Home country bias: Does domestic experience help investors enter foreign markets?

This paper investigates the dynamics of individuals’ investments leading up to their decision to make the first investment abroad. We show that investors first invest in domestic securities and only some time later they invest abroad in foreign securities. We also show that investors who trade more often in the domestic market start to invest abroad earlier. Our findings suggest that the experience investors acquire while they trade in the domestic market is a key reason why active investors enter the foreign market earlier. A reason is that highly educated investors as well as investors with more financial knowledge, arguably those for whom learning by trading is the least important, do not need to trade as much in the domestic market before they start investing in foreign securities. Another reason is that investors who start investing in foreign securities are able to improve on their performance afterwards. This improvement in performance constitutes further evidence that the home country bias is costly.     

Foreign Under‐Investment in US Securities and the Role of Relational Capital

Over 70 academic papers attempt to explain why foreigners invest in US securities. All ignore the vital role of the US broker‐dealer. Macroeconomic factors like a trade balance or corporate governance may guide foreign investors toward certain markets. But US broker‐dealers provide information to foreign investors and execute the actual trades. We hypothesize that particular foreign investors under‐invest in US securities because of a lack of relational capital with US broker‐dealers. We find that broker‐dealer marketing intensity in foreign markets partly explains foreigners’ decisions to invest in US securities. We also estimate “pent‐up” demand for US securities in developing countries – like China, Argentina, Turkey and Russia –equals roughly half‐a‐trillion dollars. Such pent‐up demand – represented as a convergence gap with investment‐to‐GDP ratios in highly developed capital markets – helps predict which markets these broker‐dealers are likely to invest marketing effort in the future. As such, broker‐dealers interested in assisting foreign investors find the right securities for their portfolios should not focus on big, rich economies. They should focus on economies with the largest convergence gaps. We also find that broker‐dealers must take in account the effect their marketing effort has on the typical variables (like relative returns, risks, asymmetric shocks and communication with the US) when they use these screening variables in deciding where to build their relational capital (and place their sales effort) in any year.     

Elections and Capital Flows

This paper investigates the extent to which elections affect capital flows. I find little evidence of political capital flow cycles in advanced economies. In emerging and developing countries, however, presidential elections significantly lower preelection foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows but have no effect on other types of capital flows. Furthermore, I find evidence that these cycles are not caused by economic crises related to elections or preelection manipulation of policy variables. These results suggest that uncertainty about future government policies, which should have greater impact on more irreversible forms of capital flows like FDI, may be an important factor in generating this cycle.     

Foreign participation in local currency bond markets

Countries that cannot attract foreigners to invest in their local currency bonds run the risk of currency mismatches that can result in painful crises. We analyze foreign participation in the bond markets of over 40 countries. Bond markets in less developed countries have returns characterized by high variance and negative skewness, factors that we show are eschewed by U.S. investors. While results based on a three-moment CAPM indicate that it is diversifiable idiosyncratic risk that U.S. investors shun, our analysis suggests that countries can improve foreign participation by reducing macroeconomic instability.     

Foreign booms,domestic busts: The global dimension of banking crises

This paper provides novel empirical evidence showing that foreign financial developments are a powerful predictor of domestic banking crises. Using a new data set for 38 advanced and emerging economies over 1970–2011, we show that credit growth in the rest of the world has a large positive effect on the probability of banking crises taking place at home, even when controlling for domestic credit growth. Our results suggest that this effect is larger for financially open economies, and is consistent with transmission via cross-border capital flows and market sentiment. Direct contagion from foreign crises plays an important role, but does not account for the whole effect.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Debt Financing in Emerging Economies

The rich dynamics of capital flows is an important characteristic of business cycles in emerging market economies. In the data external debt is always procyclical, while FDI is procyclical only in normal times. We provide a microfounded rationale for this pattern by linking financial shocks to capital flows. For this purpose, we build a small open economy model in which firms are subject to borrowing constraints, and are either owned domestically or by foreign investors who purchase firms through FDI. During a financial crisis, the valuation gap per unit net worth between foreign and domestic investors widens, which triggers more FDI inflow. Our model produces business cycle moments consistent with empirical observations.     

What lies beneath: Foreign exchange rate exposure,hedging and cash flows

This paper presents results from an in-depth analysis of the foreign exchange rate exposure of a large nonfinancial firm based on proprietary internal data including cash flows, derivatives and foreign currency debt, as well as external capital market data. While the operations of the multinational firm have significant exposure to foreign exchange rate risk due to foreign currency-based activities and international competition, corporate hedging mitigates this gross exposure. The analysis illustrates that the insignificance of foreign exchange rate exposures of comprehensive performance measures such as total cash flow can be explained by hedging at the firm level. Thus, the residual net exposure is economically and statistically small, even if the operating cash flows of the firm are significantly exposed to exchange rate risk. The results of the paper suggest that managers of nonfinancial firms with operations exposed to foreign exchange rate risk take savvy actions to reduce exposure to a level too low to allow its detection empirically.     

内外部金融周期差异如何影响中国跨境资本流动?

本文揭示了内外部金融周期差异影响跨境资本流动的机制,并以美国为外部经济代表,基于1998年第一季度至2018年第一季度数据进行了实证检验。研究发现:(1)中国跨境资本流动波动主要来自短期资本流动波动;分类看,其他投资波动较大;方向上看,流入波动要大于流出波动。(2)利差、汇差、资产价差(股指变动差异和房价变动差异)是影响跨境资本流动的重要因素,汇差和资产价差对短期资本流动影响尤甚。(3)内外部金融周期差异变动对资本流入的影响比对资本流出的影响更明显。(4)近年来,利差对跨境资本流动影响减弱,汇差和资产价差对跨境资本流动影响增强。结果说明,防范跨境资本流动风险要关注其他投资资本流动大幅波动风险,同时注意防范汇率和资产价格波动共振对跨境资本流动的冲击。     

International capital mobility: net versus gross stocks and flows

Feldstein and Horioka (1980) observed that net capital flows have been small in relation to domestic saving and investment flows for OECD countries in the post-war period, which they interpreted as evidence of low capital mobility. This paper argues that the correlation between gross domestic and international financial flows can be a better indicator of capital mobilitythan net capital flows. Contrary to the conventional wisdom among international economists, gross flows have been small in relation to gross domestic asset creation for OECD countries, although by this measure the degree of capital mobility increased in the 1980s.     

Going multinational under exchange rate uncertainty

We analyze a model where an exporting firm competes a la Cournot in a foreign market. The firm faces exchange rate uncertainty and has the option to invest abroad. The paper contributes four results. First, real option pricing techniques are used to derive the optimal timing rule of the investment and the price of the firm and foreign competitors. Second, the sunk cost of entry into the foreign market introduces hysteresis in direct investment flows. We find that the degree of hysteresis grows with the number of firms in the industry. Third, we determine the conditions under which dumping may appear and the role of FDI in precluding this type of dumping. Fourth, tariffs have the well known FDI-inducing effect, more so in less competitive markets, and are more effective at deterring delocation. Furthermore, a tariff might have the effect of triggering dumping.     

Capital account liberalization, financial development and industry growth: A synthetic view

This paper synthesizes studies analyzing the effects of capital account liberalization on industry growth while controlling for financial crises, domestic financial development and the strength of institutions. We find evidence that financial openness has positive effects on the growth of financially dependent industries, although these growth-enhancing effects evaporate during financial crises. Further analysis indicates that the positive effects of capital account liberalization are limited to countries with relatively well-developed financial systems, good accounting standards, strong creditor rights and rule of law. It suggests that countries must reach a certain threshold in terms of institutional and economic development before they can expect to benefit from capital account liberalization.     

Determinants of US investment in real estate abroad

The purpose of this paper is to analyse and discuss those factors which are contributing to the expansion of US FDI in real estate. The empirical results of this model of FDI in real estate show that as US foreign financial liabilities increase, there is an accompanying increase in its FDI in real estate. This result is consistent with the study by Russekh, F., Ruffin, R., 1986. The role of foreign direct investment in US capital flows. Am. Econ. Rev. 76, 1127–1130, who showed that US FDI abroad is a substitute for US financial assets. Furthermore, the empirical results indicate that as returns from the US stock market decline, there are more incentives for US investors to invest in foreign real estate. The empirical results also show that US financial wealth, US FDI in manufacturing and banking and US bilateral trade contribute positively to the expansion of US FDI in real estate.     

Stock Market Liberalization, Economic Reform, and Emerging Market Equity Prices

A stock market liberalization is a decision by a country's government to allow foreigners to purchase shares in that country's stock market. On average, a country's aggregate equity price index experiences abnormal returns of 3.3 percent per month in real dollar terms during an eight-month window leading up to the implementation of its initial stock market liberalization. This result is consistent with the prediction of standard international asset pricing models that stock market liberalization may reduce the liberalizing country's cost of equity capital by allowing for risk sharing between domestic and foreign agents.     

Global financial shocks and foreign asset repatriation: Do local investors play a stabilizing role?

We study the dynamic response of gross capital flows in emerging market economies to different global financial shocks, using a panel vector-autoregressive (PVAR) approach. Our focus lies primarily on the potentially stabilizing role played by domestic investors in offsetting the response of foreign investors to adverse global shocks. We find that, while foreign investors tend to retrench from emerging markets in response to global risk aversion and monetary policy shocks, foreign asset repatriation by resident investors does not always follow suit. Local investors play a meaningful stabilizing role in the face of global risk aversion shocks, with sizeable asset repatriation largely offsetting the retrenchment of non-residents. In contrast, foreign investor retrenchment in response to global monetary policy shocks is not mirrored by asset repatriation. Finally, we find robust evidence that positive global real shocks tend to have a positive impact on net capital inflows to emerging markets. Our results shed light on the likely impact of the Fed's QE tapering on capital flows to emerging market economies.     

新兴市场国家的国际资本流动与双危机模型扩展

本文基于新兴市场国家经济背景下,从国内中央银行和国内投资者、国际投资者三类主体进行不完全信息博弈的角度对双危机理论模型进行了有效扩展,探讨了对国际资本流动进行和不进行数量和税费控制条件下银行危机与货币危机发生所满足的必要条件,从而更深入全面地探讨了国际资本流动与双危机之间的传导机制。以马来西亚的实际数据对扩展模型的合理性和有效性进行了验证,并对模型中的主要参数对均衡结果的不同影响进行了分析,为类似中国的新兴市场国家制定安全有效的货币政策以及防范金融危机提供了思路和政策建议。     

Multinational Banks and the Global Financial Crisis: Weathering the Perfect Storm?

We use data on the 48 largest multinational banking groups to compare the lending of their 199 foreign subsidiaries during the Great Recession with lending by a benchmark of 202 domestic banks. Contrary to earlier and more contained crises, parent banks were not a significant source of strength to their subsidiaries during 2008–09. When controlling for other bank characteristics, multinational bank subsidiaries had to slow down credit growth almost three times as fast as domestic banks. This was in particular the case for subsidiaries of banking groups that relied more on wholesale funding.     

对外资流入境内房地产市场规模的测算

近年来,外资流入房地产市场引起了普遍关注。本文综合考虑外资对房地产信贷的撬动因素,运用资产负债比例法间接推算出2003和2004年外资流入房地产开发和销售市场的资金总规模(包括直接流入的外汇资金及其撬动的人民币信贷资金)分别占全国房地产资金总规模的17．5％和11．5％,其中直接流入的外汇资金分别为140亿和120亿美元。     

International reserves and gross capital flows dynamics

This paper explores the role of international reserves as a stabilizer of international capital flows, in particular during periods of global financial stress. In contrast with previous contributions, aimed at explaining net capital flows, we focus on the behavior of gross capital flows. We analyze an extensive cross-country quarterly database – 63 countries, 1991–2010 – using standard panel regressions. We document significant heterogeneity in the response of resident investors to financial stress and relate it to a previously undocumented channel through which reserves act as a buffer during financial stress. A robust result of the analysis is that international reserves facilitate financial disinvestment overseas by residents – a fall in capital outflows. This partially offsets the drop in foreign capital inflows observed in such periods. For the whole sample, we also find that larger stocks of international reserves are linked to higher gross inflows and lower gross outflows. These results, which challenge current approaches to measuring reserve adequacy, call for refining such tools to better account for the role of resident investors.     

贸易开放度会影响极端国际资本流动吗?——基于54个经济体跨国面板数据的分析

随着世界各国频繁出现国际资本大规模流入或流出的现象,极端国际资本流动已成为国际金融领域广泛关注的重要问题。本文参考Forbes&Warnock (2012)的方法,基于54个经济体1991年第一季度至2016年第四季度的国际资本流动数据,构建极端国际资本流动时期数据库,可识别四种极端国际资本流动事件类型:"激增(Surges)""骤停(Sudden Stops)""外逃(Flight)"以及"撤回(Retrenchment)"。基于该数据库,分析贸易开放度对极端国际资本流动的影响。实证结果表明,第一,一国贸易开放度越高,其发生极端国际资本流动事件的可能性越低。第二,在考虑了国家经济发展水平的差异后,贸易开放度对本国资本和外国资本流入和流出的影响存在显著差异。对于发达经济体,贸易开放度对外国资本流动和本国资本流动均有显著影响;对于发展中经济体,贸易开放度仅影响本国的资本流动,对外国资本流动的影响并不显著。第三,贸易开放度对长期资本极端流动与短期资本极端流动的影响并没有显著差异。基于本文的研究结果,建议我国应继续坚持贸易开放政策,且此后分析极端国际资本流动应将其细分为激增、骤停、外逃和撤回四类,对极端国际资本流动的监测应区分本国资本和外国资本异常流动情况。     

Contagion and banking crisis – International evidence for 2007–2009

Policy makers aim to avoid banking crises, and although they can to some extent control domestic conditions, internationally transmitted crises are difficult to tackle. This paper identifies international contagion in banking during the 2007–2009 crisis for 54 economies. We identify three channels of contagion – systematic, idiosyncratic and volatility – and find evidence for these in 45 countries. Banking crises are overwhelmingly associated with the presence of both systematic and idiosyncratic contagion. The results reveal that crisis shocks transmitted from a foreign jurisdiction via idiosyncratic contagion increase the likelihood of a systemic crisis in the domestic banking system by almost 37 percent, whereas increased exposure via systematic contagion does not necessarily destabilize the domestic banking system. Thus while policy makers and regulatory authorities are rightly concerned with the systematic transmission of banking crises, reducing the potential for idiosyncratic contagion can importantly reduce the consequences for the domestic economy.