Single Bidders and Tacit Collusion in Highway Procurement Auctions

Collusion in auctions can take different forms, such as refraining from bidding. Certain aspects of highway procurement auctions facilitate collusive outcomes. We collect data on asphalt paving auctions conducted in Kentucky from 2005-2007. We determine the potential service area of each asphalt plant and potential bidders for each paving project. We analyze firms’ bid participation decisions, including variables affecting costs as well as competitive and strategic effects. In many geographic markets where firms face only a few identifiable rivals, county boundaries serve as a coordinating mechanism for softening competition, significantly influencing firms’ decisions whether and how much to bid.     

Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory

Within an infinitely repeated game, I compare the level and conduct of collusion under uniform and discriminatory auctions. For this purpose, I characterize the optimal collusive schemes and sets of sustainable profits under these auction formats. I show that uniform auctions facilitate collusion more than discriminatory auctions: the optimal penal code is equally severe under the two formats; but bidders' deviation incentives are weaker in uniform auctions given that the pay-off irrelevant bids can be used to relax the enforcement problem. This discussion is particularly relevant after the recent reforms in the electricity industry in England & Wales, and elsewhere.     

Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and Antitrust Enforcement

This paper analyzes dynamic cartel formation and antitrust enforcement when firms operate in demand-related markets. We show that cartel prosecution can have a knock-on effect: bringing down a cartel in one market reduces profits and cartel stability and leads to the break-up of the cartel in the adjacent market. Cartel prosecution can also have a waterbed effect: disrupting a cartel increases cartel stability in the adjacent market and induces cartel formation in previously competitive markets. We discuss the impact of dynamic cartel formation on consumer surplus, explore antitrust spillovers, the optimal scope of antitrust interventions and cartel formation with local firms.     

Risk Aversion and Tacit Collusion in a Bertrand Duopoly Experiment

Recent research has found significant differences in the ability of subjects tacitly to collude, depending on the nature of the strategic interaction (e.g., Cournot vs. Bertrand or substitutes vs. complements goods). We investigate the relationship between subject-specific risk tolerance and tacit collusion in Bertrand duopoly experiments. We find that less risk-averse subjects price higher than do their more risk-averse counterparts, but this relationship is only significant when actions are strategic substitutes. When we analyze pair-level data, we find that non-risk averse subject pairs price significantly higher than do risk averse and mixed pairs in both the substitutes and complements treatments.     

Non-cooperative Tacit Collusion,Complementary Bidding and Incumbency Premium

This article focuses on testing the intuitive idea of Folk Theorem in a repeated game, and the existence of complementary bidding and incumbency premium. Through careful analysis of bidding behaviors in the Dallas-Ft. Worth (DFW) school-milk industry, I find that cooperation based on rationality and repetition satisfies the conditions for a kind of Folk Theorem. The data also strongly suggest that all major milk processors are engaged in complementary bidding to allocate consumers geographically and command statistically significant incumbency premia in their incumbent districts. Even if the equilibrium outcomes are largely non-cooperative, some pieces of circumstantial evidence uncovered in this school-milk market study may be sufficiently convincing to enable dispensing with evidence of actual communication.     

The Value of Collusion with Endogenous Capacity and Demand Uncertainty

Collusion has often been alleged in industries where long‐lived capacity investments are important. This article develops a computational duopoly model with capacity investments, demand shocks and either competitive or collusive pricing. It shows that allowing for endogenous capacity investments can sometimes make collusion less valuable than competition and that it can change the normal relationships between the profitability of collusion and both the discount rate and industry‐wide demand shocks.     

Optimal Exit Policy with Uncertain Demand*

In a framework where entrants must make sunk investment decisions with uncertain returns and have private demand information, we show that the relationship between innovation and exit value is non-monotone and features an inverted U-shaped pattern. Consumer surplus is maximised at the lowest exit value that incentivises the investment. These insights are applied to optimal merger policy. An entrant is more willing to innovate to be acquired afterwards, even if it has no bargaining power. This innovation-for-buyout effect implies that an entrant is less likely to leave the market under a lenient than a strict merger policy.     

Real-Time Pricing and Imperfect Competition in Electricity Markets*

We analyze the effects of the adoption of real-time pricing (RTP) of electricity when generating firms have market power. We find that an increase in consumers on RTP contracts decreases peak prices and increases off-peak prices, increases consumer surplus (both for switching and non-switching consumers) and welfare, while decreasing industry profits, with these effects being magnified by the extent of market power. We illustrate these results by calibrating our model to the New Zealand electricity market, and find that taking into account the market power of generating firms increases the efficiency gains from RTP adoption by 41%.     

非典疫情对我国电力需求的影响

目前,非典疫情对我国经济的负面影响,主要是局限在第三产业和局部地区,对第一、第二产业的直接影响尚不明显。由于第二产业占我国全社会用电的73%,非典对全国用电增长的不利影响,不能因局部地区疫情比较严重而过分夸大。现阶段非典疫情对我国全社会用电增长的影响不大,主要体现在个别行业和局部地区。如果今年6、7月份非典疫情得到有效控制,则非典疫情对电力需求的影响不大,且小于对经济的影响。如果疫情年内难以得到有效控制,非典疫情的影响将由第三产业向第二产业、第一产业延伸,从而对今年下半年、乃至明年的电力需求产生明显不利影响。●●●●     

电力供需形势及其对策——本刊举办“当前电力供需形势分析座谈会”

当前,我国电力供需形势趋紧,引起了中央领导、政府部门、新闻媒体、社会各界和各电力企业的高度关注。关于如何认识、分析当前的电力供需形势以及如何应对,也存在着不同的看法。2000年9月,本刊曾举办“电力弹性系数课题座谈会”,并围绕“十五”到2015年间要以多高的电力增长速度来支撑国民经济的增长、如何从深层次认识电力弹性系数等问题,连续3期作了专题报道。2003年2月26日,结合当前电力供需形势,本刊特邀请部分资深专家及有关人士举办了分析座谈会,专家们见仁见智,各抒己见,提出了许多意见和建议。这有助于对供需形势的全面分析和正确判断,有助于采取有效对策,迅速适应电力供需形势的发展和变化。现将部分内容整理刊发,以飨读者。     

规制分权化、组织合谋与制度效率--基于中国电力行业的实证研究

产业组织理论中关于规制合谋的研究分为芝加哥学派和图卢兹学派，研究结果均表明，规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋行为降低了规制效率．降低了社会福利水平。文章主要研究中国当前规制分权化背景下的地方规制机构与被规制企业之间的合谋问题，并且用计量方法对规制的效果进行了检验．结果表明规制分权化没有显著的正面效应，即规制低效率。因此，规制分权化产生的合谋导致了规制低效率．而解决问题的关键是机制设计。     

菲律宾经济发展及2008年电力需求分析

菲律宾是典型的外向型经济,经济发展受国际经济环境影响较大。受到本国政局动荡的影响,经济增长波动起伏。总体水平不高。受国内外经济波动影响,菲律宾电力需求增长也不平稳,具有较大的不确定性。2008年,在工业用电增长放缓、农业和服务业用电稳定增长的条件下,菲律宾全社会用电量将达到650亿kW·h,电力消费增速约为4％。     

2006年全国电力供需形势预测

2006年新增发电机组将在7500万千瓦左右,预计是建国以来发电机组投产最多的一年,全国电力供需形势将进一步缓解     

2003年夏季电力供需尖峰期报告（摘要）

一、“尖峰期”概念的提出进入2003年,“缺电”已成为全社会关注的问题。随着气温的持续升高,我国中南部地区出现了较为严重的缺电,个别城市甚至连市政路灯用电都无法保障。去年电力供应仍有富余的福建、安徽,今年夏季也出现电力供应紧张的局面。今年夏季我国的电力供应究竟怎么了?究竟什么叫缺电?出现电力供应紧张的地区缺电的性质是否相同?是什么原因造成的缺电?要深入解析以上这些问题,需要引入“尖峰期”的概念。这对于研究夏季尖峰期各电网的电力供需问题,把握我国当前的电力供需形势,较准确地分析认识电力供需中存在的深层次问题以及…     

2004年全国电力供需形势预测

2003年,全国经济发展态势良好,电力消费迅速增长,电力供需形势比2002年更加紧张,出现拉闸限电的省(市、自治区)包括河北、山西、内蒙、浙江、江苏、上海、安徽、福建、河南、湖北、湖南、江西、四川、重庆、广东、广西、云南、贵州、海南、甘肃、青海和宁夏等共计22个,总数比2002年增加了10个,部分地区从原先仅缺电力发展到电力电量均短缺。预计2004年全国电力供需形势仍然紧张,总体缺额同2003年大体相当。如果考虑到受干旱、高温、电煤供应不足等不确定因素的影响,供需形势可能会更加严峻。一、2003年全国电力供需形势分析我国经济发展目前…     

Collusion Under Imperfect Monitoring with Asymmetric Firms

We explore the effects of asymmetries in capacity constraints on collusion where market demand is uncertain and where firms’ sales and prices are private information. We show that all firms can infer when at least one firm's sales are below some firm‐specific ‘trigger level.’ When firms use this public information to monitor the collusive agreement, price wars may occur on the equilibrium path. Symmetry facilitates collusion but, if price wars are sufficiently long, then the optimal collusive prices of symmetric capacity distributions are lower on average than the competitive prices of asymmetric capacity distributions. We draw conclusions for merger policy.     

Collusion in a price-quantity oligopoly

In the context of an infinitely repeated oligopoly game, we study collusion among firms that simultaneously choose prices and quantities. We compare a price cartel with a price-quota cartel and analyze when and why firms prefer the latter to the former. Output quota may be required to solve coordination and incentive problems when market demand is sufficiently elastic. If market demand is sufficiently inelastic, then the cartel faces a trade-off between increasing prices and the amount of costly overproduction. We find that a price cartel prices consistently below the monopoly price to mitigate excessive production. In this case, a quota arrangement allows firms to avoid overproduction and to sustain the monopoly price. From a policy perspective, our findings suggest that an overall price increase in conjunction with more stable prices and market shares is indicative of collusion in industries where production precedes sales and outputs are imperfectly observable.     

Economics, Competition, and Costs in the Resructuring of U.S. Electricity Markets

Many of the problems facing U.S. electricity markets stem from blatant disregard for the advice and warnings of economists who specialize in these markets. The short list of disregarded economic advice includes existing market power of some generators; transmission discrimination, lack of efficient pricing of transmission congestion; inefficient retail prices; anemic incentives to minimize costs; and lack of consumer choice and experience, occasionally coupled with high switching costs. As uncomfortable as the current state of electric power restructuring may be, going back to full regulation likely would be worse. There is reason to hope that less direct paths to increased competition will resolve some of the worst policy patches and half-reforms. These less direct paths to increased competition include expansion of the size of geographic markets, geographic expansion of transmission unbundling, reductions in obstacles to long-term supply contracting, growth of demand response programs, improvements in generator efficiency and availability, and expansion of real-time pricing and customized energy services for commercial and industrial customers. In aggregate, these constitute a promising “quiet phase” of electric power reform.     

跟踪电力供需形势做好电力规划研究

本文分析了2002年上半年的电力供需形势和特点,预测了2002年下半年和2003年的电力供需情况,提出了做好电力规划研究的若干建议。