物流业上市公司大股东减持对盈余管理行为的影响研究

文章选取2010～2019年沪深A股物流业上市公司为样本,研究大股东减持与盈余管理间的关系,结果表明大股东减持与盈余管理显著正相关,大股东减持比例越高,盈余管理程度越强。在此基础上引入股权集中度和董事会的独立性调节变量,分组检验其对大股东减持与盈余管理关系的影响。研究发现股权集中度能够加强大股东减持与盈余管理的正向关系,董事会的独立性则可削弱他们的正向关系。     

股权集中度与盈余管理相关性实证研究——来自深市A股市场的经验证据

在我国上市公司中股权相对集中,第一大股东持股比例平均在40%以上,这种高持股比例导致大股东与其他投资者之间存在重大的利益冲突,其结果可能发生上市公司的盈余管理行为。本文以2004年深市A股上市公司为样本,对上市公司股权集中度与盈余管理的相关关系进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:上市公司的股权越集中,公司的应计利润越容易被大股东所操纵。还发现,公司的第一大股东为国有股时更容易操纵应计利润。     

大股东控制程度与盈余管理——来自A股上市公司2002年至2006年的证据

我国上市公司普遍存在盈余管理现象,本文选择大股东控制程度与盈余管理之间的相关性进行研究,进而了解我国上市公司盈余管理行为产生的深层次原因。以我国A股市场2002—2006年的上市公司数据为样本,分别从股权集中度、股权制衡度和独立董事制衡度三个方面衡量大股东控制程度。研究发现：第一大股东持股比例越大,盈余管理程度越高;股权制衡度越大,盈余管理程度越小;没有发现独立董事的制衡与盈余管理之间在统计意义上的相关关系。     

大股东控制程度与盈余管理——来自A股上市公司2002年至2006年的证据

我国上市公司普遍存在盈余管理现象,本文选择大股东控制程度与盈余管理之间的相关性进行研究,进而了解我国上市公司盈余管理行为产生的深层次原因。以我国A股市场2002-2006年的上市公司数据为样本,分别从股权集中度、股权制衡度和独立董事制衡度三个方面衡量大股东控制程度。研究发现:第一大股东持股比例越大,盈余管理程度越高;股权制衡度越大,盈余管理程度越小;没有发现独立董事的制衡与盈余管理之间在统计意义上的相关关系。     

大股东控制下的股权再融资与盈余操纵研究

我国上市公司处于大股东的超强控制状态，大股东与潜在投资者之间严重的信息不对称导致了大股东在股权再融资过程中表现出强烈的盈余操纵动机。本文建立了一个模型来分析大股东进行盈余操纵的机理，大股东通过调整利润的时间分布可以改变投资者对上市公司盈利能力和投资价值的判断，从而造成股票再发行价格的提升，使大股东获取更多的私人利益。存在盈余操纵成本的情况下，只要盈余操纵的边际收益大于边际成本，实施盈余操纵就是大股东的最优选择，从而使盈余操纵成为上市公司股权再融资过程中的普遍现象。     

市场环境、股权集中度与盈余管理——基于中国A股市场的实证研究

本文以A股制造业上市公司2003年至2007年经验数据为样本,对市场环境、股权集中度及盈余管理之间的关系进行实证检验。研究发现,市场化程度越高,盈余管理水平也越高,股权集中度与盈余管理的U型关系并不显著,仅其U型右侧即高股权集中地区,股权集中度与盈余管理的正相关关系显著。在股权高度集中的地区,市场化程度会加剧股权集中度与盈余管理的正相关关系。     

上市公司股本结构对盈余管理的影响——来自沪深两市上市公司的经验数据

公司治理结构对盈余管理的影响一直以来都是研究的热点。对于两者之间的关系,学者是仁者见仁、智者见智,而公司治理中股本结构对盈余管理的影响尤为显著。本文从股权集中情况、股票流通情况以及管理层持股情况方面,分析了上市公司股本结构对盈余管理的影响。结果发现：上市公司国有股一股独大现象较为明显;相互关联的前十大股东更有可能勾结起来控制公司操纵利润。     

利润操纵、股权再融资与资本配置效率研究

本文研究了资本市场参与者的行为与利润操纵之间的关系,并分析了对资本配置效率的影响效应。大股东通过操纵报告盈余来改变会计盈余的时间分布和误导投资者,从而攫取更多的隐性收益,造成资本市场配置效率的降低。研究结果表明:(1)大股东通过利润操纵在股权再融资过程中可以获得中小股东无法得到的隐性收益;(2)大股东的收益随着利润操纵程度的增加而提升,中小股东的财富随着利润操纵程度的增加而降低;(3)利润操纵程度的增加将降低上市公司的资本配置效率和企业价值。     

股权结构与盈余管理实证研究

本文以我国1267家A股上市公司为样本,对股权集中度、制衡度与盈余管程度之间的相关关系进行实证分析,以期通过完善股权结构来抑制盈余管理行为.研究发现,股权集中度与盈余管理程度显著正相关,制衡度与盈余管理程度显著负相关.     

基于经营者股权激励的盈余管理与股价操纵相关性研究——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

本文对股权激励制度下经营者利用盈余管理进行股价操纵的动机与条件进行了探讨,研究发现,我国实施经营者股权激励的上市公司,其当前的应计利润对当前的股票价格的影响程度大于当前的现金净流量。这也就鼓励公司经营者通过盈余管理进行操纵股价以达到获得更多股权收益的目的。     

Majority Shareholder Ownership and Real Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea

This article examines the influence of majority shareholder ownership on real earnings management. It investigates whether there is a conflict between or an alignment of majority and minority shareholders' interests. If majority shareholders' interests are aligned with those of minority shareholders, a greater majority shareholder ownership lowers real earnings management. On the other hand, if they are not aligned, majority shareholders' attempts to exploit minority shareholders will increase real earnings management. This study does not find a systematic relationship between majority shareholder ownership and real earnings management. However, real earnings management significantly decreases in the upward earnings management incentive bracket as majority shareholder ownership increases. This occurs primarily because majority shareholders are more sensitive to upward real earnings management, which has a negative effect on future performance. These results suggest that the larger the ownership of majority shareholders, the more they play a positive role in mitigating real earnings management. This positive role is only effective in the post‐Asian economic crisis period. These results may suggest that the economic crisis in Korea helped majority shareholders more conscious of the long‐term costs of real earnings management. These findings support the convergence‐of‐interests hypothesis, providing evidence by investigating real earnings management instead of accruals‐based earnings management.     

业绩预告下的股份减持与内幕交易——会计稳健性是遏制还是助力？

选取2010—2018年沪深A股上市公司为样本,考察业绩预告发布前后大股东是否存在以及如何利用自身信息优势进行股份减持交易,会计稳健性是否以及如何对该内幕交易产生影响。研究结果表明:与强制性业绩预告相比,自愿性业绩预告披露前后发生大股东减持的概率更高,并且会计稳健性会显著抑制自愿性业绩预告披露前后的大股东减持行为。进一步将业绩预告消息区分为好消息和坏消息之后研究发现:坏消息的利空程度越高,大股东在业绩预告之前进行股份减持的规模越大;或者好消息的利好程度越高,大股东在业绩预告之后减持的规模也越大;稳健的财务信息能够抑制公司在隐匿坏消息方面进行的内幕交易,但会加剧公司在隐匿好消息方面进行的内幕交易。     

Independent directors and earnings management: The moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights

The research results on the suppressing effect of independent directors on earnings management are not consistent in existing literature. In addition, it has been argued that using financial statements provided by top management to investigate top management's earnings management is not appropriate. Therefore, the purpose of this study is twofold. First, we used external auditors (including the auditors of Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation and the auditors of two Big Four accounting firms – Deloitte & Touche and KPMG in Taiwan) as respondents in order to obtain less biased data. Second, we investigate the moderating effects of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. The results show that both the existence of controlling shareholders and the divergence of cash-flow and control rights have significant suppressing effects on the relationship between independent directors and earnings management. Theoretical and practical implications are also discussed.     

Selective Trading of Available-for-Sale Securities: Evidence from U.S. Commercial Banks

This paper examines the selective trading of available-for-sale (AFS) securities by U.S. banks after the implementation of fair value accounting under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115, Accounting Standards Codification Topic 320. Our findings suggest firms still engage in earnings management through selective selling of AFS securities despite the mandatory disclosure of unrealized security holding gains and losses in their financial statements. Such activities do not appear to be driven by the lack of reliability of the fair value measure. Instead, the degree of earnings management varies significantly with the reporting format of unrealized AFS security holding gains and losses. We find evidence of earnings management among banks that choose to report unrealized holding gains and losses in the statement of shareholders’ equity. By contrast, we find no such evidence among banks disclosing unrealized holding gains and losses in the income statement.     

A Comparison of Reporting Lags of Multinational and Domestic Firms

This study examines whether multinational firms report earnings sooner than domestic firms. When compared with domestic firms, the reporting environment and business operations of multinational firms are significantly more complex. There is a greater amount of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders of multinational firms. Therefore, multinational firms potentially face higher monitoring and external financing costs. To reduce these costs, we conjecture that managers of multinational firms take steps to reduce the information asymmetry between shareholders and management by increasing the timeliness (a proxy for relevance) of their earnings reports. Specifically, we expect multinational firms to announce earnings earlier than domestic firms. We separate earnings reporting delay into auditor‐related delay and management's discretionary delay. While test results weakly support the hypothesis that auditors take longer to audit multinational firms, there is strong evidence that managers of multinational firms release their earnings reports sooner than domestic firms.     

企业国际化战略与管理层业绩预告准确度

以2007—2020年中国A股上市公司为样本,深入探讨企业实施国际化战略对管理层业绩预告准确度（管理层业绩预告偏差）的影响。研究发现,国际化战略与管理层业绩预告偏差之间并非存在简单的线性相关关系,而是存在一种类似“U型”曲线的相关关系,说明随着企业国际化经营程度的提高,管理层业绩预告偏差会呈现出先减后增的变化趋势。机制检验结果表明,企业实施国际化战略所引发的企业经营风险、盈余操纵动机与代理成本的“U型”变化是“U型”曲线关系产生的重要原因。进一步分析发现,这种“U型”曲线关系主要出现在非国有、外资股东持股比例较低、非双重监管、分析师治理水平较差和审计师治理水平较差的企业中。研究结论对于引导证券监管部门防范国际化经营企业业绩预告违规风险具有一定的实践意义。     

对我国上市公司关联交易及盈余管理的探讨

上市公司关联交易及盈余管理是上市公司控股大股东、管理当局追求其自身利益的一种行为过程。由于我国上市公司通过关联交易及盈余管理的现象越来越严重,须从关联交易及盈余管理的涵义与特征入手,对其惯用的手法和防治的对策进行阐述与分析,提出规范上市公司关联交易及盈余管理完善法人治理结构,进一步完善关联方关系及其交易准则。     

The Effect of CEO Stock-Based Compensation on the Pricing of Future Earnings

This paper examines whether CEO stock-based compensation has an effect on the market’s ability to predict future earnings. When stock-based compensation motivates managers to share their private information with shareholders, it will expedite the pricing of future earnings in current stock prices. In contrast, when equity-compensated managers attempt to temporarily manipulate the stock price to maximize their own benefit rather than that of shareholders, the market may not fully anticipate future performance. We find that a CEO’s stock-based compensation strengthens the association between current returns and future earnings, indicating that more information about future earnings is reflected in current stock prices. In addition, we find that the positive effect is weaker for firms that have a high level of signed discretionary accruals or a low management forecast frequency. Overall, our study suggests that on average, equity-based compensation improves the informativeness of stock prices about future earnings, while opportunistic discretionary accruals or lowered earnings guidance hamper this improvement.     

基于盈余管理视角的上市公司审计质量研究——来自沪市制造业审计意见的实证分析

随着上市公司造假案件的频频曝光,资本市场遭受前所未有的冲击。外部投资者与公司“内部人”之间的信息不对称,使会计盈余管理行为在上市公司中较为普遍存在。盈余管理增加了上市公司的内在风险,注册会计师出具的审计意见应当予以恰当的披露和报告。本文选取沪市制造行业2004年和2005年的财务数据,通过截面修正的Jones模型和多元回归方法,对审计意见识别盈余管理水平的能力进行了实证研究,研究结果均表明,审计意见具有一定的信息含量,能在一定程度上揭示出上市公司的盈余管理现象。