Costly Coasean Bargaining and Property Right Security

This paper examines how transaction costs affect Coasean bargaining with secure and insecure property rights in the lab. Consistent with the theory that secure property rights lowers the cost of non-cooperation, we find that bargaining efficiency is inversely related to property right security. Less secure property rights increased economic efficiency twofold. Property owners with secure rights are more likely to opt for their riskless outside option rather than pay the costs of bargaining.     

分配承诺、产权与经济效率

在政府分配的承诺可置信时,地方政府分权竞争的结果是资方获得了最大利益,而劳方的利益被忽视了。而当政府分配的承诺不可置信时,资方的投资生产激励会受到较大的削弱,社会福利会受到较大损害。关于中国经济增长奇迹的经济解释,文章认为:在改革开放初期,中性政府对经济增长起到了很重要的作用;而随着改革开放的深入,地方政府分权的竞争激励机制可能起到了更为重要的作用。产业结构与产权保护有着密切的关系,要使产业结构完成升级,拥有良好的产权保护制度是一个重要条件。针对地方政府分权竞争带来的问题以及承诺可置信性缺失,文章引入第三方规制和以权力配置作为一种可信承诺等两种解决途径,并指出了其不足之处。     

Determinants of intra‐firm trade: Evidence from foreign affiliates in Sub‐Saharan Africa

By exploiting a unique sample of foreign affiliates in Sub‐Saharan Africa, we study previously examined and unexamined firm‐level determinants of intra‐firm trade. We document that foreign affiliates engaging in intra‐firm trade are relatively few and that the majority of these also engage in trade at arm's length, which accounts for an important fraction of their total trade. The identified firm‐level determinants of intra‐firm trade are consistent with property rights and intangible asset theories of the multinational firm, with international production hierarchy theories, as well as with theories of complex FDI and of multinational activity under credit constraints.     

Social welfare and competitiveness

The predominant narrative of globalisation is that it has led to a decline in the power of the nation state and an increase in the power of markets. Others note that the power of the state has increased along some dimensions, even as it has lost economic power. Both of these literatures, however, tend to be too reductive by focusing on the national scale. In contrast, this paper argues that globalisation may reconfigure, respatialise, and potentially increase the economic and political power of certain states. This hypothesis is tested empirically through reference to Chinese engagement in the Southern African country of Zambia using data obtained from in-depth interviews conducted with government officials, Chinese business owners, employees and other key informants.     

A Political Economy Application of the “Tragedy of the Anticommons”: The Greek Government Debt Crisis

The tragedy of the anticommons unfolds when separate social agents—be they private owners of a property who intend to use the property for their own economic benefit or political actors who pursue their political objectives—do not hold effective rights to use their economic or political power for their own purposes without consent of the other players of the economic or political game. I shall discuss the Greek government debt crisis and the Eurozone countries’ policies toward Greece within the analytical framework of the tragedy of the anticommons in this paper. I do not intend to dig deep into the structure and long-term trends of public and private finances in Greece. I shall only show that the successive bail-out programs of the Eurozone countries were doomed to fail because of these countries’ competitive and non-cooperative approach to the Greek financial problems. I shall also show that a coordinating agency, say the IMF, can foster the coordinated outcome only under strict informational conditions.     

Patriarchy and Property Rights among Yoruba Women in Nigeria

ABSTRACT

In most patriarchal societies, women's property rights are often achieved vicariously, usually through their husbands. By contrast, among the Yoruba of Nigeria, women have some levels of autonomy and independence such that they can accumulate property to which their husbands have no claim, yet they customarily do not have any inheritance right to their husbands’ property. This study examines how this gender-equitable property rights regime affects gender relations at the household and societal levels through in-depth interviews conducted in 2012 with fifty-six purposively selected women property owners who lived in urban Ibadan, Nigeria. Findings include that though economic power has improved the status of the women and contributes to development of their communities, it has not yet translated into equity in decision making. More than economic power is required to attain equality. The capability of defining goals and acting upon them is also critical.     

REGIONAL ANTI‐CORRUPTION EFFORT,POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND FIRM INNOVATION EFFORT: EVIDENCE FROM CHINA

This paper examines how firm characteristics and local anti‐corruption effort moderate the influence of political connections on enterprises’ private R&D investment using data from 2,587 Chinese A‐share listed enterprises. Our results show that the local anti‐corruption institutional environment significantly moderates the strong relationship between political connections and enterprises’ private R&D investment. Firm characteristics (i.e., firm size and firm age) also show a moderating effect on the relationship between political connection and enterprises’ private R&D investment; larger and older enterprises are more likely to have innovative resources and business cooperation partners, and thus are able to reduce their degree of reliance on political connections and government funding. The results of our study suggest the importance of having a transparent and fair institutional environment for enterprise innovation activities.     

Educated Bandits: Endogenous Property Rights and Intra‐Elite Distribution of Human Capital

This article presents a simple model of endogenous institutions linking property rights to the distribution of human capital between political and economic elite groups. In the absence of institutional constraints, the commitment problem of the political elites is intensified, because their human capital can turn out to be a double‐edged sword raising their efficiency in predation as well as in production. In general, the more human capital the political elites have, the stronger the institutional concessions they are ready to offer to attarct investment. Provided that predation depends sufficiently on human capital, the political elites can credibly commit to respect property rights by specializing in fields that are relevant for the priavte sector. Brain drain can undermine the transition to stable property rights even when the political elites are well‐educated. Comparative narratives from Malaysia and Zimbabwe are presented to motivate the theoretical discussion.     

Exporting to fragile states in Africa: Firm‐level evidence

This study analyses the effect of fragility in destination markets on firm export behavior and the role of firm size in mediating adverse outcomes. The analysis is conducted using firm transaction data on Kenyan exports to Africa over the period 2004–2013. The analysis reveals that fragility negatively affects a firm's decision to enter a given destination market, reducing Kenya's bilateral trade flows to African countries. Larger firms are more resilient to destination shocks in fragility and are less likely to exit. These results are robust to alternative measures of destination fragility, and the exclusion of bordering countries and the East African Community partner states. Our analysis reveals that the effect of business fragility (regulatory quality, government effectiveness, and control of corruption) dominates that of political fragility (voice and accountability, rule of law, and political stability), although both effects are negative and significant.     

产权保护、业务变更与企业绩效

针对我国上市公司频频发生的业务变脸行为,本文考察了产权保护对上市公司主营业务变更的影响及其经济后果。研究发现,在产权保护越差的地区,由于研发投入的不足和已有竞争优势的较快散失,公司更易变更自己的经营主营业务;国有公司由于更多地得到政府支持,产权保护对其主营业务变更的影响较弱,且这一结果主要集中于政府绝对控股和直接持股的公司。短期内,通过改变经营主营业务,公司业绩得到改善,但长期来看,由于竞争力的缺乏和发展后劲不足,主营业务变更公司的市场表现较差。     

Gandhian Economics from the Perspective of John R. Commons

We examine the evolution of law regarding corporations' legal status and the power of government to regulate corporations. John R. Commons described this jurisprudential history as changing the meaning of property from individual ownership to a going business owned by a going concern. Despite this history, the U.S. Supreme Court's 2010 decision, Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, accorded corporations the rights of individual citizens, characterizing the corporation as an "association of citizens." If corporations are associations of citizens rather than going concerns distinct from their owners, the law will elevate private interests of shareholders above collective interests.     

Rapacious Resource Depletion,Excessive Investment and Insecure Property Rights: A Puzzle

For a country fractionalized in competing factions, each owning part of the stock of natural exhaustible resources, or with insecure property rights, we analyze how resources are transformed into productive capital to sustain consumption. We allow property rights to improve as the country transforms natural resources into capital. The ensuing power struggle about the control of resources is solved as a non-cooperative differential game. Prices of resources and depletion increase faster than suggested by the Hotelling rule, especially with many competing factions and less secure property rights. As a result, the country substitutes away from resources to capital too rapidly and invests more than predicted by the Hartwick rule. The theory suggests that power struggle boosts output but depresses aggregate consumption and welfare, especially in highly fractionalized countries with less secure property rights. Also, adjusted net saving estimates calculated by the World Bank using market prices over-estimate welfare-based measures of genuine saving. Since our theory suggests that genuine saving is zero while empirically they are negative in resource-rich, fractionalized countries, we suggest ways of resolving this puzzle.     

Export Competition between Landlocked and Coastal Countries: An Analysis of Strategic Export Policies

This paper analyzes economic rivalry between two firms using an international Cournot duopoly model, where a firm from a landlocked country (LC) and a firm from a coastal country (CC) compete in a third‐country market. It is assumed that the landlocked country firm adopts a transport‐cost reducing R&D subsidized by its government, while the CC government imposes a toll fee on the LC firm. The findings show since a change in the LC's transport‐cost reducing R&D subsidy has a positive effect on its export and a negative effect on the CC's export, both measures have effective strategic export policies.     

赋权视角下实现中国经济可持续发展的思考

现今中国实现长期经济发展面临的各种结构性难题的深层次原因是公民权利的缺失。转变政府权力主导资源配置方式,赋予民众对涉及自身利益重大决策的知情权、参与权和表决权,赋予农民完整的土地财产权,赋予公民自由迁徙和自由择业的权利,赋予农户和企业金融决策的自主权,是实现中国经济可持续发展的必由之路。而民主和法治建设则是民众权利回归最基本的制度保障。     

Adam Smith's “tolerable administration of justice” and the Wealth of Nations

Adam Smith argues that a country’s income depends on its labor productivity, which in turn hinges on the division of labor. But why are some countries able to take advantage of the division of labor and become rich, while others fail to do so and remain poor? Smith describes how the security of property rights, through a “tolerable administration of justice,” allows investment and exchange to take place, bringing about economic progress. Recent empirical work on economic development has supported Smith’s emphasis on a country’s political “institutions,” particularly the judiciary, in determining its national income.     

跨国基金的产权关系:一种新诠释

本文在假定基金产权划分为直接产权与间接产权、物质产权与价值产权的基础上,以离岸基金为例探讨跨国基金的产权关系.基金产权相互分离,且归属于相对独立的不同产权所有者,是基金实施跨国经营和跨国融资的产权基础,其中关键是,基金的国家间接物质产权与国家间接价值产权相分离并分别归属于不同国家的政府.实现跨国基金的制度创新和管理创新需要,规范各类基金产权所有者的权利和行为,降低基金内部的交易费用,重新构建基金治理机制.     

Political Influence of Firms in the Tradables and Non‐Tradables Sectors: A Cross‐Country Analysis

Recent theoretical studies have shown that firms lobby government agencies to influence the structure of trade policies. This article empirically examines whether firms classified as either exporting or import‐competing (i.e. firms in the tradables sector) have differential levels of political influence relative to domestic firms that only produce non‐traded goods (i.e. firms in the non‐tradables sector). We use a rich firm‐level, cross‐sectional dataset from the World Business Environment Survey to achieve this objective. Results from the analysis reveal that exporting or import‐competing firms do have more political influence relative to domestic firms that neither export nor produce import‐competing goods. Market structure, firm age, firm size, government ownership, and dependence on public infrastructure also affect the extent of political influence that firms have.     

Private Property Rights,Investment Patterns,and Asset Structure

The right to private property was first written into the Constitution of the People's Republic of China in March 2004. This study takes advantage of the 2004 amendment and uses a difference‐in‐differences approach to empirically test the impact of private property rights security on investment patterns and thereby on asset structure. Employing the Chinese Industrial Enterprises Database from 2000 to 2007 to implement the analysis, we find that private property rights security has not only led enterprises to boost investment in both fixed assets and intangible assets but also induced them to allocate available resources more towards intangible assets. We address two potential concerns about our empirical design.     

FIRM‐LEVEL DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL INFLUENCE

This paper uses a large cross‐country survey of business firms to assess their influence on government policies. When controlling for endogeneity, we find that such an influence is associated with larger firms and to a lesser extent with government ownership, but not with the degree of competition. We also find that firms' perception of being politically influential is enhanced with the country's level of institutional quality.     

A Simple Model of Inefficient Institutions

This paper develops a simple model of economic and political institutions that lead to poor aggregate economic performance. In the model economy, groups with political power, the elite, choose policies to increase their income and to directly or indirectly transfer resources from the rest of society to themselves. The resulting equilibrium is generally inefficient because of three distinct mechanisms: (1) revenue extraction, (2) factor price manipulation and (3) political consolidation. In particular, the elite may pursue inefficient policies to extract revenue from other groups. They may do so to reduce the demand for factors coming from other groups in the economy, thus indirectly benefiting from changes in factor prices. Finally, they may try to impoverish other groups competing for political power. The elite's preferences over inefficient policies translate into inefficient economic institutions. The notable exception to this general picture emerges when long‐term investments are important, thus creating a commitment (holdup) problem, whereby equilibrium taxes and regulations are worse than the elite would like them to be from an ex ante point of view. In this case, economic institutions that provide additional security of property rights to other groups can be useful.