Money demand, the Cagan model, testing rational expectations vs adaptive expectations: The case of Turkey

This paper estimates the Cagan type demand for money function for Turkish economy during the period 1986:1–1995:3 and tests whether Cagan's specification fits the Turkish data using an econometric technique assuming that forecasting errors are stationary. This paper also tests the hypothesis that monetary policy was implemented in aiming to maximize the inflation tax revenue. Finally, the Cagan model is estimated with the additional assumption of rational expectations for Turkey for the considered period. First version received: March 1998/final version received: October 1998     

The empirical validity of the New Keynesian Phillips curve using survey forecasts of inflation

This paper investigates the performance of the New Keynesian Phillips curve when survey forecasts of inflation are used to proxy for inflation expectations. Previous authors such as Brissimis and Magginas (2008) have applied survey measures of inflation expectations to the NKPC, and have concluded that these estimates are superior to those estimated using actual data on future inflation. However this approach employs the use of the labor income share as the proxy for real marginal cost, something which is highly problematic once we consider the countercyclicality of this variable. This paper develops and tests a procyclical marginal cost variable alongside various survey measures of inflation forecasts in the NKPC, while recognizing the problem of weak instruments that occurs when estimating the model using conventional GMM. We find that the NKPC produces a counter-intuitive negative and significant coefficient on procyclical marginal cost when surveys of inflation forecasts are used, which casts serious doubt on the empirical viability of the NKPC model, even when estimated with survey inflation forecasts.     

The expectations theory of the term structure: Evidence from inflation forecasts

This paper tests the joint hypothesis of rational expectations and the expectations theory of the term structure using the Livingston survey data on price inflation forecasts. For a variety of sample periods, the paper presents evidence that the data are consistent with the theory. Since inflation forecasts, unlike interest rates, are not linked to specific underlying financial assets, the relationship between longterm and short-term inflation forecasts should not embody risk premia. This paper's findings therefore lend support to the view that a time-varying risk premium is needed to explain the observed term structure of interest rates.     

Can central bank communication help to stabilise inflation expectations?

This paper examines whether central bank communication stabilises euro area inflation expectations through the information and news channel. A novelty of the study is its use of data from Google Analytics on ECB website traffic as proxy for visitors’ attention to its communication. We conduct several econometric tests with daily data to measure the impact of ECB communication on the information demand of the public and ultimately on inflation expectations. Overall, this study shows that website attention, as captured by search volumes of visitors, influences euro area inflation expectations. We find that increased website attention contributes to narrowing the gap between market-based forecasts and (the mean of) longer-term professional inflation expectations. Our findings add to the theoretical evidence on the existence of an information and news channel.     

Central bank forecasts and private expectations: An empirical assessment from three emerging economies

As part of their monetary policy strategy, many central banks are attempting to manage private sector expectations about key macroeconomic variables. In this article, we investigate whether forecasts provided by central banks in three inflation targeting emerging economies (Brazil, Mexico, and Poland) affect the expectations of private forecasters. In particular, we analyze whether the disagreement between the central bank and private sector forecasts applies to explain changes in private sector expectations regarding inflation and economic growth. The findings show that while central bank forecasts are higher than those made by private sector forecasters, the result is an update upwards of private forecasts and that this effect is stronger for GDP growth forecasts than for inflation forecasts.     

Do professional forecasters behave as if they believed in the New Keynesian Phillips Curve for the euro area?

This paper finds that participants in the European Central Bank’s Survey of Professional Forecasters have submitted forecasts that are consistent with a (mostly forward-looking) empirical version of the New Keynesian Phillips Curve for the euro area. The estimation technique takes advantage of the panel nature of the Survey of Professional Forecasters’ dataset to exploit both its time series and cross-section dimensions, and to control for unobservable individual heterogeneity across forecasters. The estimation results suggest that euro-area inflation forecasts have reacted less to unemployment forecasts after the start of the financial crisis but another cost measure (energy inflation) remains significant. This finding is consistent with a flatter Phillips Curve in the euro area after 2007. However, the reasons suggested by the International Monetary Fund for this finding, namely a better anchoring of inflation expectations and increases in structural unemployment do not seem to find support in the survey data. Instead, the expectations for compensation per employee submitted by professional forecasters are consistent with the existence of downward real-wage rigidities in euro-area labour markets.     

The Accuracy of OECD Forecasts for Japan

A variety of accuracy measures, error diagnostics and rationality tests are applied to the OECD's macroeconomic forecasts for Japan of aggregate demand and output, inflation and the balance of payments. It is found that the OECD forecasts are superior to naive no-change predictions and forecasts generated by simple autoregressive time-series models. Most forecasting error is nonsystematic. As predictors of direction the OECD's six-month ahead forecasts should be considered valuable; this cannot be said for forecasts which look ahead a year and 18 months. Many forecasts fail bias, efficiency and consistency tests so that the rational expectations hypothesis is not generally supported.     

Applying a microfounded-forecasting approach to predict Brazilian inflation

We investigate whether combining forecasts from surveys of expectations is a helpful empirical strategy for forecasting inflation in Brazil. We employ the FGV–IBRE Economic Tendency Survey, which consists of monthly qualitative information from approximately 2000 consumers since 2006, and also the Focus Survey of the Central Bank of Brazil, with daily forecasts since 1999 from roughly 250 professional forecasters. Natural candidates to win a forecast competition in the literature of surveys of expectations are the (consensus) cross-sectional average forecasts (AF). We first show that these forecasts are a bias-ridden version of the conditional expectation of inflation using the no-bias tests proposed in Issler and Lima (J Econom 152(2):153–164, 2009) and Gaglianone and Issler (Microfounded forecasting, 2015). The results reveal interesting data features: Consumers systematically overestimate inflation (by 2.01 p.p., on average), whereas market agents underestimate it (by 0.68 p.p. over the same sample). Next, we employ a pseudo out-of-sample analysis to evaluate different forecasting methods: the AR(1) model, the Granger and Ramanathan (J Forecast 3:197–204, 1984) forecast combination (GR) technique, a Phillips-curve based method, the Capistrán and Timmermann (J Bus Econ Stat 27:428–440, 2009) combination method, the consensus forecast (AF), the bias-corrected average forecast (BCAF), and the extended BCAF. Results reveal that: (i) the MSE of the AR(1) model is higher compared to the GR (and usually lower compared to the AF); and (ii) the extended BCAF is more accurate than the BCAF, which, in turn, dominates the AF. This validates the view that the bias corrections are a useful device for forecasting using surveys. The Phillips-curve based method has a median performance in terms of MSE, and the Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) combination method fares slightly worse.     

Inflationary expectations with heterogeneous information: ‘generational expectations’

This paper proposes a modified theory of expectation formation. The hypothesis of generational expectations (GE), unlike the widely accepted hypothesis of rational expectations, assumes that agents from their inflationary expectations using the most economical information set – their personal experience with inflation. The GE hypothesis incorporates the realistic assumptions of heterogenous information sets and bounded rationality. Several alternative expectational hypotheses are compared in terms of properties of inflation forecasts and estimates of a version of natural-rate aggregate supply functions and age-group-specific Phillips curves. It is shown that GE performs just as well or even better than other methods.     

The properties of survey-based inflation expectations in Sweden

This article assesses the properties of survey-based inflation expectations in Sweden. The survey in question is conducted by Prospera once every quarter and consists of respondents from businesses and labour-market organisations. The article shows that inflation expectations measured in this survey tend to be biased and inefficient forecasts of future inflation. Moreover, evaluations of forecast accuracy show that these inflation expectations are worse predictors of inflation than those of a professional forecasting institution and also typically outperformed by a simple autoregressive model. Given that the true inflation expectations are captured by the survey, our results indicate that economic agents’ expectations formation process is suboptimal.     

Ten-year forecasts of real stock price changes

This paper provides the strongest evidence to-date on the predictability of real stock prices over long horizons. Ex ante forecasts account for over two-thirds of the variation of the growth rate of real stock prices over ten year spans from 1940 through 2001. The paper forecasts negative growth rates of real stock prices over the next ten years. This bearish long-run outlook is buttressed by the long-run relationship between the growth rates of real stock prices, inflation, dividends, and productivity. First version received: June 2000/Final version received: June 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  Special thanks to an anonymous referee for helpful comments.     

Rationality tests in the presence of instabilities in finite samples

The importance of expectations in modern macroeconomic models and in particular of policy makers expectations for forward looking policy rules has generated a lot of interest in time series of professional forecasts (including central bank staff forecasts). This has spawned a large literature on the evaluation of forecasts that are not model based or where the model is unknown. Although, the available time series of historical forecasts are typically short, this literature has so far mostly disregarded the small sample properties of the proposed tests and estimators. In this paper we fill this gap in the literature, focusing on a set of recently proposed rationality tests for unstable environments. Using a Monte Carlo study we demonstrate that the asymptotic tests are substantially oversized in finite samples including any sample size that is practically available. We provide finite sample adjusted critical values, that allow those tests to be properly applied to sample sizes of typically available forecasts such as the Survey of Professional Forecasters, the Federal Open Market Committee. The critical values we provide will help to avoid false rejections using those data.     

The Role of Central Bank Transparency for Guiding Private Sector Forecasts*

Central banks have become remarkably more transparent over the last few decades. In this paper, we study the effects of this evolution, focusing on whether enhanced central bank transparency lowers dispersion among professional forecasters of key economic variables. We use a large set of proxies for central‐bank transparency in 12 advanced economies. We find evidence for a sizeable effect (e.g., by announcing a quantified inflation objective, or by publishing inflation and output forecasts). However, there are decreasing marginal effects to increases in transparency, and the disagreement among the expectations of the general public is not affected. This suggests that there are possible limits to transparency.     

Inflation expectations of Brazilian consumers: an analysis based on the FGV survey

ABSTRACT

An accurate assessment of inflation expectations is crucial for the management of monetary policies. However, expectations are not directly observed and are hence normally inferred either from the interest rate structure or from surveys of professional forecasters. Alternatively, a direct measure may be obtained from consumer surveys. The aim of this paper is to study the formation of inflation expectations in Brazil, using a novel dataset based on the FGV/IBRE consumer survey. Basing our model on the rational inattention hypothesis, we find that individual heterogeneity plays a very significant role in shaping individual expectations; also, Brazilians adjust expectations to current inflation and to a fixed reference value, while professional forecasts do not play a very relevant role.     

Is there a Core of Macroeconomics that Euro Area Forecasters Believe In?

The quantity theory of money, Okun's law, and the Phillips curve are cornerstones of macroeconomic theory. But are they also of practical relevance? Using survey data for the euro area, we found that professional economists’ forecasts are consistent with a version of the quantity theory in which forecasts of the growth rate of money supply correlate in a proportional way with forecasts of the inflation rate. We also found that forecasts of changes in the unemployment rate and forecasts of the growth rate of real output are consistent with Okun's law. Evidence of a systematic link between forecasts of the inflation rate and forecasts of the unemployment rate, however, is not strong.     

Detecting and Predicting Forecast Breakdowns

We propose a theoretical framework for assessing whether a forecast model estimated over one period can provide good forecasts over a subsequent period. We formalize this idea by defining a forecast breakdown as a situation in which the out-of-sample performance of the model, judged by some loss function, is significantly worse than its in-sample performance. Our framework, which is valid under general conditions, can be used not only to detect past forecast breakdowns but also to predict future ones. We show that main causes of forecast breakdowns are instabilities in the data-generating process and relate the properties of our forecast breakdown test to those of structural break tests. The empirical application finds evidence of a forecast breakdown in the Phillips' curve forecasts of U.S. inflation, and links it to inflation volatility and to changes in the monetary policy reaction function of the Fed.     

Directional analysis of consumers’ forecasts of inflation in a small open economy: evidence from South Korea

We evaluate the directional accuracy of consumers’ forecasts of inflation in predicting the movement of the actual CPI in a small open economy. In order to do so, we use a method developed by Pesaran and Timmermann (2009), based on South Korean data. By illustrating an application of the new market-timing test, we show that consumers’ expectations of inflation are not a useful predictor of the CPI in South Korea. Our findings suggest that the directional accuracy of consumers’ 1-year-ahead forecasts of inflation is not affected by the inflation targeting of the Bank of Korea. Our findings also suggest that consumers’ 1-year-ahead forecasts of inflation are scattered away from the Bank of Korea’s inflation target.     

The link between inflation and inflation uncertainty: Evidence from G7 countries

In this paper we adopt the Markov-switching heteroscedasticity model to analyse the inflation series for G7 countries and examine the interaction between inflation rate and its uncertainty over both the short- and long-run. It is found that the relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty depends on whether the shock is permanent or transitory. The relationship also differs from country to country. High uncertainty about long-run inflation is associated with a significant positive shift in inflation for Canada, Germany, and Japan. High uncertainty about short-run inflation is associated with a significant positive shift in inflation for Germany and USA, and a significant negative shift in inflation for Canada. The modelling approach employed in this paper is empirically supported by various diagnostics including the Vuong test. We also derive the two components of the variance of inflation forecast for a particular forecast horizon. It is found that the inflation uncertainty increases at all horizons in the middle of 1970s and return to the low level in the middle of 1980s.First version received: June 2001/Final version received: October 2003We would like to thank three anonymous referees for many helpful comments and suggestions.     

Do inflation targets anchor inflation expectations?

We suggest a simple test of whether an inflation target anchors private-sector inflation expectations. The test is easy to compute and it is robust to various sources of misspecification. The test may be a useful alternative to dispersion measures commonly studied in research on inflation targeting. Using data for 22 inflation targeting countries, we find for many countries that the forecasters scatter their inflation forecasts away from the inflation target. We account for the endogeneity of inflation targets, we study the variability of our finding across countries and across time, and we study to which extent our results depend on the level and variability of inflation targets.