Elections,Information, and State‐Dependent Candidate Quality

The quality of political candidates often depends on the current state of the world, for example because their personal characteristics are more valuable in some situations than in others. We explore the implications of state‐dependent candidate quality in a model of electoral competition where voters are uncertain about the state. Candidates are fully informed and completely office‐motivated. With a reasonable restriction on voters' beliefs, an equilibrium where candidates' positions reveal the true state does not exist. Nonrevealing equilibria always exist. Some main findings are that candidates' positions can diverge more in equilibrium when they differ more in state‐dependent quality and when the electorate is less well informed.     

State‐Society Synergy and Export Sophistication

This paper contributes to the recent research on “export sophistication,” or the composition of a country's export portfolio. The central question of the current study is what determines a country's level of export sophistication. I argue that a synergetic relationship between state and society positively contributes to the level of export sophistication. The logic behind the argument is that the socially optimal level of investment in new products can only be realized if both the firm and the government find it individually profitable to carry out the investment. In cases whereby either or both lacks private incentive to invest, higher synergy between public and private sectors makes such joint investments more likely to occur. This logic is formally illustrated using a simultaneous game with incomplete information. The central hypothesis is tested using time series cross‐sectional data. The key empirical novelty of this paper is the construction of a “synergy index” based on Peter Evans' conceptualization of the term. Overall, the data give good support to the hypothesis. This relationship is particularly robust for the subsample of countries with intermediate levels of synergy. Furthermore, there is evidence suggesting that state‐society synergy is subject to diminishing returns as its values get higher.     

Optimal Incentives with State‐Dependent Preferences

In both experimental and natural settings, incentives sometimes underperform, generating smaller effects on the targeted behaviors than would be predicted for entirely self‐regarding agents. A parsimonious explanation is that incentives that appeal to self‐regarding economic motives may crowd out noneconomic motives such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation, ethical values, and other social preferences, leading to disappointing and sometimes even counterproductive incentive effects. We present evidence from behavioral experiments that crowding may take two forms: categorical (the effect on preferences depends only on the presence or absence of the incentive) or marginal (the effect depends on the extent of the incentive). We extend an earlier contribution (Bowles and Hwang, 2008 ) to include categorical crowding, thus providing a more general framework for the study of optimal incentives and as a result, an expanded range of situations for which the sophisticated planner will (surprisingly) make greater use of incentives when incentives crowd out social preferences than when motivational crowding is absent.     

Contractual Hazard,Political Hazard and FDI Ownership Structure in Joint‐venture Enterprises in China

This paper investigates how institutional environments, especially the contractual hazard and the political hazard, affect foreign investors’ share ratios in joint‐venture enterprises in China. We build a model combining Transaction Cost Economics and Property Rights Theory to describe the tradeoff that foreign investors face between choosing a larger share ratio and a smaller one. We argue that when the contractual hazard increases, foreign investors request larger shares to avoid being held up by their domestic partners, and when the political hazard increases, they hold smaller shares to circumvent the local government's grabbing hand. Moreover, the effect of the contractual hazard is channeled through enterprises’ asset specificity. These theoretical predictions are verified by studying the relationship between the ownership structure of Chinese manufacturing joint‐venture enterprises and the provincial‐level institutions they are embedded in.     

Growth, Inequality, and Integration: A Political Economy Analysis

The issue of political integration between two countries (more generally two political constituencies) for economic reasons is studied within the context of a simple endogenous growth model with a productive public good financed by taxation. We consider two countries that initially differ in terms of average endowment, size, and inequality. Because taxation affects the distribution of income both within and between countries, we are able to show how integration impacts it over the entire time horizon. The decision to integrate or not is made by the two national median voters. We establish the net gain for any individual in any country derived from integration and offer a simple decomposition of this gain. It is then proven that even though integration generates aggregate gains for both countries through an endogenous growth mechanism related to size, it may be in the interest of either median voter not to vote for integration given the transformation in the inequality schedule it implies. Surprisingly, even the poorer median voter may vote against integration. Turning to the process of union building, we prove that, once it is decided, integration is irreversible. Countries may initially decide against integration yet be willing to reverse this decision in a subsequent period.     

State‐Dependent Forward Guidance and the Problem of Inconsistent Announcements

Forward guidance can be provided as an unconditional promise, i.e. commitment to a specific low policy rate. Alternatively, the promise may include an escape clause, i.e. a condition defining the state of the economy under which the central bank would not keep such a low rate and, instead, it would revert to setting policy under discretion. The escape clause can be expressed as a threshold in terms of a specific variable. The present paper shows that, when such a threshold is expressed in terms of an endogenous variable (e.g. output, inflation), there are cases where it becomes impossible for the central bank to act in a way that is consistent with its promise. Consistency imposes limits on the policy rate that can be set since reverting immediately to the optimal discretionary rate can be incompatible with exceeding the threshold.     

Manufacturing Skill‐biased Wage Inequality,Natural Resources and Institutions

We use an extensive dataset on occupational wages to measure the manufacturing skill premium and assess, for the first time, the influence of natural resources and institutional quality—in addition to traditional drivers—for advanced and less‐advanced countries and the full sample. The new findings, regarding 21 countries between 1988 and 2008 in the main panel estimations, suggest the premium of advanced countries rises with tertiary enrollment, net foreign direct investment (FDI) and institutional quality, and falls with centralized wage negotiations and geographically diffuse natural resource activities, mainly re‐exportation related. In less‐advanced countries, the premium rises with net FDI, scale effects, centralized wage negotiations and geographically concentrated natural resource activities (absorbing scarce skilled workers), and falls with trade, diffuse natural resource exploration (using mainly unskilled workers) and high‐technology exports, as emerging national low‐end technology industrial exporters may lower skill pay compared with foreign industrial exporters. In the full sample, the premium rises with scale effects, trade, institutional quality and concentrated natural resources, and falls with the relative skilled‐labor supply, centralized wage negotiations and diffuse natural resources. The results account for a wider diversity of situations compared with the previous studies.     

Globalization,Inequality, and Local‐level Dynamics: Indonesia and the Philippines*

Subnational disparities and center–region relations are increasingly important issues in both the development economics literature and East Asian policy circles. Almost all developing countries in East Asia are actively decentralizing power and resources from the center. Analytically, there is growing interest in spatial economics, arising out of the fusion of economics and geography. This paper examines these issues with reference to Indonesia and the Philippines. Both countries are well suited to such a study: they are the two largest archipelagic nations in the world, they both feature great subnational diversity, and they have both adopted major decentralization programs, in similar circumstances. We conclude that, in aggregate, there have been no major changes in regional inequality in either country, although this conclusion is sensitive to the selection of economic indicators. In general, the regions that are the best connected to the global economy have grown more rapidly.     

Inequality,Democracy, and Persistence: Is There a Political Kuznets Curve?

The aim of this paper is to provide comprehensive empirical evidence on recent theories that link democracy and income inequality for the period 1960–1997. In simple cross-country regressions I find a non-monotonic link between democracy and inequality when using ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, and Eusufzai tests. I also employ dynamic panel data techniques, which control for potential simultaneity and heterogeneity problems. I also find support for the existence of apolitical Kuznets curve. Moreover, it appears that income inequality is unconditionally persistent. Results are robust to different democracy proxies when sensitivity analysis is applied.     

Market Size and the Survival of Foreign‐owned Firms*

We develop a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms and foreign direct investment cost uncertainty and investigate the survival of foreign‐owned firms. The survival probabilities of foreign‐owned firms depend on firm‐level characteristics, such as productivity, and host country characteristics, such as market size. We show that a foreign‐owned firm will be less likely to be shut down when its parent firm's productivity is higher and its indigenous competitors are less productive. Although a larger market size will always reduce the survival probability of indigenous firms, it can lead to a higher survival probability for foreign‐owned firms if their parent firms are sufficiently productive.     

Government Spending Shocks and Rule‐of‐Thumb Consumers with Steady‐State Inequality*

In the body of literature concerning fiscal policy, a central result is that government spending might stimulate private consumption because only some households save, while others spend their entire income each period. Although such heterogeneity naturally causes inequality, this complication is commonly avoided by assuming that transfers redistribute steady‐state wealth. I show that this steady‐state assumption drives short‐run results. Without redistribution, the equilibrium is indeterminate, and the labor‐market structure that is imposed to support the expansive result is theoretically inconsistent. On a more positive note, I propose a labor‐market formulation under which the expansive effects of government spending might arise.     

国有企业市场退出与并购重组的对策

本文分析转轨时期国有企业退出市场的障碍,提出了国有企业并购重组的对策。     

国有企业民营化的竞争与均衡模型

在现实经济中,处于转型经济中的政府通常保留一定的被私有化企业的股份.在生产差别产品的双寡头模型里,我们考察了部分国有对企业投资和产出行为的影响机制.从而得出结论:政府所保留股份的最适宜份额取决于产品市场的竞争.并进一步探讨了在哪种情况下把两个公司出售给唯一买主是更可取的.本文的理论模型有助于更好地理解和解决在我国市场经济和特型经济条件下的国有大中型企业重组,国有资产的战略性退出以及明晰现代产权制度等问题.     

浅谈国有企业改制中存在的问题与对策

深入进行国有企业改革是巩固、和发展社会主义市场经济的重要环节。国有企业公司制造是市场经济条件下建立现代企业制度的重大举措。本文指出了国有企业在改制中存在的主要问题,并提出了国有企业走出困境的相应对策。     

Inequality,growth, and environmental quality trade‐offs in a model with human capital accumulation

This paper develops a simple endogenous growth model where pollution exposure and vulnerability are unequally spread across the population, and growth and distribution are endogenous. In this set‐up, we investigate whether trade‐offs between growth, distributional, and environmental concerns may emerge. We show that a tighter environmental policy reduces income inequality and can improve both growth and total welfare. Immediate welfare losses, though, do occur, and are larger for countries that start at low levels of environmental quality (e.g. developing countries).     

Accounting for Cross‐Country Differences in Wealth Inequality

There is considerable cross‐country variation in levels of household wealth and in wealth inequality. This paper assesses the extent to which these differences can be accounted for by differences in the distributions of households' demographic and economic characteristics. A counterfactual decomposition analysis of micro data from five countries (Italy, U.K., U.S., Sweden and Finland) is used to identify the effects of characteristics on component wealth holdings, their value and their distribution. The findings of the paper suggest that the biggest share of cross‐country differences is not attributable to the distribution of household demographic and economic characteristics but rather reflect strong unexplained country effects.     

Transaction costs and economic growth under common legal system: State‐level evidence from Mexico

This paper examines the contribution of administrative and procedural transaction costs to economic growth under common legal system. We show that administrative and procedural costs vary quite a lot even within the institutional environment sharing the common legal system. States with low‐cost business registration, low‐cost access to property rights and greater judicial efficiency tend to have consistently higher growth. The established effects are robust to alternative model specifications, heterogeneity bias, and to a variety of control variables that might confound the effects of administrative and procedural costs on growth. Such differences in costs are far from being trivial as we show that these within‐system differences might be instrumental in influencing economic growth. Lower administrative and procedural costs induce growth by increasing investment rate, lowering unemployment rate, encouraging labor supply and improving total factor productivity. In the counterfactual scenario, the transition from high‐cost to low‐cost regime is associated with substantial growth and development gains over time. By exploiting the variation in the disease environment, ethnic fractionalization and historical urbanization, we show that the negative effect of rising procedural and administrative costs on growth and development appears to be causal.     

The Regressive Recovery: Distribution,Inequality and State Power in Britain's Post-Crisis Political Economy

This article interrogates the underlying mechanisms at the heart of Britain's post-crisis political economy. We argue that the contemporary economic recovery has been characterised by a dynamic of ‘regressive redistribution’: a socially regressive dynamic of state-led economic restructuring that has worked through two axes at the centre of the recovery. The first axis, a monetary policy framework centred upon Quantitative Easing, has driven asset-price inflation to the benefit of the wealthiest asset holders. The second axis centres upon the politics of regressive labour market restructuring which has provoked widespread wage deflation. In combination, these two axes have been central to defining the contours of the Britain's post-crisis political economy paradigm: characterised by rising asset wealth for the few, and falling living standards alongside increasing economic insecurity for wage earners. The opportunity to change path from the trends of deepening inequality that defined the pre-crisis era has not been taken. Instead, the prevailing policy paradigm of the post-crisis period – discursively unified and sustained by David Cameron's government – has intensified the regressively redistributive dynamics at the core of the neo-liberal project. Ultimately, this is likely to further entrench structural weaknesses in Britain's economy in the years ahead.