Investment-based financing constraints and debt renegotiation

We consider how equity holders’ bargaining power during financial distress influences the interactions between financing and investment decisions when the firm faces the upper limit of debt issuance. We obtain four results. First, weaker equity holders’ bargaining power is more likely that the firm is financially constrained. Second, the investment quantity is independent of equity holders’ bargaining power. Third, the constrained credit spreads are increasing with equity holders’ bargaining power, contrary to the unconstrained ones. Fourth, higher volatility and weaker equity holders’ bargaining power are likely that the firm prefers to issue debt with renegotiation, compared with debt without renegotiation.     

Costly external financing, investment timing, and investment–cash flow sensitivity

This paper examines the effects of costly external financing on the optimal timing of a firm's investment. By altering the optimal investment timing, costly financing affects current investment and the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flow. Importantly, the relation between the cost of external funds and investment–cash flow sensitivity is non-monotonic. Investment–cash flow sensitivity is decreasing in the cost of external financing when it is relatively low and is increasing in the financing cost when it is high. Empirical tests examining investment–cash flow sensitivities within groups of firms classified by proxies for their costs of external funds provide evidence consistent with the model. The model and the empirical results complement recent studies by Cleary, Povel and Raith [Cleary, S., Povel, P. and Raith, M., 2007. The U-shaped investment curve: theory and evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 42, 1–39.] and Almeida and Campello [Almeida, H. and Campello, M., in press, Financial constraints, asset tangibility and corporate investment, Review of Financial Studies.] that show a non-monotonic relation between firms' investment and the availability of internal funds.     

Monetary policy and financial (in)stability: An integrated micro–macro approach

Evidence on central banks’ twin objective, monetary and financial stability, is scarce. We suggest an integrated micro–macro approach with two core virtues. First, we measure financial stability directly at the bank level as the probability of distress. Second, we integrate a microeconomic hazard model for bank distress and a standard macroeconomic model. The advantage of this approach is to incorporate micro information, to allow for non-linearities and to permit general feedback effects between financial distress and the real economy. We base the analysis on German bank and macro data between 1995 and 2004. Our results confirm the existence of a trade-off between monetary and financial stability. An unexpected tightening of monetary policy increases the probability of distress. This effect disappears when neglecting microeffects and non-linearities, underlining their importance. Distress responses are largest for small cooperative banks, weak distress events, and at times when capitalization is low. An important policy implication is that the separation of financial supervision and monetary policy requires close collaboration among members in the European System of Central Banks and national bank supervisors.     

Monetary Policy and Financial Markets

Monetary policy and financial markets are intrinsically linked. Central banks conduct monetary policy by influencing financial market prices. Financial market prices reflect the expectations of market participants about future economic and monetary developments. Monetary policy works primarily through expectations. Transparency and credibility render monetary policy more effective. However, they are no substitutes for action. If a credible central bank uses words with the explicit aim of substituting them for action, it will risk losing credibility. To avoid what has been described as “the dog chasing its tail” problem, central banks must exercise caution in basing their monetary policy decisions on financial market information. The information about expected future developments reflected in market prices must be continuously cross-checked against economic and monetary indicators in what amounts to a “checks and balances” approach to monetary policy.     

A theory of corporate financial decisions with liquidity and solvency concerns

This paper studies the impact of both liquidity and solvency concerns on corporate finance. I present a tractable model of a firm that optimally chooses capital structure, cash holdings, dividends, and default while facing cash flows with long-term uncertainty and short-term liquidity shocks. The model explains how changes in solvency affect liquidity and also how liquidity concerns affect solvency via capital structure choice. These interactions result in a dynamic cash policy in which cash reserves increase in profitability and are positively correlated with cash flows. The optimal dividend distributions implied by the model are smoothed relative to cash flows. I also find that liquidity concerns lead to a decrease of dispersion of credit spreads.     

Firm location and corporate debt

This study examines the influence of a firm’s geographical location on corporate debt and provides evidence that the higher cost of collecting information on firms distant from urban areas has significant implications on a wide array of corporate debt characteristics. We find that rural firms face higher debt yield spreads and attract smaller and less prestigious bank syndicates than urban firms. Rural firms attempt to reduce their informational disadvantage by relying more on relationship banking. Our results on the effect of location on corporate debt are robust to the inclusion of an extensive set of firm and issue characteristics.     

Monetary policy,bond risk premia,and the economy

Within an affine model of the term structure of interest rates, where bond yields get driven by observable and unobservable macroeconomic factors, parameter restrictions help identify the effects of monetary policy and other structural disturbances on output, inflation, and interest rates and decompose movements in long-term rates into terms attributable to changing expected future short rates versus risk premia. When estimated, the model highlights a broad range of channels through which monetary policy affects risk premia and the economy, risk premia affect monetary policy and the economy, and the economy affects monetary policy and risk premia.     

Effects of financial constraints on corporate policies in Australia

We jointly study the impact of financial constraints on Australian companies’ investment decisions and demand for liquidity. By examining a large sample of Australian firms over the period 1990–2003, we find that financial constraints not only reduce the sensitivity of investment to the availability of internal funds, but also increase the responsiveness of cash holdings to internally generated cash flows. Further analysis shows that the impact of financial constraints varies across different cash flow states; that is, financial constraints have a small effect on corporate investment and cash policies when cash flows are positive. In contrast, the severity of constraints is high in negative cash flow years in which the cost disadvantage of external finance coincides with deteriorating operating performance.     

The effect of financial constraints,investment policy,product market competition and corporate governance on the value of cash holdings

This study empirically investigates the value shareholders place on excess cash holdings and how shareholders’ valuation of cash holdings is associated with financial constraints, firm growth, cash‐flow uncertainty and product market competition for Australian firms from 1990 to 2007. Our results indicate that the marginal value of cash holdings to shareholders declines with larger cash holdings and higher leverage. However, firms that are more financially constrained, that have higher growth rates and that face greater uncertainty exhibit a higher marginal value of cash holdings. These findings are consistent with the explanation that excess cash holdings are not necessarily detrimental to firm value. Firms with costly external financing and that also save more cash for current operating and future investing needs find that the market values these cash hoarding policies favourably. Finally, there is limited evidence of an association between various corporate governance measures and the value of cash holdings for a shorter sample period.     

Monetary policy with signal extraction from the bond market

Monetary policy is conducted in an environment of uncertainty. This paper presents a model where the central bank uses real time data from the bond market together with standard macroeconomic indicators to infer the current state of the economy more efficiently, while taking into account that its own actions influence the bond market and therefore what it observes. That the central bank uses the information in the term structure to set policy creates a link between the bond market and the macroeconomy that is novel to the literature. The estimated model suggests that there is some information in US yields of maturities of less than 1 year that can help the Federal Reserve to identify shocks to the economy on a timely basis.     

Conservative financial reporting, debt covenants, and the agency costs of debt

Considerable research has documented the role of debt covenants and conservative financial accounting in addressing agency conflicts between lenders and borrowers. Beatty, A., Weber, J., and Yu, J. [2008. Conservatism and debt. Journal of Accounting and Economics, forthcoming] document interesting, but mixed, findings on the relation between debt covenants and conservative accounting, and the extent to which the two contracting mechanisms act as substitutes or complements. In this paper, I discuss the economic roles of financial reporting, debt covenants, and conservatism within the debt contracting environment, and attempt to fit BWY's findings within this context.     

CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies

We undertake a broad-based study of the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on corporate financial policies and show that the risk-taking incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) significantly influence their firms’ financial policies. In particular, we find that CEOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with lower (higher) leverage and higher (lower) cash balances. CFOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with safer (riskier) debt-maturity choices and higher (lower) earnings-smoothing through accounting accruals. We exploit the stock option expensing regulation of 2004 to establish a causal link between managerial incentives and corporate policies. Our findings have important implications for optimal corporate compensation design.     

Monetary and financial stability in the euro area: Pro-cyclicality versus trade-off

This paper investigates the nexus between monetary stability and financial stability. We examine, in the experience of EMU between 1994 and 2008, first, the response of the term structure of interest rates, share prices, exchange rates, property price inflation and the deposit–loan ratio of the banking sector (our proxies for financial stability) to changes in the consumer price level and ECB policy rate (our proxies for monetary stability); second, whether and to what extent lower inflation has caused share price stability and how ECB policy rate has reacted to inflation. Using a sign-restriction-based VAR approach, we find that there is a pro-cyclical relationship between monetary and financial stability in the long-run. With a positive inflation shock, we find on average a 2% estimated decline in share prices. This suggests that the interest rate instrument used for inflation targeting is conducive to financial stability.     

资本充足要求下货币政策与银行监管的联系

本文借鉴Kopecky-VanHoose有关资本约束对银行信贷影响的模型,将银行资本内生化,通过分析银行在资本充足率管理的约束条件下经营目标最优化情形,阐释了银行监管与货币政策的联系。文章最后针对我国银行业发展现状,分析资本充足要求下的银行监管和货币政策的联系对我国货币政策和银行监管政策制定的启示及对银行业管理的意义,并提出协调两者目标一致性的政策建议。     

金融发展与企业债务融资

本文通过我国各地区金融发展的差距研究了金融发展对公司债务融资决策的影响,研究结果表明:①金融越发展,企业的短期债务比率越高;②金融发展有助于可抵押资产较少的企业获得债务融资;③金融发展有助于规模较小的企业获得债务融资和长期债务融资;④金融发展有助于那些依赖无形资产投资的企业获得债务融资和短期债务融资。这些研究结果不仅可以深化我们对金融发展如何影响公司融资决策的理解,而且可以使我们对金融发展促进经济增长的微观机理有更加深入的了解。     

The cost of capital and optimal financing policy in a dynamic setting

This paper revisits the Modigliani–Miller propositions on the optimal financing policy and cost of capital in a dynamic setting. In an environment without taxes and bankruptcy costs, the results are generally consistent with the Modigliani–Miller Propositions 1 and 2. However, the first proposition should be presented and interpreted more carefully, as given firm characteristics, there is only one optimal capital structure. Thus, a firm’s capital structure is relevant. A relaxation of assumptions about either taxes or bankruptcy costs leads to conclusions that are generally different from those in Modigliani and Miller (1958). The model predicts that leverage and sales-to-capital ratios decrease but firm size and capital stock increase with the subjective discount factor of the firm’s manager if there are taxes and bankruptcy costs. The empirical analysis supports these predictions.     

Access policy and money market segmentation

Deviations between interest rates paid in the Swiss franc unsecured money market and the respective Libor rate are analysed for a period spanning the financial crisis. First, banks that have access to sources of secured central bank and interbank funding pay less than other banks. Second, foreign banks (not chartered in Switzerland) pay more than domestic banks. Third, both lines of segmentation are economically relevant but limited due to open access to sources of secured funding. Thus, access policy matters for monetary policy implementation and financial stability.