Conservatism, growth, and return on investment

Return on Investment (ROI) is widely regarded as a key measure of firm profitability. The accounting literature has long recognized that ROI will generally not reflect economic profitability, as determined by the internal rate of return (IRR) of a firm’s investment projects. In particular, it has been noted that accounting conservatism may result in an upward bias of ROI, relative to the underlying IRR. We examine both theoretically and empirically the behavior of ROI as a function of two variables: past growth in new investments and accounting conservatism. Higher growth is shown to result in lower levels of ROI provided the accounting is conservative, while the opposite is generally true for liberal accounting policies. Conversely, more conservative accounting will increase ROI provided growth in new investments has been “moderate” over the relevant horizon, while the opposite is true if new investments grew at sufficiently high rates. Taken together, we find that conservatism and growth are “substitutes” in their joint impact on ROI.     

Discussion of “Conservatism, growth and return on investment”

Providing data for the measurement of financial performance is a key objective of financial reporting. Rajan, Reichelstein, and Soliman (2007, Conservatism, growth and return on investment, Review of Accounting Studies, this issue) provide new insights into the well known biases involved in measuring return on investment (ROI) on the basis of accrual accounting. They analyze the relationships among ROIs, growth rates, accrual policies and cash flow profiles in a fairly general steadystate model (only the last parameter is severely restricted). New and interesting results outside steady-state are presented as well. In the empirical part of the paper Rajan et al. demonstrate that the biases involved are systematic and economically significant. Hence empiricists must pay attention (whatever their sample sizes). Hopefully this paper will generate renewed interest in the analytical aspects of accrual accounting.     

Traditional investment versus absolute return programmes

Hilary Till and Joseph Eagleeye argue that the differences between the hedge-fund and traditional-investment industries arise from competing views of the key sources of investment returns.     

Financial flexibility,corporate investment and performance: evidence from financial crises

This study examines the impact of financial flexibility on the investment and performance of East Asian firms over the period 1994–2009. We employ a sample of 1,068 firms and place particular emphasis on the periods of the Asian crisis (1997–1998) and the recent credit crisis (2007–2009). The results show that firms can attain financial flexibility, primarily through conservative leverage policies and less commonly by holding large cash balances. Financial flexibility appears to be an important determinant of investment and performance, mainly during the Asian 1997–1998 crisis. In particular, firms that are financially flexible prior to this crisis (1) have a greater ability to take investment opportunities, (2) rely much less on the availability of internal funds to invest, and (3) perform better than less flexible firms during the crisis. Our analysis covering the credit crisis period of 2007–2009 suggests that some of the advantages of flexible firms towards investing persist but are significantly less pronounced over that period. We also find that the value of financial flexibility is region/country specific, which may be explained by the fact that different regions/countries often adopt different macroeconomic policies and operate in diverse economic/legal environments.     

Financial accounting return on investment and financial leverage

This note presents a method for teaching the concept of financial leverage and its relationship to accounting rates of return. Typically, financial leverage is only briefly mentioned in introductory accounting textbooks, and it is rarely related explicitly to rates of return on total assets and on common stockholders' equity. Yet the concept is an important one for financial managers. We have developed and class tested a numerical illustration to explain in a conceptually sound manner why the two rates of return differ. Accounting instructors who share our view that financial leverage should be covered more thoroughly in the introductory accounting course will find this example to be a useful supplement. The example can also be used as a way to develop critical thinking skills or to enhance a user orientation.     

Fair valuation of cliquet-style return guarantees in (homogeneous and) heterogeneous life insurance portfolios

Participating life insurance contracts allow the policyholder to participate in the annual return of a reference portfolio. Additionally, they are often equipped with an annual (cliquet-style) return guarantee. The current low interest rate environment has again refreshed the discussion on risk management and fair valuation of such embedded options. While this problem is typically discussed from the viewpoint of a single contract or a homogeneous* insurance portfolio, contracts are, in practice, managed within a heterogeneous insurance portfolio. Their valuation must then – unlike the case of asset portfolios – take account of portfolio effects: Their premiums are invested in the same reference portfolio; the contracts interact by a joint reserve, individual surrender options and joint default risk of the policy sponsor. Here, we discuss the impact of portfolio effects on the fair valuation of insurance contracts jointly managed in (homogeneous and) heterogeneous life insurance portfolios. First, in a rather general setting, including stochastic interest rates, we consider the case that otherwise homogeneous contracts interact due to the default risk of the policy sponsor. Second, and more importantly, we then also consider the case when policies are allowed to differ in further aspects like the guaranteed rate or time to maturity. We also provide an extensive numerical example for further analysis.     

Art as an investment: risk, return and portfolio diversification in major painting markets

The present paper examines risk, return and the prospects for portfolio diversification among major painting and financial markets over the period 1976–2001. The art markets examined are Contemporary Masters, French Impressionists, Modern European, 19th Century European, Old Masters, Surrealists, 20th Century English and Modern US paintings. The financial markets comprise US Treasury bills, corporate and government bonds and small and large company stocks. In common with the published literature in this area, the present study finds that the returns on paintings are much lower and the risks much higher than conventional investment markets. Moreover, while low correlations of returns suggest that opportunities for portfolio diversification in art works alone and in conjunction with equity markets exist, the construction of Markowitz mean‐variance efficient portfolios indicates that no diversification gains are provided by art in financial asset portfolios. However, diversification benefits in portfolios comprised solely of art works are possible, with Contemporary Masters, 19th Century European, Old Masters and 20th Century English paintings dominating the efficient frontier during the period in question.     

Profitability of return and sentiment-based investment strategies in US futures markets

Our study adds to the literature by providing initial evidence on the interaction between short-horizon return predictability and investors’ sentiment by traders’ types on US commodity futures market. We find that the short-term contrarian profit is more associated with an increase rather than a decrease in hedgers’ sentiment. However, the interaction between lagged return and past change in speculators’ sentiment illustrates that the short-term contrarian profit is more associated with a decrease rather than an increase in sentiment. Based on behavioral finance theories, we conclude that hedgers behave like irrational traders while speculators behave like rational ones. Using Chou et al. (2007) decomposition, our results confirm the obtained relations between change in trader's sentiment and the overreaction. By expanding this decomposition, we find that the winners’ portfolio tends to more overreact with futures specific information. Also, the cross-autocorrelation between winners and losers and between losers and winners can represent another source of contrarian profits.     

Housing,mortgage bailout guarantees and the macro economy

What are the macroeconomic and distributional effects of government bailout guarantees for Government Sponsored Enterprises (e.g., Fannie Mae)? A model with heterogeneous, infinitely lived households and competitive housing and mortgage markets is constructed to evaluate this question. Households can default on their mortgages via foreclosure. The bailout guarantee is a tax-financed mortgage interest rate subsidy. Eliminating this subsidy leads to a large decline in mortgage origination and increases aggregate welfare by 0.5% in consumption equivalent variation, but has little effect on foreclosure rates and housing investment. The interest rate subsidy is a regressive policy: it hurts low-income and low-asset households.     

Loan guarantees and credit supply

The efficiency of federal lending guarantees depends on whether guarantees increase lending supply or simply act as a subsidy to lenders. We use notches in the guarantee rate schedule for Small Business Administration (SBA) loans to estimate the elasticity of bank lending volume to loan guarantees. We show significant bunching in the loan distribution on the side of the size threshold that carries a more generous loan guarantee. The excess mass implies that increasing guarantee generosity by one percentage point of loan principal would increase per-loan lending volume by $19,000. Excess mass increases in periods with guarantee generosity, and placebo results indicate that the effect disappears when the guarantee notch is eliminated.     

Bank pay caps,bank risk,and macroprudential regulation

This paper studies the consequences of a regulatory pay cap in proportion to assets on bank risk, bank value, and bank asset allocations. The cap is shown to lower banks’ risk and raise banks’ values by acting against a competitive externality in the labour market. The risk reduction is achieved without the possibility of reduced lending from a Tier 1 increase. The cap encourages diversification and reduces the need a bank has to focus on a limited number of asset classes. The cap can be used for Macroprudential Regulation to encourage banks to move resources away from wholesale banking to the retail banking sector. Such an intervention would be targeted: in 2009 a 20% reduction in remuneration would have been equivalent to more than 150 basis points of extra Tier 1 for UBS, for example.     

Bank capital requirements,loan guarantees and firm performance

This paper studies the effects of the bank capital requirements imposed by the European authorities in October 2011 on loan collateral and personal guarantees usage to enhance capital ratios. We use detailed information on the loan contracts granted by a representative Spanish bank and several subsidiaries to nonfinancial corporations around that date. We document that personal guarantees usage increases more than that of collateral, especially at subsidiaries with lower capital ratios. However, although the former type of guarantees demonstrably disciplined firms in their risk-taking before 2011, their subsequent overuse may have blunted their impact and may have even undermined firm performance and investment.     

Risk and return: Long-run relations,fractional cointegration,and return predictability

Univariate dependencies in market volatility, both objective and risk neutral, are best described by long-memory fractionally integrated processes. Meanwhile, the ex post difference, or the variance swap payoff reflecting the reward for bearing volatility risk, displays far less persistent dynamics. Using intraday data for the Standard & Poor's 500 and the volatility index (VIX), coupled with frequency domain methods, we separate the series into various components. We find that the coherence between volatility and the volatility-risk reward is the strongest at long-run frequencies. Our results are consistent with generalized long-run risk models and help explain why classical efforts of establishing a naïve return-volatility relation fail. We also estimate a fractionally cointegrated vector autoregression (CFVAR). The model-implied long-run equilibrium relation between the two variance variables results in nontrivial return predictability over interdaily and monthly horizons, supporting the idea that the cointegrating relation between the two variance measures proxies for the economic uncertainty rewarded by the market.     

Predicting base station return on investment in the telecommunications industry: Machine-learning approaches

Investment in the right location ensures sustainable competition. In the telecommunication sector, the number of base stations (BSs) is one of the most significant investment parameters. When a potential BS is subject to be selected, practitioners will first consider investing in a BS where the return on investment (ROI) is highest. Therefore, the quantifiable objectives are distinctly defined, as it makes sense to choose maximizing features that raise per unit investment. This study provides a solution to evaluate the best BS installation alternative with machine-learning approaches as well as to estimate ROI value by changing the properties that affect the ROI value. For this purpose, the estimation performance of logistic regression, random forest, and XGBoost methods are compared and further strengthened by random forest hyperparameter optimization to provide the best performance. The model, with a success rate of 98.7% according to the $F$-score, showed that it was a robust algorithm. The three most essential features for the ROI value are determined to be voice traffic, data traffic, and frequency cost. These parameters enable a review of the prediction results of telecommunications managers and planning specialists responsible for BS investment.     

Risk,return, and dividends

Using only the definition of returns, together with a transversality assumption, we demonstrate that given a dividend process, any one of three variables—expected return, return volatility, and the price–dividend ratio—completely determines the other two. By parameterizing only one of these processes, common empirical specifications place strong, and sometimes counter-factual, restrictions on the dynamics of the other variables. Our findings lend insight into the nature of the risk–return relation and the predictability of stock returns.     

Investment,agency conflicts,debt maturity,and loan guarantees by negotiation

We consider an irreversible investment, of which the sunk cost is financed by a finite-term debt after entering into an option-for-guarantee swap (OGS) with negotiation. The OGS is a three-party agreement among a lender (bank), an insurer, and a borrower (entrepreneur), where the bank lends at a given interest rate to the entrepreneur and if the borrower defaults on debt, the insurer must pay all the principal and remaining interests to the lender instead of the borrower. In return for the guarantee, the borrower must allocate a perpetual American call option to purchase a fraction (guarantee cost) of his equity at a given strike price. We find that the investment threshold decreases but the exercise threshold of the insurer’s option increases with the borrower’s bargaining power. Both the investment and exercise threshold increase with debt maturity, but there is a U-shaped relation between the guarantee cost and debt maturity. The borrower postpones investment once the funding gap or project risk increases. The swap may overcome the inefficiencies from asset substitution and debt overhang, strongly depending on the debt maturity and borrower’s bargaining power.     

Partial credit guarantees and SMEs financing

Using data for the Italian Central Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises, the paper analyses the effect of partial credit guarantees on firms’ financing. We show that neglecting heterogeneity in guarantee intensities, namely considering all firms as equally treated, leads to a mis-measurement of the additionality effect. Moreover, we document the existence of non-linear effects, suggesting that coverage ratios below a certain threshold are likely to be ineffective to lessen obstacles faced by firms when seeking external financing funds.