The Swing Voter's Curse in the Laboratory

This paper reports the first laboratory study of the swing voter's curse and provides insights on the larger theoretical and empirical literature on "pivotal voter" models. Our experiment controls for different information levels of voters, as well as the size of the electorate, the distribution of preferences and other theoretically relevant parameters. The design varies the share of partisan voters and the prior belief about a payoff relevant state of the world. Our results support the equilibrium predictions of the Feddersen–Pesendorfer model. The voters act as if they are aware of the swing voter's curse and adjust their behaviour to compensate. While the compensation is not complete and there is some heterogeneity in individual behaviour, we find that aggregate outcomes, such as efficiency, turnout and margin of victory, closely track the theoretical predictions.     

资源诅咒:研究进展及其前瞻

矿产资源开发在区域经济发展中扮演一个什么样的角色?国家或区域经济发展的实践说明,有诅咒也有祝福。学术界对这一问题的看法亦有正、反两方面观点,分别对资源诅咒现象进行经济学阐释与质疑。近20多年来,矿产资源开发与区域经济发展正、方两方面观点,似乎都离不开资源行业出现的巨额收益。矿产开发中的收益分配机制是否合理,相关制度是否健全,或许是资源丰裕区域规避或陷入资源诅咒的关键,也是未来需要进一步研究的重点问题。     

驳资源诅咒论

资源诅咒论最早形成于1990年代。其核心思想是自然资源禀赋与经济增长呈负相关,即使从国内省级层面来讲也是如此。这一理论主要存在以下几个方面的错误:一是自然资源的丰度衡量指标设计存在缺陷;二是相关文献也没有对经济增长速度作出具体的说明,即多少为快,多少为慢;三是假设能源价格是合理的,或者接近于市场价格,也不符合中国的实际;四是相关文献对资源诅咒传导机制的分析也令人难以信服;五是忽视了区域的异质性、生产条件的差异和交通因素对于经济发展水平的影响。     

Thy Neighbor's Curse: Regional Instability and Economic Growth

We show that regional instability, defined as politicalinstability in neighboring countries, has a strong negative effecton a country's economic performance. The magnitude of this negativeexternality is similar in size to that of an equivalent increasein domestic political instability. We also identify two mainchannels through which regional instability lowers economic performance.First, regional instability disrupts trade flows. The sharesof merchandise and manufactured trade are lower in countrieswith high regional instability. Second, regional instabilityleads to increased military outlays. Defense expenditures arehigher in countries with high regional instability. In contrast,the share of government expenditures allocated to education islower in countries with politically unstable neighbors. Our resultssuggest the existence of negative spillovers among politicallyunstable neighboring countries. These adverse regional influencesshould be taken into account when projecting the future economicperformance of countries. The evidence presented also suggeststhat the gains from reducing regional instability extend farbeyond the welfare of the country experiencing political unrest.Policies directed at settling current territorial disputes ina peaceful and orderly manner can have large beneficial effectsfor parties not directly involved in the conflict.     

Increasing Competition and the Winner's Curse: Evidence from Procurement

We assess empirically the effects of the winner's curse which, in common–value auctions, counsels more conservative bidding as the number of competitors increases. First, we construct an econometric model of an auction in which bidders' preferences have both common– and private–value components, and propose a new monotone quantile approach which facilitates estimation of this model. Second, we estimate the model using bids from procurement auctions held by the State of New Jersey. For a large subset of these auctions, we find that median procurement costs rise as competition intensifies. In this setting, then, asymmetric information overturns the common economic wisdom that more competition is always desirable.     

我国区域资本形成机制差异的资源诅咒分析

资本形成理论认为资本是经济发展的重要要素，资本形成机制差异也相应成为区域经济非均衡发展的动力源。基于此，本文从“资源诅咒”理论出发，对我国三大区域资本形成机制差异的根源进行了重新诠释，并有针对性地提出了相应措施，以建立有效的资本形成机制与发展模式，帮助中西部地区走出资源诅咒困境。     

财政透明度中的资源诅咒-基于四川省县级财政自主性的经验证据

本文研究了财政自主性与财政透明度的经验关系及其反映出的地方政府行为逻辑。我们发现,更多的自有财源和更强的财政自主性并没有为财政透明度提升创造有利条件,反而表现为政府财务公开的一大阻碍。我们将此现象解释为财政透明度中的资源诅咒,并认为现有的财政体制和问责机制是其主要成因。要破除财政自主性对于财政透明度的诅咒效应,有待于通过收入分权培养形成与地方支出责任相适应的财政自给能力,同时完善社会公众自下而上推动财政透明的参与和监督机制。     

Rule of Law and the Resource Curse: Abundance Versus Intensity

We examine the ‘resource curse’ using new data on historic resource stocks and an improved econometric methodology. The paper distinguishes between resource abundance (stocks) and extractive intensity (flows), focusing on relationships between resources and rule of law. Previously unavailable information on past resource stocks is estimated. We find that economically large initial natural resource stocks are associated with subsequent lower levels of rule of law and do not directly affect growth, while raw resource exports do not have a significant effect on rule of law when stocks are included in the analysis but do affect average growth rates. Sample size is maximized through the use of an EMis (expectation maximization with importance sampling) algorithm to replace missing data, minimizing the bias and inefficiency associated with listwise deletion, which commonly eliminates half or more of the available data in this setting. An earlier version of this work appeared as part of my doctoral dissertation in economics at the University of California, Santa Barbara. Thanks are due to my dissertation committee: Robert T. Deacon, Stephen J. DeCanio and Carol McAusland; as well as Okan Kavuncu, Henning Bohn, Kelly Bedard, Olivier Deschennes, Doug Steigerwald and numerous seminar participants as well as two anonymous referees.     

The Methodological Basis of Institutional Economics: Comment

This article highlights Simon Patten's contributions to the institutionalist method and view of abundance. It illustrates Patten's role in the cross-fertilization between early institutionalists and the German Historicists. Patten's views on the societal transition to abundance, the method of social inquiry, and the role of social scientists are re-examined in light of the current exigencies of a climate-constrained, post-industrial economy. The policy implications that emerge from Patten's rejection of the presumption of scarcity are examined in a contemporary context. The article suggests that the historical and evolutionary approach that Patten fostered among institutionalists is essential to the identification and implementation of the socio-economic reform requisite of an age of abundance.     

The Curse and Blessing of Training the Unemployed in a Changing Economy: The Case of East Germany After Unification

Abstract. We analyse the effects of government-sponsored training for the unemployed conducted during East German transition. For the microeconometric analysis, we use a new, large and informative administrative database that allows us to use matching methods to address potential selection bias, to study different types of programmes and to observe labour market outcomes over eight years. We find strong evidence that, on average, the training programmes under investigation increase long-term employment prospects and earnings. However, as an important exception, the longer training programmes are not helpful for their male participants. At least part of the explanation for this negative result is that caseworkers severely misjudged the structure of the future demand for skills.     

A股市场上的“中石油魔咒”现象及其解释

文章针对A股市场上流传甚广的"中石油魔咒"现象,首次从基本面角度进行了解释,认为造成这一现象的根本原因是国际原油价格对我国股票市场存在显著的负向溢出效应,即当国际原油价格上涨时,对中石油个股产生利好,但对整体宏观经济却构成利空,因而中石油股票价格上涨,整个股票市场却会下跌。进一步研究还发现,这种负向溢出效应具有非线性特征,表现为国际原油价格上涨对股票市场的打压力度要大于其下跌对股票市场的提升力度。这提醒A股投资者相对于国际原油价格下跌,要更加关注国际原油价格上涨带来的投资风险。     

流入中亚及高加索各国的外资:诅咒还是福音?

对发展中国家而言,外资的数量与构成对各国政要所掌握的政治财富,进而对该国政治制度的演进,影响重大。本文表明,中亚及高加索各国财政赤字的弥补严重依赖外资的流入,这些外资大多直接进入各国权威主义政府手中。这种状况增强了各国威权式统治者的力量,而对当地企业的金融支持几无助益,对各国进行市场化改革提供了较弱的激励。另外,这些国家在流入外资构成方面的些许差异,可以解释为什么一些国家走向了温和的威权统治,而另一些国家走上了强硬的威权统治。     

资源型经济摆脱“资源诅咒”的财政调节机制

受资源产品价格变化和资源不可再生规律的影响,资源财政的稳定性往往较差,政府难以对经济发展进行有效的长期规划,这也是资源丰裕地区陷入"资源诅咒"的重要原因。在我国,有相当多的城市具有资源财政的特征,该文提出应借鉴国际经验,在当前资源产品价格高涨时期,建立具有预算稳定基金性质的资源基金,并对资源基金的筹集、使用和管理进行了探讨。     

资源诅咒、经济转型与政府职能转变

世界经济发展表明,众多资源丰裕的国家和区域并未享受资源的福音反而已经或正在遭受着资源诅咒的折磨。有效摆脱资源诅咒,规避因资源繁荣所带来的病态问题,实现资源型经济的转型既是资源主导型国家面临的严峻挑战,也是实现持续发展的关键。国际上资源型经济成功转型案例表明,在资源性经济转型过程中,政府职能的转变发挥着重要作用。     

The Fable of the Allegory: The Wizard of Oz in Economics: Comment

Although recent research strongly suggests that L. Frank Baum did not write The Wonderful Wizard of Oz as a monetary or political allegory, the Populist-parable interpretation of his book remains a tremendous teaching tool in economics classes. The author offers some background on the rise and fall of the Populist interpretation, in recognition of students' natural curiosity about Baum's intentions. He also offers a classroom-ready version of the parable that synthesizes several different versions of that interpretation.