Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings

We consider bidders who are simultaneously participating in private value second-price sealed bid auctions in multiple markets. While active in each market, each bidder is associated with a unique home market in which it can potentially serve as a ring center. Pairs of bidders can establish bilateral agreements to be members of bidding rings in each others’ home markets. Rings can be weak or strong depending respectively on whether side payments are permitted or not. Weak multimarket rings have been shown to take the form of exclusive groups of completely connected bidders. We consider strong multimarket bidding rings and show that they assume a radically different architecture of dominant groups, stars, and interlinked stars. Since bidding rings are tacit, and therefore unobservable, we develop observable implications of multimarket rings that can detect the existence of collusion as well as its form (i.e., weak or strong).     

Weak and strong monotone comparative statics

Summary This paper develops necessary and sufficient conditions for the set of solutions to an optimization problem to be nondecreasing in a weak sense still strong enough to guarantee the existence of an increasing selection, and thus strong enough to guarantee monotonicity when the solution is unique, as well as necessary and sufficient conditions for the set of optimizers to be nondecreasing in a strong sense which is strong enough to rule out the possibility of a decreasing selection. These necessary and sufficient conditions are variations of quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property introduced in Milgrom-Shannon [13]. Moreover, to determine when an objective function satisfies these conditions, this paper develops several characterizations of quasisupermodularity and the single crossing property and their variants, both in terms of differential conditions and in terms of restrictions on the structure of the level sets of these functions. Several examples are given to choice theory under loss aversion and to an auction problem.I am grateful to Don Brown and Paul Milgrom for numerous helpful conversations concerning earlier versions of this paper. This paper is a revised and expanded version of the paper An Ordinal Theory of Games with Strategic Complementarities (Shannon [15]). I am pleased to acknowledge the financial support of the National Science Foundation, and an Alfred P. Sloan Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship.     

Rent seeking and rent dissipation: A neutrality result

We consider rent seeking contests between at least two agents who might value the prize differently. We capture a wide range of institutional aspects of contests by analyzing a class of contest success functions fulfilling several properties. The main properties are anonymity and a condition on the elasticity of a rent seeker's win probability with respect to her effort. We show the existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium and establish equilibrium payoffs. In this equilibrium complete rent dissipation holds. Our results imply a partial robustness result for the all-pay auction.     

Price rigidity and market-clearing: a conceptual clarification

This article tests the view (derived from Hicks and Patinkin)that non-market clearance may be caused by slow adjustment (‘processrigidity’). There are models where market-rationing ispresent and derives from some form of rigidity, but this rigiditycannot be considered as process rigidity. It is similarly possibleto accommodate the idea of process rigidity within the Marshallianresearch programme. What is missing is that market-rationingmight be its corollary. The reason such a causal link is oftenbelieved to exist lies in a generic use of the concept of rigidity,used to designate alternative and incompatible phenomena: ‘exogenousend-state rigidity’ and ‘equilibrium end-state rigidity’,as well as process rigidity. It is true that these first twoforms of rigidity create market rationing. The belief that slowadjustment also generates market rationing results from theunwarranted extension to process rigidity of conclusions whichare only valid for the first two.     

On model ambiguity and money neutrality

We solve for the equilibrium of a stochastic neo-classical continuous time model without and with money under model ambiguity. We show that: (i) the correction for ambiguity stemming from the money supply is nil at equilibrium; (ii) money is neutral with respect to the stock market equilibrium (the equity risk premium); (iii) money is not neutral with respect to consumption and capital accumulation, and its effect may be quantitatively substantial; (iv) the preference for model robustness affects all the real economic variables as well as the expected inflation rate and the nominal interest rate.     

Tax neutrality and the social discount rate: A suggested framework

There are few problems in tax analysis which have generated as much study and discussion among economist as the question of how to formulate ‘neutral’ tax incentives for investment. Yet no consensus has been reached concerning the proper approach to take when adjusting taxes. Comparing the two fundamental notions of neutrality found in the literature, referred to here as Present Value Rules and Internal Rate of Return Rules, we argue that, to the extent that neutrality is a useful concept, only the latter of these approaches makes sense in terms of achievement of production efficiency.     

Panel cointegration and the neutrality of money

Most econometric methods for testing the proposition of long-run monetary neutrality rely on the assumption that money and real output do not cointegrate, a result that is usually supported by the data. This paper argues that these results can be attributed in part to the low power of univariate tests, and that a violation of the noncointegration assumption is likely to result in a nonrejection of the neutrality proposition. To alleviate this problem, two new and more powerful panel cointegration tests are proposed that can be used under quite general conditions. The empirical results obtained from applying these tests to a panel covering ten countries between 1870 and 1986 suggest money and real output are cointegrated, and hence that the neutrality proposition must be rejected.      

Industrial policy and the neutrality of the state

Some insights from recent debates on the Marxian theory of the state are applied to the analysis of state intervention in production in liberal democratic capitalist societies. It is argued that such industrial policies tend to undermine the apparent neutrality both of the state and of the market as a mechanism for the allocation of resources.     

Sheila Dow's concept of dualism: clarification, criticism and development

This paper analyses Dow's concept of dualism and decomposesit into eight categories, one not explicitly identified by Dow.It is argued that Dow's original definition is underdevelopedand thereby lacking practical relevance. The paper presentsa development of Dow's definition, which allows her to attackthe splitting of polar categories. This significantly increasesthe relevance of Dow's definition of dualism and buttressesher criticisms of the mainstream. The paper also identifies‘heuristic dualism’ in Dow's work. A distinctioncan be made between Dow's ‘heuristic dualism’, whichis strictly an intermediate step in an argument, and the mainstreamuse of fixed dualistic categories.     

Basic income,liberal neutrality,socialism, and work

Liberal critics often object to basic income (BI) on the grounds that it violates reciprocity and is biased toward those who choose voluntarily to opt out of work and thus violate the principle of liberal neutrality toward conceptions of the good life. In the first part of this paper I argue that liberal neutrality favors BI. Marxist critics of BI are less likely to accept liberal neutrality, but I argue in the second part that the argument for BI in the first part applies with equal force to Marxist objections that BI is unfairly exploitative of workers. Marxists are also less likely to accept current labor market trends, seeing socialism as affording more opportunity for guaranteeing everyone a right to decent work, and suspecting BI of making the unfair inequalities of capitalism a little more palatable while diverting attention from a more equitable socialist alternative. I argue that BI is not incompatible with socialism or Marxism, and should not be opposed to but rather combined with strategies for full employment.     

Weak and Strong Signals

Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz showed that competitive markets can perform very poorly in the presence of informational asymmetry. In this paper I show that if there is a signaling technology which is sufficiently strong (i.e., the marginal cost of signaling declines sufficiently rapidly with quality) the cost of sorting is low and a Nash equilibrium exists. Empirically testable necessary and sufficient conditions for existence are derived. I further show that if Akerlovian participation constraints are added to a signaling model there is a minimum signaling threshold. Finally I argue that these conclusions hold regardless of whether it is the uninformed or informed agents who move first.
JEL classification : D 8     

Symmetry restrictions and the semblance of neutrality in exchange rate models

This paper shows that the symmetry restrictions commonly used to simply the two-country, sticky-price monetary setup are not necessary for tractability as previously thought. The paper also shows that the practice of using these restrictions has obscurred the true long-run properties of the sticky-price setup. The paper shows that although one-time changes in money in the standard models of Frankel and Hooper and Morton lead to proportionate changes in the relative level of goods prices (i.e., domestic minus foreign), the absolute levels of these variables move disproportionately, with consequent movements in the steady-state levels of real interest rates and real money balances.     

Weak complementarity and production

This paper describes how weak complementarity, a common assumption to characterize consumer preferences for recovering measures of willingness to pay for nonmarketed environmental resources, can be used to evaluate the effects of pollution that may affect profits or costs. In such cases, pollution serves as an externality imposed by third parties on production activities.     

Revenue and formula effects of school finance reform of wealth neutrality

The impact of school finance reform in South Carolina on wealth neutrality is analysed in the context of revenue and formula effects. The total effect is analysed, with or without local revenue effects, by splitting the revenue effect into state revenue and local revenue effects. Results indicate considerable improvements in wealth neutrality from 1978 to 1982. Moreover, only 25% of the total reduction in the wealth coefficient may be attributed to the change in the formula, the remainder being explained by changes in state and local revenues.     

Property taxes and dynamic efficiency: A correction

According to Kim and Lee (1997), property taxes as opposed to capital gain taxes and taxes on rent endanger dynamic efficiency. The present paper shows that the choice of the tax base is immaterial. What counts is whether the taxes eliminate the after-tax rent. Empirical evidence suggests that this is not the case.     

Testing for short-run money neutrality in a small open economy: The case of Canada

This paper adopts an econometric methodology which is based on standard nested-hypotheses testing in order to test the policy ineffectiveness proposition in the context of the Canadian economy. It thus avoids some problems associated with the non-nested hypotheses framework used by Barro and numerous other writers. The substantial openness of the Canadian economy is taken into account through the use of a Mundell-Flemming aggregate demand side. The supply response of the economy is carefully modelled, in the same context, and the familiar Sargent-Wallace aggregate supply function is derived as a special case of a more general Keynesian function — by assuming instantaneous adjustment of prices to costs. Empirical tests based on a data sample spanning the period of Canada's recent experience with flexible exchange rates are unfavorable to the policy ineffectiveness proposition.     

Yet another long-run neutrality result: Absence of tax-induced growth effects under implicit intergenerational contracts

We provide an example whereby the existence of optimal time-consistent implicit contracts between the young parent and the yet-to-be-born child could nullify the long-run effects of income taxes on human-capital investment and growth. Implications for the Ricardian equivalence theorem are also discussed.