates how changes in tax policy affect total factor productivity growth by limiting both the number of formal‐sector firms and the intensity of innovation. These results indicate a potential mechanism to induce firms to operate formally or mitigate harmful impacts of necessary tax changes.     

Dividend taxation and intertemporal tax arbitrage

We analyze the effects of changes in dividend tax policy using a life-cycle model of the firm, in which new firms first access equity markets, then grow internally, and finally pay dividends when they have reached steady state. We find that unanticipated permanent changes in tax rates have only small effects on aggregate investment, since macroeconomic dynamics are dominated by mature firms for which dividend taxation is not distortionary. Anticipated or temporary dividend tax changes, on the other hand, create incentives for firms to engage in inter-temporal tax arbitrage so as to reduce investors' tax burden. For example, a temporary tax cut – the type most likely to be enacted by policymakers – induces firms to accelerate dividend payments while tax rates are low, which reduces their cash holdings and makes them capital-constrained when large investment opportunities arise. This can significantly lower aggregate investment for periods after the tax cut.     

Tax Base and Crowding‐in Effects of Balanced Budget Fiscal Policy

A dynamic general equilibrium business cycle model is constructed with staggered price adjustment, monopolistic wage setting and distortionary taxation. The government purchases goods, runs an unemployment benefit system and balances its budget through a proportional tax on labour income. A temporary tax‐financed increase in government expenditures can lower the tax rate through a demand‐induced widening of the tax base. It is shown analytically that this allows private consumption to rise, under realistic conditions, despite the negative wealth effect of increased fiscal spending.     

On the Neutrality of Profit Taxation in a Mixed Oligopoly

This paper investigates the neutrality of profit taxation in a mixed oligopoly where one (partially) public firm competes with private firms. We find that the neutrality of a profit tax is robust under a general cost and a general demand function as long as the degree of privatization is endogenously determined. This result is also true when product heterogeneity is considered under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. By contrast, if the degree of privatization is exogenously given, the profit tax neutrality holds only in the cases where the public firm is fully privatized or fully state-owned; otherwise, the neutrality breaks down.     

MULTINATIONALS,TAX HOLIDAYS,AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER*

Host country governments often grant investment incentives to foreign firms located in their territories. We show that such preferential treatment of foreign firms can induce transfer of foreign technology, facilitate entry by the local firm, and improve host country welfare. However, this pro‐competitive outcome results when preferential treatment is granted for a limited time. Permanent tax concessions yield the opposite effect.     

International Commodity Taxation under Monopolistic Competition

We analyze non‐cooperative commodity taxation in a two‐country trade model characterized by monopolistic competition and international firm and capital mobility. In this setting, taxes in one country affect foreign welfare through the relocation of mobile firms and through changes in the rents accruing to capital owners. With consumption‐based taxation, these fiscal externalities exactly offset each other and the non‐cooperative tax equilibrium is Pareto efficient. With production‐based taxation, however, there are additional externalities on the foreign tax base and the foreign price level that lead non‐cooperative tax rates to exceed their Pareto efficient levels.     

Taxation of firms with unknown mobility

We analyze optimal business tax policy when some firms are able to escape taxation by moving abroad. In contrast to the existing literature, we assume that the true number of mobile firms is ex ante unknown. While the government may learn from the firms' location responses to past tax rate changes, firms may anticipate this and adjust their choices accordingly. We find that incomplete information on mobility substantially affects the properties and the implications of equilibrium policy choices. First, the government may find it optimal to set a tax rate that triggers partial firm migration but full revelation of the true number of mobile firms. Second, we show that, if the firms' outside option is attractive (i.e., relocation cost and foreign tax rates are low), expected tax rates and expected firm migration are higher if the degree of mobility is unknown. Third, there is a positive value of learning, i.e., commitment on future tax rates cannot increase the government's expected revenue. However, if the government can commit to a rule‐based learning mechanism, i.e., credibly tie its future tax policy to present policy outcomes, it may obtain a Pareto improvement.     

Taxation under oligopoly in a general equilibrium setting

Taxation under oligopoly is analyzed in a general equilibrium setting where the firms are large relative to the size of the economy and maximize the utility of their shareholders. Assuming that preferences are either identical and homothetic or identical and quasi‐linear, then the oligopoly model is an aggregative game, which greatly simplifies the comparative statics for the effects of taxation. This novel analysis of taxation leads to a number of counterintuitive results that challenge conventional wisdom in microeconomics. A lump‐sum tax may increase the price of the oligopolistic good and decrease welfare whereas a profits tax may decrease the price of the oligopolistic good and increase welfare. A profits tax is shown to be superior to a lump‐sum tax. Furthermore, in line with conventional wisdom, total tax revenue is always higher with an ad valorem tax than with a specific tax that leads to the same price for the oligopolistic good.     

After‐tax Valuation of Convertible Bonds and Participation Exemption

This paper studies the after‐tax valuation of convertible bonds in the light of Europe's participation exemption (PEX) rules and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). The focus is on Italy's representative case. PEX rules exempt from company taxation capital gains realized by companies selling stocks. PEX rules raise the value of convertibles as investor companies can strategically convert the bond into stock to enjoy PEX. Historical cost‐based national accounting standards imply taxation upon realization and valuable tax timing options (TTOs). ‘Fair value’ based IFRS entail mark‐to‐market taxation, which ‘kills’ TTOs, but investor companies can convert the bond early in order to enjoy PEX. Early conversion can be valuable.     

Laffer strikes again: Dynamic scoring of capital taxes

We set up a neoclassical growth model extended by a corporate sector, an investment and finance decision of firms, and a set of taxes on capital income. We provide analytical dynamic scoring of taxes on corporate income, dividends, capital gains, other private capital income, and depreciation allowances and identify the intricate ways through which capital taxation affects tax revenue in general equilibrium. We then calibrate the model for the US and explore quantitatively the revenue effects from capital taxation. We take adjustment dynamics after a tax change explicitly into account and compare with steady-state effects. We find, among other results, a self-financing degree of corporate tax cuts of about 70–90% and a very flat Laffer curve for all capital taxes as well as for tax depreciation allowances. Results are strongest for the tax on capital gains. The model predicts for the US that total tax revenue increases by about 0.3–1.2% after abolishment of the tax.     

The tax advantage of public firms over private firms in the German household solid waste disposal industry

We measure the tax advantage of public firms over private firms, which operate at municipality level in the German household solid waste disposal industry. Public firms with sovereign duties pay no taxes, but equivalent private firms have to. In a simple risk-free setting, we develop a measure of the percentage difference of the charges of both types of firms demanded under their respective tax treatments. We model a cost-covering public firm and a net present value maximizing private firm. For sensible model parameters from the German waste disposal industry the private firm has to demand an about 16% to 18% higher charge. The by far biggest impact on the measure has the value added tax, with revenues as a much larger tax base than profits. Tax savings, which directly affect pre-tax profits, only alleviate the disadvantage bit. There is some evidence that at least one type of private firms—that is, private law firms that are also majority privately owned, are productive enough to overcome the tax advantage of public firms and be able to charge a lower price than public firms.     

Investment under Uncertainty, Debt and Taxes

It is common practice in financial derivative valuation to use a discount factor based on the riskless debt rate. But, to what extent is this discount factor appropriate for cash flows emerging in capital budgeting? To answer this question, we introduce a framework for real asset valuation that considers both personal and corporate taxation. We first discuss broad circumstances under which personal taxes do not affect valuation. We show that the appropriate discount rate for equity‐financed flows in a risk‐neutral setting is an equity rate that differs from the riskless debt rate by a tax wedge due to the presence of personal taxation. We extend this result to the valuation of the interest tax shield for exogenous debt policy with default risk. Interest tax shields, which accrue at a net rate corresponding to the difference between the corporate tax rate and a tax rate related to the personal tax rates, can have either positive or negative values. We also provide an illustrative real options application of our valuation approach to the case of an option to delay investment in a project, showing that the application of Black and Scholes formula may be incorrect in presence of personal taxes.     

THE WELFARE GAINS OF AGE‐RELATED OPTIMAL INCOME TAXATION

Using an overlapping generations model with skill uncertainty and private savings, we quantify the gains of age‐dependent labor income taxation. The total steady‐state welfare gain of switching from age‐independent to age‐dependent nonlinear taxation varies between 2.4% and 4% of GDP. Part of the gain descends from relaxing incentive–compatibility constraints and part is due to capital‐accumulation effects. The welfare gain is of about the same magnitude as that which can be achieved by moving from linear to nonlinear income taxation. Finally, the welfare loss from tax‐exempting interest income is negligible under an optimal age‐dependent labor income tax.