The welfare implications of resource allocation policies under uncertainty: The case of public education spending

In this paper, we examine whether policy interventions, aimed at improving resource allocation, also have important stabilization effects over the business cycle. To this end, we employ a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model in which public education expenditures, financed by distorting taxes, enhance the productivity of private education choices. We then calculate the welfare implications of competing operating targets using a state-contingent instrument rule for public education spending. Our main findings are: (i) there can be important cyclical effects of different resource allocation policies depending on the operating target used and the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty; (ii) it is important to use an operating target which is as close as possible to the heart of the market imperfection that justifies policy action; (iii) policy action should not be monotonic in the degree of macroeconomic uncertainty.     

Fiscal policy reforms in general equilibrium: The case of Greece

This paper quantifies the macroeconomic and welfare implications of (i) changes in the tax-spending mix and (ii) debt consolidation policies. The setup is a neoclassical growth model augmented with a relatively rich public sector. The model is calibrated to the Greek economy. The results suggest that, if the goal of fiscal policy is to stimulate the economy and increase welfare by changing the tax mix, then it should decrease the tax rate on labour income and increase the consumption tax rate. While higher public investment spending is good for the economy, it is lower public consumption spending that is found to be expansionary. The results also suggest that both tax- and expenditure-based debt consolidation policies lead to worse economic activity in the short run, but they have strong beneficial effects in the medium and long run when the consolidation period finishes.     

On Indeterminacy and Growth under Progressive Taxation and Utility‐Generating Government Spending

We examine the theoretical interrelations between progressive income taxation and macroeconomic (in)stability in an otherwise standard one‐sector AK model of endogenous growth with utility‐generating government purchases of goods and services. In sharp contrast to traditional Keynesian‐type stabilization policies, progressive taxation operates like an automatic destabilizer that generates equilibrium indeterminacy and belief‐driven fluctuations in our endogenously growing macroeconomy. Unlike the no‐sustained‐growth counterpart, this instability result is obtained regardless of (i) the degree of the public‐spending preference externality and (ii) whether private and public consumption expenditures are substitutes, complements or additively separable in the household's utility function.     

WELFARE AND MONETARY PRECOMMITMENT IN AN ECONOMY WITH MENU COSTS AND UNIONIZED WAGE SETTING

The paper shows that monetary precommitment can be advantageous to the government in a macroeconomic policy game where (i) the government's objectives are explicitly derived from those of the citizens, (ii) inflation has a real cost and (iii) the suboptimality of the output level arises from the structure of the private sector rather than from fiscal policy. It suggests that, to this extent, welfare interpretations of game theoretic monetary policy models are coherent.     

Public Investment and Economic Growth in Latin America: an Empirical Test

The paper analyzes the impact on economic growth of public investment spending and other relevant variables (such as human capital) for nine major Latin American nations over the 1983–93 period. The results suggest that both public and private investment spending contribute to economic growth. Overall central government consumption expenditures, on the other hand, are found to have a negative effect on private investment and growth. Finally, public expenditures on education and healthcare are found to have a positive and statistically significant effect on private capital formation and long–term economic growth. From a policy standpoint, the results suggest that indiscriminate cuts in public and private investment spending are likely to be counterproductive in the long run, and more importantly, scarce public expenditures should be channeled to the promotion of new human capital (via primary and secondary education) and the maintenance of existing human capital (through healthcare expenditures).     

Financing public goods and attitudes toward immigration

We study a model where individuals choose both the level of provision of a public good and the quota of low-skilled immigrants that are allowed into the country. Individuals can supplement the public good in the private market. Immigrants affect natives through three channels: (i) the labor market; (ii) tax collection; (iii) the quality of the public good. We find that the higher the political weight of the rich (highly skilled) is, the less tolerant the poor and the middle-class are toward immigration and the more demanding they are toward increasing public spending. The rich are the most favorable to immigration. As they have more weight, the political outcome is closer to their preferences and further from the preferences of the other groups. We use data from the European Social Survey to test the implications of our model.     

A quantitative analysis of Turkish Private Education Reform

A recent education policy Turkish government is wishing to undertake is to shut down all private supplementary education centers (SECs) unless SECs manage to convert into a private school. With this policy, the government is willing to increase equality of opportunity among students. We show quantitatively that the policy, in fact, leads to a decrease in equality of opportunity since SECs are given the option to convert into private schools. We use a political economy model of education at which households, heterogeneous with respect to exogenously set income, choose among a continuum of private schools differentiated by tuition and a public school. Households choosing the public school can privately supplement their child's education spending in any amount. Public school is free of charge, and its spending is financed by income tax revenue collected from all households. Income tax rate is determined by majority voting. Achievement of a child depends only on educational spending. We calibrate the model's parameters by matching certain targets from 2013 Turkish data. We then exogenously restrict the supplemental education spending to zero in a counterfactual experiment. We find that variance of achievement (or inequality of opportunity) increases by 23.51% and mean achievement decreases by 1.74%.     

Generational conflict and education politics: Implications for growth and welfare

This study considers the politics of public education and its impact on economic growth and welfare across generations. We employ probabilistic voting to demonstrate the generational conflict regarding taxes and spending and show that aging shifts the tax burden from the retired to the working generation, reduces public education spending, and ultimately slows economic growth. We subsequently consider a legal constraint that aims to boost education spending: a spending floor for education. This constraint stimulates economic growth but creates a trade-off between current and future generations’ welfare. Finally, the quantitative implications of our results are explored by calibrating the model to the Japanese economy.     

Forecast accuracy of small and large scale dynamic factor models in developing economies

Developing economies usually present limitations in the availability of economic data. This constraint may affect the capacity of dynamic factor models to summarize large amounts of information into latent factors that reflect macroeconomic performance. This paper addresses this issue by comparing the accuracy of two kinds of dynamic factor models at GDP forecasting for six Latin American countries. Each model is based on a dataset of different dimensions: a large dataset composed of series belonging to several macroeconomic categories (large scale dynamic factor model) and a small dataset with a few prescreened variables considered as the most representative ones (small scale dynamic factor model). Short‐term pseudo real time out‐of‐sample forecast of GDP growth is carried out with both models reproducing the real time situation of data accessibility derived from the publication lags of the series in each country. Results (i) confirm the important role of the inclusion of latest released data in the forecast accuracy of both models, (ii) show better precision of predictions based on factors with respect to autoregressive models and (iii) identify the most adequate model for each country according to availability of the observed data.     

General equilibrium impact of an energy-saving policy in the public sector

We analyse a disregarded environmental policy instrument: a switch in government expenditure away from energy (or other natural resources) and toward a composite good which includes energy-saving expenditure. We first develop two variants of an analytical general equilibrium model. A composite good is produced with constant returns to scale, and energy is imported or produced domestically with diminishing returns, yielding a differential rent to its owners. The government purchases energy and composite goods from private firms. Such a policy unambiguously increases employment. It also raises private consumption and welfare under two conditions: (i) it is not too costly and (ii) the initial share of the resource is smaller in public spending than in private consumption, or the difference is small enough. We then run numerically a model featuring both importation and domestic production of energy (oil, gas and electricity), for the OECD as a whole. Simulations show that employment, welfare and private consumption rise. We provide magnitudes for different parameter values. Earlier versions of this paper have benefited from conference participants at the European Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, International Society for Ecological Economics World Congress, CIRED seminar and EUREQua environmental economics seminar. We especially thank Michèle Sadoun and two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Tax Policy and Human Capital Formation with Public Investment in Education

This paper studies the effects of distortionary taxes and public investment in an endogenous growth OLG model with knowledge transmission. Fiscal policy affects growth in two respects: first, work time reacts to variations of prospective tax rates and modifies knowledge formation; second, public spending enhances labour efficiency but also stimulates physical capital through increased savings. It is shown that Ramsey-optimal policies reduce savings due to high tax rates on young generations, and are not necessarily growth-improving with respect to a pure private system. Non-Ramsey policies that shift the burden on adults are always growth-improving due to crowding-in effects: the welfare of all generations is unambiguously higher with respect to a private system, and there generally exists a continuum of non-optimal tax rates under which long-run growth and welfare are higher than with the Ramsey-optimal policy.     

The value of information in a principal-agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case

In a principal-agent model with moral hazard, a signal about the principal?s technology — the stochastic mapping from the agent?s action to the outcome — is observed before the contract is offered. The signal is either uninformative (null information), informative and observed only by the principal (private information), or also observed by the agent (public information). We show that, from an ex ante standpoint (before the signal is observed): (i) the agent prefers private to both null and public information; (ii) the principal sometimes prefers null to both private and public information; and (iii) when the principal prefers public to null information, she prefers public to private information, whereas the agent prefers private to public information. In this last situation, we also show that (iv) for any separating equilibrium with private information, there exists a contract with public information that both strictly prefer.     

Private labels, price rivalry, and public policy

The article examines (i) why low-quality private labels are introduced in some product categories and not in others, (ii) how the existence of a low-quality private label affects the pricing of a competing national brand, and (iii) how consumers’ surplus and welfare are affected by private labels. We find that the potential for private label introduction may—in return for national brand exclusivity in that particular retail store (exclusive dealing)—lead to price concessions from the producer of the national brand. If the national brand producer decides not to offer an exclusivity contract, a private label is introduced. In this case, private label introduction may lead to higher retail prices on national brands, which can be detrimental to consumer welfare as well as total welfare. We argue that our results have important implications for the interpretation of empirical results and the public policy towards national brands     

财政政策、货币政策与国外经济援助

本文通过把国外经济援助分成直接对私人的经济援助和直接对政府的经济援助来讨论这两类经济援助对政府财政政策和货币政策的影响。我们发现对私人的经济援助的增加可以使得私人消费水平和政府公共消费水平增加 ,但是它也导致政府收入税税率和通货膨胀率的提高 ;另一方面 ,对政府的经济援助增加可以使得均衡时的私人资本存量、私人消费水平和政府公共消费水平增加 ,同时可以使得均衡时的收入税税率和通货膨胀率下降。     

Structural reform of the electricity industry and economic growth

Using 782 panel data from 34 OECD countries from 1991 to 2013, this study aims to evaluate how structural reform affects GDP growth rate. We use the Barro-type GDP growth rate regression model and apply both fixed and random effect models. Eight structural reform variables are selected: (i) third party access, (ii) wholesale market dummy, (iii) choice of supplier, (iv) private ownership, (v) generation-others separation, (vi) transmission-others separation, (vii) distribution-others separation and (viii) overall vertical separation. Major finding results are as follows: (i) third party access can positively contribute to GDP growth rate, (ii) wholesale market and overall vertical separation might have a small negative effect, and (iii) other variables have no significant effect.     

The Intergenerational Incidence of Government Spending*

This paper analyzes the effect of an increase in government spending on the welfare of different generations in a dynamic general equilibrium model. The paper shows that the intergenerational incidence of government spending on a public good is determined not only by the welfare effects due to the public good and to financing the good but also by a welfare effect due to intertemporal substitution between private consumption when government spending is increased. The degree of substitutability between private consumption and public spending is shown to be a key determinant of this incidence.     

Keynesian Multipliers, Direct Crowding Out, and the Optimal Provision of Public Goods

This paper studies Keynesian multipliers in a macroeconomic model with monopolistic competition. We allow public and private consumption goods to be perfect substitutes in private utility. This enables us to study the effect of direct crowding out on the size of national income, profit and employment multipliers for a given rise in real public spending. A positive real national income multiplier is obtained if consumers value public consumption less than private consumption. In addition, we determine the effective marginal cost of public funds and the optimal provision of public goods, both in the short run and in the long run.     

PRIVATE AND PUBLIC EDUCATION: HUMAN CAPITAL ACCUMULATION UNDER PARENTAL TEACHING*

This paper examines a simple overlapping generations model of human capital accumulation under both the public and private education regimes. Both young individuals and their parents allocate time to human capital accumulation. Under the public education regime, the government collects tax to finance expenditure for education resources. We show that there exists a level of tax which maximizes the speed of human capital accumulation because of parental teaching; and, if the government chooses tax rates adequately, human capital grows faster and welfare levels become higher under the public education regime than under the private.     

Endogenous Public Expenditures on Education

We construct a model of the determination of public funding of education through majority voting. Households have the option of privately supplementing public education. Alternatively, they can opt out of public education completely and choose private education. We find that in general the single‐crossing property cannot be used to establish existence of a majority voting equilibrium. Numerical solutions of the model reveal (i) when public education inputs and private supplements are substitutes, private school enrollment is often zero; and (ii) the funding level for public education is very sensitive to the productivity of private supplements and the elasticity of substitution between public inputs and private supplements.     

Can a Mixed Health Care System be Desirable on Equity Grounds?*

Should health care provision be public, private, or both? We consider this question in a setting where people differ in their earnings capacity and face some illness risk. We assume that illness reduces an individual's time endowment when waiting for treatment. Treatment can be obtained in a competitive private sector (through private insurance) or in the National Health Service (NHS) where it is provided free of charge but after some (endogenous) waiting time. The equilibrium in the health care sector consists of a waiting time in the NHS such that no patient wants to switch health care provider. This equilibrium is governed by two public policies: the income tax system and the size of the NHS. We find that: (i) a mixed system with a small NHS is never desirable; (ii) actuarially fair sickness insurance is never desirable either; (iii) a mixed system with a sufficiently large NHS may improve on a pure public system if the dispersion of earnings capacities is large enough; and (iv) the welfare gains from such a mixed system are not likely to be significant.