“市场势”、消费者主权与企业行为优化

<正> 在现代市场经济条件下,消费者与生产者之间的利益关系仍然是最基本的经济关系。它通过“市场势”作用于市场经济运行的全过程。“市场势”是指消费者主权与生产者主权的制衡。在中国,由于消费者主权劣势,难于有力制衡生产者主权,致使企业行为扭曲。因此,只有通过保护消费者主权,并以“势”来约束企业行为,社会资源才能合理配置。     

消费者与生产者矛盾冲突的博弈分析--以售后服务为例

现实生活中 ,消费者与生产者之间的矛盾冲突时有发生 ,而且会在不同情况下演变成不同的结果。通过对消费者与生产者之间关系博弈模型的分析 ,可以看出消费者与生产者在售后服务方面冲突、博弈和谈判的过程 ,“砸车”事件就是消费者与生产者矛盾冲突的典型代表。     

北京城镇居民对不同猪肉质量安全特征的消费偏好和支付意愿

利用针对北京市城镇居民的问卷调查数据,运用选择实验法,采用多元条件Logit模型实证分析了消费者对生鲜猪肉的不同质量安全特征的偏好和支付意愿。结果表明:对猪肉产品的不同质量安全特征进行标识有助于提高消费者的效用水平;北京市城镇居民对生鲜猪肉建立质量安全可追溯体系的偏好和支付意愿最高,其次是生鲜猪肉通过产品质量安全认证、柔嫩度较好,对生鲜猪肉具有无瘦肉精和兽药残留的质量安全标识的偏好和支付意愿最低。据此提出:中国应加强生鲜猪肉质量安全可追溯体系建设;政府监管部门应规范农产品质量安全标识的申请和使用行为,确保农产品生产者进行安全生产,确保质量安全标识制度的有效实施。     

消费者侵权消费行为分析——道德与法制约束视角

消费者与生产者都是市场主体,共同影响市场秩序。生产者破坏市场秩序的行为受到道德与法制的双重约束,而消费者破坏市场秩序的消费行为却缺乏有效的约束机制。要治理市场秩序,应培育和提高消费者的消费道德素质并建立合理的法制约束机制。     

广告与市场进入壁垒

一、引言 广告是现代生活中极其普遍的现象.在现实生活中,由于消费者和生产者之间信息不对称,消费者需要一种媒介来获知产品的信息,而生产者需要把其产品介绍给消费者,这样广告就应运而生.     

选择实验理论及其在食品需求研究中的应用:文献综述

概述了选择实验理论及其应用,在此基础上对利用选择实验方法研究食品需求的国内外文献进行综述。得出结论:美国的此类研究主要聚焦于消费者对食品质量和安全属性的偏好和支付意愿方面;欧洲的此类研究除了关注消费者的食品质量和安全需求外,还关注转基因、动物福利等问题。提出后续基于此类方法的研究应进一步关注食品特定属性的变化对消费者或社会福利的影响以及由此导致的市场效应的评价,而消费者需求行为与食品生产者行为、政府角色的结合可作为未来研究的切入点,同时应将选择实验方法更多地应用于中国食品需求研究。     

选择实验理论及其在食品需求研究中的应用:文献综述

概述了选择实验理论及其应用,在此基础上对利用选择实验方法研究食品需求的国内外文献进行综述。得出结论:美国的此类研究主要聚焦于消费者对食品质量和安全属性的偏好和支付意愿方面;欧洲的此类研究除了关注消费者的食品质量和安全需求外,还关注转基因、动物福利等问题。提出后续基于此类方法的研究应进一步关注食品特定属性的变化对消费者或社会福利的影响以及由此导致的市场效应的评价,而消费者需求行为与食品生产者行为、政府角色的结合可作为未来研究的切入点,同时应将选择实验方法更多地应用于中国食品需求研究。     

产业组织对技术创新行为与绩效的影响分析

产业组织理论是研究产业内企业之间竞争与垄断关系的应用经济理论,其重心在于寻求最有利于资源合理配置的市场秩序和企业行为。产业组织由市场结构、市场行为与市场绩效等主要范畴构成,体现为产业内企业与企业之间、企业与市场之间的相互关系。技术创新作为企业的基本活动,显然与产业组织的几个主要范畴密切相关。在熊彼特((J·A·Schumpeter)的创新思想中,有两个基本的假设,一是技术推力说,认为“生产者发动经济的变化,而消费者只是在必要时受到生产者的启动”;二是垄断利润是技术创新活动的基本目标,垄断的存在是企业家愿意投资于创新的前提。这两个假设引起后人的广泛争议,尤其是后者,关于是垄断还是竟争,大企业还是小企业更有利于创新的问题,成为研究产业组织与技术创新相关性的主要间题。     

关于股票一、二级市场差价的一点思考

股票一、二级市场之间应有一定差价,就象商品的出厂价与零售价之间应有差价一样。在商品能顺利地从生产者手里转移到消费者手里的前提下,消费者需要为商品流通支付的费用越少越好。同理,在上市公司能够顺利完成股票发行的前提下,股票一、二级市场的差价也越小越好。股票一、二级市场差价太大,是由政府行为引起,其后果是造成损失。     

中外房地产周期的比较

生产者/消费者的比例也是预测房价拐点的良好指标。生产者是指年龄在25⁶4岁之间的人口,这里消费者是一个净消费者的概念,指的是年龄在25岁以下或者 64岁以上的人群。生产者/消费者实际上与人口抚养比是个类似的概念,但生产者/消费者比例对房地产泡沫的破裂有较好的指示作用,很多国家的经验表明,房地产泡泳的破裂领先于生产者/消费者比例的见顶。     

制假产业存在的原因与规制——基于收入差距的市场演化分析

本文首先论证了收入差距的固化是生产者的逐利动机加强和消费者对低端产品消费需求增加的原因。然后通过演化博弈分析得到结论，在存在收入差距的条件下，若监管缺位，市场将出现正常产业与制假产业并存的均衡状态；消费者的收入约束差距越大，生产者进入制假产业的概率越高。因此缩小收入差距，并对通过对制假产业分类实施市场监管，提高监管效率，才能真正减少直至消除制假产业。     

GATT TRADE RULES AND THE ENVIRONMENT

This paper addresses the alleged conflict between the GATT trade rules and the protection of the environment by GATT members. The author contends that the principal objective of the GATT rules on nontariff trade restrictions is to eliminate government interventions that promote the commercial interests of domestic producers and consumers in a manner that discriminates against foreign producers and consumers in either domestic or international markets. He further contends that this objective fundamentally does not conflict with protecting GATT members' domestic environment or the global environment. The GATT should explicitly recognize the objectives of environmental protection and natural resource consemation, either by an amendment to the GATT Articles or by resolution of the GATT Council. GATT members, in the interest of protecting their national and the global environment, should be free to impose restrictions on imports or exports so long as the interventions conform to the following conditions: (i) restrictions do not have the intent or signficant effect of discriminating against foreign producers or consumers in favor of domestic ones, (ii) restrictions are in the interest of protecting the global environment where the concerns are widely shared by other nations and do not simply reflect unique and parochial views of the individual member, and (iii) restrictions do not constitute an effort to force trading partners to adopt environmental standards of production that have no global or trans-border pollution implications .     

An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries

Regulation and consumer class actions can complement, duplicate, or oppose each other, depending, among others, on the leanings of regulatory objective functions towards the industry or consumers. In particular, pro-consumer regulators would like to see consumers benefit from class actions while pro-industry regulators would like to prevent regulated firms from being harmed by them. However, because pro-consumer regulators are already doing their best for consumers and pro-industry regulators their best for firms, they are both usually constrained in their policies. The result is that class actions tend to be less efficient under pro-consumer regulators and more efficient under pro-industry regulators.      

Regulating internal markets for hospital care

Internal markets have been created in an attempt to shift power from producers to consumers in a context where consumers have very weak incentives to seek out low-cost producers and have little knowledge about the quality of health care. The idea is that by establishing public agencies to act as the sole purchasers on behalf of consumers in their area of jurisdiction, the asymmetry of information can be moderated and a more competitive environment created in which costs will be minimized and quality enhanced. Whether these aspirations can be fulfilled will depend on how the internal market is organized. In this article the cost-minimizing properties of alternative market structures where hospitals do not share the same objectives are examined. The scheme is designed from the standpoint of a benevolent regulator that provides services using two hospitals with fixed locations. The paper shows that price discrimination is a superior instrument. Finally some market forms are always dominated and should be avoided.

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Professional versus consumer interests in regulation: the case of the US child care industry

Professional licensure benefits producers by creating entry barriers into the profession, but consumers might also gain if licensure induces producers to supply high levels of quality. Whether consumers or producers gain most form licensure can be determined by examining the effect of licensure requirements on aggregate consumption. This paper uses a cross-sectional model to estimate the relationship between variations in state licensure rules and consumption of child care services. The results suggest that professional interests, and not those of consumers, are dominant in the setting of regulatory standards for the US child care industry.     

The Market Response to Restructuring: A Behavioral Model

In this paper, I model the behavior of producers, consumers, and regulators in deciding to restructure the electricity sector and estimate their equilibrium response to the newly restructured market. The empirical model consists of simultaneous price and restructuring equations with endogenous switching and cross-equation correlation in the errors. This approach allow me to account for the influence of special interest groups and potential selection bias in which countries choose to restructure. I estimate distinct shifts from restructuring in both industrial and residential prices, and for English speaking, Scandinavian, and South American countries. I find that in all countries, it is industrial consumers that experience the price effects of restructuring, while residential consumers remain largely unaffected. In English speaking and Scandinavian countries, industrial prices decrease while in South American countries they increase. This is consistent with the political–economic environment in which these countries have considered restructuring.     

我国玉米产业技术进步的福利效应分析

在分别构建供给和需求模型对我国玉米生产消费状况进行分析的前提下,运用福利效应模型测算了技术进步对玉米生产者和消费者的福利效应,基本结论为:玉米具有较低的供给弹性和需求弹性,玉米技术进步的福利效应表现为消费者福利增加和生产者福利减少,但消费者福利的增加值大于生产者福利的减少值,使得整个社会的经济福利处于上升趋势。     

QUALITY-ASSURING PRICE AND BREACH OF EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTY

If consumers cannot discern quality prior to purchase, firms may use both court enforcement and the market mechanism to assure quality. But the level of warranty protection that firms choose to offer depends on the efficiency of the market. As the ability of consumers to communicate information concerning quality among themselves (market efficiency) increases, the level of warranty protection that maximizes consumer surplus falls. In highly efficient markets, producers do not offer a warranty. Thus, courts should not imply a warranty if producers do not specify one. In addition, the level of warranty protection depends on the courts' ability to distinguish between producer and consumer moral hazard.     

Money: Capital Good,Consumers’ Good,or (Media of) Exchange Good?

Is money a producers’ good or a capital good, or is it sui generus, as Mises, Rothbard, and other Austrians have maintained? We argue that all action is either consumption or production, and that exchange is but a form of production. Consequently, all goods are either consumers’ goods or producers’ goods; there is no third possibility. And that among these two money is a producers’ good, not a consumer good.     

Focus on quality assessment: the need for evaluation

There is growing concern among purchasers and consumers of health care as well as among regulators that managed care has meant that quality has been sacrificed in the name of cost saving. Employers, as major purchasers, should demand that the managed care organizations they utilize demonstrate high-quality/low-cost care.