“ENVIRONMENT”, “NEEDS” AND REAL INCOME COMPARISONS(1)

Conventional measures of national product make no pretence of including everything that affects welfare. As increasing attention is being paid to environmental pollution, the problem of incorporating certain non-economic variables into the analysis of well-being becomes more relevant. The object of this note is to show how a difference in “needs” for, and hence expenditures on, anti-pollutants, which will show up in conventional national accounts comparisons as differences in “tastes”, should be converted into differences in real income.     

Distorted Trade Barriers: A Dissection of Trade Costs in a “Distorted Gravity” Model

It is common in the trade literature to use iceberg transport costs to represent both tariffs and shipping costs alike. However, in models with monopolistic competition these are not identical trade restrictions. This difference is driven by how the two costs affect the extensive margin. We illustrate these differences in a gravity model. We show theoretically that trade flows are more elastic with respect to tariffs than transport costs and find a linear relationship between the elasticities with respect to tariffs, iceberg transport costs, and fixed market costs. We empirically validate these results using data on US product‐level imports.     

At the crossroads of “futurism” and “prospective”: Towards a Canadian synthesis?

North American “future studies” and the French concept of “prospective” have been integrated to provide the basis for an attempted “Canadian Synthesis” in the approach developed by the Montreal-based think-tank, the Gamma Institute. In this paper the founding president of Gamma outlines the four stages of the approach in a conceptual framework entitled the “Chronospace” and illustrates its applicability by referring to some of Gamma's projects in the last 12 years.     

“Constitutionalizing” the corporation

To become effective instruments in the attainment of a sustainable society, corporations should have their constitutional status settled. Thus far, mainly by Supreme Court decisions, corporations have an uncertain status. They are “persons” under the Constitution and have certain rights; but unlike natural persons, they do not have concomitant constitutional duties. Corporations should be viewed as “private” governments exercising substantial power in society. They are, however, considered to be associations of individuals rather than divisions of society. The need is to legitimate their governing power by “constitutionalizing” them. That can be done by corporations accepting, or having imposed upon them, two principal constitutional duties. First, means should be developed whereby corporate officers routinely take the general good into account. That duty could be implemented by making “social impact statements,” analogous to but broader than the familiar environmental impact statements, before making important corporate decisions. Secondly, as “sociological communities,” corporate officers wield considerable power over members of those communities. A bill of rights similar to the Constitution's Bill of Rights is recommended so as to make corporate power that is necessary for achievement of societal goals as tolerable and decent as possible. Acceptance of those duties would make corporations parts of, not separate from, the greater corporation called society. They would be private, profit-making entities with a definite public function. Preferably, the duties should be voluntarily accepted. Congress, however, has undoubted constitutional power to impose both, should it so desire.     

“Fair marriages”: An impossibility

For marriage markets [Gale, D. and Shapley, L.S., 1962, College admissions and the stability of marriage, American Mathematical Monthly 69, 9–15.] so-called fair matchings do not always exist. We show that restoring fairness by using monetary transfers is not always possible: there are marriage markets where no amount of money can guarantee the existence of a fair allocation.     

“Large” versus “Small” Players: A Closer Look at the Dynamics of Speculative Attacks

What is the role of “large players” (e.g., hedge funds) in speculative attacks? Recent work suggests that large players move early to induce smaller agents to attack. However, many observers argue that large players move late in order to benefit from interest‐rate differentials. We propose a model in which large players can do both. Using data on currency trading by foreign (large) and local (small) players, we find that foreign players moved last in three attacks on the Norwegian krone during the 1990s. During the attack on the Swedish krona after the Russian moratorium in 1998, foreign players moved early. Gains by delaying attack were small, however, because interest rates did not increase.     

The Role of Absolute Continuity in “Merging of Opinions” and “Rational Learning”

D. Blackwell and L. Dubins (1962, Ann. Math. Statist.38, 882–886) showed that opinions merge when priors are absolutely continuous. E. Kalai and E. Lehrer (1993, Econometrica61, 1019–1045) use this result to show that players in a repeated game eventually play like a Nash equilibrium. We provide an alternative proof of merging of opinions that clarifies the role of absolute continuity while casting doubt on the relevance of the result. Persistent disagreement, the opposite of merging, allows the construction of a sequence of mutually favorable “bets.” By a law of large numbers, both agents are certain they will win these bets on average. This certain disagreement violates absolute continuity. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C11, C69, C72, D83.     

MONITORING ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE POVERTY: “NOT ENOUGH” IS NOT THE SAME AS “MUCH LESS”

Financial poverty indicators assess which people have few financial resources and are thereby at risk of having an unacceptably low living standard. Most countries use one or several “official” poverty indicators, but they typically use either an absolute or a relative benchmark to determine what is unacceptable; absolute benchmarks are based on basic needs or rights while relative benchmarks depend on what is considered to be a “normal” living standard. Applying the absolute U.S. and the relative EU poverty indicators on the U.S. and 15 EU member states, this research shows that it makes sense to use both benchmarks.     

The “similarity” and “heterogeneity” theses in studying innovation: evidence from the end-of-life vehicle case

The paper seeks to understand how eight companies in the European car industry responded to changing business conditions under the threat of regulation on the waste problem of end-of-life vehicles. It was observed that the companies pursued diverging innovation tracks in dealing with the regulatory pressure, although competing in the same markets and subject to similar regulatory pressure. The case is interesting to consider in the light of recent discussions of differences in styles of innovation. The question then is whether any sort of style of innovation may be distinguished in the diverging innovation tracks. The objective of the paper is to add to these discussions by considering the results of this case study in the light of “similarity” and heterogeneity hypotheses that may be advanced around “styles” of innovation.     

TESTING CATCHING‐UP BETWEEN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: “GROWTH RESISTANCE” AND SOMETIMES “GROWTH TRAGEDY”

This paper provides empirical evidence that there is no convergence between the GDP per‐capita of the developing countries since 1950. Relying upon recent econometric methodologies (non‐stationary long‐memory models, wavelet models and time‐varying factor representation models), we show that the transition paths to long‐run growth (the catch‐up dynamics) are very persistent over time and non‐stationary, thereby yielding a variety of potential steady states (conditional convergence). Our findings do not support the idea according to which the developing countries share a common factor (such as technology) that eliminates per‐capita output divergence in the very long run. Instead, we conclude that growth is an idiosyncratic phenomenon that yields different forms of transitional economic performance: growth tragedy (some countries with an initial low level of per‐capita income diverge from the richest ones), growth resistance (with many countries experiencing a low speed of growth convergence), and rapid convergence.