Cross‐Subsidies,and the Elasticity of Informality to Social Expenditures: The Case of Mexico's Seguro Popular

How is the size of the informal sector affected when the distribution of social expenditures across formal and informal workers changes? How is it affected when the tax rate changes along with the generosity of these transfers? In our search model, taxes are levied on formal‐sector workers as a proportion of their wage. Transfers, in contrast, are lump‐sum and are received by both formal and informal workers. This implies that high‐wage formal workers subsidize low‐wage formal workers as well as informal workers. We calibrate the model to Mexico and perform counterfactuals. We find that the size of the informal sector is quite inelastic to changes in taxes and transfers. This is due to the presence of search frictions and to the cross‐subsidy in our model: for low‐wage formal jobs, a tax increase is roughly offset by an increase in benefits, leaving the unemployed approximately indifferent. Our results are consistent with the empirical evidence on the recent introduction of the “Seguro Popular” healthcare program.     

Minimum Wage: Does it Improve Welfare in Thailand?

We study the causal impact of the minimum wage on labor market outcomes, household consumption, inequality and poverty in Thailand by relying on policy variation in minimum wages over time across provinces. We find that minimum‐wage increases have a large and significant impact on the likelihood of working in the uncovered sector among workers with elementary education. However, the impact is very small and insignificant among other labor market groups. In contrast, the minimum wage has large positive effects on the formal sector wages of low‐earning workers, such as the young, elderly and low educated. Increases in the minimum wage are associated with reductions in household poverty and consumption inequality at the bottom half of the distribution.     

An Efficiency Enhancing Minimum Wage

We consider an economy with a tax on all labor earnings. We discover that a slightly binding minimum wage on one sector can enhance efficiency. The minimum wage attracts high‐reservation wage workers into the minimum‐wage sector. If the labor demand curve in the free sector is quite flat, the vast majority of workers displaced by the minimum wage find employment in the free sector, raising aggregate employment. This displacement of workers by the only slightly binding minimum wage has negligible effects on efficiency. So efficiency and tax revenue rise as the minimum wage pulls labor out of untaxed leisure, where too much of the labor force is lurking, into taxed work.     

The Vietnam reforms,change in wage inequality and the role of the minimum wage

The Vietnam ‘renovation’ reforms were implemented during the 1990s, but their full effect was only felt several years later. We present evidence on the developments in real wage growth and inequality in Vietnam from 1998 to 2008. Using a variety of approaches (traditional measures of inequality, comparison of density functions, decomposition of the change in real wage by sector as well as a detailed decomposition of the change in the Gini), we present a consistent picture: contrary to what one might have expected given the nature of the reforms, inequality declined sharply in the private sector (but not in the state sector). This study links these developments to the policy of aggressively increasing the minimum wage over the past several years, differences in implementation by sector as well as variation in the over‐time changes in minimum wage.     

Are Minimum Wages to Blame for Informality in the Labour Market?

The paper estimates the impact of the minimum wage on formal and informal employment in a developing country combining the use of aggregate time series data with modern time-series methods. The analysis is carried out for the case of Brazil over the period 1982–2002. The hypothesis under investigation is that minimum wage rises price workers out of the formal labour market and into the informal sector. The modelling strategy involves the estimation of the long-run structure as well as the short-term dynamics of employment equations in which the minimum wage enters as an explanatory variable.JEL codes: J23 J51 C32     

Trade Reform and Informal Wages

When trade reform contracts protected formal sectors in developing countries and the formal workers move to the informal sector for employment, does that reduce informal wages? Using a 2 × 2 Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson (HOS) structure with formal–informal production organization for the same commodity, we show that a tariff cut in the import‐competing sector increases both informal wage and employment under very reasonable assumptions. An increase in the price of the export commodity will also increase informal wages, although aggregate informal employment unambiguously falls even if the informal export sector is labor intensive. Furthermore, the formal–informal segmentation of each sector opens up an interesting, hitherto unexplored, possibility that the informal export sector may contract despite a price increase in this sector. Change in the overall size of the export sector is also ambiguous and conditional on the relative strengths of changes in these two segments.     

THE IMPACT OF THE MINIMUM WAGE ON FEMALE EMPLOYMENT IN JAPAN

This article examines the impact of the minimum wage on employment, focusing on women in their 20s and 30s, who are known to be typical low‐wage workers in Japan. The results, based on a panel estimation, suggest that the minimum wage has a measurable impact on employment; the workers whose current wage is below the revised minimum wage are about 20–30 percentage points less likely to be employed in the following year than comparable low‐wage workers who are not affected by the revision of the minimum wage. The estimation results are sensitive to the choice of the control group. (JEL J23, J38, J88)     

Assessing the distributive effects of minimum wage

This paper analyzes the role of Uruguay's sharp minimum wage increases after 2004 amidst the country's slight wage inequality decrease. We found that the minimum wage increase has contributed to the reduction of wage inequality for formal workers mainly. However, we also found a negative impact on employment outside the capital city, Montevideo, and observed a reduction in working hours. These results raise doubts about the effectiveness of minimum wage as a redistribution instrument in developing countries.     

MINIMUM WAGE HIKES AND THE WAGE GROWTH OF LOW‐WAGE WORKERS

This paper presents difference‐in‐differences estimates of the impact of the British minimum wage on the wage growth of low‐wage employees. Estimates of the probability of low‐wage employees receiving positive wage growth have been significantly increased by the minimum wage upratings or hikes. However, whether the actual wage growth of these workers has been significantly raised or not depends crucially on the magnitude of the minimum wage hike considered. Findings are consistent with employers complying with the legally binding minimum wage but holding down or offsetting the wage growth that they might have awarded in periods of relatively low minimum wage hikes.     

Firm ownership and internal labour practices in a transition economy

One feature common to many post‐socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage structure in the state‐owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labour force works in the state sector. We explore firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labour practices and outcomes, in a transition setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to privately owned firms with foreign ownership. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies result in flatter wage–experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in greater need of formal training, a need that is in part met through direct government financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labour productivity. The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The internal labour practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit‐maximizing firms operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that exhibit much more idiosyncratic behaviour and whose labour practices are often indistinguishable from state firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of on‐going research yet we conjecture that various private sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role.     

Institutions for private sector development and pro‐poor growth: Evidence from Vietnam

Using the Vietnam Household Living Standards Survey 2008, we explore the differences in pro‐poor growth performance in provinces in Vietnam according to the quality of the provinces’ institutions that support private sector activity. We exploit the localized and varying effect of French colonial legacy across Vietnamese provinces to address the endogeneity of institutions. We find strong and robust evidence of a positive effect of good‐quality institutions that support private sector activity on pro‐poor growth and that enhanced working hours and hourly wage and extended income from non‐farm self‐employment play critical roles in this outcome.     

Increasing wage dispersion and the changes in relative employment and wages in Mexico's urban informal sector: 1987-1993

This study analyses the role of changes in informal/formal relative employment, wage levels and wage inequality in explaining increasing wage dispersion in Mexico during the 1987–1993 period. From 1987 to 1993, the variance of the log of hourly wages for Mexican workers increased by more than 50 per cent. Using data from the Encuesta nacional de empleo urbano we find that this increase in the overall wage dispersion was mainly driven by increasing wage dispersion in the formal sector coupled with a faster growth in formal sector employment as a percentage of total employment. However, compression in the distribution of wages within the informal sector contributed to substantially slowdown the increasing overall wage inequality. About 60 per cent of the 1987–1993 4.65 percentage point reduction in the informal sector share of total employment is explained by changes in the structure that determines sectoral employment; the rest is explained by changes in the composition of the labour force, particularly increases in the sectoral education gap and a change in the regional relative share of sectoral employment. Also, from 1987 to 1993 the sectoral wage ratio increased from 0.59 to 0.63. It seems that a relative improvement in unobserved skills in the informal sector helped to close the wage differential but this effect was partially offset by an increase in the relative prices of both observed and unobserved skills, as well as increases in relative observed skills in the formal sector, particularly education.     

IS MINIMUM WAGE AN EFFECTIVE ANTI‐POVERTY POLICY IN JAPAN?

This paper considers whether the minimum wage is a well‐targeted antipoverty policy by examining the backgrounds of minimum‐wage workers. Whether raising the minimum wage reduces employment for unskilled workers is also investigated. An examination of micro data from a large‐scale government household survey, the Employment Structure Survey (Shugyo Kozo Kihon Chosa), reveals that approximately half of minimum‐wage workers belong to households with annual incomes of more than 5 million yen as a non‐head of household. A regression analysis indicates that an increase in the minimum wage moderately reduces the employment of male teenagers and middle‐aged married women, while it encourages the employment of high‐school age youth.     

The Political Economy of the "Minimum-Wage Institution" in an Internationally Integrated Market

The paper explores the political economy of the “minimum‐wage institution (MWI)” in an internationally integrated product market. The authors consider a two‐sector Economic Union (EU) with a perfectly competitive agricultural sector and a unionized oligopolistic manufacturing sector in which there exist productivity asymmetries across firms. It is shown that efficient firms have an incentive to strategically opt for intercountry minimum‐wage agreements high enough to raise their inefficient rivals’ costs and thus gain business in equilibrium. The unions of workers in all countries also find these agreements in their best interest. As a consequence, the MWI may emerge as the equilibrium institutional resolution of alternative political processes (i.e., an EU‐wide referendum or special‐interest politics), despite its negative effect on aggregate employment.     

Assessing the Possible Antipoverty Effects of Recent Rises in Age‐Specific Minimum Wages in New Zealand

Real minimum wages increased by nearly 33 percent for adults and 123 percent for teenagers in New Zealand between 1999 and 2008. Where fewer than 2 percent of workers were being paid a minimum wage at the outset of this sample period, more than 8 percent of adult workers and 60 percent of teenage workers were receiving hourly earnings close to the minimum wage by the end of this period. These policy changes provide a unique opportunity to estimate the effects of the minimum wage on poverty. Although minimum wage workers are more likely to live in the poorest households, they are relatively widely dispersed throughout the income distribution. This is particularly true of teenage minimum wage workers. Furthermore, low‐income households often do not contain any working members. We estimate that a 10 percent increase in minimum wages, even without a loss in employment or hours of work, would lower the relative poverty rate by less than one‐tenth of a percentage point.     

Long‐Term Impact of Minimum Wages on Workers’ Careers: Evidence from Two Decades of Longitudinal Linked Employer–Employee Data

We analyze the impact of high youth minimum wages, relying on two decades of linked employer–employee data and a major law change. Alternative treatment/control groups follow from two strands of the literature, one tracking low‐skilled workers employed before the law change, who are eligible for a large wage increase, and one tracking the employment of full cohorts, whether working or in school when the law changed. High minimum wages led to a short‐term wage gain, which faded over time. They did not jeopardize employment prospects. Changes in the hours worked by part‐time workers point to increased job attachment.     

Economic reform and informal wage—a general equilibrium analysis

We attempt to trace the consequences of liberal economic policies on informal wage in a general equilibrium model with formal informal labor markets, wage-differential, vertical linkage and restricted capital movement. In particular, we show that the informal wage, representing income for a vast segment of unskilled labor may actually increase even if more people are employed in the informal segment. This also confirms that a contraction in the formal sector employment and the consequent expansion in the informal segment do not necessarily imply impoverishment of the existing set of informal workers.     

Informality,public employment and employment protection in developing countries

This paper proposes an equilibrium matching model for developing countries’ labor markets where the interaction between public, formal private and informal private sectors are taken into account. Theoretical analysis shows that gains from reforms aiming at liberalizing formal labor markets can be annulled by shifts in the public sector employment and wage policies. Since the public sector accounts for a substantial share of employment in developing countries, this approach is crucial to understand the main labor market outcomes of such economies. Wages offered by the public sector increase the outside option value of the workers during the bargaining processes in the formal and informal sectors. It becomes more profitable for workers to search on-the-job, in order to move to these more attractive and more stable types of jobs. The public sector therefore acts as an additional tax for the formal private firms. Using data on workers’ flows from Egypt, we show empirically and theoretically that the liberalization of labor markets plays against informal employment by increasing the profitability, and hence job creations, of formal jobs. The latter effect is however dampened or even sometimes nullified by the increase of the offered wages in the public sector observed at the same time.     

Changing wage structure and education in Vietnam, 1992–98

This paper examines the changes in relative earnings of workers with different education levels in Vietnam. Using a simple demand‐and‐supply framework developed by Katz and Murphy (1992 ), it was found that an increase in the relative demand for better‐educated male workers in particular appears to play an important role in explaining the earnings differentials between workers of different education groups. Education reform to better suit the needs of the post‐reform emerging market, on‐the‐job training for workers and equal access to education are some policy options that hold the key to reducing wage inequality between different education groups.     

劳动力异质性与中国最低工资标准就业效应分析

最低工资是当今世界各国广泛应用的经济政策,也是经济学家关心的议题。我国的最低工资标准偏低,且执行程度欠佳,所以我国的最低工资覆盖情况实际上符合部分覆盖的假设。同时由于我国劳动力的异质性以及最低工资制度的实施,导致未覆盖部门的低技能劳动力就业增多,而覆盖部门的高技能劳动力就业比例增多,总的就业效应方向并不明确。