The political economy of land reform choices in Central and Eastern Europe

In all Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) land reform has been a key part of the overall agrarian reforms and land reform procedures differ significantly among CEECs. This paper, by focusing on distributional effects and political economy implications, explains why thirteen CEEC governments chose particular reform procedures. Key factors in their choices are the history of the land ownership, including the post-collectivization ownership status, length of Communist rule, the ethnicity of pre-collectivization owners, and the equality of pre-collectivization asset distribution. These factors influence the distributional consequences of the land reform, including the (potential) conflicts between efficiency, social equity, and historical justice, and thus the political economy equilibrium.     

经济改革与经济学转型

我国的经济改革是在传统计划体制背景下启动的,也是在一定的改革意识引领下发生的,但在传统政治经济学框架内形成的改革理论具有一定的局限性。改革开放以来,经济学者运用现代经济学方法对中国经济进行分析,获得了有价值的成果。但是,我国经济学理论的转型还没有完成。为了深化市场经济的改革,如何科学地认识市场经济,怎样在经济学理论研究中体现现代精神,都需要在范式转型的前提下继续进行探索。     

Democracy and prosperity in two decades of transition1

This article revisits the relationship between democracy, liberalization and prosperity in transition countries, using a panel of 25 countries over 20 years. Earlier investigations found political and economic liberalization to be positively correlated although the relationship between political liberalization and prosperity remained unclear. In this article, the results are ambiguous regarding the relationship between democracy indicators by Freedom House and the Polity Project on one hand and growth on the other. This contribution therefore investigates the component variables of these indicators to determine their degree of influence. The findings suggest that basic constitutional rights and constraints on the government rather than political competition as such may be conducive to both economic liberalization and prosperity in the transition countries.     

Institutions and growth in limited access societies

We build a dynamic political economy model with a two-class society, workers and the elite, in which the elite formation, the innovation rate and fiscal policy are endogenous. The model generates a mapping between institutions and patterns of growth consistent with empirical evidence. Ex ante, when facing constraints in choosing institutions, the elite may delegate policy control to some of its members, even though such delegation exacerbates the conflict within the elite and causes policy failures. Committing to such institutional arrangements prevents more harmful outcomes, such as rapid entry and subsequent deterioration of the elite?s economic and political power.     

On the distribution of education and democracy

This paper empirically analyzes the influence of education on democracy by controlling for unobservable heterogeneity and by taking into account the persistency of some of the variables. The most novel finding is that an increase in the education attained by the majority of the population is what matters for the implementation and sustainability of democracy, rather than the average years of schooling. We show this result is robust to issues pertaining omitted variables, outliers, sample selection, or a narrow definition of the variables used to measure democracy.     

Why Are Rich Countries More Politically Cohesive?*

We document empirically that rich countries are more politically cohesive than poorer countries. In order to explain this regularity, we provide a model where political cohesion is linked to the emergence of a fully functioning market economy. Without market exchange, the welfare of inherently selfish individuals will be mutually independent. Whoever has greater bargaining power will be willing to make decisions that enhance the productivity of their supporters at the expense of other groups in society. If the gains from specialization are sufficiently large, however, a market economy will emerge. From being essentially non‐cohesive under self‐sufficiency, the political decision‐making process becomes cohesive in the market economy, because the welfare of individuals will be mutually interdependent as a result of the exchange of goods.     

Public ownership of banks and economic growth

In an influential article, La Porta et al. (2002) argue that public ownership of banks is associated with lower GDP growth. We show that this relationship does not hold for all countries, but depends on a country's initial conditions, in particular its financial development and political institutions. Public ownership is harmful only if a country has low financial development and low institutional quality. The negative impact of public ownership on growth fades quickly as the financial and political system develops. In highly developed countries, we find no or even positive effects. Policy conclusions for individual countries are likely to be misleading if such heterogeneity is ignored.     

Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies

What explains private investment in autocracies, where institutions that discourage expropriation in democracies are absent? We argue that institutionalized ruling parties allow autocrats to make credible commitments to investors. Such parties promote investment by solving collective-action problems among a designated group, who invest with the expectation that the autocrat will not attempt their expropriation. We derive conditions under which autocrats want to create such parties, and we predict that private investment and governance will be stronger in their presence. We illustrate the model by examining the institutionalization of the Chinese Communist Party.     

The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

China's Fiscal Decentralization and Regional Economic Growth

The present paper applies Lucas's theory of endogenous growth and Stiglitz's theory of local public goods to build an econometric model consisting of five simultaneous equations to study China's fiscal decentralization effects on regional economic growth. The model is estimated by two‐stage least squares using a set of panel data on 31 Chinese provinces during 1996–2005. The estimated results show that China's fiscal decentralization increased the local governments' expenditure on physical infrastructure and education, which led to the rising local physical capital stock and human capital levels, respectively, and then resulted in the growth of regional economies.     

Integration and transition: Scenarios for the location of production and trade in Europe

Applying a newly developed CGE-model, we present scenarios for the future economic geography of Europe. The model divides the world into ten regions, five of which are European, and 14 industries, of which 12 are imperfectly competitive. With a complete input-output structure, the model captures comparative advantage mechanisms as well as intra-industry trade and 'new economic geography' agglomeration forces. The simulations focus on the consequences of successful transformation in Eastern Europe. The results indicate that transformation and European integration are of great importance for Eastern Europe, while the overall effects for other European regions are small. Individual sectors in the EU, such as Textiles and Transport Equipment, are, however, in some cases strongly affected.
JEL classification: C68, F12, F17, R11.     

Disorganization and financial collapse

Since the fall of communism, the former Soviet Union experienced a strong output decline and a dramatic increase in arrears and barter. We develop a model which explains how these three phenomena are connected. We introduce liquidity and credit constraints into a model of disorganization and show how these problems can alleviate the hold-up problem. We argue further that barter creates a hostage that allows to deal with disorganization when credit enforcement becomes prohibitively costly. Based on a firm survey in Ukraine in 1997, we test how input shortages, financial shortages and barter affect output growth of firms.     

Discussion

Institutions are widely recognized as determinants of economic development. However, institutional economists often overlook pertinent historical incidents in their search for broad patterns. At times, this search oversimplifies truly complex phenomena. In light of this, we apply a micro-institutional analysis to explain the success of colonial Brazil's early settlements as a mix of accident and design. By doing so, we stress the limitations that can result when applying an aggregate institutional interpretation of economic history and development. We also apply the principal-agent model and its main feature – risk-sharing – to an extreme case that involves settlers and natives risking their lives, while Portuguese principals sought to reduce transaction costs in an important and resource-rich colony.