Is Audit Committee Equity Compensation Related to Audit Fees?*

Section 301 of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) implicitly assumes that audit committees can independently determine audit fees. Critics of section 301 have questioned this assumption in particular, and the efficacy of section 301 more generally. In response, the SEC issued a concept release in 2015 calling for public disclosure of the process that audit committees follow for determining auditor compensation. Motivated by these calls and the widespread use of stocks and options to compensate firms' independent directors, we examine the relation between equity compensation granted to audit committee members and audit fees. Using a sample of 3,685 firm‐year observations during 2007–2015, we find a negative relation between audit committee equity compensation and audit fees, consistent with larger equity pay inducing audit committee members to compromise independence by paying lower audit fees. These findings are robust to controlling for endogeneity, firm size, alternative measures of equity compensation, alternative samples, and an alternative treatment of extreme values. We further show that larger equity compensation is associated with lower earnings quality. We also find that the negative effect of equity compensation on audit fees is stronger when city‐level audit market competition is high. However, this negative relation disappears when (i) firms face high litigation risk, (ii) auditors have stronger bargaining power, (iii) the audit committee includes a high proportion of accounting experts, and (iv) auditors are industry experts. Our results are relevant for regulators and investors.     

What is the Relationship Between Audit Partner Busyness and Audit Quality?

Contemporaneous studies generally find a negative relationship between audit partner busyness (APB), measured as the number of clients in an audit partner's portfolio, and audit quality. Their argument is that a busy partner does not devote sufficient time to properly audit his average client. Contrary to these studies, we argue that when busyness is optimally chosen by the partner, in equilibrium, there is no causal relationship between APB and audit quality. Using Australian data for the 1999–2010 period, we show that APB is not reliably linked to audit quality, consistent with this equilibrium theory. We argue that causality can be ascribed to the APB‐audit quality relationship when accounting scandals exogenously shocked the Australian audit market during the 2002–04 period and APB likely deviated from optimum levels. Supporting this disequilibrium view, we find that higher APB reduces a partner's propensity to issue first‐time going‐concern opinions during this period. Our evidence highlights the importance of the equilibrium condition in testing empirical associations between audit outcomes and endogenous auditor attributes, and shows that the detrimental effect of APB on audit quality is not as pervasive as contemporaneous studies suggest.     

How Do Audit Offices Respond to Audit Fee Pressure? Evidence of Increased Focus on Nonaudit Services and their Impact on Audit Quality

We investigate whether audit offices respond to audit fee pressure by increasing their focus on nonaudit services (NAS), as well as the combined effect of audit fee pressure and an increased focus on NAS on audit quality. We find a positive association between audit fee pressure and changes in NAS at the audit office level. We also find increased rates of client misstatement among audit offices that increase focus on NAS in the presence of audit fee pressure compared to audit offices that do not, suggesting a joint effect on audit quality. We find that the reduction in audit quality occurs in large audit offices. Overall, we provide evidence that audit offices’ provision of additional NAS in the presence of fee pressure is an important dimension to consider when examining the effects of declining audit fees on audit quality.     

Does Audit Committee Accounting Expertise Help to Promote Audit Quality? Evidence from Auditor Reporting of Internal Control Weaknesses

In this study, we examine whether audit committee accounting expertise helps to promote audit quality by motivating auditors to conduct diligent internal control audits and make appropriate internal control assessments because audit committee accounting expertise safeguards auditors from dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. Among clients with existing and likely internal control material weaknesses (as proxied by future restatements of audited financial statements), we find a greater likelihood of adverse internal control audit opinions when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise (measured by the proportion of accounting experts on the audit committee). Among all clients, we find a lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal following an adverse internal control audit opinion when the audit committee has greater accounting expertise. In further analyses, we find that this lower likelihood of subsequent auditor dismissal occurs when at least two audit committee members possess accounting expertise. We also find some evidence that CFO influence (but not CEO influence) over the audit committee negates the increased likelihood of adverse internal control opinions when internal control material weaknesses likely exist, as well as the decreased likelihood of auditor dismissal following adverse internal control opinions. These findings have important implications for regulators and corporate nominating committees interested in promoting audit committee effectiveness.     

Audit Risk Controlling of Computing Network Accounting Data

With the rapid development of computing network technology, the computer techniques are used widely in accounting and make the accounting operation more convenient. But this also makes the safety of accounting data face more risks. This paper analyses the challenges of the network accounting data for the audit. The methods of how to control accounting data are being put forward under the condition of network audit.     

When Do Ineffective Audit Committee Members Experience Turnover?

We use information extracted from a major proxy advisory service to test predictions from institutional theory regarding when and why audit committee (AC) members experience turnover because of evidence of ineffective governance. First, we broadly categorize AC ineffectiveness concerns as either (i) financial reporting failures or (ii) characteristics of individual AC members. Institutional theory suggests that the visible nature of the first category is more likely to threaten perceptions of AC legitimacy and hence prompt turnover, which is what we find. We then enrich the analysis by interacting the AC‐member ineffectiveness indicators with the extent of shareholder protest votes, finding that shareholder dissent elevates the turnover effects of both categories of ineffectiveness, as institutional theory would predict. Finally, we find that otherwise effective AC members face an increased likelihood of turnover if they serve on the AC when financial reporting failures are discovered, even if they were not on the AC when the events precipitating the failures occurred. Overall, our findings support the institutional theoretic premise that boards take remedial actions when necessary to restore perceived legitimacy.     

Do Clients’ Enterprise Systems Affect Audit Quality and Efficiency?

Enterprise systems (ESs) are widely used to support business processes along the enterprise value chain. It has been shown that ESs, by integrating business functions and making information about day‐to‐day activities available, enhance operational transparency and improve the internal information environment. However, while ES‐based business infrastructures can offer many benefits, their prevalence and increased complexity have also brought new challenges to external auditors. Motivated by the prominence of this issue for auditors and regulators and by the scarcity of research jointly examining ESs and auditors’ work, we investigate whether the presence and extent of client firms’ ES implementations are related to the quality and efficiency of auditors’ work. Using proprietary archival data on ES implementations and controlling for self‐selection, we find that ES implementation improves the quality and efficiency of current and future years’ audit work. Specifically, there are fewer restatements, a greater likelihood of auditors issuing going‐concern opinions to firms that do not survive, higher accruals‐based auditing quality, a lower likelihood of Form 10‐K filing delays, and generally lower audit fees. We further show that the benefits of ESs generally increase with the scope of implementation and are generally greater when the ES includes accounting and finance systems. Inconsistent with improvement in the quality of auditors’ work, we find no evidence that ESs help auditors identify material weaknesses in advance of restatement announcements and we find that, even in the presence of ESs, auditors issue an excessive number of going‐concern opinions to clients that survive.     

Are Reviewers' Judgements Influenced by Memo Structure and Conclusions Documented in Audit Workpapers?*

This paper investigates how the initial conclusion reached by the preparer of audit workpapers and the manner with which the preparer structures the associated evidence can influence the reviewer's judgement in an audit setting. We conducted an experiment in which auditors reviewed the work of a preparer who had concluded that the account of the client's major customer was either collectible or not collectible. The preparer's memo was structured in a neutral manner or stylized to emphasize (de‐emphasize) evidence consistent (inconsistent) with the preparer's conclusion. Results showed that reviewers placed less reliance on the conclusions reached by the preparer when the preparer's memo was stylized than when the memo was structured in a neutral manner. These results suggest that reviewers are sensitive to stylization attempts by preparers. Implications of the paper are discussed.     

Do Investors Respond to Explanatory Language Included in Unqualified Audit Reports?

This article investigates whether investors respond to explanatory language (EL) added to unqualified audit reports. Although prior research finds an association between auditor EL and lower financial reporting quality, surveys suggest that many investors limit their attention to the unqualified nature of the opinion. We use three‐day abnormal returns and abnormal trading volume to measure investor response to EL in unqualified audit reports issued from 2000 to 2014. We find little evidence to indicate that investors respond to auditor EL at the audit report release date. In further analyses, we find that the lack of investor response is attributable both to incomplete investor reactions (55 percent of EL occurrences) and previous incorporation of EL (40 percent of EL occurrences). Overall, the results support policymakers’ initiatives to improve the usefulness of unqualified audit reports.     

Did the 1998 Merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand Increase Audit Quality?

We examine the effects of the 1998 merger of Price Waterhouse (PW) and Coopers & Lybrand (CL) on the audit quality of the merged firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) at both the firm and office levels, where audit quality is surrogated by the auditor's propensity to issue a going‐concern opinion, clients’ likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, and clients’ accrual quality. At the firm level, we find that the merger increased audit quality for PwC relative to the audit quality of the other Big N firms. At the office level, our findings, albeit mixed, collectively suggest that the improvement in firm‐level audit quality was likely driven by the improvement in audit quality at PwC's overlapping offices, that is, offices in cities where both PW and CL had separate offices prior to the merger. Further, our findings suggest that although the PW/CL merger increased auditor concentration in local audit markets with PwC overlapping offices, the merger improved (rather than hurt) audit quality in those markets. Overall, our study contributes to the extant sparse literature on the effect of Big N mergers on audit quality, and is of potential interest to regulators.     

Does the Identity of Engagement Partners Matter? An Analysis of Audit Partner Reporting Decisions

This study examines the persistence and economic consequences of variations in reporting style across audit partners in individual engagements. Our results show that both aggressive and conservative audit reporting, measured by the pattern of prior Type 2 and Type 1 audit reporting error rates in auditor‐specific clienteles, persist over time and extend to other clients of the same partner. Analyses of abnormal accruals and persistence of client firms’ accrual estimates corroborate this finding, and hold both for private and publicly listed companies. Further, our results also show that the market penalizes client firms susceptible to aggressive audit partner reporting decisions. In particular, we find that our proxies for aggressive audit reporting are related to higher interest rates, worse credit ratings and less favorable forecasts of insolvency for private client companies, and a lower Tobin's Q for publicly listed client companies. Collectively, these results imply that audit partner aggressive or conservative reporting is a systematic audit partner attribute and not randomly distributed across engagements.     

Mind the Gap: Why Do Experts Have Differences of Opinion Regarding the Sufficiency of Audit Evidence Supporting Complex Fair Value Measurements?

Reported deficiencies continue to persist in audits of fair value measurements and other complex accounting estimates (hereafter, “FVMs”), despite improvements in auditor performance observed by regulators. The persistence of reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs suggests that factors underlying this trend may be more complicated and multidimensional than previously suggested by regulators and academic research, which has focused largely on auditors' unsatisfactory performance as the principal source of reported deficiencies. Drawing from the judgment and decision‐making expertise literature, we gather field‐based data from audit experts to identify additional factors that are likely to be contributing to differences of opinion between audit and inspection experts and the persistence of reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs. We find evidence that audit experts interpret standards and evaluate audit evidence differently than inspectors, and thus perceive there to be a gap between what auditors and inspectors regard as sufficient appropriate audit evidence to support audits of FVMs (hereafter, “FVM gap”). Moreover, results highlight several areas in audits of FVMs where differences of opinion exist between auditor and inspector experts regarding what constitutes a reported deficiency. Within the contexts we examine, our results identify additional factors, beyond deficient auditor performance, that may contribute to the FVM gap. We also report audit partners' recommendations for ways to reduce the FVM gap and suggest avenues for future research. Gaining a more complete understanding of sources contributing to reported deficiencies will help regulators, standard setters, audit firms, and academics to identify ways to reduce the FVM gap and reported deficiencies in audits of FVMs.     

Discussion of “Does the Identity of Engagement Partner Matter? An Analysis of Audit Partner Reporting Decisions”

The authors of this provocative study apply commonly used audit quality surrogate measures to a large and unique set of financial and other data on statutory audits of small private companies in Sweden. The paper has received unparalleled attention by the financial press and the PCAOB for its presumed support for regulatory intervention in standards for U.S. public company audits. In this Discussant Comment, I review the paper's content, analyze its predictive validity, and discuss its multiple implications plus, following Conference instructions, I provide constructive suggestions for improvements. Based on predictive validity analysis, I conclude that engagement partner assignment strategy is an important and acknowledged omitted variable that affects the study's internal validity via both the independent variable (partner's prior performance measure) and the dependent variable (borrower's cost of debt capital). The omission also affects construct validities and, if audit firms are applying a plausible assignment strategy, then interpretation of the study's main results would be reversed. Finally, the lack of a standards intervention noted by the authors and the extreme size and other differences between audits of Swedish private companies and U.S. public companies impair external validity and generalization to the U.S. intervention. As to improvements, I suggest that the authors (i) ask Swedish lenders to validate their presumed use of partner performance ratings in determining a borrower's interest rate, and (ii) ask Swedish Big 4 audit firms to provide a few internal partner performance ratings for comparison with the external performance measures used in the study. This two‐pronged, multimethod approach might confirm or deny critical assumptions underlying the present study and may substantively inform standards setters, evidence‐based standards, and fellow researchers about the validity of commonly applied surrogates for audit quality and the study's stated conclusion.