Some Insights on Religion from Public Goods Economics

This paper provides a theoretical discussion on what analytical insight is gained by viewing religion as both a pure and impure public good. It suggests that organized religion converts a public good into an excludable club good and can be viewed as providing both an access regime for this club good as well as acting as an intermediary. Interestingly, this drives a wedge between the ardent and moderate adherents of a religion. It also presents an analysis of trust in social relationships when organized religion works to provide a credible signal of trustworthiness.     

Postwar Reconstruction: Some Insights from Public Choice and Institutional Economics

A successful reconstruction is characterized by a widespread coordination problem, combined with potential pockets of conflict. We analyze the array of relationships that take place in the reconstruction process – political, economic and social – by considering under what circumstances they are situations of conflict or coordination. Historical attempts at reconstruction provide further understanding of how to achieve success.JEL Classification: N40, O1, P11, Z13.     

实验经济学的兴起与公共产品理论的发展

实验经济学是经济学的一个新的分支,其研究内容主要包括个人决策、市场交易、博弈论、学习理论和方法论。它的兴起对公共财政论的核心理论——公共产品理论产生了影响,加深了搭便车问题的研究,对如何有效提供公共产品从实验角度给出了有益的启示,推动了公共产品理论的研究。     

农村公共产品供给问题研究

农村的经济发展已经取得了举世瞩目的成就,国家越来越关注“三农”问题,但是在农村公共产品的供给问题上障碍重重,着实提高农村公共产品的建设质量已经成为民生的大事。农村公共产品供给影响着农民生活的各个方面,也对国家的经济发展有着非常重要的影响,本文从农村公共产品的含义入手,分析了当前存在的问题,并提出了解决措施。     

The Relationships of Religion to Economics

The relationships between religion and economics are both complex and controversial. In this paper is explored one method for organizing those relationships. Four categories are examined which help identify possible options: economics separate from religion economics; in service of religion; religion in service of economics; and religion in union with economics. The paper begins with a definition of what is included under the headings of religion and economics. Next, each of the four categories is described and discussed. Conclusions close the paper.     

Bargaining over Public Goods

In a simple public good economy, we propose a natural bargaining procedure, the equilibria of which converge to Lindahl allocations as the cost of bargaining vanishes. The procedure splits the decision over the allocation in a decision about personalized prices and a decision about output levels for the public good. Since this procedure does not assume price-taking behavior, it provides a strategic foundation for the personalized taxes inherent in the Lindahl solution to the public goods problem.     

Decentralizing Public Goods Production

Decentralized decisions, to a bureau with a given budget, about the production of public goods is analyzed within a general equilibrium model with a representative agent and no pure profits. Contrary to previous results on decentralization it is shown that sequential decentralization (i) does not necessarily imply aggregate production efficiency and (ii) need not be optimal even if all public goods are neutral. Also, cost‐benefit criteria are derived and the marginal cost of public funds is characterized.     

作为公共品的组织

组织是一种特别的公共品。如果能够使不同成员的边际贡献与他们从组织中得到的边际收益相等,那么组织就实现了均衡。由于成员的边际贡献难以测度,因此只有通过实施“一报还一报”的策略才能激励成员实现组织的共容利益。     

Public Versus Private Provision of Public Goods

It is well known that public goods are underprovided in a static setting with voluntary contributions. Public provision—in a median voter framework with proportional taxation—generally exceeds private provision. This paper compares private and public provision of public goods in a dynamic setting. In a dynamic setting, voluntary donations can result in efficient provision. Also, majority‐rule solutions exist even when taxes are not proportional to income. At low discount factors, public provision tends to exceed private provision. As patience increases, however, private provision may exceed public provision. This occurs because many outcomes with a low level of public good provision—and potentially large targeted transfer payments to particular individuals—become sustainable under public provision. Under private provision, however, large targeted transfers are unsustainable. To finance the public good, private provision tends to result in benefit taxation, and public provision tends to result in progressive taxation.     

论公共产品的市场提供

一般而言，满足消费者需求的消费品划分为两类，一类是用货币收入等价交换的消费品，即私人产品；一类是不以货币交换的消费品，即公共产品。私人产品只能由私人提供，公共产品只能由政府提供，这一分析结论所包含的政策含义往往导致公共产品供给决策绝对化和“一刀切”的倾向，把许多行业和商品纳入公共产品范畴由政府垄断性供给，由此导致资源配置效率和使用效率较低，因此。中国应加大公共产品提供的市场化改革步伐。     

公共产品视角下的政府规制及最优供给研究

政府规制主要是指政府行政机构制定并执行的直接干预市场配置机制或间接改变企业和消费者的供需决策的一般规则或特殊行为。作为一种约束性制度安排,政府规制具有非排他性和非竞争性,可以视为一种公共产品。本文详细论证了政府规制的公共产品属性,进一步分析了政府规制的供给特征与需求特征,并在归纳中国政府规制特征基础上,研究探讨了中国政府规制优化的制度设计。     

Trade Gains and Public Goods

This paper proves that in a multicountry general‐equilibrium model of international trade with local public goods, free trade is beneficial if the governments in the trading world behave strategically with respect to the provision of public goods.     

Threatened Species as Public Goods and Public Bads

This paper discusses Pareto efficient allocations of an environmental commodity, which is both a public good and a public bad, with an application to the Scandinavian problem of conserving wild predators that are killing semi-domesticated reindeer. The paper begins by briefly outlining this conflict. This is followed by a theoretical analysis employing a diagrammatic tool called the Kolm triangle, which is an analogue of an Edgeworth box in an economy with a public good. Bargaining, Pareto improving reallocations and the shape of the Pareto set are discussed, using a simple model, where one of the agents is involountarily contributing to a public good. The paper concludes with an analysis of income-loss compensations and incentives for illegal hunting of predators.     

地方性公共品供给制度创新研究

在市场经济条件下 ,地方政府的主要职责是分级提供各种地方性公共品 ,满足居民生活和企业生产的共同需要。但是 ,政府提供并不等于政府生产 ,更不等于政府垄断生产。中国现行地方性公共品供给制度的主要缺陷是地方政府以及公共部门的过度垄断。按公共品生产与提供、直接生产与间接生产分开等原则 ,打破垄断 ,有序地向国内外开放公共品生产市场 ,大力推进公共品生产的市场化 ,形成“公”与“私”以及各自内部的竞争 ,将有助于提高地方性公共品供给效率 ,增进公共福利 ,并有助于推进中国的市场化进程。     

Pareto-Improving Redistribution and Pure Public Goods

In the pure public good model, the Nash equilibrium associated with one initial income distribution may Pareto dominate the equilibrium associated with another distribution of the same aggregate income. We explore this possibility and examine its implications for Pareto-improving policy intervention by undertaking a comparative static analysis of Pareto-improving tax-financed increases in pure public good provision. Under some circumstances, a government can engineer policies that raise public good provision while increasing the well-being of contributors and non-contributors. Crucial factors promoting this outcome involve a large number of non-contributors, a high marginal valuation for the public good by non-contributors and a large aggregate response of contributors to changes in their income.     

Collusion-Proof Samuelson Conditions for Public Goods

We analyze a public good problem when agents form a grand coalition to promote their own collective goal instead of that of society as a whole. When collusion takes place under symmetric information , the collusion-proof Samuelson rule takes a simple form that is close to an ex ante cost-benefit analysis . Then, we analyze the case where agents collude under asymmetric information . First, we describe the set of collusion-proof allocations. Second, we establish the collusion-proof Samuelson rule that highlights the role of coalitional virtual valuations . Asymmetric information within the coalition allows the principal to recover some flexibility in the design of the optimal policy. We finally discuss the nature of the inefficiency created by the agents' collusive behavior and the scope of their ex ante gain in forming a coalition.